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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 20-10474
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:16-cv-00529-RH-MJF
CRYSTAL LEANNE KOCSIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
Florida Public Entity,
Defendant-Appellee,
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(August 19, 2021)
Before JORDAN, GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Crystal Kocsis, proceeding pro se, appeals the denial of her motion for relief
from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Kocsis filed her
motion after this Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to
the Florida State University Board of Trustees (“FSU”) in Kocsis’s sexual
harassment and retaliation case. In this appeal, Kocsis argues that she is entitled to
relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because she misunderstood the law and did not know to
raise certain issues, including disparate treatment; she asserts that she should be
allowed to amend her complaint to add those issues now. She then argues that
because she did not know to raise certain issues, those issues have not been
decided on the merits. And she contends that her request to amend her complaint
is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) because her proposed
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. None of these
arguments are persuasive, and we accordingly affirm.
I.
Let’s start with a brief overview of the facts.
In 2016, Kocsis filed an action against FSU, its Title IX Director, the Dean
of the College of Criminology, and two professors, alleging violations of Title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”). She alleged that while a PhD
student at FSU, she witnessed a professor subject female students and students of
color to a hostile environment and claimed that FSU failed to take appropriate
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action in response. She additionally asserted that professors retaliated against her
for her complaint by lowering her grades and denying her an assistantship—a type
of academic appointment.
FSU and the individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss in response. A
magistrate judge found that, liberally construed, Kocsis’s complaint alleged a
discrimination claim under Title IX and a retaliation claim for calling attention to
such discrimination. The magistrate judge recommended that the claims against
the individual defendants be dismissed and the remaining claims against FSU
proceed. The District Court adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation
and dismissed the claims against only the individual defendants.
Following discovery, FSU filed a motion for summary judgment. Kocsis
responded. A new magistrate judge recommended that FSU’s motion be granted
on both the sexually hostile environment and retaliation claims. On the first
claim—sexually hostile environment—the magistrate judge found that it was
undisputed that FSU did not receive actual knowledge of any alleged harassment
until 2015 when Kocsis filed a complaint with FSU’s Office of Equal Opportunity
and Compliance. Likewise, the magistrate determined that FSU was not
deliberately indifferent because it conducted a prompt investigation into Kocsis’s
claims and took reasonable measures to prevent harassment.
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On the second claim—retaliation—the magistrate judge concluded that
Kocsis established only two of the three elements of a prima facie case: Kocsis
engaged in protected expression by filing a formal complaint and submitted
sufficient evidence to establish materially adverse action, but she presented no
evidence showing a causal connection between her protected expression and any
adverse action. Indeed, the materially adverse actions occurred before Kocsis’s
protected expression, so they could not have been retaliatory. And, in any event,
the magistrate judge noted that FSU submitted evidence of non-discriminatory,
non-retaliatory reasons for refusing Kocsis the assistantships—her scores and
grades were inferior to the students who received the positions. In early 2019, the
District Court adopted the report and recommendation and granted summary
judgment for FSU.
In her first appeal, Kocsis argued that she had a viable disparate treatment
claim. But we affirmed the judgment for FSU and found that Kocsis waived any
disparate treatment argument because she failed to raise it before the District
Court. Kocsis v. Fla. State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 788 F. App’x 680, 688 (11th Cir.
2019). We noted that the District Court did not recognize a disparate treatment
claim and that Kocsis did not object to such a claim being overlooked. Id.
So, after this Court issued its mandate, Kocsis filed a Rule 60(b) motion for
relief from judgment in the District Court. Specifically, she requested that the
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judgment be set aside so that she could file an amended complaint to plead new
claims—disparate treatment, disparate impact, and discriminatory use of test
scores. Kocsis claimed that her failure to assert a claim of disparate impact was an
inadvertent mistake stemming from her lack of legal understanding. The District
Court denied the motion and stated that Rule 60(b) does not allow a losing plaintiff
to change legal theories and start anew. Kocsis timely appealed.
II.
We generally review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Davenport,
668 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012). To
show that a district court abused its discretion in denying a Rule 60(b) motion, the
“justification for relief [must be] so compelling that the district court was required
to grant [the] motion.” Rice v. Ford Motor Co.,
88 F.3d 914, 919 (11th Cir. 1996)
(emphasis in original). An appeal of a denial of a Rule 60(b) motion addresses
only the propriety of the denial; we may not review issues in the underlying
judgment. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co.,
198 F.3d 1332, 1338
(11th Cir. 1999).
III.
On appeal, Kocsis argues that, because she is a pro se plaintiff, the District
Court was required to sua sponte notify her that her complaint was deficient and
give her at least one chance to amend it; she requests that this Court reverse and
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remand to allow her an opportunity to amend her complaint. Kocsis additionally
asserts that her failure to raise the disparate impact claim is excusable neglect, as
she would have raised the claim earlier had she been aware of the relevant case
law. And she finally notes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) allows her to
amend her complaint because her proposed amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading. Rule 60(b), Rule 15(c), and claim preclusion issues are
nested in Kocsis’s arguments, so we’ll discuss them all.
Rule 60(b)(1) allows a court to grant relief from a final judgment due to
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
Excusable neglect can be shown, for example, when the failure to comply with a
filing deadline is attributable to negligence. Pioneer Investment Services Co. v.
Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership,
507 U.S. 380, 394,
113 S. Ct. 1489, 1497
(1993). An attorney error based on a misunderstanding or misinterpretation of the
law, on the other hand, generally cannot constitute excusable neglect. Davenport,
668 F.3d at 1324. And when making an excusable neglect determination, a court
should consider the danger of prejudice to the opposing party, the length of the
delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, and
whether the movant acted in good faith. Pioneer,
507 U.S. at 395,
113 S. Ct. at
1498.
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Claim preclusion “bars relitigation of matters that were litigated or could
have been litigated in an earlier suit.” Manning v. City of Auburn,
953 F.2d 1355,
1358 (11th Cir. 1992). The doctrine aims to protect defendants from vexatious
lawsuits and to conserve judicial resources. Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid,
193 F.3d
1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). “[A] claim is precluded by the judgment in a prior
case when (1) the prior judgment was rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) the judgment was final and on the merits; (3) both cases involve
the same parties or those in privity with them; and (4) both cases . . . involve the
same causes of action.” Borrero v. United Healthcare of N.Y., Inc.,
610 F.3d 1296,
1306 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). The doctrine “applies not only to
the precise legal theory presented in the previous litigation, but to all legal theories
and claims arising out of the same operative nucleus of fact.” Manning,
953 F.2d
at 1358–59 (quotation marks omitted).
Moving to Kocsis’s claims, we first note that her arguments involving Rule
15 are misplaced. While this Circuit has permitted plaintiffs to amend complaints
following dismissal—even where the plaintiff did not seek to amend before the
District Court—we have done so on direct appeal from those dismissals, not on
appeal from a Rule 60(b) order. See Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp.,
314 F.3d 541, 542, 545 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Kocsis’s motion does request
leave to amend her complaint, but it is not a valid motion under Rule 15(c);
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instead, just as it is labeled, it is a post-judgment motion under Rule 60(b) seeking
relief from a final judgment. Kocsis could have—and should have—raised in her
first appeal her arguments about the denial of leave to amend her complaint before
final judgment. And to the extent that Kocsis challenges the underlying summary
judgment order, we may not review that underlying judgment because our scope of
review is limited to the propriety of the District Court’s denial of the Rule 60(b)
motion. See Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., 198 F.3d at 1338.
But more to the point, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Kocsis’s Rule 60(b) motion. In her motion, Kocsis essentially sought to
reopen her case on the grounds that she misunderstood what claims she could have
initially brought. Kocsis’s misunderstanding of the law does not qualify her for
relief under Rule 60(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); Davenport,
668 F.3d at 1324.
But even if Kocsis—as a pro se litigant—was entitled to the Pioneer excusable
neglect considerations, they cut against her arguments: reopening Kocsis’s case to
allow for new legal theories would plainly prejudice FSU, who has already gone
through discovery and summary judgment proceedings. Pioneer,
507 U.S. at 395,
113 S. Ct. at 1498.
At bottom, Kocsis is constructively asking to file a new action, but she is
precluded from bringing new legal theories and claims arising from the same
operative nucleus of fact as her original complaint. See Borrero,
610 F.3d at 1306;
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Manning,
953 F.2d at 1358–59. Allowing Kocsis to start over in the District Court
in this manner would allow her to end-run around the protections claim preclusion
affords defendants. See Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1238.
Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s denial of Kocsis’s Rule 60(b)
motion.
AFFIRMED.
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