Francisco Ezequiel Guerrero-Cruz v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2020 )


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  •        USCA11 Case: 20-11247    Date Filed: 12/10/2020      Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 20-11247
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    Agency No. A205-005-849
    FRANCISCO EZEQUIEL GUERRERO-CRUZ,
    a.k.a. FRANCESCO EZEQUIEL CRUZ,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ________________________
    (December 10, 2020)
    USCA11 Case: 20-11247      Date Filed: 12/10/2020   Page: 2 of 6
    Before MARTIN, BRANCH, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Francisco Guerrero-Cruz (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Mexico,
    petitions for review of the order by Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
    affirming the decision of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”). The IJ’s decision denied
    Petitioner’s application for cancellation of removal. No reversible error has been
    shown; we dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
    In July 2011, the Department of Homeland Security served Petitioner with a
    Notice to Appear. The notice charged Petitioner as removable under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the United States without having been
    admitted or paroled.
    Petitioner, through his lawyer, conceded removability. Petitioner later
    applied for cancellation of removal, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). In his
    application, Petitioner listed his two minor children (each of whom is a United
    States citizen) as qualifying relatives who would suffer hardship if Petitioner were
    removed.
    2
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    Following a hearing, the IJ denied Petitioner’s application for cancellation of
    removal. In pertinent part, the IJ determined that Petitioner had failed to
    demonstrate that his removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual
    hardship” to Petitioner’s children.1 The IJ found that -- although Petitioner’s
    children would experience some hardship by moving to Mexico -- such hardship
    would be limited to the “type of hardship that normally results from an alien’s
    deportation.” The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. 2
    We review de novo our subject matter jurisdiction. See Martinez v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    446 F.3d 1219
    , 1221 (11th Cir. 2006).
    The Attorney General has discretion to cancel the removal of an alien who
    shows, among other things, that “removal would result in exceptional and
    extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s . . . child, who is a citizen of the United
    States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
    1
    The IJ also determined that Petitioner had failed to show that he had resided continuously in the
    United States for at least ten years, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). Because the BIA
    declined expressly to address the continuous-physical-presence issue, that issue is not before us
    in this appeal. See Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    820 F.3d 399
    , 403 (11th Cir. 2016) (“We do not
    consider issues that were not reached by the BIA.”).
    2
    In addition to affirming the IJ’s decision on the merits, the BIA rejected Petitioner’s arguments
    (1) that a remand was necessary so that Petitioner could pursue a “U” visa, and (2) that Petitioner
    was deprived of due process based on the IJ’s denial of a continuance, his lawyer’s deficient
    performance, and missing transcripts from two master calendar hearings. Because Petitioner
    raises no challenge to the BIA’s ruling on these issues on appeal, those claims are not before us.
    3
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    Congress has precluded judicial review of “any judgment regarding the
    granting of relief under section . . . 1229b” -- including cancellation of removal --
    “except to the extent that such review involves constitutional claims or questions
    of law.” See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(B), (D); Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    971 F.3d 1258
    , 1262 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). To invoke our jurisdiction under section
    1252(a)(2)(D), a petitioner must allege a colorable constitutional or legal
    challenge. Patel, 971 F.3d at 1275.
    Because Petitioner seeks to challenge the BIA’s discretionary denial of
    cancellation of removal, we may review his petition only to the extent Petitioner
    raises a constitutional claim or question of law.
    On appeal, Petitioner argues that the IJ and the BIA failed to consider
    properly whether his children would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual
    hardship.” In deciding whether the hardship standard has been met, the IJ and the
    BIA consider “in the aggregate” the pertinent circumstances of the qualifying
    relative. In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 
    23 I. & N. Dec. 56
    , 64 (BIA 2001). Factors that
    might be considered include (1) the qualifying relative’s age, health, and
    educational needs; (2) whether the qualifying relative would experience “[a] lower
    standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return”; and (3)
    4
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    whether the qualifying relative would lose a family support system. See 
    id. at 63
    ;
    In re Gonzalez Recinas, 
    23 I. & N. Dec. 467
    , 470-71 (BIA 2002).
    Petitioner contends that he demonstrated sufficient hardship based on his
    children’s ages, limited Spanish proficiency, their mother’s health concerns, and
    the decreased standard of living they would experience if moved to Mexico.
    Petitioner says the IJ and the BIA considered in isolation each of these hardship
    factors but never discussed or “dedicate[d] any analysis” to the impact of these
    factors “in the aggregate.” When considered together, Petitioner says the total
    weight of these factors would “crush” his children.
    Petitioner characterizes his argument as raising a question of law: that the IJ
    and the BIA applied an incorrect legal standard. We disagree. Although Petitioner
    couches his argument as a legal question, Petitioner in effect challenges the weight
    given to the pertinent hardship factors and the adequacy of the IJ’s and BIA’s
    explanations. We have stressed that a petitioner may not create jurisdiction merely
    by “dress[ing] up a claim with legal or constitutional clothing.” See Patel, 971
    F.3d at 1272; see also Fynn v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    752 F.3d 1250
    , 1252-53 (11th Cir.
    2014) (rejecting a petitioner’s attempt to characterize his claim as a legal question:
    challenges to the “relative weight accorded to the evidence . . . is a ‘garden-variety
    5
    USCA11 Case: 20-11247       Date Filed: 12/10/2020   Page: 6 of 6
    abuse of discretion argument’ that is insufficient to state a legal claim over which
    we have jurisdiction under § 1252(a)(2)(D).”).
    Because Petitioner has raised no legal or constitutional challenge to the
    BIA’s denial of cancellation of removal, we lack jurisdiction to review the petition.
    PETITION DISMISSED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-11247

Filed Date: 12/10/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/10/2020