United States v. Lavont Flanders, Jr. , 752 F.3d 1317 ( 2014 )


Menu:
  •           Case: 12-10995   Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 1 of 44
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-10995
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-20557-KMM-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    LAVONT FLANDERS, JR.,
    a.k.a. Antone Cobe,
    a.k.a. Shannon, et al.,
    EMERSON CALLUM,
    a.k.a. Jah-T,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    ________________________
    No. 12-15027
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-20557-KMM-1
    Case: 12-10995   Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 2 of 44
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    LAVONT FLANDERS, JR.,
    a.k.a. Antone Cobe,
    a.k.a. Shannon,,
    a.k.a. Larry Griffin,
    a.k.a. Karen Watson,
    a.k.a. Darius,
    a.k.a. Ladarius Cobe,
    a.k.a. Darius Cove,
    a.k.a. Errick Farmer,
    a.k.a. Eric Lawson,
    a.k.a. Erick Liwson,
    a.k.a. Tina Clintmore,
    a.k.a. Erick Blossom,
    a.k.a. Gregory Bagget,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    No. 12-15248
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-20557-KMM-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    LAVONT FLANDERS, JR.,
    2
    Case: 12-10995       Date Filed: 05/27/2014       Page: 3 of 44
    a.k.a. Antone Cobe,
    a.k.a. Shannon,
    a.k.a. Larry Griffin,
    a.k.a. Karen Watson,
    a.k.a. Darius,
    a.k.a. Ladarius Cobe,
    a.k.a. Darius Cove,
    a.k.a. Errick Farmer,
    a.k.a. Eric Lawson,
    a.k.a. Erick Liwson,
    a.k.a. Tina Clintmore,
    a.k.a. Erick Blossom,
    a.k.a. Gregory Bagget,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (May 27, 2014)
    Before MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges, and DUFFY, * District Judge.
    DUFFY, District Judge:
    For years Lavont Flanders, Jr., and Emerson Callum (collectively,
    “Defendants” or “Appellants”) perpetrated a scheme in which they fraudulently
    lured women to South Florida, drugged them with Benzodiazepines, filmed them
    engaging in sexual acts, and distributed the pornographic footage. After a six-day
    trial, a jury convicted both Flanders and Callum on multiple counts of inducing
    *
    Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy, United States District Judge for the District of South
    Carolina, sitting by designation.
    3
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 4 of 44
    women to engage in sex trafficking through fraud and of benefitting from that
    scheme. Flanders was also convicted of distributing a controlled substance, which
    he used to impair the victims’ judgments such that they would participate in the
    filming of pornographic videos. Appellants were sentenced to multiple
    consecutive life sentences. In this appeal, they raise several challenges to their
    convictions and sentences, and Flanders challenges his forfeiture. After oral
    argument and a careful review of the briefs and record in this case, we affirm.
    I. Background
    A. Criminal Scheme
    As part of the scheme, Flanders, using one of numerous aliases, would
    recruit women off of modeling websites and convince them to travel to South
    Florida for an “audition” for a liquor commercial. He usually advised the women
    to come alone to the audition. When they arrived, Flanders explained that they
    would need to act out a scene for a commercial before they could be taken to a
    second man, later identified as Callum, to film test footage. Flanders convinced
    the women that the auditions required them to taste alcohol, say scripted lines, and
    repeat the scene several times. Unbeknownst to the women, the alcohol was laced
    with Benzodiazepines, a drug known to impair memory and reduce inhibitions.
    As Flanders drove the women to another location to meet Callum, whom
    they thought was a Bacardi agent, the victims became dizzy, groggy, and often
    4
    Case: 12-10995    Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 5 of 44
    “blacked out.” Flanders and Callum then had the women sign Model Release
    Forms. The women remembered little, as they helplessly fell unconscious, waking
    momentarily only to realize that Callum was having sex with them while Flanders
    filmed. When they fully regained consciousness the following day in their cars or
    hotel rooms, they were disoriented, confused, and sometimes bleeding and covered
    in bodily fluids. At least four victims tested positive for Callum’s DNA, recovered
    from vaginal swabs, and for Benzodiazepines.
    Unbeknownst to the victims, Callum distributed and attempted to distribute
    videos of the assaults over the Internet and to businesses through his pornographic
    production company, Miami Vibes Enterprises. The distributed videos were edited
    to remove portions where the victims were obviously unconscious.
    B. Police Investigation
    In the midst of their scheme, in 2007, Appellants were arrested by state
    police, and their residences were searched pursuant to warrants. Both were
    released on bond and continued their scheme until their arrests in 2011 following
    searches pursuant to new warrants.
    1. 2007 Searches
    In Flanders’s bedroom in a residence he shared with two adult relatives,
    officers discovered victims’ pornographic videos. In the only bathroom in the
    residence, officers found a prescription codeine pill bottle containing eight
    5
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 6 of 44
    Diazepam pills and three codeine pills. Flanders waived Miranda rights, stated
    that he was a bus driver, denied working for Bacardi, denied knowing Callum or
    Miami Vibes, and denied meeting anyone at an IHOP restaurant (although officers
    knew he had met a victim there).
    In Callum’s office, officers observed hundreds of pornographic photos on
    the walls. They seized thousands of pornographic videos, including hundreds of
    copies of three victims’ videos, and nude photos of a fourth victim. Officers found
    raw footage of one victim that included footage—which had been edited out of the
    commercial copy—in which she fell asleep during the sexual encounter. Even the
    raw footage was not a complete representation of the encounter between the victim
    and Callum because the filming stopped and started.
    In Callum’s residence, officers found hundreds of inserts for, and
    commercial copies of, victims’ videos, Model Release Forms for two victims,
    copies of the video interview of one victim, and evidence that Callum paid for the
    artwork on a victim’s video.
    2. 2011 Searches
    From a residence Flanders shared with his girlfriend and her sister, officers
    seized four computers and memory devices, a cellphone, a camera, numerous
    videos of victims (some packaged for sale), Model Release Forms for five victims,
    and a copy of one victim’s student ID. Officers also found a package containing
    6
    Case: 12-10995   Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 7 of 44
    letters from Flanders to HomeGrownVideo revealing that Flanders was attempting
    to sell pornographic videos of Callum and several young women, including one of
    the victims. On a nightstand, officers found a bottle containing nineteen
    Clonazepam pills. Analysis of recovered computers showed that Flanders used
    them to email victims and conduct hundreds of searches on modeling websites and
    searches for images of unconscious women.
    In Callum’s residence, officers seized over 100 boxes, including sales
    receipts for victims’ videos, victims’ Model Release Forms, and hundreds of
    victims’ DVDs (commercial and master copies), and DVD cover inserts. Also
    found was a handwritten note indicating that one victim’s footage was filmed at a
    Miami motel.
    C. Procedural History
    A twenty-count superseding indictment charged both Appellants with
    conspiracy and substantive sex trafficking of women (
    18 U.S.C. §§ 371
    , 1591,
    1594), and Flanders with narcotics distribution (
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    ). Count 1
    charged a § 371 conspiracy (May 2006–July 2007) to commit sex trafficking by
    fraud. Substantive offenses committed during this conspiracy were: § 1591(a)(1)
    sex trafficking by fraud (Counts 2, 4, 7, and 10) and § 1591(a)(2) benefitting by
    participating in a venture that commits sex trafficking by fraud (Counts 3, 6, 9, and
    11). Count 13 charged a § 1594(c) conspiracy (May 2010–August 2011) to
    7
    Case: 12-10995        Date Filed: 05/27/2014       Page: 8 of 44
    commit sex trafficking by fraud. Substantive offenses committed during this
    conspiracy were: § 1594(a) attempted sex trafficking by fraud (Counts 14 and 16)
    and § 1594(a) attempted benefitting by participating in a venture that commits sex
    trafficking by fraud (Counts 15 and 18). Flanders alone was charged with § 841
    distribution of Alprazolam (“Xanax”) (Counts 5, 8, 12, and 17).
    During the six-day trial, the jury heard testimony from seven victims and
    watched portions of their videos. The jury also heard testimony from an expert on
    Benzodiazepines and learned about the evidence seized during the 2007 and 2011
    searches. After the Government rested, Defendants brought a Rule 29 motion as to
    all counts. The district court granted the motion as to Counts 19 and 20 1 and
    denied the motion as to the other counts. The defense rested without putting on
    any witnesses. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all of the remaining counts.
    On January 27, 2012, the district court entered a Preliminary Order of
    Forfeiture against Flanders and Callum. The court then held a sentencing hearing
    on February 16, 2012. At the hearing, the district court overruled Appellants’
    objections to the pre-sentence report, adopted the advisory guideline range of 262–
    327 months’ imprisonment, and granted the Government’s request for an upward
    departure to life imprisonment. The court heard testimony from victims, denied
    Flanders’s request for a downward variance, and concluded that life imprisonment
    1
    These two counts involved crimes against a victim who did not testify at trial.
    8
    Case: 12-10995      Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 9 of 44
    was reasonable. The court sentenced Callum to a total imprisonment term of life,
    including sixty months for the § 371 conspiracy and life imprisonment for each of
    the sex-trafficking charges, to run consecutively to each other and to the sixty-
    month term. The court similarly sentenced Flanders to a total imprisonment term
    of life, including concurrent sixty-month terms for the § 371 conspiracy and drug
    counts and life terms for each of the sex-trafficking charges, to run consecutively
    to each other and to the sixty-month terms.
    Judgment was entered against Flanders on February 21, 2012, and against
    Callum on February 22, 2012. Both Appellants timely appealed their convictions
    and sentences (Appeal No. 12-10995). The district court entered a Final Order of
    Forfeiture against Flanders and Callum on August 28, 2012. Flanders filed a
    notice of appeal of the Final Order of Forfeiture on September 20, 2012 (Appeal
    No. 12-15027). On September 26, 2012, the district court denied Flanders’s
    motion for disclosure of grand jury transcripts and materials, and Flanders timely
    appealed (Appeal No. 12-15248).
    II. Sufficiency of the Indictment
    Flanders argues that the indictment was defective because (1) the drug
    counts omitted a citation to the statute, and (2) the Government fraudulently told
    the grand jury that the crimes involved minors. However, “a defendant must object
    before trial to defects in the indictment, . . . and the failure to do so waives
    9
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 10 of 44
    appellate review. The only exceptions to the waiver rule are for claims that the
    indictment fails to state an offense—for instance, by omitting an element—or fails
    to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” United States v. Pacchioli, 
    718 F.3d 1294
    ,
    1307 (11th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 
    134 S. Ct. 804
     (2013); see
    Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B) (“The following must be raised before trial: a motion
    alleging a defect in the indictment or information—but at any time while the case
    is pending, the court may hear a claim that the indictment or information fails to
    invoke the court’s jurisdiction or to state an offense.”); 
    id.
     R. 12(e) (“A party
    waives any Rule 12(b)(3) defense, objection, or request not raised by the deadline
    the court sets under Rule 12(c) or by any extension the court provides. For good
    cause, the court may grant relief from the waiver.”). Because Flanders failed to
    challenge the indictment prior to trial and has not shown good cause for relief from
    the Rule 12(e) waiver, he has waived these challenges to the indictment. See
    United States v. Dulcio, 
    441 F.3d 1269
    , 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that
    because defendants did not raise before trial their argument that the indictment was
    filed in bad faith, “the issue is deemed to have been waived”); United States v.
    Ramirez, 
    324 F.3d 1225
    , 1227–28 & n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding no good cause to
    excuse waiver where defendants had all the information necessary to challenge the
    indictment prior to trial but waited until after opening arguments to file their
    motion).
    10
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014     Page: 11 of 44
    Even if we treat Flanders’s argument as asserting that the drug counts did
    not state an offense, which would avoid the Rule 12(e) waiver, the claim lacks
    merit. Flanders argues that the drug counts (Counts 5, 8, 12, and 17) are defective
    because they cite the penalty provision (
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)) but fail to cite the
    substantive conduct provision (§ 841(a)) of the criminal statute. Because Flanders
    challenges the adequacy of the indictment for the first time on appeal, “this Court
    must find the indictment sufficient unless it is so defective that it does not, by any
    reasonable construction, charge an offense for which the defendant is convicted.”
    United States v. Pena, 
    684 F.3d 1137
    , 1147 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks
    omitted). Moreover, “[u]nless the defendant was misled and thereby prejudiced,
    neither an error in a citation nor a citation’s omission is a ground to dismiss the
    indictment . . . or to reverse a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(2).
    We readily conclude that Flanders was not prejudiced by the indictment’s
    citation error. The drug counts directly quote the following language from
    § 841(a)(1): “knowingly [and] intentionally . . . distribute . . . a controlled
    substance.” This language, coupled with the citation to § 841(b)(2), sufficiently
    charged Flanders with the offense for which he was convicted. See Pena, 684 F.3d
    at 1147; see also United States v. Elgersma, 
    929 F.2d 1538
    , 1540–42 (11th Cir.
    1991) (holding that defendant was not prejudiced by citation error where the
    language of the count tracked the language of the substantive requirements of the
    11
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 12 of 44
    offense, thus giving defendant full notice of the elements of the offense charged),
    reasoning adopted by United States v. Elgersma, 
    971 F.2d 690
    , 691 n.1 (11th Cir.
    1992) (en banc). Thus, the citation error was harmless.
    III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    We review de novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of
    acquittal on sufficiency of evidence grounds. United States v. Browne, 
    505 F.3d 1229
    , 1253 (11th Cir. 2007). In doing so, “we consider the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the Government, drawing all reasonable inferences and
    credibility choices in the Government’s favor.” 
    Id.
     “It is not necessary that the
    evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly
    inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt.” United States v. Faust,
    
    456 F.3d 1342
    , 1345 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). “If a reasonable
    jury could conclude that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
    we will affirm the verdict.” Browne, 
    505 F.3d at 1253
    .
    A. Conspiracy Charges (Counts 1 and 13)
    To prove conspiracy in Counts 1 and 13, the Government had to establish
    (1) the existence of an agreement between Flanders and Callum to violate 
    18 U.S.C. § 1591
    (a)(1) (sex trafficking by force, fraud, or coercion); (2) Flanders’s
    knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy; and (3) an overt act in
    furtherance of the conspiracy. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 371
    , 1594(c); United States v.
    12
    Case: 12-10995    Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 13 of 44
    White, 
    663 F.3d 1207
    , 1214 (11th Cir. 2011). “Because conspiracies are secretive
    by nature, the existence of an agreement and [Flanders’s] participation in the
    conspiracy may be proven entirely from circumstantial evidence.” White, 
    663 F.3d at 1214
     (quotation marks omitted).
    Flanders argues that there was insufficient evidence of an agreement
    between Flanders and Callum to defraud the victims or of an overt act in
    furtherance of the conspiracy. We disagree. The victims testified that Callum
    represented himself as a Bacardi agent, and the jury could infer that he would not
    have known to make such a representation unless he were in on the fraud.
    Furthermore, the jury heard testimony that Flanders falsely and fraudulently
    represented himself to be “Karen Watson,” a fictitious female employee of a
    modeling agency who would put the victim in contact with a modeling scout.
    Callum is on video laughing and telling a victim during a sexual assault to say
    hello to Flanders’s alias “Karen Watson,” whom Callum would have known about
    only had he been in on the fraud. Callum also used the phrase “love your look”
    during another victim’s video, mocking the phrase Flanders used routinely when
    contacting potential victims via modeling websites and thus demonstrating that
    Callum was a party to the fraud. In the videos, the women lacked physical
    strength, despite one being an Army soldier and another a fitness instructor. The
    jury could reasonably conclude from their observations of the women in the videos
    13
    Case: 12-10995      Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 14 of 44
    that the women were drugged, and they could conclude that Callum, who had an
    unparalleled opportunity to observe the unconscious and/or semi-unconscious
    states of the victims while he was engaging in sex acts with them, knew that they
    were drugged. From this evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that Callum
    and Flanders had agreed to defraud the victims and had committed an overt act in
    furtherance of the conspiracy.
    Moreover, we wholly reject Flanders’s argument that the victims’ signatures
    on modeling release forms evidenced their voluntary participation in the films and
    created reasonable doubt of his guilt. The evidence at trial established that the
    victims signed those forms after being drugged. Viewing the evidence and
    drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Government,
    we find that a reasonable jury could conclude that the evidence at trial established
    Flanders’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the verdict as
    to the conspiracy counts, Counts 1 and 13.
    B. Sex-Trafficking Charges (Counts 2, 4, 7, 10, 14, and 16)
    To prove the sex-trafficking charges in Counts 2, 4, 7, 10, 14, and 16, the
    Government had to prove that Defendants (1) did knowingly (2) in or affecting
    interstate and foreign commerce, (3) entice, recruit, harbor, transport, provide,
    obtain, or maintain by any means a person, (4) knowing, or in reckless disregard of
    the fact, (5) that fraud would be used to cause such person to engage in a
    14
    Case: 12-10995       Date Filed: 05/27/2014       Page: 15 of 44
    commercial sex act. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 1591
    (a)(1). The evidence established that
    Flanders used fraud both to recruit and entice the victims to travel to Miami and to
    drug the victims in order to cause them to engage in filmed sex acts, and that the
    films were then distributed commercially over the Internet. Flanders, however,
    argues that the victims’ involvement was entirely voluntary and that the victims’
    testimony regarding the attacks cannot be considered credible. In light of the
    overwhelming evidence at trial, these arguments are completely meritless. 2
    Because we find that a reasonable jury could find Flanders guilty of the sex-
    trafficking charges beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm the verdict as to Counts
    2, 4, 7, 10, 14, and 16.
    C. Benefitting Charges (Counts 3, 6, 9, 11, 15, 18)
    To prove the sex-trafficking charges in Counts 3, 6, 9, 11, 15, and 18, the
    Government had to prove that Defendants (1) did knowingly benefit, financially or
    by receiving anything of value, (2) from participation in a venture which (a) in or
    affecting interstate and foreign commerce, (b) has enticed, recruited, harbored,
    2
    The evidence established that (1) the victims were recruited by Flanders under the false
    pretense of auditioning for a lucrative modeling contract in South Florida; (2) the victims were
    “duped” by Flanders’s emails pretending to be a female modeling agent and his phone calls
    pretending to be a modeling scout working with the female agent; (3) the victims trusted
    Flanders because they believed the female agent had referred him and he appeared professional;
    (4) the victims unconsciously signed release forms after unknowingly consuming drugs,
    provided by Flanders, which rendered their consent invalid; and (5) the two victims who agreed
    to film “love scenes” were told by Flanders that it would be like acting in a movie, and they
    never agreed to film pornography. With regard to the victims’ credibility, the jury observed the
    victims’ demeanor and had the opportunity to judge their character for truthfulness during their
    direct and cross-examinations and made credibility determinations accordingly.
    15
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 16 of 44
    transported, provided, obtained, or maintained by any means a person,
    (3) knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, (4) that fraud would be used to
    cause such person to engage in a commercial sex act. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 1591
    (a)(2).
    Flanders argues that there is no evidence that he benefitted or attempted to benefit
    financially from participating in the sex-trafficking venture. He further argues that
    his possession of copies of the videos was not evidence that he derived a benefit
    from the venture because possession of adult pornography is legal.
    The evidence showed that Flanders benefitted personally when he received
    payment from two victims in the form of auditioning fees and when he took money
    from the wallet of a third victim. Moreover, the evidence established that
    Appellants’ “venture” was to produce and sell pornographic footage of Callum
    having sex with drugged women. Searches of Callum’s business and home
    uncovered thousands of commercial copies of the victims’ DVDs, which were
    being sold in pornography stores and on the Internet, as well as receipts showing
    payment from the sales. Flanders’s name appeared on a release signed by Callum
    in 2010, a copy of which was found in Flanders’s bedroom. Furthermore, during
    both the 2007 and 2011 searches of Flanders’s residence, officers seized copies of
    the victims’ videos, a thing of value to Flanders, who spent considerable time
    online looking at pornography as evidenced by his Internet searches for “sex with
    unconscious women.” Because Flanders aided Callum in creating the videos
    16
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 17 of 44
    Callum sold for financial remuneration, the jury could reasonably infer that
    Flanders had received the videos as remuneration for his work on the films.
    Finally, officers also found a package containing letters from Flanders to
    HomeGrownVideo revealing that Flanders was attempting to sell pornographic
    video footage of Callum and several young women, including at least one victim.
    We conclude that there is sufficient evidence to uphold the conviction on
    these counts. The jury could infer that Flanders benefitted from the venture when
    he accepted “auditioning fees” from the victims. Cf. United States v. Jennings, 280
    F. App’x 836, 844 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished) (finding sufficient evidence for
    the jury to infer that defendants derived a benefit from the sex-trafficking venture
    where their co-defendant used money derived from minor’s prostitution to pay for
    their gas and hotel room). Moreover, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of
    the Government, we conclude that Flanders’s personal copies of the victims’
    videos as well as the letters from Flanders to HomeGrownVideo supported a
    finding that he derived a benefit from the venture. Because a reasonable jury could
    have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Flanders benefitted from the fraudulent
    scheme by selling the videos and by receiving fees from the victims and free
    pornography from Callum, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to affirm
    Flanders’s conviction on these counts.
    17
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 18 of 44
    D. Drug Charges (Counts 5, 8, 12, 17)
    In order to convict Flanders on the drug charges in Counts 5, 8, 12, and 17,
    the Government had to “prove three elements: (1) knowledge; (2) possession; and
    (3) intent to distribute.” United States v. Poole, 
    878 F.2d 1389
    , 1391 (11th Cir.
    1989) (per curiam). Possession may be shown by constructive possession. 
    Id. at 1392
    . Constructive possession, whether exclusive or joint, exists when a defendant
    has ownership, dominion, or control over an object or the premises where the
    object is found. 
    Id.
    The evidence here was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that
    Flanders had knowing possession of Benzodiazapines and that he distributed them.
    When his residence was searched in 2007, the police found Diazepam pills in the
    bathroom; during the 2011 search, they found Clonazepam pills in a bottle on a
    nightstand. This evidence was sufficient to establish Flanders’s constructive
    possession over the drugs. Specifically with regard to the Diazepam pills, the
    evidence established that Flanders was living at the residence, along with two adult
    relatives, and stored pornographic videos of victims in his bedroom. The
    Diazepam pills, which were concealed in a medicine bottle in a shared bathroom at
    the residence, permitted the inference that Flanders was in joint constructive
    possession of the drugs.
    18
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 19 of 44
    Moreover, there was ample evidence at trial that he knowingly distributed
    the drugs to the victims. The victims testified to remarkably similar experiences
    after ingesting the alcohol provided by Flanders during the “pre-audition,”
    including bouts of unconsciousness, weakness, and memory loss. Nearly all of the
    victims testified that the amount of alcohol consumed was insignificant, lending
    credence to the conclusion that they were not simply feeling the effects of the
    alcohol when they became unconscious and weak. Moreover, an expert explained
    that the effects of the drugs are made stronger when dissolved in liquid and that
    alcohol especially intensifies the drugs’ effects. Finally, at least four of the victims
    testified that they had never before knowingly ingested Alprazolam, and yet they
    all tested positive for the drug following their auditions. Viewing the evidence and
    drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the Government,
    we conclude that a reasonable jury could find Flanders guilty of the drug charges
    beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the verdict as to Counts 5, 8,
    12, and 17.
    IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct
    The Eleventh Circuit reviews claims of prosecutorial misconduct de
    novo. United States v. House, 
    684 F.3d 1173
    , 1197 (11th Cir. 2012). “But where a
    defendant fails to make a contemporaneous objection to the alleged misconduct in
    the district court, we review such claims for plain error.” 
    Id.
     Under the plain error
    19
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014     Page: 20 of 44
    standard, the defendant must show that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was
    plain; (3) it affected his substantial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness
    of the judicial proceedings. 
    Id.
     “Under the third prong of the plain error analysis,
    the defendant bears the burden of persuasion and must show that the claimed error
    affected his substantial rights, which almost always requires that the error must
    have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Pena, 684 F.3d at
    1151 (quotation marks omitted).
    Flanders asserts that the indictment and superseding indictment were
    procured by deception because the Government falsely alleged to the grand jury
    that Flanders was involved in the sexual exploitation of minors. However, even if
    Flanders’s allegations of misconduct before the grand jury are true, “the petit jury’s
    verdict rendered harmless any conceivable error in the charging decision that might
    have flowed from the violation.” United States v. Mechanik, 
    475 U.S. 66
    , 67
    (1986) (explaining that “the petit jury’s verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
    demonstrates a fortiori that there was probable cause to charge the defendants with
    the offenses for which they were convicted”). The record shows that there was no
    mention of child exploitation before the petit jury. Thus, the petit jury’s guilty
    verdicts demonstrate that there was probable cause to charge Defendants with the
    offenses for which they were convicted, and any alleged misconduct before the
    20
    Case: 12-10995    Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 21 of 44
    grand jury was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of
    Flanders’s motion for disclosure of the grand jury transcripts and materials.
    Flanders next argues that the Government withheld evidence in violation of
    Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963). According to Flanders, the Government
    failed to provide the arrest information filed by Agent Chavez that contained
    exculpatory and impeaching evidence, and there are FBI 302s that were not turned
    over to Flanders. “A Brady claim is available if either exculpatory or
    impeachment evidence is suppressed, regardless of the good faith or bad faith of
    the prosecution. A defendant who seeks a new trial based on an alleged Brady
    violation must show that, had the evidence been revealed to the defense, there is a
    reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been
    different.” United States v. Fernandez, 
    136 F.3d 1434
    , 1438 (11th Cir. 1998)
    (citation omitted). Flanders provides no details regarding what type of exculpatory
    and impeachment evidence was contained in the arrest information or in the
    allegedly missing 302s. Furthermore, he has not shown that there is a reasonable
    probability that, had the evidence been revealed, the outcome of the proceeding
    would have been different. Accordingly, we find Flanders’s Brady claim wholly
    without merit.
    Finally, Flanders argues that the prosecutor’s statements in his closing
    argument require reversal of Flanders’s conviction because (1) the prosecutor, over
    21
    Case: 12-10995   Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 22 of 44
    objection, improperly commented on Flanders’s lack of testimony to police; (2) the
    prosecutor, over objection, improperly argued that Flanders committed rape; and
    (3) the prosecutor tainted the jury by stating throughout its closing that Flanders
    lied “over and over again” both to the police and the women. Flanders concludes
    that the cumulative effect of the improper prosecutorial comments infected the
    entire trial.
    “[I]n reviewing claims that a prosecutor’s comments violated a defendant’s
    Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination,” the Court “must
    determine whether a prosecutor’s remarks were manifestly intended to urge the
    jury to draw an inference from the defendant’s silence that he or she is guilty, or
    whether a jury would naturally and necessarily construe the prosecutor’s remarks
    as inviting such an impermissible inference.” United States v. Thompson, 
    422 F.3d 1285
    , 1299 (11th Cir. 2005). Whether these conditions are satisfied “can be
    determined only by examining the context in which the statement was made.” 
    Id.
    In support of his argument that the prosecutor, over objection, improperly
    commented on Flanders’s lack of testimony to police, Flanders cites the following
    portion of the Government’s closing argument:
    If Mr. Flanders really had been honest with the victims, if he had
    nothing to hide, then why didn’t he just say that to the police when
    they interviewed him? Why did he lie about knowing Emerson
    Callum? We know that he knew his name was Emerson Callum . . . .
    He told [a victim] three months before that his coworker’s name is
    Emerson. That is how he knew it. . . . Why was he so afraid of
    22
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 23 of 44
    admitting that he had been to the IHOP parking lot with a [victim]?
    Why didn’t he just say, “. . . that is the woman I lied to, to get her
    down here. Once she was here, I came clean. She decided to do
    pornography and then she got real sick. Hope she is okay.” What did
    he have to hide?
    Trial Tr. 214:23–24. These remarks do not explicitly reference Flanders’s silence
    to the police; instead, the remarks question why he lied to the police. Moreover, it
    cannot be said that these remarks “were manifestly intended to urge the jury to
    draw an inference from the defendant’s silence that he . . . is guilty.” Thompson,
    
    422 F.3d at 1299
    . Accordingly, we find no merit to Flanders’s claim that the
    prosecutor improperly commented on Flanders’s silence.
    Similarly, there is no merit to Flanders’s other claims of prosecutorial
    misconduct or that the comments resulted in cumulative error. In addressing a
    claim of cumulative error, “we consider all errors preserved for appeal and all plain
    errors in the context of the trial as a whole to determine whether the appellant was
    afforded a fundamentally fair trial.” House, 684 F.3d at 1197 (quotation marks
    omitted). “The total effect of the errors on the trial will depend, among other
    things, on the nature and number of the errors committed; their interrelationship, if
    any, and combined effect; the strength of the government’s case; and the length of
    trial.” Id. (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Upon review of the record, we
    find that Flanders has not demonstrated prosecutorial misconduct in any of the
    23
    Case: 12-10995      Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 24 of 44
    cited comments. Thus, there was no error, let alone cumulative error, in the
    closing argument.
    V. Evidentiary Rulings
    We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for a clear abuse of
    discretion and will reverse those rulings “only if the resulting error affected the
    defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Dodds, 
    347 F.3d 893
    , 897 (11th
    Cir. 2003). “[D]eterminations as to the relevancy of evidence are well within the
    broad discretion of the district courts and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a
    showing that the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Tinoco, 
    304 F.3d 1088
    , 1120 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). “[E]vidence is
    relevant if it has ‘any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
    consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
    it would be without the evidence.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401).
    Although Federal Rule of Evidence 403 permits the district court to exclude
    otherwise relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
    the danger of unfair prejudice,” Fed. R. Evid. 403, it is “an extraordinary remedy”
    that should be used sparingly, United States v. Elkins, 
    885 F.2d 775
    , 784 (11th Cir.
    1989). “[I]n a criminal trial relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; it is only
    when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value that the rule permits
    exclusion.” United States v. King, 
    713 F.2d 627
    , 631 (11th Cir. 1983) (emphasis in
    24
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 25 of 44
    original). Accordingly, “in reviewing issues under Rule 403, we look at the
    evidence in the light most favorable to its admission, maximizing its probative
    value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.” Tinoco, 
    304 F.3d at 1020
    (quotation marks omitted).
    A review of the record reveals that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in admitting evidence of the Internet searches over Appellants’
    objections. The evidence of prior Internet searches for sex with unconscious
    women was probative because, at a minimum, it demonstrated either: (1) that
    Flanders was performing background research for his scheme, which involved and
    relied upon sexual performances by or with drugged women; or (2) that Flanders
    enjoyed viewing images of sexual intercourse with unconscious women. Under
    either or both scenarios, the evidence was relevant. Admission of the evidence
    would have enabled the jury to compare the searches (and any resulting images)
    with the allegations against the Defendants for any similarities. Cf. United States
    v. Pruitt, 
    638 F.3d 763
    , 767 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing jury’s consideration of the
    record of Internet searches using terms related to child pornography).
    To the extent Flanders claims that the Internet-search evidence was unfairly
    prejudicial, he has failed to properly raise the issue. See Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
    
    561 F.3d 1275
    , 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[A]n appellant’s simply stating that an
    issue exists, without further argument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of
    25
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 26 of 44
    that issue and precludes our considering the issue on appeal.”); Fed. R. App. P.
    28(a)(8) (requiring that appellant’s brief contain “appellant’s contentions and the
    reasons for them, with citation to the authorities and parts of the record on which
    the appellant relies”). Nevertheless, Flanders’s argument in this regard is without
    merit, particularly in view of the quantum of the other evidence presented.
    Similarly unpersuasive are Flanders’s arguments with regard to the
    ownership of and access to the computers. There was no evidence adduced at trial
    as to the owner of the computers found in the residence Flanders shared with his
    girlfriend. Rather, the jury was presented with computer analysis establishing that
    Flanders’s email was used and that someone logged into the computers and
    conducted hundreds of searches of modeling websites and for images of sex with
    unconscious women. The jury could infer that Flanders, not his girlfriend,
    conducted these searches, particularly in light of the fact that they were conducted
    at times when Flanders’s girlfriend was working. Nevertheless, Flanders’s
    arguments do not strike at the relevancy of the evidence, but rather the weight the
    jury was entitled to assign to it.
    Flanders also claims that the district court erred in allowing for the
    introduction of the drugs found during a search in 2007, which were located in a
    shared bathroom of the residence, because Flanders did not have exclusive access
    to the bathroom, and there was no evidence of constructive possession. Flanders’s
    26
    Case: 12-10995       Date Filed: 05/27/2014      Page: 27 of 44
    arguments in this regard largely mirror his claims, discussed above, regarding the
    ownership of and access to the computers. As explained in the earlier discussion
    addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Diazepam pills, which were
    concealed in a medicine bottle in a shared bathroom at the residence, permitted the
    inference that Flanders was in joint constructive possession of the drugs.
    Moreover, Flanders fully explored this issue on cross-examination and argued that
    his shared residence vitiated the significance of the Diazepam, as well as the online
    searches. Notwithstanding the foregoing, even if the inferences of constructive
    possession were unwarranted, any error in the admission was harmless given the
    overwhelming evidence of Appellants’ guilt. 3
    Similarly, there is no merit to Flanders’s argument that the reading into
    evidence of a transcript of his 2007 post-Miranda statements violated the best
    evidence rule. “The best evidence rule provides that the original documents must
    be produced to prove the content of any writing, recording or photograph.” United
    States v. Howard, 
    953 F.2d 610
    , 612 n.1 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Fed. R. Evid.
    1002–06). An original is not required if it is lost or destroyed, unless it is
    unavailable through bad faith. Fed. R. Evid. 1004. A duplicate is admissible to the
    same extent as an original, unless there is a genuine question of authenticity or it
    would be unfair to admit the duplicate. Fed. R. Evid. 1003; see United States v.
    3
    We find no merit in Callum’s arguments that the evidence of the drugs and Internet searches
    found during the two searches of Flanders’s residences was unfairly prejudicial to Callum.
    27
    Case: 12-10995        Date Filed: 05/27/2014       Page: 28 of 44
    Ross, 
    33 F.3d 1507
    , 1513–14 (rejecting best-evidence challenge to transcripts of
    destroyed recordings of co-conspirators’ conversations).
    At trial, Detective Fletcher testified that the audio recording of Flanders’s
    statements had been inadvertently destroyed. Furthermore, there is no evidence of
    bad faith or to support Flanders’s assertion that the transcript was untrustworthy.
    Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
    admitted into evidence a transcript of Flanders’s statements. Moreover, to the
    extent that Flanders argues for the first time on appeal that the publication
    method—wherein the transcript was read into the record—violated the rules, this
    argument is subject to, and fails, the plain error standard. Given the overwhelming
    evidence of his guilt, Flanders cannot show that the method of publication affected
    the outcome of his district court proceedings, as required under plain error review. 4
    VI. Public Trial
    Appellants argue that their Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was
    violated when the court ordered the courtroom doors locked during closing
    arguments. “The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is not absolute and must,
    on occasion, give way to other rights and interests.” United States v. Brazel, 102
    4
    For the first time on appeal, Flanders argues that the search warrant was invalid because it was
    based on misrepresentations that the case involved minors, rendering inadmissible all evidence
    seized pursuant to the warrant. Because Flanders did not raise this issue prior to trial, it is
    waived. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(e); United States v. Ford, 
    34 F.3d 992
    , 994 n.2 (11th Cir. 1994)
    (“A party’s failure to present a suppression motion prior to trial constitutes waiver unless the
    district court grants relief for good cause shown.”).
    28
    Case: 12-10995      Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 29 of 
    44 F.3d 1120
    , 1155 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Waller v. Georgia, 
    467 U.S. 39
    , 45
    (1984)). We have “recognized a distinction between total closures of proceedings
    . . . and situations where the courtroom is only partially closed to spectators.” Judd
    v. Haley, 
    250 F.3d 1308
    , 1315 (11th Cir. 2001). In the event of a partial closure,
    where access to the courtroom is retained by some spectators (such as
    representatives of the press or the defendant’s family members), “a court need
    merely find a ‘substantial’ reason for the partial closure,” 
    id.,
     rather than the
    “compelling” reason that is required to justify a complete closure, Brazel, 102 F.3d
    at 1155.
    The record establishes the following facts: (1) the courtroom was nearly full,
    and several of Defendants’ family and friends were present during closing
    arguments; (2) only those people who arrived past 9:05 a.m. were denied access;
    (3) neither side objected when the court proposed locking the doors; (4) when
    defense counsel expressed concern after closing arguments that some of
    Defendants’ family had been locked out of the courtroom, the court offered
    counsel the opportunity to redeliver their closing arguments with the doors
    unlocked, but both sides declined; (5) before the verdicts were announced, defense
    counsel moved for a mistrial on Sixth Amendment grounds, but the court denied
    the motion, finding no contemporaneous objection; and (6) defense counsel later
    moved for a new trial on the same grounds, but the district court again denied the
    29
    Case: 12-10995       Date Filed: 05/27/2014      Page: 30 of 44
    motion, explaining in a written order that it had locked the doors once closing
    arguments had begun in order to limit distractions to the jury that could have
    inhibited their ability to perform their function. Under these facts and for the
    reasons given in the district court’s thoughtful order, United States v. Flanders,
    
    845 F. Supp. 2d 1298
     (S.D. Fla. 2012), we readily conclude that the Defendants’
    right to a public trial was not violated by the partial closure of the courtroom. See
    Aaron v. Capps, 
    507 F.2d 685
    , 687–88 (5th Cir. 1975)5 (finding no constitutional
    violation caused by partial closure of criminal trial where some members of the
    public, including the news media and defendant’s relatives and clergyman, were
    admitted; the courtroom was at least three-fourths full; and the transcript of the
    trial became public record).
    VII. Double Jeopardy
    Both Flanders and Callum argue that each pair of their 
    18 U.S.C. § 1591
    (a)(1) and (a)(2) convictions, arising out of the same set of facts, was
    multiplicitous and therefore violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. We review
    claims of double jeopardy de novo. United States v. Bobb, 
    577 F.3d 1366
    , 1371
    (11th Cir. 2009). Among other prohibitions, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
    Fifth Amendment does not allow for multiple punishments for the same offense.
    5
    The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209
    (11th Cir. 1981), adopted as precedent decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to
    October 1, 1981.
    30
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 31 of 44
    
    Id.
     Where a defendant has violated two different criminal statues, the Double
    Jeopardy Clause is implicated if both statutes prohibit the same act or if one act is a
    lesser included offense of the other. 
    Id.
     However, Congress has the power to
    authorize multiple punishments arising out of the same act or transaction, and there
    is no double jeopardy implication where legislative intent is clear. 
    Id.
    In order to determine whether two provisions punish the same offense, we
    look to whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not. 
    Id.
    at 1372 (citing Blockburger v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
    , 304 (1932)). This
    analysis focuses on the proof necessary to establish the statutory elements for each
    offense, not the evidence presented at trial. 
    Id.
    Section 1591 reads:
    (a) Whoever knowingly—
    (1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . .
    recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or
    maintains by any means a person; or
    (2) benefits financially or by receiving anything of
    value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in
    an act described in violation of paragraph (1),
    knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that . . . fraud
    . . . will be used to cause the person to engage in a
    commercial sex act . . . shall be punished as provided in
    subsection (b).
    
    18 U.S.C. § 1591
    .
    31
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 32 of 44
    A plain reading of § 1591(a)(1) and (a)(2) demonstrates that the two
    subsections meet the Blockburger test of whether separate convictions are
    authorized. Section 1591(a)(1) requires proof that the defendant was criminally
    responsible for the recruitment or enticement of a person with knowledge that the
    person will be fraudulently induced to engage in a commercial sex act. 
    18 U.S.C. § 1591
    (a)(1). Section 1592(a)(2) does not require proof of such conduct on the
    defendant’s part, as only participation in a venture which has recruited or enticed a
    person for such purposes is required. 
    Id.
     § 1592(a)(2). Further, while § 1592(a)(2)
    requires proof that the defendant received a valuable benefit from his participation,
    § 1591(a)(1) requires no such proof. Each subsection, therefore, requires proof of
    an element that the other does not, and the separate convictions for each do not
    result in a double jeopardy violation. See Bobb, 
    577 F.3d at 1372
    .
    VIII. Reasonableness of the Sentences
    Both Flanders and Callum challenge the reasonableness of their consecutive
    total life sentences. We employ a two-step process to review a sentence for
    reasonableness. United States v. Beckles, 
    565 F.3d 832
    , 845 (11th Cir. 2009).
    First, we must “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
    error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,
    treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
    selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
    32
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 33 of 44
    explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007). Once
    we determine that the district court did not procedurally err, we then “consider the
    substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion
    standard, based on the totality of the circumstances.” Beckles, 
    565 F.3d at 845
    (quotation marks omitted). We will remand for resentencing only when “left with
    the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
    judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
    outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
    States v. Pugh, 
    515 F.3d 1179
    , 1191 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
    “The party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the
    sentence is unreasonable in the light of both [the] record and the factors in section
    3553(a).” United States v. Thomas, 
    446 F.3d 1348
    , 1351 (11th Cir. 2006)
    (quotation marks omitted).
    A. § 2A3.1(b)(1) Enhancements
    Appellants argue that the district court erred in applying U.S.S.G.
    § 2G1.1(c)’s cross reference to U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1 in calculating their guideline
    range. We review de novo the district court’s application of the Sentencing
    Guidelines, and we review underlying factual findings for clear error. United
    States v. Foley, 
    508 F.3d 627
    , 632 (11th Cir. 2007). The Guidelines instruct that
    when a cross reference applies, the entire referenced offense guideline, including
    33
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 34 of 44
    enhancements, should apply. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.5(a). “Additionally, the [G]uidelines
    specifically instruct courts to take into consideration all relevant conduct when
    calculating the guideline range.” United States v. Webb, 
    665 F.3d 1380
    , 1383
    (11th Cir. 2012) (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3).
    The guideline range for convictions under 
    18 U.S.C. § 1591
     are calculated in
    U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1, cmt. Under a cross-reference provision, if
    the offense “involved” conduct described in 
    18 U.S.C. § 2241
    (a) or (b) (aggravated
    sexual abuse) or § 2242 (sexual abuse), the guideline should be calculated under
    § 2A3.1. Id. § 2G1.1(c)(1). Section 2A3.1 provides for a four-level enhancement
    only if the offense involved conduct described in 
    18 U.S.C. § 2241
    (a) or (b). 
    Id.
    § 2A3.1(b)(1). It is aggravated sexual abuse when a defendant “administers to
    another person . . . without the knowledge or permission of that person, a drug,
    intoxicant, or other similar substance[,]” which “substantially impairs the ability of
    that other person to appraise or control conduct[,]” and “engages in a sexual act
    with that other person[.]” 
    18 U.S.C. § 2241
    (b)(2).
    Callum appears to argue that because he was convicted of fraudulent
    inducement, and not a sex act itself, his sentence cannot be enhanced based on the
    sex act. However, the plain language of the cross reference states that it should
    apply if the offense “involved” § 2241 conduct, not merely if the § 2241 conduct
    was the basis for the conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(c). The offense conduct
    34
    Case: 12-10995    Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 35 of 44
    met the description in § 2241(b)(2), as Flanders gave drugs to women who did not
    know the alcohol they were drinking contained drugs, and Callum then had sex
    with them. Accordingly, we find that Callum’s challenge to the application of the
    § 2G1.1(c) cross reference is without merit.
    Flanders argues that the court erred in imposing the § 2A3.1(b)(1)
    enhancement to his guideline calculation because the conduct described in 
    18 U.S.C. § 2241
    (a) or (b) was used to calculate his base offense and thus could not
    be used for purposes of an enhancement. Flanders argues that imposing the
    enhancement constituted impermissible double counting.
    We review a claim of double counting de novo. United States v. Suarez, 
    601 F.3d 1202
    , 1220 (11th Cir. 2010). “Impermissible double counting occurs only
    when one part of the Guidelines is applied to increase a defendant’s punishment on
    account of a kind of harm that has already been fully accounted for by application
    of another part of the Guidelines.” Webb, 665 F.3d at 1382 (quotation marks
    omitted). “Double counting a factor during sentencing is permitted if the
    Sentencing Commission intended that result and each guideline section in question
    concerns conceptually separate notions relating to sentencing.” Id. (quotation
    marks omitted). We presume that the Commission intended to apply separate
    sections cumulatively unless otherwise specified, “and, as a result, a defendant
    asserting a double counting claim has a tough task.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
    35
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 36 of 44
    In this case, the district court did not err in applying the 2G1.1(c) cross
    reference and 2A3.1(b)(1) enhancement in conjunction with one another. Based on
    the plain language of the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission intended for the
    entirety of § 2A3.1, including any enhancements, to apply following the
    application of the cross reference. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.5(a). Further, the cross
    reference and the enhancement do not deal with identical conduct. The cross
    reference applies where the offense involved any conduct constituting sexual
    abuse. See id. § 2G1.1(c)(1); 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2241
    (a)–(b) and 2242. The
    enhancement, however, applies an additional four levels only where the offense
    involved conduct constituting the more severe subset of aggravated sexual abuse
    offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(1); 
    18 U.S.C. § 2241
    (a) and (b). To the extent
    that Appellants’ base offense level and enhancement were based on the same
    conduct, therefore, those calculations did not constitute impermissible double
    counting. See Webb, 665 F.3d at 1352–53.
    B. § 2G1.3(d) Grouped Offenses
    Flanders next argues that the district court incorrectly grouped his offenses
    based on § 2G1.3(d), which deals with underage victims. In the case of a
    conviction or convictions for sex trafficking involving minors, the grouping rules
    apply as if each victim constituted a separate conviction. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(d)(1).
    36
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 37 of 44
    The same grouping rule applies where the offense did not involve any minors. Id.
    § 2G1.1(d)(1).
    Flanders did not object to the use of § 2G1.3(d) below, so plain error review
    applies. See United States v. Barrington, 
    648 F.3d 1178
    , 1195 (11th Cir. 2011).
    Here, as the Government concedes, the district court applied the wrong Guidelines
    provision in grouping the offenses, as there was no evidence that the offenses
    involved minors. Because the explicit language of the rule makes clear that an
    error occurred, the error can be classified as “plain.” See United States v. Lejarde-
    Rada, 
    319 F.3d 1288
    , 1291 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). However, the correct
    Guidelines section, § 2G1.1(d), would have grouped the offenses in the exact same
    manner. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2G1.1(d)(1) and 2G1.3(d)(1). The error therefore did not
    affect Flanders’s substantial rights, as the outcome of the sentencing could not
    have been any different had the correct provision been applied. See Pena, 684
    F.3d at 1151. Accordingly, the error does not meet the plain error standard and is
    not a basis upon which to find procedural unreasonableness.
    C. § 5K2.8 Upward Departure
    Appellants argue that the court erred in granting the Government’s motion
    for a § 5K2.8 upward departure, which applies when a defendant’s conduct was
    unusually “heinous, cruel, or brutal.” We review for abuse of discretion the district
    37
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 38 of 44
    court’s decision to grant a departure. United States v. Siegelman, 
    640 F.3d 1159
    ,
    1190 (11th Cir. 2011).
    After calculating a defendant’s guideline range, the district court is directed
    to consider whether a departure warrants consideration. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(b). The
    court can grant an upward departure if the defendant’s conduct was “unusually
    heinous, cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim,” including where the offense
    involves a “prolonging of pain or humiliation.” Id. § 5K2.8. We have upheld the
    district court’s imposition of the § 5K2.8 departure where: an HIV-positive
    defendant knowingly exposed a minor victim to the disease without notifying her,
    United States v. Blas, 
    360 F.3d 1268
    , 1273–74 (11th Cir. 2004); a defendant forced
    victims to engage in oral, anal, and vaginal sex, United States v. Lewis, 
    115 F.3d 1531
    , 1538–39 (11th Cir. 1997); and a defendant exposed victims to public
    embarrassment and repeated harassing letters over a period of twenty years, United
    States v. Taylor, 
    88 F.3d 938
    , 946 (11th Cir. 1996).
    We readily conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    granting the upward departure. Flanders videotaped Callum having sex with
    women who were under the influence of drugs that Flanders had given to them
    without their knowledge. Victims woke up covered in bodily fluids and uncertain
    of what had happened to them. Appellants then distributed those videos over the
    Internet, where the videos will be available indefinitely, thus “prolonging [the
    38
    Case: 12-10995    Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 39 of 44
    victims’] pain or humiliation.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.8. The district court did not abuse
    its discretion when it concluded that Appellants’ conduct was “unusually heinous,
    cruel, brutal, or degrading to the victim[s].” Id. Thus, the upward departure was
    not an abuse of discretion.
    D. Substantive Reasonableness
    Appellants challenge the substantive reasonableness of their life sentences.
    On substantive reasonableness review, we can “vacate the sentence if, but only if,
    we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a
    clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
    that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
    United States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation
    marks omitted). Among the factors that the court should consider in sentencing are
    the guideline range; the nature and circumstances of the offense; and the need for
    the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to deter criminal conduct, and
    to protect the public from the defendant’s future crimes. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). The
    weight to be given any particular factor in sentencing generally is left to the sound
    discretion of the district court. United States v. Amedeo, 
    487 F.3d 823
    , 832 (11th
    Cir. 2007).
    Neither Flanders nor Callum has met his burden of demonstrating that his
    total life sentence was substantively unreasonable. See Thomas, 
    446 F.3d at 1351
    .
    39
    Case: 12-10995    Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 40 of 44
    Flanders used false pretenses to convince women to travel to South Florida, told
    the women that they had to drink alcohol for a commercial, drugged the alcohol,
    and drove the women to Callum, who had sex with the women while they were
    under the influence of the drugs. Appellants’ crimes were made more serious,
    warranting a longer sentence, by the fact that they filmed the sexual encounters and
    then distributed those videos in DVDs and over the Internet. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2)(A); Irey, 
    612 F.3d at 1208
     (explaining that the seriousness of the
    defendant’s crime was enhanced because he recorded his sexual assaults, in that
    case on children, and distributed the videos on the Internet, which (1) “magnified
    and perpetuated” the harm, because each viewing of the video represented a
    renewed violation of the victims, and (2) encouraged others to commit similar
    crimes).
    A long sentence also could be justified by the need to protect the public from
    future crimes of the Defendants, underscored by the fact that Flanders and Callum
    continued their scheme after having been arrested and charged in state court. See
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2)(C). Moreover, although neither Flanders nor Callum had a
    significant criminal history, their scheme took place over a number of years dating
    back to 2006 and involved a large number of victims. See United States v.
    Campbell, 
    491 F.3d 1306
    , 1317 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that a first conviction
    is not the same as being a first time offender where the fraud took place over a
    40
    Case: 12-10995        Date Filed: 05/27/2014       Page: 41 of 44
    number of years and the defendant tried to conceal the fraud). At sentencing, the
    prosecutor’s proffer showed that there were at least fifty victims, only seven of
    whom testified at trial to Appellants’ abhorrent conduct.
    Neither Flanders nor Callum presents any persuasive argument as to why a
    life sentence was outside the range of reasonable sentences, and the facts of their
    crimes do not support such a conclusion. Accordingly, we hold that their sentences
    are substantively reasonable.6
    IX. Constitutionality of the Sentence
    Finally, Flanders argues that his life sentences violated the Eighth
    Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. “We review
    challenges to the constitutionality of a sentence de novo.” United States v.
    Sanchez, 
    586 F.3d 918
    , 932 (11th Cir. 2009). However, when a defendant fails to
    raise an Eighth Amendment challenge to a sentence in the district court, we review
    that challenge on appeal for plain error.7 United States v. Raad, 
    406 F.3d 1322
    ,
    1323 (11th Cir. 2005). Outside the context of capital punishment cases, successful
    Eighth Amendment challenges are “exceedingly rare.” Solem v. Helm, 
    463 U.S. 277
    , 289 (1983). “In non-capital cases, the Eighth Amendment encompasses, at
    6
    There is no merit to Flanders’s argument that the court should have granted his motion for a
    downward variance.
    7
    It is questionable whether Flanders raised an Eighth Amendment objection below. While he
    asserted that a life sentence would be “cruel and unusual,” he did so in the context of requesting
    a variance before the sentence was actually imposed. Under any standard of review, however,
    there is no merit to Flanders’s Eighth Amendment challenge.
    41
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 42 of 44
    most, only a narrow proportionality principle.” United States v. Reynolds, 
    215 F.3d 1210
    , 1214 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted). We review
    the sentence imposed by first determining whether the sentence is “grossly
    disproportionate to the offense committed.” 
    Id.
     If we find that it is, we then
    consider sentences imposed on others convicted of the same crime. 
    Id.
    Flanders’s argument—that his consecutive life sentences violate the Eighth
    Amendment because he had no prior convictions and the sentences demonstrate a
    lack of mercy and compassion—is wholly without merit. The statutory range for
    the sex-trafficking counts is fifteen years to life. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1591
    (b)(1),
    1594(b). Accordingly, the sentence imposed for each count was within the limits
    prescribed by the statute. See United States v. Moriarty, 
    429 F.3d 1012
    , 1024
    (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“In general, a sentence within the limits imposed by
    statute is neither excessive nor cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.”).
    Moreover, for the same reasons that his sentence is not substantively unreasonable,
    Flanders’s total life sentence was not so disproportionate to his crimes that it would
    be considered cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
    X. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    Flanders raises numerous ineffectiveness allegations. “Generally, claims of
    ineffective assistance of counsel are not considered for the first time on direct
    appeal.” United States v. Tyndale, 
    209 F.3d 1292
    , 1294 (11th Cir. 2000) (per
    42
    Case: 12-10995     Date Filed: 05/27/2014   Page: 43 of 44
    curiam) (noting exception for cases where the record is “sufficiently developed”).
    Because we find that the record is not sufficiently developed to facilitate
    consideration of Flanders’s ineffectiveness claims, we decline to address the merits
    of these claims on direct appeal.
    XI. Flanders’s Appeal of the Final Order of Forfeiture
    Under appeal number 12-15027, Flanders appeals pro se from the district
    court’s final order of forfeiture. After a conviction upon which criminal forfeiture
    is sought, the court must determine which property is forfeitable as soon as
    practical following the conviction. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A). The court must
    then enter a preliminary order of forfeiture setting forth the money or property that
    will be forfeited. 
    Id.
     R. 32.2(b)(2)(A). The preliminary order of forfeiture
    becomes final as to the defendant at sentencing, during which the court must
    include the forfeiture when pronouncing sentence and the forfeiture order in the
    judgment. 
    Id.
     R. 32.2(b)(4)(A) and (B). The time for the defendant to file an
    appeal from a forfeiture order runs from the entry of the judgment. 
    Id.
     R.
    32.2(b)(4)(C). A final order of forfeiture is entered after the court has had an
    opportunity to account for any third-party rights in the forfeited property. 
    Id.
     R.
    32.2(c)(2). The advisory committee notes explain that a defendant’s right to
    appeal a forfeiture order runs from the entry of the preliminary order of forfeiture,
    because that is when the order becomes final as to the defendant. 
    Id.
     R. 32.2,
    43
    Case: 12-10995      Date Filed: 05/27/2014    Page: 44 of 44
    Advisory Committee Note, Subdivision (b) (2000 Adoption). Because the final
    order of forfeiture has no bearing on the defendant’s rights, the defendant has no
    right to appeal that order. 
    Id.
    We previously authorized Flanders to file a separate, pro se brief, only
    insofar as he challenged the district court’s “Final Order of Forfeiture,” and
    directed that all remaining arguments should be raised and submitted in the
    counseled brief. However, we now conclude that Flanders has no standing to
    appeal from the final order of forfeiture. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2, Advisory
    Committee Note, Subdivision (b). Therefore, we dismiss appeal number 12-15027
    for a lack of jurisdiction based on Flanders’s lack of standing. See United States v.
    Edwards, 
    728 F.3d 1286
    , 1291 (11th Cir. 2013) (explaining that we are obliged to
    examine our own jurisdiction, including whether an appellant has standing).
    Pursuant to our order, Flanders’s counsel could have raised any challenge to the
    preliminary order of forfeiture in its initial appellate brief.
    XII. Conclusion
    We affirm the Appellants’ convictions and sentences (Appeal No. 12-10995)
    as well as the district court’s order denying disclosure of the grand jury transcripts
    and materials (Appeal No. 12-15248). Flanders’s pro se appeal of the Final Order
    of Forfeiture (Appeal No. 12-15027) is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
    AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART.
    44
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-10995, 12-15027, 12-15248

Citation Numbers: 752 F.3d 1317, 2014 WL 2186554

Judges: Martin, Fay, Duffy

Filed Date: 5/27/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (41)

United States v. Pruitt , 638 F.3d 763 ( 2011 )

Gall v. United States , 128 S. Ct. 586 ( 2007 )

United States v. Henry Affit Lejarde-Rada , 319 F.3d 1288 ( 2003 )

United States v. Lewis , 115 F.3d 1531 ( 1997 )

Singh v. US Atty. Gen. , 561 F.3d 1275 ( 2009 )

United States v. Livan Alfonso Raad , 406 F.3d 1322 ( 2005 )

United States v. Franklin David Howard , 953 F.2d 610 ( 1992 )

United States v. Jerry Ford , 34 F.3d 992 ( 1994 )

United States v. Jean-Marie Rosemond Dulcio , 441 F.3d 1269 ( 2006 )

United States v. Yuby Ramirez, Jairo Castro , 324 F.3d 1225 ( 2003 )

United States v. De La Cruz Suarez , 601 F.3d 1202 ( 2010 )

United States v. Dodds , 347 F.3d 893 ( 2003 )

United States v. Allan Ross , 33 F.3d 1507 ( 1994 )

United States v. Fernandez , 136 F.3d 1434 ( 1998 )

united-states-v-william-harrison-king-jb-mcglocklin-michael-d-berry , 713 F.2d 627 ( 1983 )

United States v. Irey , 612 F.3d 1160 ( 2010 )

United States v. Jose Blas , 360 F.3d 1268 ( 2004 )

Brady v. Maryland , 83 S. Ct. 1194 ( 1963 )

United States v. Browne , 505 F.3d 1229 ( 2007 )

United States v. Damon Amedeo , 487 F.3d 823 ( 2007 )

View All Authorities »