Phillip Wayne Tomlin v. Tony Patterson , 633 F. App'x 710 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-13878
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-00120-CG-B
PHILLIP WAYNE TOMLIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
TONY PATTERSON,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(July 16, 2015)
Before MARCUS, JILL PRYOR and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Phillip Wayne Tomlin appeals denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. We vacate the district judge’s judgment without prejudice and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
Tomlin has been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the 1977
murders of Richard Brune and Cheryl Moore four times. His first three
convictions were reversed. His fourth conviction was affirmed, but his sentence
was reduced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole by the Alabama
Supreme Court. During state post-conviction proceedings, Tomlin argued
unsuccessfully his life sentence without parole violated ex post facto and due
process principles under the United States and Alabama Constitutions.
On March 9, 2010, Tomlin filed a pro se § 2254 petition in district court. He
argued his sentence of life imprisonment without parole was “illegal,” because the
Alabama capital-murder statute applicable in his case required the presence of a
statutorily enumerated aggravating factor for him to be eligible for a death
sentence or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 1 R. at 55. The
aggravating circumstance on which his sentence was based, double-intentional
murder, was not enumerated in the relevant provision. Without further explanation,
1
Alabama’s former capital-murder statute contained one provision setting forth capital
crimes, Ala. Code § 13-11-2, and a second provision setting forth aggravating circumstances,
Ala. Code § 13-11-6.
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he asserted his sentence violated his rights “under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments (due process [and] equal protection of the law) as guaranteed in the
United States Constitution.” R. at 56.
In a reply to the state’s response to his § 2254 petition, Tomlin argued
(1) the Alabama legislature did not add double murder as an aggravating factor
until 1999, after he had committed his crimes; and (2) consequently, using that
factor to convict and sentence him to life without parole under the capital-murder
statute violated ex post facto principles. After filing his reply, Tomlin requested
leave to file a supplemental pleading based on our then-recent decision in
Magwood v. Warden, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 664 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2011). His
supplemental pleading contained assertions his conviction violated the Ex Post
Facto Clauses of the United States and Alabama Constitutions. Referencing
Magwood, Tomlin argued his sentence violated the fair warning principle inherent
in the Due Process Clause, because it was based on judicial constructions of the
Alabama capital-murder statute that occurred after his crimes and was applied
retroactively in his case. The district judge did not rule on Tomlin’s motion to
supplement.
A magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”),
recommending Tomlin’s § 2254 petition be denied. The magistrate judge,
however, did not address the ex post facto and due process, fair warning claims
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presented in Tomlin’s motion to supplement his § 2254 reply brief. In addressing
the claim his sentence was illegal, because the aggravating circumstances on which
it was based were not statutorily enumerated at the time of his crimes in Tomlin’s
initial § 2254 petition, the magistrate judge relied on the judicial expansion of the
Alabama capital-murder statute in Kyzer,2 and the Supreme Court’s recognition of
the Kyzer holding in Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 130 S. Ct. 2788 (2010).
The district judge adopted the R&R.
A judge of this court issued a certificate of appealability on the following
issue:
Whether the Alabama court’s decision—that Tomlin’s
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause—was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law, as determined by the
United States Supreme Court.
On appeal and represented by counsel, Tomlin argues his sentence of life
without parole violates the “ex post facto principle of fair notice” inherent in the
Due Process Clause. Appellant’s Br. at 47. The state responds Tomlin’s claim is
unexhausted, procedurally barred, and meritless.
II. DISCUSSION
2
Ex Parte Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330 (Ala. 1981), abrogated in relevant part by Ex Parte
Stephens, 982 So.2d 1148, 1152-53 (Ala. 2006).
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We review de novo a district judge’s denial of a § 2254 petition. Davis v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 341 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th Cir. 2003). District judges must
resolve all claims alleging a constitutional violation a habeas petitioner presents.
Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc). We have explained
we “will vacate the district court’s judgment without prejudice and remand the
case for consideration of all remaining claims whenever the district court has not
resolved all such claims.” Id. at 938.
The district judge violated Clisby, because (1) Tomlin presented his
constitutional claims of Ex Post Facto Clause and fair warning principle violations
in his motion to supplement his § 2254 petition and his § 2254 reply brief; (2) the
judge did not rule on Tomlin’s motion to supplement; and (3) the judge
consequently did not address the merits of these claims in denying Tomlin’s
§ 2254 petition. See id. at 936, 938. In addition, the district judge did not address
whether these claims were exhausted or procedurally barred. Therefore, we vacate
the denial of Tomlin’s § 2254 petition without prejudice and remand with
instructions for the district judge to (1) determine whether the ex post facto issues
raised in Tomlin’s § 2254 reply brief were properly before the judge; (2) if so,
decide those issues; (3) issue a decision on Tomlin’s motion to supplement his
§ 2254 petition; and (4) if the judge grants that motion, decide the ex post facto and
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due process, fair warning claims raised in Tomlin’s proposed supplement. See id.
at 938.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
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