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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 11-15134
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00016-SPM-GRJ-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ERIC JOSEF SCHULZ,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
No. 11-15135
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-00016-SPM-GRJ-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
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KELLY ANN SCHULZ,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(August 14, 2012)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, CARNES and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Eric Schulz and Kelly Schulz (“the Schulzes”) appeal their
convictions for conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to
manufacture and distribute more than 100 marijuana plants, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(vii). On appeal, the Schulzes argue that
the district court erred in denying their motions to suppress statements made
before and during the search of their property; that the district court erred in
denying their motions to suppress evidence seized from their house; and that the
district court erred in denying their motions to suppress evidence seized from their
barn.
I.
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The Schulzes argue that the district court erred in refusing to suppress their
statements made before and during the search of their property.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed standard of
review, reviewing the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its
application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. Bautista-Silva,
567 F.3d
1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2009). All facts are construed in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party below. See
id.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In
Miranda,1 the Supreme Court “established that custodial interrogation cannot
occur before a suspect is warned of his or her rights against self-incrimination.”
United States v. Newsome,
475 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007). Accordingly,
the right to Miranda warnings attaches at the start of custodial interrogation.
United States v. Luna-Encinas,
603 F.3d 876, 880 (11th Cir. 2010). Pre-custodial
questioning, in contrast, does not require Miranda warnings. United States v.
Street,
472 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2006). Statements obtained in violation of
Miranda are not admissible to prove the government’s case at trial.
Miranda, 384
U.S. at 444-45, 86 S. Ct. at 1612.
1
Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 445,
86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966).
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For the purposes of Miranda, a defendant is in custody when there has been
a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with
a formal arrest. United States v. Brown,
441 F.3d 1330, 1347 (11th Cir. 2006).
The test is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in
the defendant’s position would understand his freedom of action to be curtailed to
a degree associated with a formal arrest.
Luna-Encinas, 603 F.3d at 881. This is
an objective test that does not consider the actual, subjective beliefs of the
defendant or interviewing officer as to whether the defendant was free to leave.
Street, 472 F.3d at 1309. We consider several factors in applying this test,
“including whether the officers brandished weapons, touched the suspect, or used
language or a tone that indicated that compliance with the officers could be
compelled.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Brown, 441 F.3d at
1348-49 (holding that defendant was not in custody in part because he was in a
familiar setting, his girlfriend’s house, and because, “[a]lthough an officer
accompanied him throughout the house for safety reasons, he was free to eat,
smoke, use the phone, and move about as he wished”).
Interrogation occurs “whenever a person in custody is subjected to either
express questioning or its functional equivalent,” which refers to words or actions
“that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
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response.” Rhode Island v. Innis,
446 U.S. 291, 300-01,
100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689
(1980). This excludes, however, words or actions normally attendant to arrest and
custody.
Id. Additionally, a defendant’s volunteered statements do not implicate
Miranda.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S. Ct. at 1630; see also United States v.
Castro,
723 F.2d 1527, 1530-32 (11th Cir. 1984) (explaining that voluntary,
unresponsive statements are outside the protection of Miranda).
Here, we conclude from the record that the district court did not err in
refusing to suppress the Schulzes’ statements. As to their pre-Miranda statements,
the Schulzes were not in custody or subjected to interrogation at the time, such
that the right to Miranda warnings had not attached. See
Street, 472 F.3d at 1309.
Moreover, some of their statements were volunteered and not responsive to any
question by the agents. See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S. Ct. at 1630; see also
Castro, 723 F.2d at 1530-32. In regard to Eric Schulz’s post-Miranda statements,
the district court properly refused to suppress them because they were knowingly
and voluntarily made by E. Schulz after waiver of his Miranda rights. See Oregon
v. Elstad,
470 U.S. 298, 309,
105 S. Ct. 1285, 1293 (1985). Finally, given that the
Schulzes were never interrogated, their argument regarding a two-step
interrogation process is without merit.
II.
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The Schulzes next argue that the district court erred in denying their
motions to suppress as to the evidence seized from their house.
We may affirm the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported
by the record. United States v. Caraballo,
595 F.3d 1214, 1222 (11th Cir. 2010).
The Fourth Amendment protects the right to be secure against unreasonable
searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. However, the Fourth Amendment
is not implicated when police officers enter private land to knock on a citizen’s
door for legitimate police purposes unconnected with a search of the premises.
United States v. Taylor,
458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006). The officers are
permitted “to knock on a residence’s door or otherwise approach the residence
seeking to speak to the inhabitants just [as] any private citizen may,” and are
permitted some movement away from the front door depending on the
circumstances.
Id. at 1204-05 (internal quotation marks omitted). Where the
Fourth Amendment is violated, the question, in considering whether evidence is
fruit of the poisonous tree that must be suppressed, is “whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is
made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v.
United States,
371 U.S. 471, 487-88,
83 S. Ct. 407, 417 (1963) (internal quotation
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marks omitted).
The Fourth Amendment further provides that warrants shall be issued only
upon probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. If, under the totality of the
circumstances, “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime
will be found in a particular place,” then there is a sufficient basis for probable
cause. United States v. Lopez,
649 F.3d 1222, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A fair probability is present “when the facts and
circumstances would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe that the place to
be searched contains contraband or evidence of a crime.”
Id. When deciding
whether a search warrant was supported by probable cause, we must consider only
that information brought to the attention of the issuing judge. United States v.
Lockett,
674 F.2d 843, 845 (11th Cir. 1982).
Affidavits supporting a search warrant are presumed valid. Franks v.
Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 171,
98 S. Ct. 2674, 2684 (1978). If, however, a
defendant makes a threshold showing that the affiant deliberately or recklessly
made a false statement, then the defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing.
Id. at
171-72, 98 S. Ct. at 2684-85. If the defendant then makes that threshold showing
of deliberate or reckless falsity by a preponderance of the evidence, he is entitled
to a new evaluation of probable cause with the affidavit stripped of the false
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statements. See
id.
For probable cause to search a residence, there must be some nexus between
the premises and the alleged criminal activity. United States v. Bradley,
644 F.3d
1213, 1263 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 2375 (2012). This does not
require an allegation in the supporting affidavit that criminal activity took place at
the residence, but it does require that the affidavit show a connection between the
defendant and the residence and a link between the residence and the criminal
activity. United States v. Kapordelis,
569 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009).
Probable cause exists to support a search of a defendant’s residence where there is
evidence that the defendant is in possession of contraband that is of the type that
would normally be hidden at one’s residence. United States v. Anton,
546 F.3d
1355, 1358 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that, according to affidavit, federal agents had
observed defendant with firearms at gun shows, and affidavit further stated that,
based upon federal agent’s experience, convicted felons and firearms dealers
possessing contraband typically store these items on their property); see also
United States v. Jenkins,
901 F.2d 1075, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that
affidavit stated that FBI agent, who had spent ten years investigating bank robbery
and burglary matters, advised that defendant’s resident was most likely hiding
place of evidence of the theft).
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District courts should generally not suppress evidence obtained by officers
objectively acting in reasonable reliance upon such warrants even when the court
ultimately finds the search warranted unsupported by probable cause. United
States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 922-23,
104 S. Ct. 3405, 3420 (1984). Under this
so-called “good-faith exception,” “suppression is necessary only if the officers
were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored
an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.” United States
v. Robinson,
336 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In considering good faith, “we subscribe to a standard which is focused
on a reasonably well-trained officer and is based upon the totality of the
circumstances.” United States v. Taxacher,
902 F.2d 867, 872 (11th Cir. 1990). It
is indicative of good faith that an officer consults with a prosecutor before seeking
a search warrant and submits it to a neutral magistrate.
Id. Also, in determining
whether an officer reasonably relied upon a search warrant, we may look beyond
the four corners of the affidavit and warrant. United States v. Martin,
297 F.3d
1308, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2002).
The Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply,
however, in four situations:
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(1) where the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by
information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would
have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth;
(2) where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role;
(3) where the affidavit supporting the warrant is so lacking in indicia
of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable; and (4) where, depending upon the circumstances of
the particular case, a warrant is so facially deficient–i.e., in failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized–that
the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.
Robinson, 336 F.3d at 1296.
Here, we conclude that the Schulzes’ claim that the agents’ entry onto their
property violated the Fourth Amendment and rendered the subsequently seized
evidence fruit of the poisonous tree, is without merit. The agents’ valid knock-
and-talk did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See
Taylor, 458 F.3d at 1204-
05. Moreover, we conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to strike
language from the affidavit underlying the warrant because the Schulzes did not
show by a preponderance of the evidence that any language was false and
deliberately or recklessly included. See
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72,
171 98 S. Ct.
at 2684-85. Finally, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that
probable cause existed to search the Schulzes’ residence, given that the affidavit
underlying the warrant established a nexus between the residence and the alleged
criminal activity. See
Kapordelis, 569 F.3d at 1310. In any event, even if the
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search warrant was not supported by probable cause, the district court correctly
concluded that the Leon good-faith exception would negate any application of the
exclusionary rule.
III.
The Schulzes further argue that the district court erred in denying their
motions to suppress the evidence seized from their barn.
Fourth Amendment violations are subject to harmless error analysis,
including where the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. United States v.
Rhind,
289 F.3d 690, 692-94 (11th Cir. 2002). A district court’s error in failing to
suppress evidence is harmless if the other evidence of guilt was so overwhelming
that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the improperly admitted evidence.
Id. at 694; see also United States v. Delancy,
502 F.3d 1297, 1315 n.12 (11th Cir.
2007) (noting in dicta that any error in refusing to suppress certain evidence was
harmless because the additional evidence did not affect either the defendant’s
Sentencing Guidelines offense level or the statutory offense he was charged with
violating).
Here, even if we assume, arguendo, that the district court erred in refusing to
suppress the evidence seized from the Schulzes’ barn, we conclude that the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Any error by the district court did not harm the
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Schulzes, given that there was an overwhelming amount of other evidence against
them and that the evidence from the barn did not even materially affect the sentence
imposed. See
Rhind, 289 F.3d at 694; see also
Delancy, 502 F.3d at 1314-15 & n.12.
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying the
four motions to suppress and we affirm the Schulzes’ convictions.
AFFIRMED.
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