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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 20-12320
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-14157-RLR
SANDRA SHEPHERD,
EARL SHEPHERD,
individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
U.S. BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
As Trustee for Structured Asset Investment
Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
Services 2005-4,
DOES 1-10,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(December 9, 2020)
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Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sandra and Earl Shepherd appeal the district court’s dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction of their civil suit against U.S. Bank, National
Association. Although the district court erred in relying on the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, 1 we affirm because we conclude the district court appropriately abstained
from exercising its jurisdiction under the Younger2 abstention doctrine.
The Shepherds filed a complaint against U.S. Bank seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief to prevent the foreclosure on a residential property located in
Florida and to quiet title. The Shepherds alleged that they inherited the property
and that the property was secured by a mortgage currently held by U.S. Bank.
According to the Shepherds, U.S. Bank unilaterally modified the mortgage loan
contract in a scheme to defraud the borrower, and therefore the modified contract
was unenforceable as a matter of law. The Shepherds acknowledged in the
underlying complaint that a Florida state court had entered a judgment against
them in a foreclosure proceeding concerning the property, and that they were
currently appealing that judgment to the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal.
1
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1986) (doctrine that precludes federal courts from reviewing
state court judgments).
2
Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971) (providing that generally federal courts will not
interfere with pending state judicial proceedings).
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Among the relief sought, the Shepherds requested that the district court declare the
contract unenforceable, issue an injunction that prohibited the scheduled sale of the
property until the merits of this case could be decided, order disgorgement of all
the profits obtained by U.S. Bank as a result of the sale or use of the plaintiffs’
personal information, and quiet title.
The district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The Shepherds filed a
motion for reconsideration, arguing that their complaint was not barred by the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine because they were precluded from raising these defenses
in the state foreclosure action due to the state court’s grant of U.S. Bank’s motion
in limine. They maintained that the district court could entertain the complaint
because the injury they were complaining of was not caused by the foreclosure
judgment and they were not seeking review or rejection of the state-court
judgment. The district court entered a paperless order denying the motion for
reconsideration. The Shepherds appeal the order dismissing the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and the denial of the motion for reconsideration.
“We review dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo.”
Nicholson v. Shafe,
558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). “We review the denial
of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of discretion.” Richardson v.
Johnson,
598 F.3d 734, 740 (11th Cir. 2010).
3
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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a jurisdictional rule that precludes federal
district courts from reviewing final state court judgments. Lozman v. City of
Riviera Beach,
713 F.3d 1066, 1072 (11th Cir. 2013). The doctrine “is confined to
cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered
before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Following Exxon Mobil, we held that where an appeal
of the state court judgment remains pending at the time the plaintiffs commence
their federal action, the “state court proceedings have not ended for purposes of
Rooker-Feldman.” Nicholson,
558 F.3d at 1279. At the time of the filing of the
Shepherds’ complaint in the district court, the state foreclosure proceedings in the
Florida courts remained pending on appeal and therefore Rooker-Feldman did not
divest the district court of jurisdiction.
Id. Accordingly, the district court’s
reliance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was error.
Nevertheless, we conclude that dismissal of the action was appropriate under
the Younger abstention doctrine. While this abstention doctrine applies most often
in cases involving pending state criminal prosecutions, the Supreme Court has
extended it to apply to pending “state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal
prosecutions, or that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and
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judgments of its courts.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,
571 U.S. 69, 72–73
(2013) (internal citation omitted). Abstention under Younger is appropriate when:
(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with ongoing state judicial proceedings;
(2) the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the plaintiffs
have an adequate state remedy available. 31 Foster Children v. Bush,
329 F.3d 1255,
1274–75 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm’n v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n,
457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). We must “assume that state procedures will afford
an adequate remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Id.
at 1279 (quoting Pennzoil Co v. Texaco, Inc.,
481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987)). The plaintiffs
bear the burden of overcoming this presumption “by demonstrating that the state
remedies are inadequate.”
Id.
In this case, the requested relief of an injunction preventing the foreclosure
sale and quiet title would unduly interfere with the ongoing state foreclosure
proceedings in numerous ways and would effectively nullify the state trial court
foreclosure judgment. The state has a legitimate interest in the validity of its
judgments as well as an important state interest in determining disputes that affect
title to Florida property. See Sprint Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 73; Pennzoil,
481 U.S.
at 13. Although the Shepherds claim that they were not able to present the
arguments they assert in the underlying federal complaint in the state court because
the state court granted U.S. Bank’s motion in limine to exclude these arguments,
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an adverse ruling in state court proceedings does not mean that they do not have an
adequate state remedy. 3 The Shepherds have not met their burden of
demonstrating that the state remedies are inadequate. See 31 Foster Children,
329
F.3d at 1279–81.
Accordingly, because dismissal of the action was appropriate, albeit under
the Younger abstention doctrine instead of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, we
affirm. Finally, it follows necessarily that, because dismissal was appropriate
under the Younger abstention doctrine, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion for reconsideration.
AFFIRMED.
3
Indeed, allowing parallel federal litigation to raise defenses concerning the Florida
property that the state trial court excluded in the state foreclosure proceedings would allow the
Shepherds to circumvent the state judicial process itself, which further demonstrates why
abstention is appropriate under the facts of this case. See Pennzoil,
481 U.S. at 12–14
(discussing state’s interest in administering their judicial systems).
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