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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-14136
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DEVONNE L. WALKER,
a.k.a. Dee Dee,
a.k.a. Jimmy,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14136
D.C. Docket No. 5:21-cr-00040-RBD-PRL-1
____________________
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Devonne Walker appeals his sentence of 300 months’ im-
prisonment, which was imposed after he pled guilty to one count
of conspiring with others to possess with the intent to distribute
various controlled substances. Walker argues that the district
court made two errors in calculating his sentence: First, he argues
that the court erred when it applied a four-level enhancement un-
der the Sentencing Guidelines for Walker’s role as an organizer or
leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more partici-
pants or was otherwise extensive. Second, he contends that the
court improperly applied a two-level enhancement under the Sen-
tencing Guidelines for possessing a dangerous weapon in connec-
tion with a drug offense. Because the record supports the district
court’s application of these enhancements, we affirm Walker’s
sentence.
I.
Walker first appeared on the government’s radar in March
2018, when an informant indicated that Walker and another man,
Chauncy Stackhouse, were selling large quantities of cocaine and
methamphetamine. At that time, Walker and Stackhouse were
selling approximately two kilograms of cocaine per month, which
they obtained from a supplier in Orlando, Florida.
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21-14136 Opinion of the Court 3
In July 2018, government agents received a tip that Walker,
Stackhouse, and two unnamed associates were flying from Tam-
pa, Florida to Puerto Rico to purchase cocaine. Agents stopped
Walker, Stackhouse, and their associates at the Tampa airport and
seized $80,000 in cash—cash which belonged to Walker and
agents believed was intended to be used to buy cocaine. During
this time period, Walker and Stackhouse were receiving between
four and six kilograms of cocaine each month from their Puerto
Rican supplier. The supplier in Puerto Rico transferred the co-
caine from Puerto Rico to Florida, then Walker and Stackhouse
picked up the cocaine once it arrived in Florida. Walker always
paid for the cocaine.
After a few months of working with the Puerto Rican sup-
plier, Walker and Stackhouse decided to find a cheaper source for
the drugs. A friend, known to Stackhouse only as “Chad,” offered
to serve as the middleman connecting Walker and Stackhouse
with a drug supplier in Phoenix, Arizona. Walker and Stackhouse
eventually decided to cut Chad out of the deal and work directly
with their new Arizona contact. From that point on, Walker
managed all the dealings with the supplier; he arranged which
drugs would be shipped from Arizona to Florida and negotiated
the drug prices.
On their first visit to Arizona, Walker and Stackhouse
along with an associate named Tyler Reed (also known as “Kyle”)
met Kanisha Savage at a gas station in Phoenix. They convinced
Savage to buy marijuana from a dispensary for them. Walker
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-14136
gave her money for the purchase. After she purchased the drugs,
Savage and the three men smoked marijuana together and ex-
changed phone numbers.
Walker texted Savage a month after their first encounter,
asking whether she knew of any Airbnb rentals in the area be-
cause he would be returning to Phoenix soon. He also asked Sav-
age if she would continue buying marijuana from dispensaries for
him. She agreed. When Walker, Stackhouse, and Reed returned
to Arizona, Walker once again paid Savage to obtain marijuana.
This relationship between Walker and Savage continued for some
time. Eventually, Walker began requesting that Savage bring him
more marijuana than she was able to purchase through dispensa-
ries. Because she could no longer get Walker the amount of mari-
juana he wanted, Savage introduced Walker to Tymane Hamil-
ton, a known marijuana dealer. Walker and Hamilton entered in-
to an arrangement.
At some point over the course of their relationship, Walker
asked Savage to drop off packages at the post office for him in ex-
change for money. Savage agreed, and their arrangement played
out as follows: Walker would inform Savage when she could ex-
pect packages and where to pick them up. One of two men would
bring sealed packages to wherever Walker directed Savage to go
and pay Savage $100 upon giving her the parcels. Walker would
send Savage addresses located in the Middle District of Florida
and direct her to send the packages to those addresses. Once Sav-
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21-14136 Opinion of the Court 5
age dropped off the packages with the United States Postal Ser-
vice (“USPS”), Walker would pay Savage $150 through Cash App.
Under Walker’s direction, many packages were mailed
from Arizona to Florida. Between July 2018 and October 2019,
USPS identified more than 50 parcels sent from Arizona to Florida
containing cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and ma-
rijuana.
Savage also received packages on Walker’s behalf. An asso-
ciate of Walker’s named Kathy Stivale sent Savage several pack-
ages from Florida. Walker let Savage know in advance when she
could expect a package from Stivale; Walker also told Savage
what to do with Stivale’s packages. The same men who gave Sav-
age packages for Walker collected Stivale’s packages.
Savage met Stivale when Stivale accompanied Walker on a
trip to Phoenix. During that trip, Stivale was responsible for ar-
ranging Walker’s transportation. On one occasion, Walker had
Savage and Stivale carry cash and money orders for him on a
flight from Orlando to Phoenix.
In addition to handling packages and carrying money for
Walker, Savage also arranged for Walker to buy a firearm from a
man she knew in Phoenix.
As the investigation continued, agents became aware of a
residence in Phoenix on 42nd Avenue. They believed it to be a
“stash house” used by Walker, Savage, Hamilton, and other
members of the conspiracy. Agents observed Walker bringing
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-14136
shipping supplies into the house and learned that Hamilton and
his girlfriend resided there.
In October 2019, agents executed a search warrant for the
Arizona residence. They seized nine USPS parcels labeled with
addresses in the Middle District of Florida and an AM-15 rifle. In-
side the packages, agents found a total of 49.4 kilograms of mari-
juana and 2.7 kilograms of methamphetamine.
In June of 2021, Walker was indicted for conspiracy to pos-
sess with intent to distribute various controlled substances: five
kilograms or more of cocaine; 500 grams or more of metham-
phetamine; one kilogram or more of heroin; 40 grams or more of
fentanyl; and more than 50 kilograms or marijuana.1
About two weeks later, local Florida police officers execut-
ed an arrest warrant for Walker. Officers observed Walker arrive
on the scene in his sister’s car. After Walker exited the car, a dep-
uty approached the car to confirm there were no other occupants
who might threaten officer safety. While looking into the vehicle,
the deputy noticed a marijuana blunt in plain view in the front
seat center console. Officers decided to search the vehicle. On the
floorboard behind the passenger seat, they saw a drawstring bag.
Inside the bag they found a 9 mm handgun, drug paraphernalia,
1 Savage and Hamilton were charged as co-defendants. In a separate criminal
case, Stackhouse was charged with possession with intent to distribute
methamphetamine.
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21-14136 Opinion of the Court 7
and substances that the officers suspected to be marijuana, heroin,
cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamine.
Walker pled guilty to the conspiracy charged in the indict-
ment. Before Walker’s sentencing hearing, a probation officer
prepared a presentencing investigation report (“PSI”). The PSI set
forth facts about how the conspiracy operated and Walker’s role
in the conspiracy. It reported that Walker was accountable for the
distribution of 32,460 grams of “ice,” 2 51,631 grams of marijuana,
79 grams of fentanyl, and 125 grams of heroin. Based on these
drug quantities, the PSI assigned Walker a base offense level of 38.
The PSI found that Walker should receive a four-level enhance-
ment under U.S.S.G. §3B1.1(a) for being an organizer or leader of
a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was
otherwise extensive. The PSI also recommended a two-level en-
hancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) because a dangerous
weapon (in this case, a firearm) was possessed in connection with
a drug offense. The PSI calculated Walker’s adjusted offense level
as 44. It also noted that Walker was eligible for a reduction in his
offense level for acceptance of responsibility.
2 The Sentencing Guidelines define “ice” as “a mixture or substance contain-
ing d-methamphetamine hydrochloride of at least 80% purity.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1, note C.
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-14136
Walker objected to several portions of the PSI. He objected
to some of the paragraphs that described the offense conduct. He
also objected to the role and dangerous weapons enhancements.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court overruled
these objections. It adopted the PSI’s description of the offense
conduct. The district court found that the government had shown
by a preponderance of the evidence that Walker was an organizer
or leader such as to warrant a § 3B1.1(a) enhancement. The dis-
trict court was also satisfied that the rifle found at the 42nd Ave-
nue residence in Arizona and the handgun seized at Walker’s ar-
rest justified a dangerous weapons enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1).
After accepting the PSI’s calculation of the offense level and
applying a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility,
the district court found that Walker had a total offense level of 42
and a criminal history category of VI, yielding a sentence range of
360 months’ to life imprisonment. 3 The district court sentenced
Walker to 300 months’ imprisonment.
Walker timely appealed to this Court.
3 The court found that Walker was eligible for the career-offender enhance-
ment. Under the career-offender enhancement, Walker’s offense level would
have been 37 before any reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Because
this offense level was not “greater than the offense level otherwise applica-
ble,” the district court did not rely on the career-offender enhancement to
calculate Walker’s guidelines range. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b).
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21-14136 Opinion of the Court 9
II.
We accept a district court’s factual findings at sentencing
unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Caraballo,
595 F.3d
1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2010). A factual finding is clearly erroneous
when, upon review of the evidence, the Court is “left with a defi-
nite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
United States v. Foster,
155 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998).
Whether a defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal ac-
tivity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise ex-
tensive is a factual finding we review for clear error. 4 United
States v. Ramirez,
426 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir. 2005). The same
is true for whether a dangerous weapon was possessed in connec-
tion with a drug crime. United States v. Stallings,
463 F.3d 1218,
1220 (11th Cir. 2006).
We review a district court’s application of the Sentencing
Guidelines to the facts de novo. United States v. Smith,
22 F.4th
1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2022).
4 The government argues that the district court’s determination as to Walk-
er’s § 3B1.1 role enhancement should be reviewed for plain error, arguing
that Walker did not raise the specific issues he advances here in the district
court. See United States v. Aguillard,
217 F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000).
We assume Walker sufficiently raised the issue at the district court level and
proceed under the clear-error standard because the result we reach is the
same under either standard of review.
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-14136
III.
Walker challenges the district court’s application of the
leadership role and dangerous weapons enhancements in calculat-
ing his sentencing range.
We affirm the district court’s application of a four-level
§ 3B1.1(a) role enhancement because the record supports the dis-
trict court’s conclusion that Walker led or organized a criminal
activity that involved at least five participants or was otherwise
extensive. We also affirm the application of a § 2D1.1(b)(1) dan-
gerous weapons enhancement because a co-conspirator possessed
a firearm in connection with the conspiracy, and the possession
was reasonably foreseeable in light of the volume and value of the
drugs involved in the offense.
A.
The Sentencing Guidelines mandate a four-level increase to
a defendant’s offense level if (1) he “was an organizer or leader of
a criminal activity” (2) “that involved five or more participants or
was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). These are two sep-
arate and distinct requirements for a sentence enhancement un-
der § 3B1.1(a). United States v. Martinez,
584 F.3d 1022, 1026
(11th Cir. 2009).
On appeal, Walker challenges the district court’s evalua-
tion of the second prong—that the criminal activity involved ei-
ther five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. Walker
argues that the district court failed to articulate its findings as to
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21-14136 Opinion of the Court 11
this prong with sufficient specificity. He points out that the dis-
trict court did not explicitly name the five people it considered
participants in the criminal activity, nor did it specify whether the
application of § 3B1.1(a) was based on there being at least five par-
ticipants in the criminal activity or on the criminal activity being
otherwise extensive. Instead, at the sentencing hearing, the dis-
trict court simply stated that it “f[ound] the Government ha[d]
met its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that
Mr. Walker was an organizer, manager, or leader of the organiza-
tion such as to warrant the four-level enhancement under
3B1.1(a).” Doc. 134 at 186. 5
This was all the district court needed to say. Walker’s ar-
gument that the district court’s failure to make specific findings
warrants reversal has no basis in our precedent. As this Court has
previously held,
[i]n making the ultimate determination of the de-
fendant’s role in the offense, the sentencing judge
has no duty to make any specific subsidiary factual
findings. So long as the district court’s decision is
supported by the record and the court clearly re-
solves any disputed factual issues, a simple statement
of the district court’s conclusion is sufficient.
5 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries in this case.
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-14136
United States v. Rodriguez De Varon,
175 F.3d 930, 939 (11th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted)
(regarding mitigating-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2).
There is no question here that the district court resolved all
disputed factual issues. And whether the § 3B1.1(a) leadership-role
enhancement was based on the number of participants or the ex-
tent of the criminal activity, the record supports the district
court’s conclusion.
First, as to the number of participants, the record shows by
a preponderance of the evidence that at least five people partici-
pated in the conspiracy to possess controlled substances with the
intent to distribute. “A ‘participant’ is a person who is criminally
responsible for the commission of the offense, but need not have
been convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. 1. Walker and his two co-
defendants, Kanisha Savage and Tymane Hamilton, are partici-
pants under § 3B1.1(a). Evidence of more than two additional par-
ticipants exists in the record, including but not limited to:
(1) Chauncy Stackhouse, a co-conspirator who began distributing
drugs with Walker as early May 2018, traveled with Walker to Ar-
izona to arrange drug shipments back to Florida on numerous oc-
casions, and helped Walker orchestrate cocaine shipments from
Puerto Rico to Florida; (2) Tyler Reed, also known as “Kyle,” who
traveled to Arizona with Walker and Stackhouse on more than
one occasion and helped recruit Savage into the conspiracy;
(3) Kathy Stivale, who, like Savage, worked for Walker and
shipped packages across the country on his behalf; (4) Chad, who
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21-14136 Opinion of the Court 13
arranged a new supplier for Walker in Arizona; and (5) the two
men who delivered boxes of drugs to Savage for her to label and
ship to Florida.
Second, even though, in light of the number of partici-
pants, establishing that the criminal activity was otherwise exten-
sive was unnecessary, the record supports such a finding. We
consider several factors when examining a criminal activity’s ex-
tensiveness, including the length and scope of the criminal activity
and the number of persons or entities involved. United States v.
Holland,
22 F.3d 1040, 1046 (11th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., United
States v. Rodriguez,
981 F.2d 1199 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding a drug
transaction that extended through three states and another coun-
try and involved the distribution of 100 kilograms of cocaine to be
otherwise extensive); United States v. Gupta,
463 F.3d 1182, 1198
(11th Cir. 2006) (finding a seven-year fraud scheme that involved
“seven corporations, numerous straw owners, [and] Medicare re-
imbursements of over $15 million” to be otherwise extensive).
Furthermore, “[i]n assessing whether an organization is ‘other-
wise extensive,’ all persons involved during the course of the en-
tire offense are to be considered. Thus, a fraud that involved only
three participants but used the unknowing services of many out-
siders could be considered extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. 3.
The scope of the criminal activity here was extensive. The
conspiracy involved large quantities of drugs. Walker pled guilty
to possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of
cocaine, 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, one kilogram
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14 Opinion of the Court 21-14136
or more of heroin, 40 grams or more of fentanyl, and 50 kilo-
grams or more of marijuana. The PSI specifically attributed to
Walker the distribution of 32,460 grams of near-pure metham-
phetamine, 51,631 grams of marijuana, 79 grams of fentanyl, and
125 grams of heroin. And these large quantities of drugs were
shipped across state lines, with more than 50 parcels of cocaine,
heroin, methamphetamine, fentanyl, and marijuana traveling be-
tween Arizona and Florida between July 2018 and October 2019.
At one point during the conspiracy, cocaine was also coming in
from Puerto Rico. In addition, the scheme hinged on the unknow-
ing services of many outsiders—the USPS employees who unwit-
tingly transported and delivered over 50 parcels of controlled sub-
stances. We thus conclude that Walker’s criminal activity could
be considered “otherwise extensive” given its scope and number
of participants involved, including both knowing and unknowing
participants.
For all the above reasons, the district court did not err—
clearly or otherwise—in determining that Walker was an organ-
izer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more par-
ticipants or was otherwise extensive under § 3B1.1(a).
B.
The Sentencing Guidelines mandate a two-level sentencing
increase “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was pos-
sessed” in connection with a drug offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1).
To justify a § 2D1.1(b)(1) dangerous-weapons enhancement, the
government must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
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21-14136 Opinion of the Court 15
that either (1) “the firearm was present at the site of the charged
conduct” or (2) “the defendant possessed a firearm during con-
duct associated with the offense of conviction.” United States v.
Stallings,
463 F.3d 1218, 1220 (11th Cir. 2006). Once the govern-
ment meets its initial evidentiary burden, the burden shifts to the
defendant to “demonstrate that a connection between the weap-
on and the offense was clearly improbable.”
Id. (internal quota-
tions omitted).
A § 2D1.1(b)(1) dangerous-weapons enhancement may be
applied when a firearm is possessed by a co-conspirator rather
than the defendant himself. United States v. Fields,
408 F.3d 1356,
1359 (11th Cir. 2005). To apply the enhancement to a defendant
based on co-conspirator possession, the government must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that “(1) the possessor of the
firearm was a co-conspirator, (2) the possession was in further-
ance of the conspiracy, (3) the defendant was a member of the
conspiracy at the time of possession, and (4) the co-conspirator
possession was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.” United
States v. Gallo,
195 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in
original).
Here, the government offered three firearms to justify a
dangerous-weapons enhancement: (1) a rifle seized during the
search of the Arizona stash house maintained by co-defendant
Hamilton; (2) a loaded handgun found behind the front passenger
seat of the vehicle Walker drove immediately before his arrest;
and (3) a firearm co-defendant Savage arranged for Walker to buy
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16 Opinion of the Court 21-14136
in Arizona. The district court found that two firearms—the fire-
arm recovered from Hamilton’s Arizona residence and the fire-
arm found inside the vehicle at Walker’s arrest—satisfied the gov-
ernment’s initial evidentiary burden under § 2D1.1(b)(1). The
court also found that Walker failed to demonstrate that a connec-
tion between the weapons and the offense was clearly improba-
ble.
We turn first to the rifle connected to co-defendant Hamil-
ton. Walker does not dispute that: (1) Hamilton was a co-
conspirator who possessed a firearm, (2) the possession was in
furtherance of the conspiracy, or (3) Walker was a member of the
conspiracy at the time Hamilton possessed the firearm. Instead,
Walker argues that there is no evidence to show that he knew
about Hamilton’s firearm or that he should have reasonably fore-
seen his co-conspirator’s firearm possession. Thus, only the fourth
prong of Gallo is at issue.
We therefore focus on whether it was reasonably foreseea-
ble to Walker that Hamilton would possess a firearm. In this in-
quiry, it is not required that Walker knew about Hamilton’s fire-
arm possession; the question is whether the possession was rea-
sonably foreseeable. United States v. Martinez,
924 F.2d 209, 210
(11th Cir. 1991).
Our precedent recognizes that “guns are a tool of the drug
trade. There is a frequent and overpowering connection between
the use of firearms and narcotics traffic.” United States v. Cruz,
805 F.2d 1464, 1474 (11th Cir. 1986). Because of this connection,
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21-14136 Opinion of the Court 17
we have found it reasonably foreseeable that a co-conspirator
would possess a firearm when the conspiracy involves trafficking
large quantities of valuable illegal drugs. United States v. Pham,
463 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006).
Here, the rifle was seized at an Arizona stash house used by
multiple co-conspirators to facilitate drug-trafficking activities.
There were approximately 49.4 kilograms of marijuana and 2.7
kilograms of methamphetamine in the house at the time agents
seized the rifle. Those drugs were destined for Florida; agents
found them in parcels already addressed with handwritten labels
to various locations in the Middle District of Florida. In addition
to the specific drugs found at Hamilton’s residence the day agents
executed their search warrant, we reiterate, Walker pled guilty to
conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms
or more of cocaine, 500 grams or more of methamphetamine,
one kilogram or more of heroin, 40 grams or more of fentanyl,
and 50 kilograms or more of marijuana. And, again, the PSI specif-
ically attributed to Walker 32,460 grams of “ice,” 51,631 grams of
marijuana, 79 grams of fentanyl, and 125 grams of heroin.
We have no trouble concluding that Walker could have
reasonably foreseen a co-conspirator’s possession of a firearm in
light of the sheer quantity and value of drugs he and his co-
conspirators possessed and trafficked. The district court did not
clearly err in applying a two-level dangerous weapons enhance-
ment to Walker based on his co-conspirator’s possession.
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18 Opinion of the Court 21-14136
Because the co-conspirator firearm is sufficient to justify
the § 2D1.1(b)(1) sentencing enhancement, we need not address
the firearm found in the vehicle Walker drove the day of his ar-
rest.
IV.
For the above reasons, we conclude that the district court
did not err in applying the four-level leadership-role enhancement
pursuant to § 3B1.1(a) or the two-level dangerous-weapon en-
hancement pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(1). 6 The district court’s judg-
ment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
6 After the parties completed briefing in this appeal, Walker, proceeding pro
se, submitted a letter to the court arguing that the district court erred in find-
ing that he qualified as a career offender. He relied on our recent decision in
Dupree v. United States, in which we held that the crime of conspiring to
possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance offense did not quali-
fy as a “controlled substance offense” for purposes of the career-offender en-
hancement.
57 F.4th 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc).
But even assuming the district court erred in finding that Walker qualified as
a career offender, any error was harmless. Without the career-offender en-
hancement, Walker’s guidelines range would be the same because his total
offense level and criminal history category would not change.
