Sebastian v. United States Department of Immigration & Naturalization ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
October 3, 2005
No. 05-10147
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-21949-CV-UUB
DAVID SEBASTIAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION,
Robert Wallis, District Director,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 3, 2005)
Before BLACK, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
David Sebastian, a native and citizen of Cuba, appeals the district court order
dismissing his “motion for new trial/reconsideration/or amended judgment filed
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b), (c), 52(b), 55(c), or 59.”1 In its order, the district
court noted that Sebastian effectively asked the court to reconsider its original
November 18, 1993 order denying his petition for naturalization. The district court
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion because the question
of whether Sebastian was a naturalized United States citizen was “substantially
identical” to those issues that were pending before this Court in an appeal we
recently decided - Sebastian-Soler v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 409 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir.
2005) (per curiam). On appeal, Sebastian argues that he has demonstrated that he
is entitled to a final order granting his petition for naturalization, and therefore, the
district court abused its discretion in failing to set aside its original order denying
his petition for naturalization.
We review the denial of a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion.
Cavaliere v. Allstate Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). Although the
procedural history of this case is complex, the analysis of whether the district court
abused its discretion in dismissing Sebastian’s Rule 60(b) motion is
1
In a prior order considering our jurisdiction over this appeal, we construed Sebastian’s
“motion for new trial/reconsideration/or amended judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b),
(c), 52(b), 55(c), or 59" as a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion in light of Rice v. Ford Motor Co., 88
F.3d 914, 918 (11th Cir. 1996).
2
straightforward. “Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the resolution of an issue
decided at one stage of a case is binding at later stages of the same case.” Schiavo
ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
(internal marks and citations omitted). On April 25, 2003, we held in an
unpublished opinion that Sebastian’s claim of citizenship had to be raised in the
context of a removal proceeding, and judicial review was available only after a
final removal order had been entered. Sebastian v. INS, No. 02-15246 (11th Cir.
Apr. 25, 2003). Thereafter, removal proceedings were initiated and both the
immigration judge (“IJ”) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) rejected
Sebastian’s argument that he was a naturalized United States citizen. An appeal to
this Court followed, and we held that Sebastian was not a naturalized citizen or
national of the United States. Sebastian-Soler, 409 F.3d at 1284-86.
Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the district court was bound by our
decision in Sebastian, No. 02-15246, which held that Sebastian’s claim of
citizenship had to be raised in the context of removal proceedings. As such, the
district court had no choice but to defer to the ultimate outcome of the removal
proceedings with respect to Sebastian’s claim of citizenship. Therefore, it was
entirely within the district court’s discretion to dismiss Sebastian’s motion, given
that the issues raised in his motion were at that time pending before us and would
3
ultimately be resolved by our decision.
Based on our review of the record, as well as the parties’ respective briefs,
we discern no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
4