Nelida Ramirez Mendez v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2023 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 22-12509   Document: 20-1    Date Filed: 05/08/2023   Page: 1 of 12
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 22-12509
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    NELIDA RAMIREZ MENDEZ,
    DEILY DOMINGO RAMIREZ,
    DELEIDI DOMINGO RAMIREZ,
    MILBER DOMINGO RAMIREZ,
    UBILMER DOMINGO RAMIREZ,
    Petitioners,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ____________________
    USCA11 Case: 22-12509        Document: 20-1        Date Filed: 05/08/2023        Page: 2 of 12
    2                         Opinion of the Court                     22-12509
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Agency No. A208-193-212
    ____________________
    Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Nelida Ramirez Mendez and her daughter, Deleidi Do-
    mingo Ramirez, seek review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
    (BIA) final order affirming the immigration judge’s (IJ) order deny-
    ing their respective applications for asylum, withholding of re-
    moval, and relief under the United Nations Convention Against
    Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
    Punishment (CAT). 1 After careful review, we dismiss in part, deny
    in part, and grant in part the petition for review. We also vacate
    certain parts of the BIA order and remand for further proceedings.
    I.
    First, Ramirez Mendez argues that the BIA erred in finding
    that she did not suffer past persecution or have a well-founded fear
    of future persecution on account of her race as an indigenous Ma-
    yan.
    1 Ramirez   Mendez and Domingo Ramirez filed their own respective applica-
    tions for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Ramirez Mendez’s
    application includes her children as derivative beneficiaries: Deleidi, Deily,
    Milber, and Ubilmer Domingo Ramirez.
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    22-12509               Opinion of the Court                         3
    We review only the decision of the BIA, unless the BIA ex-
    pressly adopted the decision of the IJ. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
    
    577 F.3d 1341
    , 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). In deciding whether to uphold
    the BIA’s decision, we are limited to the grounds upon which the
    BIA relied. See Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    820 F.3d 399
    , 403 (11th
    Cir. 2016) (per curiam).
    We review legal conclusions de novo and review factual find-
    ings for substantial evidence. Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    913 F.3d 1301
    , 1306 (11th Cir. 2019). Under the substantial evidence
    standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    agency’s decision, draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that
    decision, and affirm the BIA’s decision “if it is supported by reason-
    able, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered
    as a whole.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks omitted). To reverse the agency’s
    fact findings, we must find that the record not only supports rever-
    sal but compels it. 
    Id.
     The mere fact that the record may support
    a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the
    agency’s findings. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 
    386 F.3d 1022
    , 1027 (11th Cir.
    2004) (en banc).
    To meet the burden of establishing eligibility for asylum, a
    non-citizen must, with specific and credible evidence, establish
    (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily protected ground,
    or (2) a “well-founded fear” that the non-citizen will be persecuted
    on account of a protected ground. Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    596 F.3d 1329
    , 1332 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a), (b).
    The protected grounds include, among other things, race and
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    4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12509
    membership in a “particular social group.” Immigration and Na-
    tionality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42); 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a), (b). Past persecution creates a rebuttable presumption
    of a well-founded fear of future persecution. De Santamaria v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    525 F.3d 999
    , 1007 (11th Cir. 2008). Without a showing
    of past persecution, an asylum applicant may show a well-founded
    fear of future persecution by showing that the fear is subjectively
    genuine and objectively reasonable. 
    Id.
     The applicant must show
    a reasonable possibility of suffering persecution, either by being
    singled out for persecution or being identified with a regularly per-
    secuted group. Li Shan Chen v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    672 F.3d 961
    , 965
    (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
    An applicant must also establish a nexus between the feared
    persecution and a protected ground, demonstrating that the pro-
    tected ground “was or will be at least one central reason for perse-
    cuting” her. INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(i), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(i). We
    have held that “[e]vidence that treatment is consistent with general
    criminal activity does not help [a petitioner] with the nexus require-
    ment.” Sanchez-Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    998 F.3d 1281
    , 1288 (11th
    Cir. 2021). In Silva v. U.S. Attorney General, we held that although it
    could be inferred that Silva was shot at because of her political ac-
    tivity, substantial evidence did not compel such a conclusion because
    Silva had not explained or distinguished herself “from the majority
    of Colombians who are also subject to the general conditions of
    violence and criminal activity in Colombia.” 
    448 F.3d 1229
    , 1238
    (11th Cir. 2006). We found that although country reports reflected
    that there was widespread and indiscriminate violence in Colombia
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    22-12509                Opinion of the Court                          5
    and that Silva testified that Colombians routinely suffer similar in-
    cidents of terroristic threats and violence, we could not say the
    shooting was “indisputably related” to her political activity when
    looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the IJ’s deci-
    sion. 
    Id.
    A non-citizen is eligible for withholding of removal if she
    shows that, upon return to her country, she more likely than not
    will be persecuted there because of a protected ground, such as her
    race or membership in a particular social group. INA § 241(b)(3), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3). If an applicant cannot meet the well-founded
    fear standard of asylum, she generally will not be eligible for with-
    holding of removal. Kazemzadeh, 
    577 F.3d at 1352
    .
    Before we dive into whether the BIA’s decision is supported
    by substantial evidence, we have a few housekeeping matters to ad-
    dress. First, despite both Ramirez Mendez and Domingo Ramirez
    appealing the BIA’s decision, their brief argues only a well-founded
    fear of persecution on account of race as a protected ground for
    Ramirez Mendez. Thus, Domingo Ramirez has abandoned her
    claim for well-founded fear of future persecution on account of
    race. See Ruga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    757 F.3d 1193
    , 1196 (11th Cir. 2014).
    Second, Ramirez Mendez argues that the BIA erred as to her
    claim of past persecution and well-founded fear of future persecu-
    tion. But as the government correctly notes, Ramirez Mendez did
    not argue to the BIA that the IJ erred on the claim of past persecu-
    tion, meaning Ramirez Mendez failed to exhaust that claim. Jeune
    v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    810 F.3d 792
    , 800 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, we lack
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    6                     Opinion of the Court                22-12509
    jurisdiction to consider Ramirez Mendez’s claim of past persecu-
    tion because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See
    INA § 242(d)(1), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1); Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    463 F.3d 1247
    , 1250 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
    Turning to the merits of Ramirez Mendez’s petition, we find
    that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination denying
    asylum and withholding of removal to Ramirez Mendez based on
    her claim that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution
    due to her race as an indigenous Mayan. Ramirez Mendez did not
    provide evidence of past persecution, and without such evidence,
    she is not entitled to a presumption of future persecution. See De
    Santamaria, 
    525 F.3d at 1007
    . As a result, Ramirez Mendez must
    show that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution.
    Ramirez Mendez submitted reports about the conditions in
    Guatemala, specifically for indigenous people. Those reports de-
    tailed inequality and exclusion based on racism and structural dis-
    criminatory actions. One report noted that indigenous people ex-
    perienced societal harm because of the “ongoing lack of protection
    for the human rights of indigenous people and communities in ac-
    cordance with international standards.” Ramirez Mendez testified
    generally about that harm but only provided one specific instance
    in which her neighbor threatened to take her land but ultimately
    did not take the land.
    Even if the record may support a conclusion contrary to the
    BIA, that is not enough to compel us to reverse the BIA’s findings.
    See Perez-Zenteno, 
    913 F.3d at 1306
    . Ramirez Mendez cannot rely
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    22-12509                Opinion of the Court                          7
    on general violence as a claim for future persecution. See Silva, 
    448 F.3d at 1238
    . Despite the reports about the treatment of indigenous
    people, other reports provided to the BIA show that Guatemalan
    law does provide for equal rights for indigenous people. Thus, sub-
    stantial evidence supports the BIA denying Ramirez Mendez’s ap-
    plication for asylum. Because Ramirez Mendez does not meet the
    more lenient standards for asylum relief, she cannot meet the high
    standard to be eligible for withholding of removal. See Kazemzadeh,
    
    577 F.3d at 1352
    .
    The BIA’s decision to deny Ramirez Mendez’s application
    for asylum and withholding of removal based on her race as an in-
    digenous Mayan is supported by substantial evidence. Accord-
    ingly, we deny the petition for review as to this issue.
    II.
    Second, Ramirez Mendez and Domingo Ramirez argue the
    BIA erred in finding that they did not suffer past persecution or
    have a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of their
    particular social groups (PSG).
    The BIA must provide “reasoned consideration” to a peti-
    tioner’s claims. Jathursan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    17 F.4th 1365
    , 1372 (11th
    Cir. 2021). In Indrawati v. U.S. Attorney General, we analyzed the pe-
    titioner’s claims that we considered were “arguments clothed in
    reasoned consideration garb.” 
    779 F.3d 1284
    , 1302 (11th Cir. 2015)
    (quotation marks omitted). We stated that we have sometimes
    “granted petitions for review, vacated agency decisions, and re-
    manded for further proceedings when the agency’s decision was so
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    8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12509
    lacking in reasoned consideration and explanation that meaningful
    review was impossible.” 
    Id.
     “When assessing whether a decision
    displays reasoned consideration, we look only to ensure that the IJ
    and the BIA considered the issues raised and announced their deci-
    sions in terms sufficient to enable review.” 
    Id.
     “[T]he IJ and the
    BIA need not address specifically each claim the petitioner made or
    each piece of evidence the petitioner presented.” 
    Id.
     (quotation
    marks omitted). We will remand for lack of reasoned considera-
    tion not because we disagree with the agency’s legal conclusions
    and factual findings but because “given the facts and claims in the
    specific case before the IJ and BIA, the agency decision [wa]s so fun-
    damentally incomplete that a review of legal and factual determi-
    nations would be quixotic.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks and emphasis
    omitted).
    In I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, the Supreme Court stated that “a
    court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of
    a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands.” 
    537 U.S. 12
    , 16 (2002) (per curiam). “The agency can bring its expertise to
    bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an
    initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed
    discussion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its
    decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.” 
    Id. at 17
    .
    Here, before the BIA, Ramirez Mendez and Domingo
    Ramirez argued that their PSG was based on the interplay between
    race and disability—specifically, their race as indigenous Mayans,
    Domingo Ramirez’s disability, and Ramirez Mendez being the
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    22-12509                 Opinion of the Court                            9
    parent of a disabled child. 2 Based on the cumulative effect of those
    two characteristics and their interplay, Ramirez Mendez and Do-
    mingo Ramirez argued that this increased discrimination against
    them and decreased their access to medical care. Despite them
    making this clear argument, the BIA separately addressed the two
    characteristics: (1) race as indigenous Mayans and (2) Ramirez
    Mendez as the parent of a disabled child and Domingo Ramirez as
    a disabled child. But the BIA failed to address those two character-
    istics in combination. The BIA should have addressed how these
    two characteristics interact to exaggerate the threat of persecution
    to possibly establish a claim of well-founded fear of future persecu-
    tion. Thus, the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to
    Ramirez Mendez’s and Domingo Ramirez’s PSG claims.
    Because this was an important argument of Ramirez Men-
    dez and Domingo Ramirez, the BIA’s decision not to address the
    PSG is “so fundamentally incomplete that a review of legal and fac-
    tual determinations would be quixotic.” Indrawati, 
    779 F.3d at 1302
    . Because the BIA did not address this issue, we must remand
    to the agency, which sits in a better place to decide the matter in
    the first instance. See Orlando Ventura, 
    537 U.S. at 17
    .
    Because the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to
    Ramirez Mendez’s and Domingo Ramirez’s PSG claim based on
    the interplay between their race as indigenous Mayans and
    2 They also made the argument before the IJ, who did not address the inter-
    play between those two characteristics.
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    10                        Opinion of the Court                      22-12509
    disability, we grant the petition for review as to this issue and re-
    mand to the agency to address each petitioner’s claim in the first
    instance.
    III.
    Last, Ramirez Mendez and Domingo Ramirez argue that the
    BIA erred in denying their request for CAT relief.
    We review the BIA’s factual determinations for the denial of
    CAT relief3 under the substantial evidence standard, where we will
    reverse the BIA only where the record compels it. Edwards v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    56 F.4th 951
    , 966 (11th Cir. 2022). But sometimes we are
    “prevented from performing that review in the first place.” Ali v.
    U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    931 F.3d 1327
    , 1333 (11th Cir. 2019). “[O]ur review
    of the Board’s decisions operates on a simple premise: The Board
    has reached a decision only after having evaluated the entire evi-
    dentiary record.” 
    Id.
     But “[w]hen the Board has not convinced us
    that it has done so, as is the case when we remand for a lack of
    reasoned consideration, we hold that the decision is incapable of
    review and thus do not proceed to analyze the Board’s legal or fac-
    tual conclusions.” 
    Id.
    3 To be eligible for CAT relief, an applicant must show that she more likely
    than not will be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (c)(2); Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    369 F.3d 1239
    , 1242
    (11th Cir. 2004). All relevant evidence must be considered, including her abil-
    ity to relocate and human rights violations within the country.
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (c)(3).
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    22-12509               Opinion of the Court                        11
    Here, in this BIA order, it is hard to comprehend whether the
    BIA has addressed both Ramirez Mendez’s and Domingo Ramirez’s
    CAT claims. When the BIA says that it is affirming the IJ’s denial
    of CAT relief as to “respondents,” we assume that it means both
    Ramirez Mendez and Domingo Ramirez. But as the BIA order pro-
    gresses, it appears to only discuss Ramirez Mendez’s CAT claim
    and not Domingo Ramirez’s CAT claim. This is a problem because
    Ramirez Mendez’s and Domingo Ramirez’s CAT claims are not the
    same. As noted, Domingo Ramirez is disabled, and she likely has a
    stronger claim as a disabled indigenous Mayan than Ramirez Men-
    dez, who is the indigenous Mayan mother of a disabled child. It
    appears that the BIA either conflated Domingo Ramirez’s CAT
    claim with Ramirez Mendez’s claim or simply ignored and failed to
    address Domingo Ramirez’s CAT claim. As a result, the BIA has
    failed to announce a decision “in terms sufficient to enable” this
    court to review and understand why Domingo Ramirez’s CAT
    claim was ultimately rejected. Tan v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    446 F.3d 1369
    ,
    1374 (11th Cir. 2006). Thus, the BIA failed to give reasoned consid-
    eration to Ramirez Mendez’s and Domingo Ramirez’s CAT claims
    as separate claims.
    We do not pass judgment on whether or not it was a good
    idea to address Domingo Ramirez’s and Ramirez Mendez’s peti-
    tions together for review. And the BIA may ultimately come to the
    same conclusion on remand, but remand requires the BIA to sepa-
    rately address each petitioner’s individual CAT claim. If the BIA
    reviews multiple petitions together (like for a family, as is the case
    here), the BIA needs to make sure that it delineates whose claim it
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    12                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12509
    is referencing to ensure meaningful appellate review. Accordingly,
    we grant the petition for review as to this issue and remand to the
    agency to address each petitioner’s claim in the first instance.
    IV.
    To recap, we dismiss the petition in part for lack of jurisdic-
    tion on Ramirez Mendez’s claim of past persecution because she
    failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. We deny the petition
    in part as to Domingo Ramirez’s and Ramirez Mendez’s claims that
    they had a well-founded fear of future persecution due to their race
    as indigenous Mayans. But we grant the petition in part because
    the BIA did not adequately address Domingo Ramirez’s and
    Ramirez Mendez’s PSG as a whole, nor did the BIA address Do-
    mingo Ramirez’s and Ramirez Mendez’s request for CAT relief as
    separate claims. Thus, we vacate the BIA’s order on those claims
    and remand to the BIA. The BIA must consider Domingo
    Ramirez’s and Ramirez Mendez’s PSG: (1) on account of how
    Ramirez Mendez’s race as an indigenous Mayan interacted with
    Ramirez Mendez having an indigenous child with a disability; and
    (2) on account of how Domingo Ramirez’s race as an indigenous
    Mayan interacted with her disability status. The BIA must also ad-
    dress Domingo Ramirez’s and Ramirez Mendez’s CAT relief claims
    separately.
    PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART,
    AND GRANTED IN PART.