Manuel De Jesus Castro v. Everglades Correctional Institute ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-13951
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-23519-MGC
MANUEL DE JESUS CASTRO,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
EVERGLADES CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(July 16, 2012)
Before HULL, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
State prisoner Manuel De Jesus Castro, proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. On appeal, Castro argues that he was denied effective assistance of
counsel during the “critical stages” of his plea proceeding because he did not
understand the consequences of his guilty plea. Castro claims that his trial counsel
advised Castro to plead guilty even though counsel knew that Castro did not
always understand what counsel was saying and thus did not understand the
consequences of his guilty plea. The district court determined that this claim was
procedurally barred because a state court had concluded that Castro failed to
timely raise the claim.1 The district court granted a certificate of appealability on
this issue.
When reviewing the district court’s denial of a habeas petition, we review
questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo and findings of fact
for clear error. Nyland v. Moore, 216 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2000).
Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, a defendant is permitted to
file a post-conviction motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence if the
judgment was entered or the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution
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By not raising it in his initial brief, Castro has abandoned the argument that his
counsel in a previous Rule 3.850 hearing was ineffective. See United States v. Jernigan, 341
F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003).
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or laws of the United States or the State of Florida, or if his plea was involuntary.
Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a)(1), (5). Generally, the defendant’s Rule 3.850 motion is
time-barred unless it is filed within the two-year period after his conviction(s) and
sentence(s) became final. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b). An exception to the two-year
time limitation applies if “the facts on which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the movant or the movant’s attorney and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b)(1).
A federal claim is subject to procedural default when the state court applies
an independent and adequate ground of state procedure to conclude that the
petitioner’s federal claim is barred. See Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302-03
(11th Cir. 1999). A state’s procedural ruling rests on independent and adequate
state grounds if: (1) the last state court rendering a judgment in a case clearly and
expressly states that it is relying on state procedural rules to resolve the federal
claim without reaching the claim’s merits; (2) the rule relied upon is not
intertwined with federal law; and (3) the state law is adequate, meaning that it is
not applied in an arbitrary or unprecedented fashion. Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d
1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). If a state court finds that a petitioner’s claims are
procedurally defaulted after applying an adequate and independent state law, a
federal court is obligated to respect the state court’s decision unless the petitioner
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can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged
violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider his claims will
result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2565 (1991).
Ordinarily, to demonstrate “cause,” the appellant must “show that some
objective factor external to the defense impeded [the petitioner]’s efforts to
comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Siebert v. Allen, 455 F.3d 1269, 1272
(11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). “Such external impediments include
evidence that could not reasonably have been discovered in time to comply with
the rule; interference by state officials that made compliance impossible; and
ineffective assistance of counsel at a stage where the petitioner had a right to
counsel.” Mize v. Hall, 532 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008). Prejudice means
that “there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding
would have been different” had the constitutional violation not occurred.
Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003).
To demonstrate a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” a defendant must
show that, “in light of new evidence, it is probable that no reasonable juror would
have convicted him.” Mize, 532 F.3d at 1190. “A ‘fundamental miscarriage of
justice’ occurs in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has
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resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent.” Henderson, 353
F.3d at 892.
Here, the state trial court denied Castro’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel because Castro’s post-conviction motion raising that issue was untimely,
having come several years after the deadline had passed for filing under Florida
Rule 3.850. Castro has not contended that this timeliness rule is intertwined with
federal law or was applied in an arbitrary or unprecedented fashion. See Judd, 250
F.3d at 1313. Accordingly, the state court applied an independent and adequate
ground of state law to deny Castro’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. See Bailey, 172 F.3d at 1302-03. This claim will be procedurally
defaulted unless Castro can demonstrate cause and actual prejudice, or a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S. Ct. at
2565.
Castro has not demonstrated cause or actual prejudice in order to overcome
the procedural bar. He does not dispute the state court’s determination that he had
filed the post-conviction motion raising this claim approximately four and a half
years after his conviction was final, or that Rule 3.850(b) provides a two-year
statute of limitations for this claim. Although Castro asserts that the facts upon
which this claim relies did not reasonably exist during the two-year limitations
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period, Castro reasonably should have known, at some point within two years after
his conviction became final, that his lack of English comprehension had affected
his understanding of the plea agreement. In addition, Castro has made no attempt
to demonstrate that his trial counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness with respect to this
claim substantially prejudiced his outcome. See Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.
Castro also has not demonstrated a “fundamental miscarriage of justice,” as he has
not shown that he was actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted.
See id.Because Castro has not overcome the procedural default, there is no basis
for federal habeas corpus relief.
AFFIRMED.
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