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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-10882
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:16-cv-00231-GKS-KRS
STEVEN GONCALVES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(December 14, 2018)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Steven Goncalves, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from the
order denying his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On
appeal, Goncalves argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion because the district court did not consider all of the necessary factors in
determining whether he established excusable neglect. We agree and remand.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to extend the time for filing a
notice of appeal for abuse of discretion. Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney,
130 F.3d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1997). “A district court abuses its direction if it
applies an incorrect legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect
manner, follows improper procedures in making a determination, or makes
findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Citizens for Police Accountability
Political Comm. v. Browning,
572 F.3d 1213, 1216−17 (11th Cir. 2009) (per
curiam).
A notice of appeal in a civil case is generally timely if it is filed no later than
30 days after the challenged order or judgment is entered on the docket. FED. R.
APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The time for filing a notice of appeal may be extended if (1) a
party moves for an extension within 30 days of the original deadline for filing the
notice of appeal and (2) the moving party shows “excusable neglect or good
cause.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A). The excusable neglect standard applies where
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the need for the extension was caused by something within the movant’s control.
See Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship,
507 U.S. 380, 394
(1993).
In Pioneer, the Supreme Court articulated the standard by which courts
should determine whether excusable neglect has been established under Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9006(b)(1). The Court explained that the
determination of excusable neglect “is at bottom an equitable one, taking account
of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission,” and instructed
courts to consider four factors in determining whether the neglect is excusable,
including: (1) the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party; (2) the length of the
delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay,
including whether it was within the movant’s reasonable control; and (4) whether
the movant acted in good faith.
Id. at 395.
We have since held that the standard articulated in Pioneer applies to the
“excusable neglect” analysis in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). See,
e.g., Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney,
77 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam). The use of a different, stricter standard constitutes an abuse of
discretion.
Id. at 1325 (holding that the district court abused its discretion by
requiring a showing of “unique circumstances” to show excusable neglect, which
could not be met by mere mistakes). We have also held that a district court abuses
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its discretion when it does not consider and apply the Pioneer factors in its analysis
of excusable neglect. Conn. State Dental Ass’n v. Anthem Health Plans, Inc.,
591
F.3d 1337, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009).
Here, the district court did not consider and apply the factors established in
Pioneer in determining whether excusable neglect is present. While the district
court did note that the delay was within the movant’s control, one factor in the
Pioneer analysis, the district court failed to consider both the prejudice to the
nonmoving party and the impact on the administration of justice, the two factors
we have previously recognized as having primary importance in the analysis. See
Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis.,
181 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir.
1999).
The district court’s failure to consider and apply the correct legal standard
and Pioneer factors constitutes an abuse of discretion. For these reasons, we
vacate and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
REMANDED.
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