United States v. Kamarian D. Millender , 635 F. App'x 611 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-10024
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00401-MHT-CSC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
KAMARIAN D. MILLENDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(December 2, 2015)
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Kamarian Deshawn Millender appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea following his conviction for aggravated identity
theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Millender moved to withdraw his guilty
plea before sentencing, arguing that the plea was not knowing and voluntary
because his retained counsel allegedly gave ineffective assistance. On appeal,
Millender argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that his
allegations of ineffective assistance did not present a fair and just reason for
withdrawal of his guilty plea. After careful review, we affirm the denial of
Millender’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
I.
Millender was arrested on February 25, 2014, after police found evidence of
identity theft in his vehicle during a search prompted by an alert from a drug-
detection dog. Millender retained Dustin Fowler as his attorney shortly after his
arrest. On June 19, Millender, with Fowler’s assistance, executed a plea agreement
with the government in which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of aggravated
identity theft charged in a felony information, and to serve the mandatory term of
24 months’ imprisonment for that offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
Millender also executed an “addendum” to the plea agreement in which he agreed
to cooperate with the government’s investigation, including by giving testimony
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against co-conspirators at trial. We refer to both documents collectively as the
“plea agreement” unless a reason exists to distinguish between the two.
The plea agreement also provided, in relevant part, that Millender agreed to
pay restitution as ordered by the court in an amount that included all losses
suffered from his conduct, and not just losses related to the specific count of
conviction. In a factual basis in the plea agreement, Millender admitted that he had
acquired stolen identities through his work as a lab technician at a medical facility
and that he had “victimized approximately 73 individuals and sought to defraud the
IRS out of approximately $536,028,” though only about $18,915 in refunds
actually issued. In exchange for Millender’s plea, the government agreed not to
bring any other charges arising out of the factual basis.
On July 8, a magistrate judge accepted Millender’s guilty plea and
adjudicated him guilty. 1 Before accepting his guilty plea, the magistrate judge
conducted the plea colloquy required by Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. P., to ensure that
Millender’s plea was knowing and voluntary. See United States v. Freixas, 332
F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003) (listing the three core concerns of Rule 11:
(1) that the guilty plea is free from coercion; (2) that the defendant understands the
nature of the charges; and (3) that the defendant knows and understands the
1
Millender consented to have the magistrate judge conduct his plea colloquy and accept
his plea. See United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1331-34 (11th Cir. 2004). But see
Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1071 n.53 (11th Cir. 2014).
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consequences of his guilty plea). To that end, the magistrate judge asked
Millender a series of questions regarding the plea agreement and his decision to
plead guilty, including whether he “had time to read the information and discuss
the charge against [him] with Mr. Fowler”; whether he “underst[oo]d the charge
against [him]”; whether he was “fully satisfied with Mr. Fowler’s representation”;
whether he had “an opportunity to read [the plea agreement] and to fully discuss
the terms of the plea agreement with Mr. Fowler”; and whether he “underst[oo]d
the terms of the plea agreement.” Millender, under oath, responded to each
question affirmatively. Millender also stated that no one had attempted to force
him to plead guilty, and that he was in fact guilty of acquiring stolen identities for
the purpose of filing fraudulent income-tax returns. With these and other
assurances, Millender’s guilty plea was accepted.
Three months later, and a few days before sentencing, Millender wrote a
letter to the district court seeking to withdraw his guilty plea based on the
ineffective assistance of retained counsel. The court allowed retained counsel to
withdraw, appointed new counsel, and then held a hearing on the matter.
At the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Millender claimed
that he was unaware of provisions in his plea agreement relating to his restitution
and cooperation obligations because Fowler did not provide him with the full
agreement. Millender also testified about the circumstances of his arrest and his
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belief that Fowler should have filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from
what Miller viewed as an illegal search of his vehicle.
For his part, Fowler testified that, before Millender signed the agreement, he
discussed with Millender the terms of the plea agreement, including the possibility
that Millender would have to testify at trial; that Millender stated that he read,
understood, and did not have any questions about the plea agreement; and that
Millender was provided with full copies of the plea agreement. Fowler also
testified that he and Millender discussed filing a motion to suppress based on the
circumstances of his arrest, including the likelihood of suppression, but that
Millender did not want to pursue suppression because doing so could expose him
to indictment on additional charges and the possibility of a much longer sentence.
Following the hearing, the district court entered an order denying
Millender’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court determined that
Millender had been fully informed of the terms of the plea agreement, finding his
testimony to the contrary “not credible.” As to Fowler’s alleged ineffectiveness,
the court found that Millender did not want to pursue suppression because of the
risk that the government might bring additional charges and increase his sentencing
exposure. In light of that strategic choice, the court concluded, whether Fowler
had more fully investigated the circumstances of Millender’s arrest “would not
have altered Millender’s decision to plead.” Doc. 29 at 8. The court also found
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that Millender would have been unlikely to succeed on the merits of his
suppression claim. Finding no fair and just reason for withdrawal of his guilty
plea, the district court denied Millender’s motion.
The district court sentenced Millender to serve 24 months’ imprisonment
and to pay $18,915 in restitution. Millender now appeals the denial of the motion
to withdraw his guilty plea.
II.
We review a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to withdraw his
guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Freixas, 332 F.3d at 1316. The district court
does not abuse its discretion unless its denial is arbitrary or unreasonable. United
States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006). Challenges to the
effectiveness of counsel are reviewed de novo as a mixed question of law and fact.
Freixas, 332 F.3d at 1316.
III.
A district court may permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea before
sentencing for “any fair and just reason.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). This rule
should be liberally construed, but a defendant has “no absolute right to withdraw a
guilty plea before sentencing.” United States v. McCarty, 99 F.3d 383, 385 (11th
Cir. 1996). To determine whether a defendant has shown a fair and just reason, a
court should “evaluate[] the totality of the circumstances, including: (1) whether
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close assistance of counsel was available; (2) whether the plea was knowing and
voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources would be conserved; and (4) whether the
government would be prejudiced if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his
plea.” Freixas, 332 F.3d at 1318 (internal quotation marks omitted). The good
faith, credibility, and weight of a defendant’s assertions in support of these
showings are issues for the trial court to decide. United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d
469, 472 (11th Cir. 1988).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
Millender to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court conducted a hearing on
the matter, heard extensive testimony from Millender and Fowler regarding the
circumstances under which Millender’s plea was entered, and then issued an order
explaining its reasons for denying Millender’s motion. Millender has not shown
that the district court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. See Brehm, 442
F.3d at 1298.
The district court was well within its discretion to find not credible
Millender’s testimony that he was unaware of the contents of the plea agreement.
See Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472. In critical respects, Millender’s testimony at the plea
withdrawal hearing was contradicted by his statements under oath during the plea
hearing. Specifically, at the plea hearing, Millender, a college graduate, told the
magistrate judge that he read the plea agreement, fully discussed its terms with
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Fowler, and understood its terms. A strong presumption exists that his statements
made under oath during his plea hearing were true, and Millender must overcome a
heavy, but not insurmountable, burden of proving those statements false. See
United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir. 1988).
In support of his burden, Millender claims that his attorney never provided
him with full copies of the June 19 plea agreement and that additional terms
concerning restitution and cooperation were added to the agreement to which he
had originally agreed two days before.2 However, Millender’s testimony on these
points is directly contradicted by Fowler, who testified that Millender was
provided with full copies of the relevant agreements, that they discussed the terms
of the plea agreement and Millender stated that he read and understood it, and that,
with respect to Millender’s cooperation obligations in particular, Fowler told
Millender that he may have to testify for the government before a grand jury or at
trial. The district court was entitled to credit Fowler’s testimony on these points.
See Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472. In addition, Millender’s testimony at the plea-
withdrawal hearing reflects that when Millender entered his guilty plea, he was
aware of the amount of restitution for which he would be responsible. Specifically,
he testified that he learned one hour before the hearing that the restitution amount
2
The government introduced a copy of the earlier agreement Millender was referencing,
which appears to be no different from the final agreement in any material respect.
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was $18,915. In sum, the record supports the district court’s conclusion that
Millender knew and understood the terms of the plea agreement.
The district court also rejected as unconvincing Millender’s claim that
Fowler coerced him into pleading guilty. Like his claim of lack of awareness of
certain terms in the plea agreement, this claim, too, is contradicted by Millender’s
statements under oath during the plea colloquy. Millender stated at the plea
hearing that he was satisfied with Fowler’s representation in the case and that no
one had attempted to force him to plead guilty. He also confirmed that he was in
fact guilty of acquiring stolen identities for the purpose of filing fraudulent
income-tax returns. Millender has not overcome the strong presumption that these
statements are false.
Millender and Fowler met alone to discuss the case at least four times for
one hour each time, and according to Fowler’s testimony, he and Millender
discussed the circumstances surrounding the search of his vehicle and his arrest.
They discussed filing a motion to suppress and the likelihood of suppression, but,
according to Fowler, the government had indicated that if Millender sought to fight
the evidence, it would take the case to a grand jury and indict Millender on other
charges besides the aggravated-identity-theft count. This in turn would have
increased Millender’s possible sentence. Fowler testified that Millender “didn’t
want to risk that.” In view of this testimony, the district court reasonably
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concluded that Millender made a strategic decision not to pursue suppression. The
fact that Fowler advised Millender to plead guilty in order to avoid additional
charges is not coercive. Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472 (“A defendant cannot complain
of coercion where his attorney, employing his best professional judgment,
recommends that the defendant plead guilty.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Millender’s principal contention is that his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary because Fowler “failed to fully and completely investigate the illegality
of the search” and gave ineffective assistance as a result. See McCoy v.
Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1196, 1198 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The guilty plea is not
knowing[] and voluntar[y] . . . if the defendant does not receive reasonably
effective assistance of counsel in connection with the decision to plead guilty.”
“The guilty plea does not relieve counsel of the responsibility to investigate
potential defenses so that the defendant can make an informed decision.” (citation
omitted). Had Fowler conducted a full investigation, Millender asserts, Millender
would not have entered a plea but instead would have elected to proceed with a
motion to suppress, which, if successful, would have ended the case.
Millender’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the
familiar framework established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.
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Ct. 2052 (1984).3 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must
show both deficient performance and prejudice. Winthrop-Redin v. United States,
767 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 2014). With respect to deficient performance, we
strongly presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance. Id. An attorney’s
“total failure to conduct pre-trial discovery,” however, may be considered deficient
performance. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386-87, 106 S. Ct. 2574,
2589 (1986). With respect to prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1219. In the context of a
challenged guilty plea, this means the defendant must show that, but for counsel’s
errors, he would not have pled guilty. Id.
Here, Millender has not shown that counsel performed deficiently. It
appears undisputed that filing a motion to suppress could have triggered severe and
3
We normally do not address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct review
unless the district court entertained the claim and the record is sufficiently developed. United
States v. Patterson, 595 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, we find that Millender’s
claim is properly before us because it was raised in Millender’s motion to withdraw his guilty
plea, the district court heard testimony from Millender and Fowler on the issue of whether
Fowler’s failure to investigate the circumstances of Millender’s arrest rendered his guilty plea
unknowing and involuntary, and the parties on appeal cite to and base their arguments with
respect to this issue on ineffective-assistance caselaw. We consider the Strickland analysis to be
subsumed within the broader analysis of whether Millender has shown a fair and just reason for
withdrawal of his guilty plea, but we apply the standards of Strickland, in line with the parties’
arguments on appeal, to determine whether Fowler’s allegedly deficient investigation shows that
the guilty plea was unknowing or involuntary. See McCoy, 804 F.2d at 1198.
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negative consequences flowing to Millender. 4 Cf. Green v. Nelson, 595 F.3d 1245,
1251 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding deficient performance because “filing a motion to
suppress could have had no possible negative impact on Green’s defense and, if
granted, would have almost assuredly precluded his conviction”). The record also
indicates that Fowler was aware of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
search of Millender’s vehicle and his arrest. Millender testified that he told Fowler
about the search and arrest, and counsel testified that he spoke to the officers
involved. According to Fowler’s testimony, Millender did not want to risk
pursuing suppression if it would increase his potential sentence. Millender does
not identify with any particularity how counsel was mistaken about either the facts
of the search and arrest or the applicable law. Under these circumstances, it does
not strike us as unreasonable for Fowler to have advised Millender to plead guilty
without spending additional time investigating more fully the circumstances of the
search and arrest, such as trying to obtain a purported video of the incident.
In any case, even if we assume, arguendo, that Fowler’s performance was
deficient, Millender has not shown that, but for counsel’s error, he would not have
pled guilty. See Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1219. We are unconvinced that
4
For example, the government may have been able to file mail or wire-fraud charges
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343. Had it done so, and had Millender been convicted of even
one such charge, he would have faced a sentence of up to 20 years’ imprisonment, which would
have been required to have been imposed consecutively to the mandatory two-year penalty for
aggravated identity theft to which Millender was sentenced under the plea agreement. See 18
U.S.C. § 1028A(b).
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further investigation by Fowler would have altered Millender’s decision to plead
guilty. The facts Fowler would have discovered through additional investigation
are unknown and therefore too speculative to show a reasonable probability of a
different result. See Harrison v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792
(2011) (“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just
conceivable.”).
Millender also has not shown that he would have been likely to prevail on
his theory of suppression, such that it would have made sense, in keeping with
Fowler’s understanding of Millender’s motivations, to risk indictment and a longer
sentence in order to pursue suppression. In fact, Millender makes no arguments on
appeal about the merits of a potential suppression claim. Instead, he asserts that it
was improper for the court to determine that suppression was unlikely under the
facts he alleged. But given that the viability of a motion to suppress was material
to matters before the court at the plea-withdrawal hearing, the court did not err in
reaching this issue based on Millender’s own testimony.
In view of Fowler’s testimony at the plea-withdrawal hearing and
Millender’s statements under oath during the earlier plea colloquy, the district
court did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily in concluding that, under the totality of
the circumstances, Millender received close assistance of counsel and his guilty
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plea was made knowingly and voluntarily. 5 See Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472-44.
Millender has not shown that Fowler’s performance, as it relates to his
investigation of the circumstances of Millender’s arrest and his advice to plead
guilty, was deficient or that Millender was prejudiced by any deficiency. And
contrary to Millender’s contention, the district court did not give undue weight to
considerations of judicial resources and prejudice to the government. The district
court expressly stated—and nothing about its order indicates otherwise—that
neither judicial resources nor prejudice to the government weighed heavily in its
analysis.
IV.
In sum, Millender has not shown that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Millender’s
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
5
Millender also contends for the first time in his reply brief that his plea was not
knowing and voluntary because he did not know the “exact charges” and sentence he would face
had he been indicted. We generally do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply
brief. United States v. Britt, 437 F.3d 1103, 1104-05 (11th Cir. 2006). In any case, this
contention is meritless. Aside from the impossibility of discussing the “exact” charges in an
indictment that has not issued, Fowler testified that he reviewed potential guideline calculations
with Millender, and there is no indication that knowledge of an exact possible sentence, as
opposed to an estimated possible sentence, would have affected Millender’s decision.
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