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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-13373
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cv-00449-MW-MAF
CAMARA BAIYINA NJERI TUNSILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION,
MICHAEL BRYAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(July 21, 2021)
Before MARTIN, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Camara Tunsill, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of
her complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court based its dismissal on
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several independent grounds. Because Tunsill fails to challenge each of those
independent grounds for dismissal on appeal, we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting
the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Young Apartments, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, Fla.,
529 F.3d
1027, 1037 (11th Cir. 2008). We hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard
and construe them more liberally than those drafted by attorneys. Waldman v.
Conway,
871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017). But “a pro se pleading must still
suggest that there is at least some factual support for a claim.”
Id. And we will deem
abandoned any issues that a pro se litigant fails to brief on appeal.
Id.
“To obtain reversal of a district court judgment that is based on multiple,
independent grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated ground for the
judgment against [her] is incorrect.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d
678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). If a party fails to challenge any one of those independent
grounds on appeal, she has abandoned any challenge on that ground, and “it follows
that the judgment is due to be affirmed.”
Id.
The district court concluded that Tunsill failed to plausibly allege that her due
process rights were violated by either Bryan or Corcoran. It rested its decision on
several independent grounds. As to Bryan, the district court held that (1) Tunsill
failed to allege any facts showing how Bryan was involved in the events supporting
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her due process claim; (2) as school principal, Bryan lacked the legal authority to
either suspend or dismiss Tunsill as an employee; (3) Tunsill did not have a protected
interest in communicating with teachers and parents or visiting school property; (4)
she did not request any relief from Bryan in the complaint; and (5) the evidence that
Tunsill attached to her complaint proves that her due process claim is insufficient as
a matter of law. As to Corcoran, the district court held that (1) he could not be held
liable for any events occurring before he began his employment as Commissioner of
Education, and (2) the documents attached to the complaint contradict Tunsill’s
assertions against him because she was afforded due process when she elected to
have a formal hearing.
Tunsill fails to challenge many of these independent grounds for dismissal on
appeal. As for her allegations against Bryan, Tunsill does not argue on appeal that
(1) she alleged specific facts showing how Bryan was involved in the events
supporting her due process claim, (2) he had the authority to suspend or dismiss her
as an employee, or (3) she requested any relief from him in the complaint. Tunsill
also fails to argue that Corcoran is liable for any events occurring before his
employment as commissioner, despite her claim that she was denied due process
before that point. In fact, she refers to Corcoran only once in her argument when
alleging that he is a state actor under Section 1983 who participated in the
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deprivation of her due process rights. Because Tunsill failed to challenge the grounds
of the district court’s decision, we affirm. See Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
AFFIRMED.
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