Lula T. Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecommunications ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-15586 August 22, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 02-02077-CV-B-NE
LULA T. BECKWITH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC.,
and KEMPER NATIONAL SERVICES,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 22, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lula Beckwith, a 54-year old African American female, pro se appeals the
dismissal of her complaint of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical
Leave Act, and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. The district court
dismissed Beckwith’s complaint with prejudice as a sanction for not complying
with its orders. Although the district court properly exercised its discretion by
requiring Beckwith to provide a more definite statement of her complaint and by
refusing to clarify a verbal order in writing, we conclude that the district court
abused its discretion when it dismissed Beckwith’s complaint with prejudice
without a finding of bad faith or wilfulness and that a lesser sanction would not
suffice. We, therefore, affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district
court.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 26, 2002, Beckwith filed her fourth complaint of various forms
of discrimination against BellSouth Telecommunications Inc. and Kemper
National Services. Kemper and BellSouth moved to dismiss the complaint based
on res judicata. Because Kemper and BellSouth submitted evidence outside the
pleadings, the district court informed Beckwith that it would consider the motion
as one for summary judgment.
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On September 22, 2003, the district court dismissed with prejudice some of
Beckwith’s claims, and, in a separate order, the district court directed Beckwith to
file an amended complaint that complied with Rules 8(a), 8(e)(1), 10(b), and 11(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court included the text of the rules in
the order. The court specifically instructed that “each count in the amended
complaint should contain no more than one discrete claim for relief against one
defendant. The amended complaint must also contain allegations of fact that
support each discrete claim. Failure to comply with this order may result in this
action being dismissed.” On October 17, 2003, Beckwith filed an amended
complaint. The amended complaint contained allegations similar to Beckwith’s
original complaint. Kemper and BellSouth then moved the court to require
Beckwith again to file a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(e).
The district court orally granted the motion for a more definite statement at
a scheduling conference held on November 17, 2003. Although there is no
transcript of the conference, the district court stated, in its order of dismissal, that,
at the conference, “[t]he court discussed with plaintiff the court’s September 22,
2003, Order and the problems with plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. The court
informed plaintiff that her Complaint did not comply with the Federal Rules of
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Civil Procedure and discussed with the plaintiff the requirements of a valid
Complaint.” The district court allowed Beckwith a month to file a second
amended complaint.
On December 19, 2003, Beckwith filed a second amended complaint. The
second amended complaint contained a “Statement of Facts” that was similar to
the facts in her two earlier complaints. Beckwith began with an explanation of her
employment history and then alleged that she was discriminated against when she
was terminated and denied benefits by BellSouth and Kemper. She also
complained that she was discriminated against in the denial of short and long term
disability benefits by Kemper and BellSouth. Beckwith alleged violations of “42
U.S.C. section 2000,” Title VII, the FMLA, the ADA, and ERISA.
On January 8, 2004, Kemper and BellSouth moved to dismiss the second
amended complaint. On August 27, 2004, the district court dismissed the
complaint with prejudice. The court noted that “[n]one of the documents filed by
plaintiff have come close to advising defendants what acts or conduct of
defendants form the basis of plaintiff’s claims.” The court stated that it gave
“plaintiff several opportunities to correct the deficiencies in her Complaint,” but
that “Plaintiff has been unable or unwilling to file a Complaint that could be read
to require an Answer from defendants.” Beckwith now appeals.
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II. DISCUSSION
Beckwith makes three arguments on appeal. She first contends that the
district court erred when it granted the motion by Kemper and BellSouth for a
more definite statement. Beckwith next argues that the district court erred when it
did not respond to her motion for a written order to clarify its verbal order at the
Scheduling Conference. Finally, Beckwith argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it dismissed her complaint with prejudice as a sanction. We
address each argument in turn.
A. Motion for More Definite Statement
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a
“short and plain statement of the claim” that shows that the pleader is entitled to
relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) requires that
the allegations of a claim “shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of
each of which shall be limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of
circumstances . . . [and] [e]ach claim found upon a separate transaction or
occurrence . . . shall be stated in a separate count.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
Although we construe them liberally, pro se complaints also must comply with the
procedural rules that govern pleadings. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S.
106, 113, 113 S. Ct. 1980, 1984 (1993).
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The failure to identify claims with sufficient clarity to enable the defendant
to frame a responsive pleading constitutes a “shotgun pleading.” Byrne v. Nezhat,
261 F.3d 1075, 1129-30 (11th Cir. 2001). We have explained that, because
“shotgun” pleadings present an unfair burden on a defendant, the plaintiff should
be required to provide a more definite statement of his complaint:
[I]t is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are
intended to support which claim(s) for relief. Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant faced with a [shotgun]
complaint . . . is not expected to frame a responsive pleading. Rather,
the defendant is expected to move the court, pursuant to Rule 12(e),
to require the plaintiff to file a more definite statement. Where . . .
the plaintiff asserts multiple claims for relief, a more definite
statement, if properly drawn, will present each claim for relief in a
separate count, as required by Rule 10(b), and with such clarity and
precision that the defendant will be able to discern what the plaintiff
is claiming and to frame a responsive pleading. Moreover, with the
shotgun pleading out of the way, the trial judge will be relieved of
“the cumbersome task of sifting through myriad claims, many of
which [may be] foreclosed by [various] defenses.” Fullman v.
Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 1984). Experience teaches
that, unless cases are pled clearly and precisely, issues are not joined,
discovery is not controlled, the trial court’s docket becomes
unmanageable, the litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the
court’s ability to administer justice.
Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th
Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted).
Beckwith’s complaints were essentially “shotgun” pleadings. Only a few of
her claims were specific as to any defendant, and the relevant facts were not
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segregated to each of their respective claims. It is virtually impossible to ascertain
what factual allegations correspond with each claim and which claim is directed at
which defendant. We do not require the district court, or the defendants, to “sift
through the facts presented and decide for [itself] which were material to the
particular cause of action asserted.” Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear,
Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1296 n.9 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted). The district court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Beckwith
to file a more definite statement; that order followed exactly the advice of this
Court. See Anderson, 77 F.3d at 366-67.
B. Motion for Clarification
Beckwith next argues that the district court erred when it did not respond to
her motion for the court to issue a written order to clarify its verbal order given at
the scheduling conference. We review this claim for abuse of discretion. See
Brown v. Thompson, 430 F.2d 1214, 1216 (5th Cir. 1970). The district court did
not abuse its discretion when it failed to issue another written order. The district
court had already explained to Beckwith the relevant rules of civil procedure to in
its September 22, 2003, order.
C. Dismissal as Sanction
On a motion by the defendant, a district court may dismiss a complaint for
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failure to prosecute or to obey a court order or federal rule. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
The power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of the authority of the court to enforce
its orders and insure prompt disposition of lawsuits. See Link v. Wabash R.R.
Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S. Ct. 1386, 1388-89 (1962); Jones v. Graham, 709
F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1983). Because dismissal with prejudice is a drastic
sanction, a district court may impose it only as a last resort, when: (1) the failure to
comply with a court order is a result of willfulness or bad faith, see BankAtlantic
v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 12 F.3d 1045, 1049 (11th Cir. 1994), and
(2) the district court specifically finds that lesser sanctions will not suffice, see
Gratton v. Great Am. Communications, 178 F.3d 1373, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999).
“The task of the reviewing court is to determine whether the trial court, in
exercising its authority to dismiss, abused its discretion.” Goforth v. Owens, 766
F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985).
Although we agree that Beckwith did not comply with the orders of the
district court, and the record shows that the district court has been patient with
Beckwith, we cannot affirm the dismissal of Beckwith’s complaint with prejudice.
The district court made neither a finding of wilfulness or bad faith nor a finding
that a lesser sanction would not suffice. See Gratton, 178 F.3d at 1375. We
cannot say that Beckwith’s failure to comply with the orders of the district court
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was a result of bad faith or wilfulness. The record shows that Beckwith twice
amended her complaint in response to the orders of the district court, although her
amendments were still deficient.
We also do not conclude that the defendants must answer the second
amended complaint, nor that the district court may not dismiss the complaint. The
second amended complaint is a “shotgun” pleading, and the district court is
empowered to remedy this sort of abusive pleading. As to the most severe
sanction, the district court may dismiss the complaint with prejudice only if it
finds that Beckwith’s failure to comply is willful or in bad faith and that lesser
sanctions will not suffice. Because the district court did not make those findings,
it abused its discretion when it dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED.
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