Dianne Roden Bradley v. Franklin Collection Service, Inc. , 739 F.3d 606 ( 2014 )


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  •               Case: 13-12276     Date Filed: 01/02/2014      Page: 1 of 9
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-12276
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 5:10-cv-01537-AKK
    MELVIN BRADLEY,
    Plaintiff,
    DIANNE RODEN BRADLEY,
    as executrix for the Estate of Melvin Bradley,
    KEVIN A. CALMA,
    individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    versus
    FRANKLIN COLLECTION SERVICE, INC.,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (January 2, 2014)
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    Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellants Melvin Bradley and Kevin Calma (collectively “Appellants”)
    incurred medical debts at North Alabama Urology, P.C. (Urology) and University
    of Alabama at Birmingham Health System West (UAB West), respectively.
    Because Appellants failed to pay their debts, Urology and UAB West referred the
    accounts to appellee Franklin Collection Service, Inc. (Franklin). As part of the
    referral, Urology and UAB West added to Appellants’ accounts a charge for
    collection fees. It is this charge that prompted Appellants to file suit against
    Franklin, alleging violations of Alabama state law, the Fair Debt Collection
    Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §1692–1692p, and the Racketeer Influenced
    and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968. 1 Both parties
    moved for summary judgment. The district court denied Appellants’ motion on all
    claims except for Calma’s unjust enrichment claim and granted Franklin’s motion.
    After the district court’s ruling, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice
    Calma’s unjust enrichment claim. Their motion was granted, and the case was
    dismissed with prejudice. Appellants now appeal the district court’s decision to
    1
    Based on the district court’s order and the parties’ briefing on appeal, it appears that
    only Bradley appeals his claims under the FDCPA and state law.
    2
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    grant Franklin’s motion for summary judgment. 2 For the reasons that follow, we
    reverse the district court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of
    Franklin on Bradley’s claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692f of the FDCPA. We affirm
    the district court’s decision granting Franklin’s motion for summary judgment on
    all remaining claims raised in this appeal.3
    We review a district court’s summary judgment decision de novo, applying
    the same legal standards as those that governed the district court. Capone v. Aetna
    Life Ins. Co., 
    592 F.3d 1189
    , 1194 (11th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is
    appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
    movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We
    construe the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving
    party. Walters v. Am. Coach Lines of Miami, Inc., 
    575 F.3d 1221
    , 1226 (11th Cir.
    2009) (per curiam). We therefore state the facts in the light most favorable to the
    Appellants, the non-moving party.
    2
    In a footnote, Franklin notes that Appellants also appeal the district court’s order
    denying their motion for class certification. However, class certification is never mentioned in
    Appellants’ briefing. Because Appellants did not brief the issue, we consider it waived. See
    Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that “a legal
    claim or argument that has not been briefed before the court is deemed abandoned and its merits
    will not be addressed”).
    3
    Because we find Appellants’ remaining FDCPA claims, RICO claims, and claims under
    state law unavailing, we affirm those claims based on the thorough and well-reasoned order of
    the district court entered on March 28, 2013.
    3
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    I. BACKGROUND
    A. UAB West
    UAB West is a healthcare institution operating under the control of the
    University of Alabama at Birmingham Health System (UAB). UAB manages
    healthcare delivery and billing for its hospitals, including UAB West. UAB and
    UAB West contracted with Franklin to collect unpaid medical bills. UAB West’s
    agreement with Franklin involved adding a 30% collection fee to all accounts UAB
    West referred for collection. The agreement also gave Franklin the right to pursue
    collection lawsuits on UAB’s behalf.
    In 2007, Appellant Calma incurred a $735 bill when he took his daughter to
    UAB West for treatment. Calma failed to pay his bill. In response, UAB West
    sent him three separate statements, warning that, pursuant to their agreement, if
    Calma failed to pay, UAB West would send his account to a collection agency.
    The agreement Calma signed with UAB West stated, in part, “I agree that if this
    account is not paid when due, and the hospital should retain an attorney or
    collection agency for collection, I agree to pay all costs of collection including
    reasonable interest, reasonable attorney’s fees (even if suit is filed) and reasonable
    collection agency fees.” 4 Calma never paid UAB West. According to its debt
    4
    Unlike Bradley, Calma did not appeal Franklin’s collection fee based on a violation of
    15 U.S.C. § 1692f. And, unlike Bradley’s agreement, Calma’s agreement explicitly provided
    that Calma agreed to pay “reasonable collection agency fees.”
    4
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    collection policy, UAB added a 30% collection fee to his account and referred his
    account to Franklin for collection. With the 30% added collection fee, Calma
    owed UAB West $922.25.
    B. Urology
    Urology is a healthcare provider that also uses Franklin to collect unpaid
    medical bills. The collection contract between Urology and Franklin stated that
    Urology would add 33-and-1/3% to a debt prior to transferring the account to
    Franklin. The contract also stipulated that Franklin was entitled to 30% of the total
    collected from each debt. Critically, Bradley was not a party to this agreement.
    In 2009, Appellant Bradley received medical treatment from Urology and
    incurred a bill for $861.96. Like Calma, Bradley also signed a patient agreement,
    which stated: “In the event of non-payment . . . I agree to pay all costs of
    collection, including a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .” Also like Calma, Bradley
    failed to pay his medical bill. As a result, Urology added a $293.06 collection fee
    to Bradley’s balance. Urology then sent his account to Franklin for collection.
    Bradley’s new balance due to Urology was $1,155.02. To avoid being sued,
    Bradley paid the $1,155.02 and reserved his right to recover overcharges.
    II. DISCUSSION
    In enacting the FDCPA, Congress sought “to eliminate abusive debt
    collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who
    5
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    refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively
    disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against
    debt collection abuses.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e). The FDCPA prohibits debt
    collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means
    in connection with the collection of any debt” as well as the use of “unfair or
    unconscionable” means of collection. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f. Here, the sole
    issue is Bradley’s claim under § 1692f. We affirm the district court on all other
    issues raised in this appeal.
    Section 1692f prohibits unfair or unconscionable means of collection.
    Subsection (1) of this section specifically prohibits “collection of any amount
    (including any interest, fee, charge, or expense incidental to the principal
    obligation) unless such amount is expressly authorized by the agreement creating
    the debt or permitted by law.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1). Bradley argues that the
    collection fee he paid violates this section of the FDCPA because the fee was
    really liquidated damages rather than the actual cost of collection. We agree.
    While the Eleventh Circuit has not previously addressed this issue, we find
    the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Kojetin v. CU Recovery, Inc., 
    212 F.3d 1318
    ,
    1318 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), to be persuasive. There, the Eighth Circuit held
    that the debt collector violated the FDCPA when it charged the debtor a collection
    fee based on a percentage of the principal balance of the debt due rather than the
    6
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    actual cost of collection. 
    Id. That is
    what happened here. When Bradley signed
    Urology’s patient registration form, he only agreed to pay “all costs of collection.”
    That is, Bradley agreed to pay the actual costs of collection; his contractual
    agreement with Urology did not require him to pay a collection agency’s
    percentage-based fee where that fee did not correlate to the costs of collection.
    Before Urology handed over Bradley’s delinquent account to Franklin, it
    added a 33-and-1/3% “collection fee.” Franklin failed to direct this Court to any
    evidence that the 33-and-1/3% “collection fee”—which was assessed before
    Franklin attempted to collect the balance due—bears any correlation to the actual
    cost of Franklin’s collection effort. As such, the 33-and-1/3% fee breaches the
    agreement between Bradley and Urology, since, contractually, Bradley was only
    obligated to pay the “costs of collection.” See 
    id. Urology and
    Franklin cannot
    alter Bradley’s obligations by the terms of their subsequent agreement. Because
    there was no express agreement between Urology and Bradley allowing for
    collection of the 33-and-1/3% fee, that fee violates the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.
    § 1692(e); see also 
    Kojetin, 212 F.3d at 1318
    .
    This is not to say that Bradley and Urology could not have formed an
    agreement allowing for the collection of the percentage-based fee. It is the nature
    of the agreement between Bradly and Urology, not simply the amount of the fee
    that is important here. For example, Plaintiff Calma agreed to pay, inter alia,
    7
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    “reasonable collection agency fees.” And, based on this contractual language,
    Calma declined to argue on appeal that the agreement that he had with UAB West
    did not cover Franklin’s percentage-based collection fee.
    Courts examining other contractual language have also suggested that a
    percentage-based fee can be appropriate if the contracting parties agreed to it. For
    example, the Seventh Circuit suggested that the following contractual provision
    may allow the imposition of a percentage-based collection fee when a delinquent
    account was referred to a third-party collection agency: “You agree to reimburse
    us the fees of any collection agency, which may be based on a percentage at a
    maximum of 33% of the debt, and all costs and expenses, including reasonable
    attorneys’ fees, we incur in such collection efforts.” See Seeger v. AFNI, Inc., 
    548 F.3d 1107
    , 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Boatley v. Diem Corp., No. CIV.
    03-0762-PHX-SMM, 
    2004 WL 5315892
    , *5-6 (D. Ariz. Mar. 24, 2004).
    But, Bradley’s contract with Urology was not like Calma’s contract with
    UAB West or the contracts from these other cases. Under the contract at issue
    here, Bradley agreed to pay the actual costs of collection; he did not agree to pay a
    percentage above the amount of his outstanding debt that was unrelated to the
    actual costs to collect that debt.
    Franklin argues that Kojetin is distinguishable because it holds that a
    violation of the FDCPA only occurs where the debt collector charges a percentage-
    8
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    based fee not supported by the language of the underlying agreement. But that is
    exactly what we have here. As explained above, the agreement creating the debt—
    the patient agreement between Urology and Bradley—only allows a charge for
    “costs of collection.” See 
    id. Nowhere on
    the form does Bradley agree to a
    collection fee that is not tied to the actual costs of collection, let alone the 33-and-
    1/3% “collection fee” he was ultimately assessed.
    We therefore hold that Franklin violated the FDCPA when it collected from
    Bradley a debt that included a 33-and-1/3% “collection fee” when Bradley only
    agreed to pay the actual costs of collection. Accordingly, we reverse the district
    court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Franklin on Bradley’s
    claim under § 1692f of the FDCPA. We affirm the district court’s decision
    granting summary judgment on Appellants’ RICO claims, remaining FDCPA
    claims, and state law claims.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-12276

Citation Numbers: 739 F.3d 606, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 11, 2014 WL 23738

Judges: Hull, Marcus, Per Curiam, Wilson

Filed Date: 1/2/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024