L. Lin Wood, Jr. v. Brad Raffensperger ( 2020 )

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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-14418
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-04651-SDG
L. LIN WOOD, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BRAD RAFFENSPERGER, in his official capacity as Secretary of State of the
State of Georgia,
REBECCA N. SULLIVAN, in her official capacity as Vice Chair of the Georgia
State Election Board, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_______________________
(December 5, 2020)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR and LAGOA, Circuit
Judges.
WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:
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This appeal requires us to decide whether we have jurisdiction over an
appeal from the denial of a request for emergency relief in a post-election lawsuit.
Ten days after the presidential election, L. Lin Wood Jr., a Georgia voter, sued
state election officials to enjoin certification of the general election results, to
secure a new recount under different rules, and to establish new rules for an
upcoming runoff election. Wood alleged that the extant absentee-ballot and recount
procedures violated Georgia law and, as a result, his federal constitutional rights.
After Wood moved for emergency relief, the district court denied his motion. We
agree with the district court that Wood lacks standing to sue because he fails to
allege a particularized injury. And because Georgia has already certified its
election results and its slate of presidential electors, Wood’s requests for
emergency relief are moot to the extent they concern the 2020 election. The
Constitution makes clear that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, U.S.
Const. art. III; we may not entertain post-election contests about garden-variety
issues of vote counting and misconduct that may properly be filed in state courts.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger is the “chief election official” of
Georgia. Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-50(b). He manages the state system of elections
and chairs the State Election Board. Id. § 21-2-30(a), (d). The Board has the
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authority to promulgate rules and regulations to ensure uniformity in the practices
of county election officials and, “consistent with law,” to aid “the fair, legal, and
orderly conduct of primaries and elections.” Id. § 21-2-31(1)–(2). The Board may
also publish and distribute to county election officials a compilation of Georgia’s
election laws and regulations. Id. § 21-2-31(3). Many of these laws and regulations
govern absentee voting.
Any voter in Georgia may vote by absentee ballot. Id. § 21-2-380(b). State
law prescribes the procedures by which a voter may request and submit an
absentee ballot. Id. §§ 21-2-381; 21-2-384; 21-2-385. The ballot comes with an
oath, which the voter must sign and return with his ballot. Id. § 21-2-385(a). State
law also prescribes the procedures for how county election officials must certify
and count absentee ballots. Id. § 21-2-386(a). It directs the official to “compare the
identifying information on the oath with the information on file” and “compare the
signature or mark on the oath with the signature or mark” on file. Id.
§ 21-2-386(a)(1)(B). If everything appears correct, the official certifies the ballot.
Id. But if there is a problem, such as a signature that does not match, the official is
to “write across the face of the envelope ‘Rejected.’” Id. § 21-2-386(a)(1)(C). The
government must then notify the voter of this rejection, and the voter may cure the
problem. Id.
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In November 2019, the Democratic Party of Georgia, the Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee challenged Georgia’s absentee ballot procedures as unconstitutional
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They sued Secretary Raffensperger
and members of the Board for declaratory and injunctive relief. Secretary
Raffensperger and the Board maintained that the procedures were constitutional,
but they agreed to promulgate regulations to ensure uniform practices across
counties. In March 2020, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and
dismissed the suit.
In the settlement agreement, Secretary Raffensperger and the Board agreed
to issue an Official Election Bulletin regarding the review of signatures on
absentee ballots. The Bulletin instructed officials to review the voter’s signature
with the following process:
If the registrar or absentee ballot clerk determines that the voter’s
signature on the mail-in absentee ballot envelope does not match any
of the voter’s signatures on file . . . , the registrar or absentee ballot
clerk must seek review from two other registrars, deputy registrars, or
absentee ballot clerks. A mail-in absentee ballot shall not be rejected
unless a majority of the registrars, deputy registrars, or absentee ballot
clerks reviewing the signature agree that the signature does not match
any of the voter’s signatures on file . . . .
Secretary Raffensperger and the Board also agreed to train county election officials
to follow this process.
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This procedure has been in place for at least three elections since March,
including the general election on November 3, 2020. Over one million Georgians
voted by absentee ballot in the general election. No one challenged the settlement
agreement until the filing of this action. By then, the general election returns had
been tallied and a statewide hand recount of the presidential election results was
underway.
On November 13, L. Lin Wood Jr. sued Secretary Raffensperger and the
members of the Board in the district court. Wood alleged that he sued “in his
capacity as a private citizen.” He is a registered voter in Fulton County, Georgia,
and a donor to various 2020 Republican candidates. His amended complaint
alleged that the settlement agreement violates state law. As a result, he contends, it
violates the Election Clause of Article I; the Electors Clause of Article II; and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4,
cl. 1; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; id. amend. XIV, § 1. Wood also alleged that irregularities
in the hand recount violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
State law requires that such recounts be done in public view, and it permits
the Board to promulgate policies that facilitate recounting. Ga. Code Ann.
§ 21-2-498(c)(4), (d). Secretary Raffensperger directed county election officials to
designate viewing areas for members of the public and the news media to observe
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the recount. He also permitted the Democratic and Republican Parties to designate
special recount monitors.
Wood alleged that officials ignored their own rules and denied Wood and
President Donald Trump’s campaign “meaningful access to observe and monitor
the electoral process.” Although Wood did not personally attempt to observe or
monitor the recount, he alleged that Secretary Raffensperger and the Board
violated his “vested interest in being present and having meaningful access to
observe and monitor the electoral process to ensure that it is properly administered
. . . and . . . otherwise free, fair, and transparent.”
Wood submitted two affidavits from volunteer monitors. One monitor stated
that she was not allowed to enter the counting area because there were too many
monitors already present, and she could not be sure from a distance whether the
recount was accurate. The other explained that the counting was hard for her to
follow and described what she thought were possible tabulation errors.
Wood moved for extraordinary relief. He asked that the district court take
one of three steps: prohibit Georgia from certifying the results of the November
election; prevent it from certifying results that include “defective absentee ballots,
regardless of whether said ballots were cured”; or declare the entire election
defective and order the state to fix the problems caused by the settlement
agreement. He also sought greater access for Republican election monitors, both at
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a new hand recount of the November election and in a runoff election scheduled
for January 5, 2021.
Wood’s lawsuit faced a quickly approaching obstacle: Georgia law requires
the Secretary of State to certify its general election results by 5:00 p.m. on the
seventeenth day after Election Day. Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-499(b). And it requires
the Governor to certify Georgia’s slate of presidential electors by 5:00 p.m. on the
eighteenth day after Election Day. Id. Secretary Raffensperger’s deadline was
November 20, and Governor Brian Kemp had a deadline of November 21.
To avoid these deadlines, Wood moved to bar officials from certifying the
election results until a court could consider his lawsuit. His emergency motion
reiterated many of the requests from his amended complaint, including requests for
changes to the procedures for the January runoff. He also submitted additional
affidavits and declarations in support of his motion.
The district court held a hearing on November 19 to consider whether it
should issue a temporary restraining order. It heard from Wood, state officials, and
two groups of intervenors. Wood also introduced testimony from Susan Voyles, a
poll manager who participated in the hand recount. Voyles described her
experience during the recount. She recalled that one batch of absentee ballots felt
different from the rest, and that that batch favored Joe Biden to an unusual extent.
At the end of the hearing, the district court orally denied Wood’s motion.
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On November 20, the district court issued a written opinion and order that
explained its denial. It first ruled that Wood lacked standing because he had
alleged only generalized grievances, instead of injuries that affected him in a
personal and individual way. It next explained that, even if Wood had standing, the
doctrine of laches prevented him from challenging the settlement agreement now:
he could have sued eight months earlier, yet he waited until two weeks after the
election. Finally, it explained why Wood would not be entitled to a temporary
restraining order even if the district court could reach the merits of his claims. On
the same day, Secretary Raffensperger certified the results of the general election
and Governor Kemp certified a slate of presidential electors.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We are required to examine our jurisdiction sua sponte, and we review
jurisdictional issues de novo.” United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
This appeal turns on one of the most fundamental principles of the federal
courts: our limited jurisdiction. Federal courts are not “constituted as free-wheeling
enforcers of the Constitution and laws.” Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker,
450 F.3d 1082, 1087 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc). As the Supreme Court “ha[s]
often explained,” we are instead “courts of limited jurisdiction.” Home Depot
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U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Article III of the Constitution establishes that our jurisdiction—that is,
our judicial power—reaches only “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2. Absent a justiciable case or controversy between interested parties, we lack the
“power to declare the law.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94
(1998).
When someone sues in federal court, he bears the burden of proving that his
suit falls within our jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Wood had the choice to sue in state or federal court. Georgia
law makes clear that post-election litigation may proceed in a state court. Ga. Code
Ann. §§ 21-2-499(b), 21-2-524(a). But Wood chose to sue in federal court. In
doing so, he had to prove that his suit presents a justiciable controversy under
Article III of the Constitution. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (listing
examples of problems that preclude our jurisdiction). He failed to satisfy this
burden.
We divide our discussion in two parts. We first explain why Wood lacks
standing to sue. We then explain that, even if he had standing, his requests to
recount and delay certification of the November election results are moot. Because
this case is not justiciable, we lack jurisdiction. Id. And because we lack the power
to entertain this appeal, we will not address the other issues the parties raise.
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A. Wood Lacks Standing Because He Has Not Been Injured in a
Particularized Way.
Standing is a threshold jurisdictional inquiry: the elements of standing are
“an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 561 (1992). To prove standing, Wood “must prove (1) an injury in fact
that (2) is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and (3) is likely
to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d
1236, 1245 (11th Cir. 2020). If he cannot satisfy these requirements, then we may
not decide the merits of his appeal. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 94.
Wood lacks standing because he fails to allege the “first and foremost of
standing’s three elements”: an injury in fact. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct.
1540, 1547 (2016) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). An
injury in fact is “an invasion of a legally protected interest that is both concrete and
particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Trichell v.
Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Wood’s injury is not particularized.
Wood asserts only a generalized grievance. A particularized injury is one
that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at
1548 (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, if Wood were a political
candidate harmed by the recount, he would satisfy this requirement because he
could assert a personal, distinct injury. Cf. Roe v. Alabama ex rel. Evans, 43 F.3d
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574, 579 (11th Cir. 1995). But Wood bases his standing on his interest in
“ensur[ing that] . . . only lawful ballots are counted.” An injury to the right “to
require that the government be administered according to the law” is a generalized
grievance. Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 1989)
(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). And the Supreme Court
has made clear that a generalized grievance, “no matter how sincere,” cannot
support standing. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 706 (2013).
A generalized grievance is “undifferentiated and common to all members of
the public.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575 (internal quotation marks omitted). Wood
cannot explain how his interest in compliance with state election laws is different
from that of any other person. Indeed, he admits that any Georgia voter could bring
an identical suit. But the logic of his argument sweeps past even that boundary. All
Americans, whether they voted in this election or whether they reside in Georgia,
could be said to share Wood’s interest in “ensur[ing] that [a presidential election]
is properly administered.”
Wood argues that he has two bases for standing, but neither satisfies the
requirement of a distinct, personal injury. He first asserts that the inclusion of
unlawfully processed absentee ballots diluted the weight of his vote. To be sure,
vote dilution can be a basis for standing. Cf. Jacobson, 974 F.3d at 1247–48. But it
requires a point of comparison. For example, in the racial gerrymandering and
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malapportionment contexts, vote dilution occurs when voters are harmed compared
to “irrationally favored” voters from other districts. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 207–08 (1962). By contrast, “no single voter is specifically disadvantaged” if
a vote is counted improperly, even if the error might have a “mathematical impact
on the final tally and thus on the proportional effect of every vote.” Bognet v. Sec’y
Commonwealth of Pa., __ F.3d __, 2020 WL 6686120, at *12 (3d Cir. Nov. 13,
2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Vote dilution in this context is a
“paradigmatic generalized grievance that cannot support standing.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Wood’s second theory—that Georgia “value[d] one person’s vote over that
of another” through “arbitrary and disparate treatment”—fares no better. He argues
that Georgia treats absentee voters as a “preferred class” compared to those who
vote in person, both by the terms of the settlement agreement and in practice. In his
view, all voters were bound by law before the settlement agreement, but the rules
for absentee voting now run afoul of the law, while in-person voters remain bound
by the law. And he asserts that in practice Georgia has favored absentee voters
because there were “numerous irregularities” in the processing and recounting of
absentee ballots. Setting aside the fact that “[i]t is an individual voter’s choice
whether to vote by mail or in person,” Bognet, 2020 WL 6686120, at *15, these
complaints are generalized grievances. Even if we assume that absentee voters are
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favored over in-person voters, that harm does not affect Wood as an individual—it
is instead shared identically by the four million or so Georgians who voted in
person this November. “[W]hen the asserted harm is . . . shared in substantially
equal measure by . . . a large class of citizens,” it is not a particularized injury.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). And irregularities in the tabulation of
election results do not affect Wood differently from any other person. His
allegation, at bottom, remains “that the law . . . has not been followed.” Dillard v.
Chilton Cnty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lance v.
Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007)).
Wood’s attempts to liken his injury to those we have found sufficient in
other appeals fall short. In Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, we ruled that
“[r]equiring a registered voter either to produce photo identification to vote in
person or to cast an absentee or provisional ballot is an injury sufficient for
standing.” 554 F.3d 1340, 1351–52 (11th Cir. 2009). But the injury there was the
burden of producing photo identification, not the existence of separate rules for in-
person and absentee voters. Id. And the burden to produce photo identification
affected each voter in a personal way. For example, some plaintiffs in Common
Cause alleged that they “would be required to make a special trip” to obtain valid
identification “that is not required of voters who have driver’s licenses or
passports.” Id. at 1351 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, even Wood
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agrees that he is affected by Georgia’s alleged violations of the law in the same
way as every other Georgia voter. “This injury is precisely the kind of
undifferentiated, generalized grievance that the Supreme Court has warned must
not be countenanced.” Dillard, 495 F.3d at 1335 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Roe v. Alabama ex rel. Evans, 43 F.3d 574, also does not support Wood’s
argument for standing. In Roe, we ruled that the post-election inclusion of
previously excluded absentee ballots would violate the substantive-due-process
rights of Alabama voters and two political candidates. Id. at 579–81. But no party
raised and we did not address standing in Roe, so that precedent provides no basis
for Wood to establish standing. Cf. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n.2 (1996)
(noting that in cases where “standing was neither challenged nor discussed . . . the
existence of unaddressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect”). And
Wood’s purported injury is far more general than the voters’ injury in Roe. The
voters in Roe bore individual burdens—to obtain notarization or witness signatures
if they wanted to vote absentee—that state courts post-election retroactively
permitted other voters to ignore. Roe, 43 F.3d at 580–81. In contrast, Georgia
applied uniform rules, established before the election, to all voters, who could
choose between voting in person or by absentee ballot, and Wood asserts that the
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effect of those rules harmed the electorate collectively. That alleged harm is not a
particularized injury.
Wood suggested in his amended complaint that his status as a donor
contributed to standing and aligned his interests with those of the Georgia
Republican Party. But he forfeited this argument when he failed to raise it in his
opening brief. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1335 (11th Cir.
2004); see also Nat’l All. for the Mentally Ill v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 376 F.3d
1292, 1296 (11th Cir. 2004) (ruling standing claims forfeited for failure to comply
with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure). And the donor argument fails on
its own terms. True, a donor can establish standing based on injuries that flow from
his status as a donor. See, e.g., Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941 F.3d 1116, 1125
(11th Cir. 2019). But donors, like voters, “have no judicially enforceable interest in
the outcome of an election.” Jacobson, 974 F.3d at 1246. Nor does a donation give
the donor a legally cognizable interest in the proper administration of elections.
Any injury to Wood based on election irregularities must flow from his status as a
voter, unrelated to his donations. And that fact returns him to the stumbling block
of particularization.
“[T]he ‘injury in fact’ test requires . . . that the party seeking review be
himself among the injured.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Wood’s allegations suggest that various nonparties might have a
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particularized injury. For example, perhaps a candidate or political party would
have standing to challenge the settlement agreement or other alleged irregularities.
Or perhaps election monitors would have standing to sue if they were denied
access to the recount. But Wood cannot place himself in the stead of these groups,
even if he supports them. Cf. Glanton ex rel. ALCOA Prescription Drug Plan v.
AdvancePCS Inc., 465 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that
“associational standing . . . does not operate in reverse,” so a member cannot
represent an association). He is at most a “concerned bystander.” Koziara v. City of
Casselberry, 392 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). So he is not “entitled to have the court[s] decide the merits of [his]
dispute.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 498.
B. Wood’s Requested Relief Concerning the 2020 General Election Is Moot.
Even if Wood had standing, several of his requests for relief are barred by
another jurisdictional defect: mootness. We are “not empowered to decide moot
questions.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “An issue is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy
with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Christian Coal. of
Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (alteration
rejected) (internal quotation marks omitted). And an issue can become moot at any
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stage of litigation, even if there was a live case or controversy when the lawsuit
began. Id. at 1189–90.
Wood asked for several kinds of relief in his emergency motion, but most of
his requests pertained to the 2020 election results. He moved the district court to
prohibit either the certification of the election results or certification that included
the disputed absentee ballots. He also asked the district court to order a new hand
recount and to grant Republican election monitors greater access during both the
recount and the January runoff election. But after the district court denied Wood’s
motion, Secretary Raffensperger certified the election results on November 20.
And Governor Kemp certified the slate of presidential electors later that day.
Because Georgia has already certified its results, Wood’s requests to delay
certification and commence a new recount are moot. “We cannot turn back the
clock and create a world in which” the 2020 election results are not certified.
Fleming v. Gutierrez, 785 F.3d 442, 445 (10th Cir. 2015). And it is not possible for
us to delay certification nor meaningful to order a new recount when the results are
already final and certified. Cf. Tropicana Prods. Sales, Inc. v. Phillips Brokerage
Co., 874 F.2d 1581, 1582 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n appeal from the denial of a
motion for preliminary injunction is mooted when the requested effective end-date
for the preliminary injunction has passed.”). Nor can we reconstrue Wood’s
previous request that we temporarily prohibit certification into a new request that
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we undo the certification. A district court “must first have the opportunity to pass
upon [every] issue,” so we may not consider requests for relief made for the first
time on appeal. S.F. Residence Club, Inc. v. 7027 Old Madison Pike, LLC, 583
F.3d 750, 755 (11th Cir. 2009).
Wood’s arguments reflect a basic misunderstanding of what mootness is. He
argues that the certification does not moot anything “because this litigation is
ongoing” and he remains injured. But mootness concerns the availability of relief,
not the existence of a lawsuit or an injury. Fla. Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water
Mgmt. Dist., 647 F.3d 1296, 1304 (11th Cir. 2011). So even if post-election
litigation is not always mooted by certification, see, e.g., Siegel v. LePore, 234
F.3d 1163, 1172–73 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc), Wood’s particular requests are
moot. Wood is right that certification does not moot his requests for relief
concerning the 2021 runoff—although Wood’s lack of standing still forecloses our
consideration of those requests—but the pendency of other claims for relief cannot
rescue the otherwise moot claims. See, e.g., Adler v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 112
F.3d 1475, 1478–79, 1481 (11th Cir. 1997) (instructing the district court to dismiss
moot claims but resolving other claims on the merits). Wood finally tells us that
President Trump has also requested a recount, but that fact is irrelevant to whether
Wood’s requests remain live.
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Nor does any exception to mootness apply. True, we often review otherwise-
moot election appeals because they are “capable of repetition yet evading review.”
ACLU v. The Fla. Bar, 999 F.2d 1486, 1496 (11th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted). We may apply this exception when “(1) the challenged action was
in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and
(2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be
subjected to the same action again.” Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Commc’ns Workers of
Am., 860 F.2d 1022, 1023 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423
U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). But we will not apply this exception if there is “some
alternative vehicle through which a particular policy may effectively be subject to”
complete review. Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2004).
The “capable of repetition yet evading review” exception does not save
Wood’s appeal because there is no “reasonable expectation” that Wood will again
face the issues in this appeal. Based on the posture of this appeal, the challenged
action is the denial of an emergency injunction against the certification of election
results. See Fleming, 785 F.3d at 446 (explaining that whether the issues in an
interlocutory appeal are “capable of repetition, yet evading review” is a separate
question from whether the issues in the overall lawsuit are capable of doing so).
That denial is the decision we would review but for the jurisdictional problems.
But Wood cannot satisfy the requirement that there be a “reasonable expectation”
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that he will again seek to delay certification. Wood does not suggest that this
situation might recur. Cf. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 463–64
(2007). And we have no reason to think it would: he is a private citizen, so the
possibility of a recurrence is purely theoretical. Cf. Hall v. Sec’y, Ala., 902 F.3d
1294, 1305 (11th Cir. 2018).
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the denial of Wood’s motion for emergency relief.
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