United States v. Bryant O'Nell Niles , 565 F. App'x 828 ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-14107
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-00053-CG-C-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BRYANT O’NELL NILES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
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(May 12, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Bryant O’Nell Niles pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and one count of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18
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U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Following his guilty plea and sentencing, Niles submitted a
pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel
led to his decision to plead guilty. The district court denied his motion. On appeal,
Niles requests that we review the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea. After
review of the parties’ briefs and related materials, we affirm.
I.
When Niles was employed at the Baymont Inn & Suites in Mobile,
Alabama, he devised and participated in a scheme to defraud the hotel. Without
authorization, he kept cash that customers had paid for their rooms, then charged
credit cards in the hotel’s database in an effort to disguise his actions. He did this
for approximately one month. After he was caught a grand jury indicted him on 11
counts of wire fraud and 11 counts of aggravated identity theft. As part of an
agreement with the government, he pleaded guilty to one count of each. The
written plea agreement contained a limited waiver of Niles’s right to appeal.
Niles repeatedly indicated his understanding of the terms of the plea
agreement. He signed the agreement under a paragraph that stated: “I have read
this Plea Agreement and carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. I
understand this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to it.” He confirmed this
understanding at the plea hearing, telling the district court he had read and
discussed the agreement with his attorney before he signed it and acknowledging
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that he understood its terms. Ultimately the district court sentenced Niles to 33-
months imprisonment.
Shortly after sentencing, Niles moved pro se to withdraw his guilty plea. He
claimed that his counsel gave notice he intended to plead guilty without his
consent; explained only part of the plea agreement to him; and did not give him a
copy of the plea agreement. The district court denied Niles’s motion, noting that
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e) his conviction could only be set aside through a direct
appeal or collateral attack because he had already been sentenced. In addition,
Niles’s statements at his plea hearing contradicted the claims made in his motion.
II.
After a district court “imposes sentence, the defendant may not withdraw a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, and the plea may be set aside only on direct
appeal or collateral attack.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e). “A defendant who failed to
object to the Rule 11 colloquy or move to withdraw his guilty plea prior to
sentencing, must show plain error on appeal.” United States v. Chubbuck, 252
F.3d 1300, 1302 (11th Cir. 2001). “[A] defendant who seeks reversal of his
conviction after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court committed plain
error under Rule 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he
would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S.
74, 83, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004). If a defendant waives the right to appeal by
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pleading guilty he waives all nonjurisdictional challenges to the constitutionality of
the conviction, and only an attack on the guilty plea’s voluntary and knowing
nature can be sustained. Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir.
1992) (per curiam).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires a guilty plea
to be both voluntary and knowing. Gaddy v. Linahan, 780 F.2d 935, 943 (11th Cir.
1986). Before the district court accepts a guilty plea, there must be an affirmative
showing that the plea was intelligent and voluntary, and the waiver of
constitutional rights will not be presumed from a silent record. Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711–12 (1969). Under Rule 11, the
district court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the
defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands, the nature of the plea
being offered and the potential consequences of that plea. United States v. Lewis,
115 F.3d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). To determine whether the
waiver is knowing and voluntary, a court accepting a guilty plea must comply with
the three core concerns of Rule 11 by ensuring that: (1) the guilty plea is free from
coercion; (2) the defendant understands the nature of the charges; and (3) the
defendant understands the consequences of his plea. United States v. Jones, 143
F.3d 1417, 1419–20 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). There is a strong presumption
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that statements made during a plea colloquy are true. United States v. Medlock, 12
F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).
III.
To begin, and to the extent that Niles appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court correctly denied his motion
because it lacked jurisdiction to withdraw the guilty plea after sentencing. See
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e).
Niles also fails to show that the district court plainly erred in finding that his
guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. See Chubbuck, 252 F.3d at 1302. Several
of Niles’s allegations in his motion to withdraw his plea are directly contradicted
by his statements made, under oath, at the plea hearing. Even if Niles
misunderstood the consequences of pleading guilty after his discussions with his
trial counsel, the district court adequately informed Niles of these consequences
when it described them at the plea hearing. He identifies nothing in the record
suggesting that the district court plainly erred in finding his plea knowing and
voluntary, particularly in light of his statements at the plea hearing. See
Chubbuck, 252 F.3d at 1302; Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187.
To the extent that Niles’s remaining allegations raise a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, we decline to consider this claim on direct appeal because
the record is not sufficiently developed. We generally will not consider claims of
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ineffective assistance of counsel raised on direct appeal where the district court did
not entertain the claim or develop a factual record. United States v. Patterson, 595
F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 2010). “The preferred means for deciding a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion even if the
record contains some indication of deficiencies in counsel’s performance.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted). The record contains no information about the specific
discussions that Niles and his trial counsel had regarding the notice of intention to
plead guilty, the plea agreement, or the possibility of filing motions on Niles’s
behalf. Niles did not raise, and the district court did not address, any of the issues
of ineffective assistance of counsel Niles now seeks to raise, and we decline to
consider this claim on direct appeal.
IV.
Based on the above, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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