United States v. Jose Manuel Saldana , 273 F. App'x 845 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-16127 April 15, 2008
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 95-00605-CR-PAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSE MANUEL SALDANA,
a.k.a. Emanuel Santa,
a.k.a. John Gotti,
a.k.a. Pye,
a.k.a. Popeye,
a.k.a. Jose Soto,
FRANCISCO SALDANA,
JESUS MOREJON,
QUAMIL HAYWOOD,
DAVID VELEZ,
STEVE HARRIS,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 15, 2008)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Saldana, Francisco Saldana, Jesus Morejon, Steven Harris, Quamil
Haywood, and David Velez, federal prisoners proceeding pro se, appeal the district
court’s denial of their motions to vacate a separation order as moot. The appellants
filed their motions in the Southern District of Florida. In these motions, the
appellants request that the district court lift a separation order so that they may be
confined in the same prison.
As an initial matter, we must determine the statutory authority under which
the appellants were proceeding when they filed their motions in the district court.
The pleadings of pro se litigants should be liberally construed. Gomez-Diaz v.
United States, 433 F.3d 788, 791 (11th Cir. 2005). However, any leniency in the
construction of the pleadings does not allow a court to “rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading to sustain an action.” GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of
Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998). Courts “must look beyond
the labels of motions filed by pro se inmates to interpret them under whatever
statute would provide relief.” Means v. Alabama, 209 F.3d 1241, 1242 (11th Cir.
2000).
This Court has considered an attack by a federal prisoner on his place of
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confinement to be relief sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Ledesma v. United
States, 445 F.2d 1323, 1323–24 (5th Cir. 1971)1 (affirming a district court
construing a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion that attacked the place of confinement as a
§ 2241 petition); see also Beck v. Wilkes, 589 F.2d 901, 902–04 (5th Cir. 1979)
(addressing a § 2241 petition that challenged the transfer of a federal prisoner from
a federal facility in Virginia to a federal facility in Georgia). The appellants are
challenging where they are confined. Thus, the district court should have
construed their motions as federal habeas petitions filed pursuant 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.
Only a court inside the district where the prisoner is confined has
jurisdiction to grant relief pursuant to a § 2241 petition. Ledesma, 445 F.2d at
1324. When the district court enters a judgment on § 2241 petition even though it
lacked jurisdiction over the prisoner, we will vacate the judgement and remand to
the district court with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
Hajduk v. United States, 764 F.2d 795, 796 (11th Cir. 1985). If it is in the interest
of justice, the district court has the alternative of transferring the petition to the
proper district court. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465–67, 82 S.
1
In our en banc decision Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.
1981), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down
prior to October 1, 1981.
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Ct. 913, 915–16 (1962) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)).
None of the petitioners are confined in the Southern District of Florida, so
the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider their § 2241 petitions. See
Ledesma, 445 F.2d at 1324. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and
remand the case back to the district court to dismiss the motions without prejudice
or to transfer the motions to the respective district court where each appellant is
confined.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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