Wilma Gibbs-Matthews vs Fulton County School District , 429 F. App'x 892 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14296 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JUNE 10, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-01517-RWS
WILMA GIBBS-MATTHEWS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellant
versus
FULTON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 10, 2011)
Before EDMONDSON, BARKETT and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wilma Gibbs-Matthews, a black female, appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of Fulton County School District (“FCSD”) on her
discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 3(a).1
I. DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
In her brief on appeal, Gibbs-Matthews’s statement of the issues does not
include any challenge to the district court’s ruling on her discrimination claims,
and is limited to the district court’s ruling on her retaliation claims. She argues at
the conclusion of her brief, without any further explanation, that “the summary
judgment as to Gibbs-Matthews’ race and sex discrimination claims was plain
error,” and that such “error in assessing evidence of discrimination is plain from
the facts of the case.” (Blue Br. at 41.) However, she fails to provide any
reasoning in support of this assertion, and thus has not sufficiently raised a
challenge to these claims on appeal. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881
F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989) (declining to address the merits of an appeal
where the appellate brief elaborated no arguments on the merits as to why the
court was in error). Moreover, even if we were to construe Gibbs-Matthews’s
1
This Court reviews a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo,
viewing all of the facts in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moton
v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011).
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brief as sufficiently raising this issue on appeal, we find no reversible error on this
record in the district court’s grant of summary judgment to FCSD on Gibbs-
Matthews’s discrimination claims.
II. RETALIATION CLAIMS
Gibbs-Matthews also appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
on her claims that the FCSD retaliated against her for filing a discrimination
complaint with the EEOC by (1) denying her a promotion; (2) reassigning her to a
“temporary” position; and (3) telling a prospective employer not to hire her.
In order to establish a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII, a
claimant generally must show, among other things, that she suffered a materially
adverse action of a type that would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging
in statutorily protected activity. Burlington N. and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548
U.S. 53, 57 (2006). Moreover, there must be “a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Morgan v. City of Jasper,
959 F.2d 1542, 1547 (11th Cir. 1992).
We find no reversible error in the district court’s grant of summary
judgment on Gibbs-Matthews’s retaliation claims based on the denial of a
promotion or her reassignment to an allegedly temporary position. Gibbs-
Matthews has failed to demonstrate that these incidents constituted materially
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adverse employment actions of a type that would dissuade a reasonable employee
from filing an EEOC discrimination charge. As to the promotion, Gibbs-
Matthews testified that FCSD did not forbid her from applying for the position in
question, but rather that she voluntarily refused to do so because she was insulted
by the notion of having to apply. As to the reassignment to an allegedly temporary
position, the record reflects that her new position was not actually temporary, but
simply had a different, voter-approved source of funding. We find no reversible
error in the district court’s determination that a reasonable employee would not be
dissuaded from filing an EEOC charge merely because the source of funding for
her position changed to one that was approved by voters—particularly where, as
here, her salary, benefits, and duties did not substantially change. Moreover, even
though the funding for her position had the potential to expire in 2012, nothing in
the record suggests that FCSD would not obtain funding from another source, or
would terminate her in the event of expiration.
Finally, as to Gibbs-Matthews’s claim that FCSD retaliated against her by
informing a potential employer not to hire her, the district court concluded that
FCSD was entitled to summary judgment on this claim because it was never raised
in Gibbs-Matthews’s complaint, but rather was raised for the first time in response
to summary judgment. See Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald and Co., 382 F.3d 1312,
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1315 (11th Cir.2004) (holding that plaintiffs are not permitted to raise new claims
for relief at the summary judgment stage). The district court also found that FCSD
was entitled to summary judgment on the merits of this claim because the record
did not support the conclusion that the comment made to Gibbs-Matthews’s
prospective employer was related to her filing of an EEOC discrimination charge.2
On this record, we cannot say the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to FCSD on this retaliation claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
FCSD is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
2
Patrick Burke, Chief of Operations at FCSD, allegedly told a prospective employer that
it would be best not to hire Gibbs-Matthews for work involving Fulton County Schools while a
lawsuit was pending between Gibbs-Matthews and FCSD, and that it should consider hiring her
instead for a different opportunity. However, Gibbs-Matthews had not yet filed her Title VII
lawsuit at the time the statement was made, but had filed a different lawsuit in Dekalb County
alleging slander, tortious interference with contractual and/or business relations, and violations of
Georgia RICO. Thus, the district court found that the record did not support the conclusion that
Mr. Burke’s comment was related to Gibbs-Matthews’s discrimination claims.
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