United States v. Cepeda Broughton ( 2013 )

Case: 12-14213 Date Filed: 10/09/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-14213
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-00130-AT-LTW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CEPEDA BROUGHTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(October 9, 2013)
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Cepeda Broughton appeals his convictions following his plea of guilty to
armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d), using a firearm during a crime
Case: 12-14213 Date Filed: 10/09/2013 Page: 2 of 4
of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). He argues on appeal that (1) his convictions
under § 922(g)(1) and § 924(c) must be vacated because the reasoning of National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, --- U.S. ----, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 183
L. Ed. 2d 450 (2012), shows that these statutes exceed Congress’ power to regulate
interstate activity under the Commerce Clause; and (2) his § 924(c) conviction
must also be vacated because during his plea colloquy the district court incorrectly
advised him that § 924(c) carries a maximum sentence of life in prison. Upon
review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that Mr. Broughton’s
claims lack merit, and affirm.
In arguing for vacatur of his convictions, Mr. Broughton invites us to
overturn well-settled circuit precedent that squarely forecloses his contentions. We
decline this invitation; the court’s published opinions are binding on subsequent
panels until overruled by our panel sitting en banc or the Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
United States v. Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation
omitted).
We first reject Mr. Broughton’s claim that the Supreme Court’s National
Federation of Independent Business decision renders § 922(g)(1) and § 924(c)
unconstitutional. We have previously ruled that these statutes fall within Congress’
power to regulate interstate activity under the Commerce Clause. We concluded
2
Case: 12-14213 Date Filed: 10/09/2013 Page: 3 of 4
that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional because the government must show a felon
possessed a firearm that traveled in interstate commerce, see United States v. Scott,
263 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2001), and that § 924(c) is constitutional because it
involves the regulation of activity that has an effect on interstate commerce, see
United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1028 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v.
DePace, 120 F.3d 233, 235 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997). Nothing in National Federation
of Independent Business casts doubt on prior our reasoning; the Supreme Court’s
analysis in that case pertains only to whether Congress may “compel” individuals
to become active in interstate commerce, i.e., whether it may regulate inactivity.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2585-93 (opinion of Chief Justice
Roberts), 2644-50 (opinion of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito).
We are also unpersuaded by Mr. Broughton’s argument that the § 924(c)
conviction must be vacated because he was misinformed by the district court that a
violation of the statute carries a maximum sentence of life in prison. Under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(H), a court may only accept a guilty plea after
conveying and making sure the defendant understands “any maximum possible
penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised release” associated
with a plea of guilty. United States v. Tyndale, 209 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir.
2000). Mr. Broughton argues that the maximum sentence he could receive for
pleading guilty to § 924(c) is seven years, a conclusion he contends is supported by
3
Case: 12-14213 Date Filed: 10/09/2013 Page: 4 of 4
“comments by three Supreme Court Justices during the oral argument before the
[sic] that Court in United States v O’Brian, 130 S. Ct. 2169 (2010) . . . .”
Appellant’s Br. at 12. In light of this premise, he asserts the district court violated
Rule 11 by telling him that the maximum penalty under § 924(c) is life in prison.
The problem for Mr. Broughton is that his premise is flawed. Indeed, he concedes
that every circuit to consider the maximum penalty for violating § 924(c) has
concluded that the statute carries a maximum sentence of life in prison. We joined
that group in United States v. Pounds, 230 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2000), and
have not receded from that holding. Accordingly, the district court properly
explained that the maximum sentence for a conviction under § 924(c) is life in
prison.
AFFIRMED.
4