Slaughter v. United States Department of Agriculture , 555 F. App'x 927 ( 2014 )

Case: 13-11531 Date Filed: 02/14/2014 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-11531
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:12-cv-00094-CDL
EDDIE SLAUGHTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
SLAUGHTER FARMS INC.,
Plaintiff,
versus
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
CALVIN HYER, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
RANDY ROTH, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
________________________
(February 14, 2014)
Case: 13-11531 Date Filed: 02/14/2014 Page: 2 of 6
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eddie Slaughter appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se Amended
Complaint in which he alleged violations of the Consent Decree in Pigford v.
Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999), and additional state-law claims. The
district court dismissed the Consent Decree claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
Slaughter was a prevailing plaintiff in the Pigford litigation, a class action
lawsuit in which black farmers sued the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).
The Pigford litigation was settled by a Consent Decree. As part of the settlement,
Slaughter received $50,000 and certain debt relief.
Slaughter’s primary allegation is that the USDA and other federal
government defendants (collectively USDA) have breached the Consent Decree by
improperly recording liens against his property. His Amended Complaint asserted
six counts: (I) breach of the Consent Decree; (II) request for a preliminary
injunction to stop the breach of the Consent Decree; (III) improper taking in
violation of the Consent Decree and the Fifth Amendment; (IV) conspiracy; (V)
2
Case: 13-11531 Date Filed: 02/14/2014 Page: 3 of 6
fraudulent concealment; and (VI) an unspecified claim regarding his former
attorney Jon Coogle’s representation.
USDA and Coogle each moved to dismiss the claims against them. The
district court granted the motions and entered judgment in their favor. The district
court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Slaughter’s claims against the
federal defendants, because the District Court for the District of Columbia retained
jurisdiction over all alleged violations of the terms of the Consent Decree. In light
of that ruling, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining state-law claims against Coogle. Slaughter then filed this appeal.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Parise v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 141 F.3d 1463, 1465 (11th Cir. 1998).
We review a district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction for
abuse of discretion. Engelhardt v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1346, 1351
n.4 (11th Cir. 1998).
A. Counts I through III
The district court correctly determined that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Counts I through III, because it did not have an independent
jurisdictional basis to enforce the Pigford Consent Decree.
3
Case: 13-11531 Date Filed: 02/14/2014 Page: 4 of 6
Enforcing a settlement agreement generally falls outside the ancillary
jurisdiction of the federal courts, even where the court had jurisdiction to hear the
underlying case. Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1278
(11th Cir. 2012). A claim for the enforcement of a settlement agreement is
essentially a contract dispute for which there must be some independent basis for
federal jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
381–82, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 1677 (1994). However, a court may specifically retain
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement or consent decree through its
contempt power. Am. Disability Ass’n, Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1319–
21 (11th Cir. 2002).
Slaughter brought his complaint in the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Georgia. As the district court correctly found, it does not have
an independent basis for jurisdiction to enforce violations of the Pigford Consent
Decree. The only court that reserved jurisdiction to enforce Consent Decree
violations was the District Court for the District of Columbia. Paragraph 13 of the
Consent Decree, entitled “Enforcement Procedures,” explains the process for
seeking enforcement before that court.
4
Case: 13-11531 Date Filed: 02/14/2014 Page: 5 of 6
While Slaughter argues his claims are separate and apart from the Consent
Decree, his Amended Complaint does not reflect any independent claims. 1 For
example, Count I is entitled “Breach of Consent Decree.” And Counts II and III
allege that the defendants have taken actions in violation of the terms and
conditions of the Consent Decree. We therefore affirm the district court’s finding
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Counts I through III of Slaughter’s
Amended Complaint.
B. Counts IV through VI
We also affirm the district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Slaughter’s state-law claims for conspiracy, fraudulent
concealment, and alleged misconduct by his former attorney. A district court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional claims after
dismissing all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3); Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when,
as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial. “). Slaughter does
not offer any argument on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in
following this well-settled rule in this case. See, e.g., Roper v. Edwards, 815 F.2d
1If after further evaluation Slaughter determines, as he claims, that he has other federal claims,
under a federal statute or the United States Constitution, that are truly separate and independent
from the Consent Decree, the Middle District of Georgia may be the proper court for those
claims.
5
Case: 13-11531 Date Filed: 02/14/2014 Page: 6 of 6
1474, 1477 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[I]t is an abuse of discretion for a federal court to
dismiss pendent state claims where no viable state forum exists at the time of
dismissal.”).
III.
For these reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
6