Tajrick Conaway v. United States , 184 F. App'x 890 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 19, 2006
No. 05-14969 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket Nos. 04-00018-CV-DF-7
and 00-00004-CR-WDO
TAJRICK CONAWAY,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(June 19, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Federal prisoner Tajrick Conaway appeals the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), governs this appeal because Conaway filed his
motion after the AEDPA’s enactment. In his motion to vacate, Conaway claims
that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and other constitutional
violations. We granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) on the following
issue only:
Whether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 938
(11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by failing to address appellant’s claims
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) advise him that it was
possible for him to enter a conditional guilty plea; and (2) object to
the amount of drugs for which he was held responsible.
When reviewing the district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion, we review
questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error. Lynn v. United States,
365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 891, 125 S.
Ct. 167, 160 L. Ed. 2d 154 (2004). The scope of review is limited to the issues
specified in the COA. Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1250-51 (11th Cir.
1998) (per curiam).
Expressing “deep concern over the piecemeal litigation of federal habeas
petitions” in Clisby, we exercised our supervisory authority to require that district
courts resolve all claims for relief raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus
2
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, regardless of whether habeas relief is granted or denied.
Clisby, 960 F.2d at 935-36. We explained that, when a district court does not
address all claims presented in a habeas petition, we will “vacate the district court’s
judgment without prejudice and remand the case for consideration of all remaining
claims.” Id. at 938.1 Although Conaway’s habeas proceeding is one under § 2255
rather than § 2254, we have noted that the principles developed in § 2254
proceedings likewise apply to motions under § 2255. Gay v. United States, 816
F.2d 614, 616 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).2 We have also have vacated and
remanded a district court’s one-sentence denial of a § 2255 motion so that the
district court could “provide further explanation of its ruling in order to provide
this court with a sufficient basis for review.” Broadwater v. United States, 292
F.3d 1302, 1303 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (internal quotes omitted).
After carefully reviewing the record and considering the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court failed to address adequately Conaway’s claim that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that he could seek to enter a
1
“Policy considerations clearly favor the contemporaneous consideration of allegations of
constitutional violations grounded in the same factual basis: a one-proceeding treatment of a
petitioner’s case enables a more thorough review of his claims, thus enhancing the quality of the
judicial product.” Clisby, 960 F.2d at 936 (internal quotes omitted).
2
In fact, we have previously applied Clisby to § 2255 proceedings, though in a non-binding
opinion. See Jernigan v. United States, 11th Cir. 2006 (No. 05-10425, May 2, 2006) (unpublished)
(per curiam).
3
conditional guilty plea while reserving the right to appeal the district court’s
suppression ruling. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). The record does establish,
however, that the district court did address Conaway’s claim that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to the amount of drugs for which he was held
responsible. We therefore vacate and remand solely for the district court to address
the issue of whether Conaway’s former counsel was ineffective for failing to
advise him that it was possible for Conaway to seek to enter a conditional guilty
plea while reserving the right to appeal the district court’s suppression ruling.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
4