Kathryn Joye v. Secretary Department of Navy ( 2018 )


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  •             Case: 17-13071   Date Filed: 06/13/2018   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-13071
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:16-cv-00393-MCR-CJK
    KATHRYN JOYE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF NAVY,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (June 13, 2018)
    Before JULIE CARNES, JILL PRYOR and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 17-13071     Date Filed: 06/13/2018   Page: 2 of 7
    Kathryn Joye appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
    Secretary of the Department of Navy (the “Navy”) in her employment
    discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
    29 U.S.C. § 621
    et seq. Joye argues that, although her complaint was filed one day after the
    applicable deadline, exceptional circumstances warranted equitable tolling. After
    careful review, we affirm.
    I.
    Joye filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    (“EEOC”) after she was passed over for an operations manager position in the
    Navy’s Morale, Welfare and Recreation Program. On May 12, 2016, Joye
    received an unfavorable decision from the EEOC. The decision notified her that
    she had 90 days to file a civil action against the Navy in federal court. On August
    10, 2016, the 90th day, Joye completed and signed a pro se complaint against the
    Navy. She became concerned about driving 25 minutes to the courthouse in the
    hard rain that day, so she researched online whether she could mail the complaint
    on the due date or whether it needed to be hand delivered. Because Joye was
    unable to find the answer online, she called the Clerk of Court for the Northern
    District of Florida to ask if she could mail the complaint on the due date.
    2
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    Joye explained to the woman who answered the phone that she had a filing
    due that day and asked if she could mail the document or if it had to be hand
    delivered. The woman responded that she could mail the document as long as it
    was postmarked the day of the deadline.1 Joye gave the complaint to her husband,
    who put it in the mail that day. The Clerk’s Office received the complaint, which
    was postmarked August 10, 2016, on August 11, 2016, one day after the deadline.
    The Navy filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that it had not
    been timely filed. Joye argued in response that her case warranted equitable
    tolling. She attached exhibits including an affidavit and a copy of the Northern
    District of Florida’s instructions for pro se litigants filing an employment
    discrimination claim, which discussed the 90-day period in which to file a suit but
    did not indicate when a complaint would be deemed filed.
    The district court entered an order noting that it would construe the motion
    as one for summary judgment because the court would have to consider matters
    outside of the pleadings and providing the parties 30 days for discovery on the
    issue of whether Joye was entitled to equitable tolling of the filing deadline. After
    the discovery period ended, the court granted the Navy’s motion. In its order, the
    district court found that Joye had not diligently pursued her rights because she
    1
    The Navy filed a declaration from the Clerk of Court explaining that a document was
    considered filed when the office received and marked it and denying that any employee had
    spoken to Joye or advised any caller that a complaint was considered filed on the date it was
    mailed. At this stage in the proceedings, however, we resolve all disputes of fact in the
    plaintiff’s favor. Lee v. Ferraro, 
    284 F.3d 1188
    , 1190 (11th Cir. 2002).
    3
    Case: 17-13071        Date Filed: 06/13/2018       Page: 4 of 7
    waited until the final day of the filing period to research how to file her complaint.
    This is Joye’s appeal.
    II.
    We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss. Hunt v. Aimco Props.,
    L.P., 
    814 F.3d 1213
    , 1221 (11th Cir. 2016). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
    provide that a motion to dismiss shall be treated as a motion for summary
    judgment if the movant presents matters outside the pleadings to the court. Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 12(d). When a district court converts a motion to dismiss into one for
    summary judgment, the court is required, as it did here, to give “notice to the
    parties and an opportunity for mutual discovery.” Adinolfe v. United Techs. Corp.,
    
    768 F.3d 1161
    , 1168 (11th Cir. 2014).
    We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, drawing all inferences
    in favor of the nonmoving party. Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, 
    683 F.3d 1283
    ,
    1291-92 (11th Cir. 2012). Additionally, “the question of whether equitable tolling
    applies is a legal one subject to de novo review.” Booth v. Carnival Corp., 
    522 F.3d 1148
    , 1149 (11th Cir. 2008).2
    2
    Our prior cases have reviewed district court decisions about the application of equitable
    tolling under both abuse of discretion and de novo standards of review. Compare Arce v.
    Garcia, 
    434 F.3d 1254
    , 1260 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying abuse of discretion standard of review)
    with Booth, 
    522 F.3d at 1149
     (applying de novo standard of review) and Miranda v. B&B Cash
    Grocery Store, Inc., 
    975 F.2d 1518
    , 1531 (11th Cir. 1992) (“The question of whether or not
    equitable tolling applies is a legal one and thus is subject to de novo review . . . .”).
    When our prior panel decisions conflict, we are bound to follow the oldest one. See
    United States v. Steele, 
    147 F.3d 1316
    , 1318 (11th Cir.1998) (en banc) (“It is the firmly
    4
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    III.
    On appeal, Joye admits that her complaint was filed one day late, but argues
    that extraordinary circumstances warranted the application of equitable tolling to
    the filing deadline. We disagree. Because Joye has failed to show that she
    diligently pursued her rights, she is not entitled to equitable tolling.
    A plaintiff has 90 days to file an employment discrimination lawsuit after
    receiving the EEOC’s notice of right to sue. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The
    lawsuit is considered filed on the date the clerk receives the complaint. See
    Robinson v. City of Fairfield, 
    750 F.2d 1507
    , 1509 n.2 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[F]or
    purposes of determining whether the plaintiff commenced this Title VII action
    within the required 90-day period, we look only to the date on which the clerk
    actually received the application.”).
    Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy that should be extended
    sparingly. Chang v. Carnival Corp, 
    839 F.3d 993
    , 996 (11th Cir. 2016). The
    general test for equitable tolling, which applies to employment discrimination
    lawsuits, is that the party seeking tolling must prove that (1) she has been pursuing
    her rights diligently and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in her way and
    established rule of this Circuit that each succeeding panel is bound by the holding of the first
    panel to address an issue of law, unless and until that holding is overruled en banc, or by the
    Supreme Court.” (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we are
    bound to follow our decision in Miranda and review whether equitable tolling applies under a de
    novo standard.
    5
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    prevented her from timely filing. Villareal v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
    839 F.3d 958
    , 971 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert denied, 
    137 S. Ct. 2292
     (2017).
    Due diligence, therefore “is a necessary, though not sufficient prerequisite
    that a plaintiff must satisfy.” Chang, 839 F.3d at 996. “In addition, the interests of
    justice on which a tardy plaintiff relies do not support a plaintiff who has not filed
    her action in a timely fashion despite knowing or being in a position reasonably to
    know that the limitations period is running.” Id. (alterations adopted) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff has the burden to show that equitable
    tolling is warranted. Id.
    Joye asserts that she diligently pursued her rights because she researched
    whether the complaint would be timely if mailed and when she could not find the
    answer online, she called the Clerk’s Office. But despite knowing when the
    deadline was, see id., Joye waited until the last day to complete the complaint and
    research how to file it. Further, she has provided no explanation for why she failed
    to complete her complaint earlier in the 90-day period, so that she would have
    sufficient time to investigate the rule for timely filing. Cf. Sandvik v. United
    States, 
    177 F.3d 1269
    , 1272 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding, in the habeas corpus
    context, that equitable tolling was not warranted where late-filed motion had been
    sent by ordinary mail less than a week before deadline because petitioner’s counsel
    “could have avoided [the late filing] by mailing the motion earlier”). Joye thus has
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    failed to show that she diligently pursued her rights when she waited until the 90th,
    and last, day of the deadline to complete her complaint and research how to file it.
    Even assuming, as Joye argues, that the incorrect information she received
    from the Clerk’s Office regarding how to file a document on its due date
    constituted extraordinary circumstances beyond her control, 3 her lack of diligence
    precludes a determination that she is entitled to equitable tolling. The district court
    therefore did not err in granting summary judgment to the Navy.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    Joye also argues that extraordinary circumstances prevented her from meeting the
    deadline because neither the notice she received from the EEOC nor the U.S. District Court for
    the Northern District of Florida’s “Instructions for Pro Se Litigants Filing an Employment
    Discrimination Complaint” instructed that a complaint is considered filed when it is received by
    the court. But there is nothing “extraordinary” about these documents, especially given that
    other pro se litigants seeking to file discrimination complaints receive the same standard
    documents and manage to timely file their complaints. “Moreover, this Court has defined
    ‘extraordinary circumstances’ narrowly, and ignorance of the law does not, on its own, satisfy”
    the standard. Jackson v. Astrue, 
    506 F.3d 1349
    , 1356 (11th Cir. 2007).
    7