Amun-Ra Hotep Ankh Meduty v. Georgia Department of Administrative Services ( 2015 )


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  •          Case: 14-13939   Date Filed: 06/05/2015   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-13939
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-03240-WBH
    AMUN-RA HOTEP ANKH MEDUTY,
    Prince,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES,
    LISA PRATT,
    Director of Risk Management Services;
    individually and in her official capacity,
    BROADSPIRE SERVICES, INC.,
    PAT SANDERS,
    individually, and in her official capacity,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (June 5, 2015)
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    Before HULL, MARCUS and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Prince Amun-Ra Hotep Ankh Meduty, proceeding pro se, appeals the
    district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 18 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and
    1988 action for failure to obey a court order, pursuant to Local Rule 41.3(A)(2).
    Meduty argues that the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed his
    amended complaint for not obeying a previous order to re-plead in compliance
    with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After thorough review, we affirm.
    We review a district court’s dismissal of an action for failure to comply with
    local rules for abuse of discretion. World Thrust Films, Inc. v. Int’l Family
    Entertainment, Inc., 
    41 F.3d 1454
    , 1456 (11th Cir. 1995). “While dismissal is an
    extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the
    litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion.” Moon v.
    Newsome, 
    863 F.2d 835
    , 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
    Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading contain a short and plain statement of
    the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b) requires that the averments of a claim be
    made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be limited as far
    as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances, and each claim
    founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence shall be stated in a separate
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    count. Local Rule 41.3 states that the court may, with or without notice to the
    parties, dismiss a civil case for want of prosecution if a plaintiff refuses to obey a
    lawful order of the court. N.D. Ga. R. 41.3(A)(2). A district court has discretion
    to adopt local rules, which then have the force of law. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 
    558 U.S. 183
    , 191 (2010).
    Our case law makes clear that “a dismissal with prejudice, whether on
    motion or sua sponte, is an extreme sanction that may be properly imposed only
    when: (1) a party engages in a clear pattern of delay or willful contempt
    (contumacious conduct); and (2) the district court specifically finds that lesser
    sanctions would not suffice.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd. V. M/V Monada, 
    432 F.3d 1333
    , 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). We have said that courts may
    make “an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions would not suffice.”
    Gratton v. Great Am. 
    Commc’ns, 178 F.3d at 1373
    , 1374 (11th Cir. 1999)
    (emphasis added). We’ve also observed that “the harsh sanction of dismissal with
    prejudice is thought to be more appropriate in a case where a party, as distinct from
    counsel, is culpable.” Betty 
    K, 432 F.3d at 1338
    . Thus, although we have only
    occasionally found “implicit in an order [penalizing a party for his attorney’s
    misconduct] the conclusion that ‘lesser sanctions would not suffice,’” World
    
    Thrust, 41 F.3d at 1456
    (quotations omitted), we’ve repeatedly upheld dismissals
    with prejudice based on the district court’s implicit finding that “lesser sanctions
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    would not suffice” in cases brought by pro se plaintiffs. See, e.g., 
    Gratton, 178 F.3d at 1374-75
    (upholding dismissal based upon an implicit finding that no lesser
    sanction would suffice where the pro se plaintiff “bore substantial responsibility
    for the delays, by his spoliation of evidence and misidentification of a witness,
    among other things”); 
    Moon, 863 F.2d at 839
    (upholding dismissal based upon an
    implicit determination that lesser sanctions would not suffice where the pro se
    plaintiff refused to attend depositions and refused to pay resulting attorneys’ fees
    from the cancelled deposition). Indeed, while pro se complaints must be liberally
    construed, those complaints still must comply with the procedural rules governing
    the proper form of pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 
    148 F.3d 1262
    ,
    1263 (11th Cir. 1998); McNeil v. United States, 
    508 U.S. 106
    , 113 (1993).
    The district court’s first order in this case denied the defendants’ motions to
    dismiss without prejudice, and ordered Meduty to provide a more definite
    statement of his claims. The court noted that Meduty’s complaint was a classic
    shotgun pleading, and essentially amounted to a disjointed personal narrative
    suggesting numerous potential claims but leaving it to the court and defendants to
    determine who exactly wronged him and in what manner. The court instructed
    Meduty to provide additional necessary facts, including facts about the underlying
    incident with police. Additionally, the court provided that each claim needed to be
    listed separately with the facts that supported it, and the complaint needed to
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    specify which claims were against which defendant.          The court provided an
    example of how to accomplish this. The court also warned that it would dismiss
    Meduty’s claim if he failed to meet the deadline or filed an amended complaint
    that did not comply with the order.
    Thereafter, Meduty filed an amended complaint that alleged, in a conclusory
    manner, that he was unlawfully arrested, kidnapped, falsely imprisoned, denied
    counsel, discriminated against because of religious beliefs, unlawfully detained
    without bond, threatened to be held in jail for years without a court date, and the
    victim of unlawful seizure of property and racial discrimination. He provided no
    additional details on these claims. He said that his constitutional rights were
    violated, and that the defendants failed to perform their duties, perjured
    themselves, violated public policy, and recklessly injured Meduty and his property.
    In short, Meduty’s amended complaint lacked the facts the district court’s
    order had required, including the facts surrounding the incident with police that
    formed the basis of his insurance claim. Nor did he list his claims separately or
    differentiate the facts that supported each claim, as required in the order. In
    addition, the district court’s first order had warned Meduty that his suit would be
    dismissed if he did not follow the instructions outlined in its order, and Meduty did
    not comply. Thus, although the district court did not expressly find that no lesser
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    remedy would suffice, its order dismissing the case with prejudice -- and implicitly
    finding that no lesser remedy would suffice -- was not an abuse of discretion.
    AFFIRMED.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-13939

Judges: Hull, Marcus, Per Curiam, Rosenbaum

Filed Date: 6/5/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024