United States v. Fred Holton ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-14010
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cr-20182-FAM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
FRED HOLTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 7, 2014)
Before PRYOR, MARTIN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Fred Holton appeals his conviction and 180-month sentence after pleading
guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in and affecting interstate
commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Holton pled guilty pursuant to a
plea agreement, which included a sentence appeal waiver. However, Holton
preserved his ability to appeal the sentence if it “exceed[ed] the maximum
permitted by statute.” During the plea colloquy and at sentencing, Holton objected
to the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) enhancement,
arguing that the Shepard1-approved documents did not establish that his prior
violent felony convictions for attempted first degree murder and manslaughter
occurred on separate occasions. The district court determined that the offenses
occurred on separate occasions and sentenced Holton to 15 years’ imprisonment
pursuant to the ACCA.
On appeal, Holton argues that the district court erred in sentencing him as an
armed career criminal because the government did not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that his two prior violent felony convictions
occurred on separate occasions. He asserts that his ACCA challenge is not barred
by his sentence appeal waiver because his 15-year sentence is above the otherwise
applicable 10-year statutory maximum for a § 922(g) offense. Holton further
argues that his sentence under the ACCA violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
1
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005).
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rights because his prior violent felony convictions were not alleged in the
indictment. He also contends for the first time on appeal that his conviction under
§ 922(g) is unconstitutional both facially and as applied to him as exceeding
Congressional power under the Commerce Clause. The government asserts that
Holton’s ACCA argument is barred by his sentence appeal waiver. After
consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm Holton’s conviction, but vacate and
remand for resentencing.
I.
We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo. United States
v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008). We have rejected a hyper-
technical reading and “rigidly literal approach” to the construction of the language
in a plea agreement. United States v. Jeffries, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th Cir.
1990). The agreement should be read in light of the negotiations and should not be
interpreted to directly contradict an oral understanding between the parties. Id.However, ambiguities in plea agreements are construed against the government.
Id.A sentence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly and
voluntarily. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th Cir. 1993). To
establish that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, the government
must show either that (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant
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about the waiver during the plea colloquy, or (2) the record makes clear that the
defendant otherwise understood the full significance of the waiver. Id. If valid, an
appeal waiver cannot be altered by comments made by the district court during
sentencing. See United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 1999)
(noting that district courts lack authority to modify the terms of a plea agreement).
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924, a person who violates 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is
subject to ten years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). A person who violates
§ 922(g) and has 3 previous convictions for a violent felony or a serious drug
offense, or both, committed on occasions different from each other is subject to a
mandatory minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
In United States v. Jones, we recently addressed a defendant’s challenge that
he did not have the requisite number of predicate offenses for the ACCA
enhancement. United States v. Jones, 743 F.3d 826 (11th Cir. 2014). We noted
that Jones’s 15-year sentence exceeded the typical 10-year maximum sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) because Jones’s sentence was enhanced pursuant to
the ACCA. Id. at 827. In a footnote, we explained that Jones’s plea agreement
included a general appeal waiver but reserved his right to appeal “any sentence in
excess of the statutory maximum.” Id. at 828 n.2. We stated that we had
previously denied the government’s motion to dismiss pursuant to the appeal
waiver because, without the ACCA enhancement, the maximum sentence Jones
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could have received under the statute was ten years’ imprisonment. Id. Because
the ACCA enhancement resulted in a 15-year sentence, we stated that Jones’s
sentence was “in excess of the statutory maximum” and thus fell within the appeal
waiver exception. Id.As an initial matter, Holton does not contest the validity of his sentence
appeal waiver. In any event, the district court specifically questioned Holton about
the waiver during the plea colloquy, and the waiver was expressly stated in the plea
agreement, which Holton signed and acknowledged he understood and had
discussed with his attorney. See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. Thus, the waiver is
enforceable because it was knowing and voluntary. See id.Nevertheless, Holton’s challenge to the applicability of the ACCA
enhancement is not barred by the appeal waiver because it falls within the
exception providing that Holton could appeal if his sentence “exceeds the
maximum permitted by statute.” In Jones, we addressed the merits of the
defendant’s ACCA challenge and noted that we had previously denied the
government’s motion to dismiss pursuant to the defendant’s appeal waiver because
the defendant’s challenge to the ACCA enhancement fell within the exception
permitting him to appeal a sentence “in excess of the statutory maximum.” Jones,
743 F.3d at 828 n.2. Although our discussion from Jones is arguably dicta, it is
nevertheless persuasive.
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Holton’s appeal waiver reserved the right to appeal any sentence that
“exceeds the maximum permitted by statute.” The statutory maximum for the
offense Holton pled guilty to—§ 922(g)(1)—is 10 years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Holton’s claim on appeal is that the district
court erroneously applied the ACCA enhancement, and in doing so sentenced him
above the statutory maximum. Thus, Holton’s challenge falls within the appeal
waiver exception because it is a claim that his 15-year sentence “exceeds the
maximum permitted by statute.” See Jones, 743 F.3d at 828 n.2.
At a minimum, the plea agreement is ambiguous as to whether the appeal
waiver bars Holton’s claim. The plea agreement contains language acknowledging
that “if [Holton] is subject to [the ACCA],” the district court may impose a
sentence up to life imprisonment. This conditional reference to the ACCA
enhancement implies that the parties disagreed at the time of the plea agreement
about whether the ACCA applied, yet the appeal waiver provision of the plea
agreement does not mention the ACCA or expressly state whether such a claim
comes within the waiver. Moreover, the plea agreement never actually refers to an
ACCA-enhanced sentence as “the maximum permitted by statute.” In light of the
ACCA’s effect on the applicable statutory maximum, and the appeal waiver’s
silence as to the ACCA, despite the parties’ disagreement about its applicability,
Holton at least could have reasonably believed that the appeal waiver did not
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extend to this claim. Thus, the appeal waiver is ambiguous and ambiguities are
construed against the government. See Jeffries, 908 F.2d at 1523.
The fact that the district court during the plea colloquy repeatedly told
Holton that its decision would be final and that Holton would be stuck with
whatever decision it made does not change the result. See Howle, 166 F.3d at
1168-69 (concluding that district court’s encouragement of defendant, who had
waived right to appeal, to file an appeal “had no effect on the terms of a previously
approved plea agreement”). Therefore, Holton did not waive his right to appeal the
ACCA enhancement, and we will address the merits of Holton’s ACCA challenge.
II.
Whether prior violent felony convictions occurred on different occasions
from one another under the ACCA is a question of law that we review de novo.
United States v. Canty, 570 F.3d 1251, 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2009). We review
constitutional errors in sentencing de novo. United States v. Paz, 405 F.3d 946,
948 (11th Cir. 2005). The burden is on the government to prove that the prior
convictions “arose out of a separate and distinct criminal episode.” United States
v. Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). We have
stated that sentencing enhancements need only be proven by a preponderance of
the evidence. United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 566, 572 (11th Cir. 2010).
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Under the ACCA, a defendant convicted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is
subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment if he has 3
prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense “committed on
occasions different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). To determine the
nature of a prior conviction, a court “is generally limited to examining the statutory
definition [of the offense of the prior conviction], charging document, written plea
agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial
judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16, 125 S.Ct. at
1257. “[D]istrict courts may determine both the existence of prior convictions and
the factual nature of those convictions, including whether they were committed on
different occasions, so long as they limit themselves to Shepard-approved
documents.” United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 311, 187 L.Ed.2d 220 (2013) (citing Sneed, 600 F.3d at
1332-33).
Section 924(e)’s different-occasion requirement requires that the three
convictions were temporally distinct. Sneed, 600 F.3d at 1329. When evaluating
whether crimes were committed on different occasions, we have held that “so long
as predicate crimes are successive rather than simultaneous, they constitute
separate criminal episodes for purposes of the ACCA.” United States v. Pope, 132
F.3d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1998). As long as some temporal “break” exists between
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offenses, they will be deemed to have occurred on separate occasions. Id. at 689-
90. “Mere temporal proximity is ordinarily insufficient to merge multiple offenses
into a single criminal episode. Distinctions in time and place are usually sufficient
to separate criminal episodes from one another even when the gaps are small.” Id.
at 689.
In Weeks, we rejected the defendant’s argument that the Shepard-approved
documents were insufficient to show that his three prior burglary convictions—one
committed on November 27 and two committed on December 2—were committed
on different occasions. Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1258-61. We concluded that the first
burglary was temporally distinct from the other two because it occurred five days
before the other two offenses. Id. at 1261. Moreover, the fact that the charging
documents showed that the offenses involved three separate structures and victims
was enough to support the district court’s conclusion that the burglaries were
separate criminal episodes. Id. We specifically stated that the fact that the
December 2 burglaries occurred within close proximity to each other was not
determinative, as small gaps in time and place are enough to establish separate
offenses. Id.
Similarly, in United States v. Proch, the Shepard-approved documents
showed that the defendant committed two burglaries on the same day at two
separate businesses on the same street, as well as an escape on the same day. 637
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F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2011). We concluded that the burglaries were two
separate and distinct criminal episodes. Id. at 1265-66. Although the indictment
did not list the times that each of the offenses occurred, we noted that the two
businesses were separated by a side street and parking lot, and that the locations of
the businesses indicated that Proch had the opportunity to desist or chose instead to
commit another crime. Id. at 1266. Moreover, Proch’s escape also constituted a
separate crime because the charging document established that he was in lawful
custody at the time of the escape. Id. Thus, we reasoned that Proch was either in
jail or in transport when he attempted escape, and that his arrest had stopped the
burglary episode. Id.; see also Pope, 132 F.3d at 692 (holding that the burglary of
2 offices on the same day, separated by 200 yards, constituted 2 predicate offenses
under the ACCA because the defendant had the opportunity to desist after
completing the first burglary but chose to commit the second burglary).
On the other hand, in United States v. Canty, we held that the records of
conviction for a defendant’s prior felony convictions for escape and obstructing an
officer did not establish that the offenses were two separate and distinct episodes
under the ACCA. 570 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2009). We reasoned that both
offenses occurred on the same day and were evidenced by the single judgment of
conviction, and there was no indication that they occurred successively rather than
simultaneously. Id.; see also United States v. Sweeting, 933 F.2d 962, 967 (11th
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Cir. 1991) (holding that the burglary of one home, followed by fleeing to another
home to evade police, constituted one criminal episode for purposes of the ACCA).
Here, the district court erred in determining that Holton qualified for the
ACCA enhancement because the government did not establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that Holton had three prior violent felony convictions that occurred
on different occasions. Holton does not contest that his three prior convictions are
violent felonies, but argues that the Shepard-approved documents do not show that
his attempted first degree murder and manslaughter convictions occurred on
different occasions. To determine whether Holton’s prior convictions occurred on
different occasions, we may only look at Shepard-approved documents, which in
this case, included two informations, two judgments, and a plea colloquy for
Holton’s manslaughter conviction. See Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1259.
The Shepard-approved documents, however, do not establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the offenses occurred on occasions different
from one another. Neither the plea colloquy nor either judgment provides any
factual detail about the offenses. Both informations state that the offenses occurred
on September 26, 1989. The information for Holton’s attempted first degree
murder conviction, which also included charges for aggravated battery, aggravated
assault, shooting a deadly missile into a building, and unlawful possession of a
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firearm during the commission of a crime, was filed on October 18, 1989. It states
that Holton and two codefendants, Moore and Jackson, attempted to kill Alvin
Simmons by shooting into a building located at 2285 Northwest 50th Street, Miami,
Florida. The information for Holton’s manslaughter conviction was filed on May
28, 1991. This information does not specify a location, but states that Holton and
three codefendants, Moore, Jackson, and Shaw, provoked a shootout with Robert
Simmons, causing Robert Simmons to fire a gun to protect himself and/or others,
which resulted in the death of Anne Bell.
While we have held that two offenses occurring on the same day are separate
offenses for ACCA purposes, we have only done so where there has been some
indication of a temporal break in the offenses (i.e., different locations or different
times). See Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1359-61; Proch, 637 F.3d at 1265-66; Pope, 132
F.3d at 692. Unlike Weeks, where the charging documents showed that the three
burglary offenses involved three different structures and victims, as well as the fact
that one of the burglaries occurred five days prior to the other two burglaries, the
charging documents in the instant case do not establish the time or location of both
offenses. Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1359-61. Similar to the present case, the Shepard-
approved documents in Proch did not list the time that the two offenses occurred.
See Proch, 637 F.3d at 1266. However, in Proch it could be inferred from the
Shepard documents that a temporal break existed between the offenses because the
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offenses occurred at two different locations separated by a parking lot and a side
street. See id.
Based on the limited information in the charging documents in the present
case, it is not clear whether a temporal break existed between the two offenses. It is
plausible the offenses occurred simultaneously given that the offenses occurred on
the same date. Moreover, Holton was charged in one information with attempting
to kill Alvin Simmons and in the other information Holton was provoking a
shootout with Robert Simmons (same surname as Alvin), who returned gunfire to
protect himself and others. It is possible Robert Simmons was attempting to protect
Alvin Simmons. Furthermore, three of the same defendants were charged with both
the attempted first degree murder and manslaughter, thereby indicating that the
offenses could have occurred at the same time. Although there were different
victims, the same surname makes it likely that the two victims were related, and
although there was an additional co-defendant in the manslaughter case, all of
Holton’s co-defendants in the attempted murder case were also charged in the
manslaughter case. Based on this information, it is not more likely than not that the
offenses occurred successively.
The government argues that the offenses were successive because there are
two separate informations, separate proceedings, and separate judgments. In Canty,
we held that the two offenses were not separate and noted that there was a single
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judgment of conviction. See Canty, 570 F.3d at 1255. However, we also
emphasized that the offenses occurred on the same date and that there was no other
indication of whether the offenses occurred simultaneously or successively. See id.The present case involved two separate judgments of conviction, but like Canty, the
two offenses occurred on same date. Moreover, there are many potential reasons,
other than differences in time and place of commission, that offenses may have
been charged in different proceedings—here, for example, the State may have
delayed charging the manslaughter case to see if the victim would die from her
injuries.
Because it is not clear from the Shepard-approved documents whether the
offenses occurred simultaneously or successively, the government has not
established by a preponderance of the evidence that Holton’s prior violent felony
convictions occurred on occasions different from one another. Turner, 626 F.3d at
572. We need not address Holton’s argument that his sentence under the ACCA
violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because the district court erred in
sentencing him as an armed career criminal. However, his argument is foreclosed
by binding precedent in any event. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224, 226-27, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 1222, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998) (holding that, for
sentencing enhancement purposes, a defendant’s prior conviction does not have to
be alleged in the indictment or submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable
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doubt). Because the district court erred in sentencing Holton under the ACCA, we
vacate and remand for resentencing.
III.
We review the legal question of a statute’s constitutionality de novo. United
States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1099 (11th Cir. 2002). However, challenges
raised for the first time in a criminal appeal are reviewed for plain error. See
United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009). Under the plain
error standard, the defendant must show: “(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that
affects substantial rights.” United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th
Cir. 2005). When all three of these conditions are met, this Court will find that an
error has occurred only if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation and alteration omitted).
“An error is not plain unless it is contrary to explicit statutory provisions or to on-
point precedent in this Court or the Supreme Court.” Schultz, 565 F.3d at 1357.
Pursuant to § 922(g)(1), it is unlawful for a convicted felon “to ship or
transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has
been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). We have repeatedly upheld § 922(g)(1) against facial attacks as a
constitutional exercise of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. See
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United States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that “the
jurisdictional element of the statute, i.e., the requirement that the felon ‘possess in
or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition,’ immunizes § 922(g)(1) from
[a] facial constitutional attack”); see also United States v. Dupree, 258 F.3d 1258,
1259-60 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Nichols, 124 F.3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir.
1997); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387, 389-90 (11th Cir. 1996).
We have also upheld § 922(g)(1) against as-applied challenges where the
government has shown a “minimal nexus” between the firearm and interstate
commerce. McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390. A showing that the firearm was
manufactured in one state and traveled in interstate commerce to another state
satisfies the “minimal nexus” test. Scott, 263 F.3d at 1274.
We review Holton’s argument for plain error because he raises it for the first
time on appeal.2 His argument fails because as he readily concedes in his
appellate brief, his facial challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is foreclosed by our
precedent upholding § 922(g) under similar facial attacks. See Scott, 263 F.3d at
1273. Holton’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g) is also unavailing. At the plea
2
Holton’s guilty plea did not waive his constitutional challenge to § 922(g) because his
challenge necessarily implicates the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction, challenges to
which cannot be waived. See United States v. Smith, 532 F.3d 1125, 1127 (11th Cir. 2008)
(stating that a guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional challenges to a conviction); see also
United States v. De La Garza, 516 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that challenges to a
district court’s subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived); but see Dupree, 258 F.3d at 1259(stating in dicta that this Court could conclude that appellant waived his constitutional challenge
to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because it was raised for first time on appeal).
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colloquy, he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in and
affecting interstate and foreign commerce. He also agreed with the government’s
recitation of the facts, including that the firearm was manufactured outside the state
of Florida and therefore moved in interstate commerce. As such, this was
sufficient to show a “minimal nexus” between the firearm and its connection to
interstate commerce. See McAllister, 77 F.3d at 390. Therefore, § 922(g)(1) is
constitutional on its face and as applied to Holton. Accordingly, we affirm
Holton’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand for resentencing.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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