United States v. Robert Dayon Dumas ( 2023 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-11341
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERT DAYON DUMAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cr-00326-TPB-TGW-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11341
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Following his conviction on five counts of Hobbs Act rob-
bery, Robert Dayon Dumas appeals the district court’s denial of his
motion to suppress the items obtained during a warrantless search
of his vehicle and the statements he made to the police following
his arrest. The district court concluded that suppression of the ev-
idence was not warranted because the police officer had probable
cause to search Mr. Dumas’ vehicle for marijuana, the robbery
items unrelated to the search for marijuana were in plain view dur-
ing a lawful search of the vehicle, and Mr. Dumas knowingly and
voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 439 (1966).
After review of the parties’ briefs and the record, and with
the benefit of oral argument, we conclude that the district court did
not err in denying Mr. Dumas’ motion to suppress. We therefore
affirm.
I
A
During the five-day time period from February 8, 2018, until
February 13, 2018, an unidentified man committed a series of five
armed robberies in Wesley Chapel, Florida.
Specifically, on February 8, 2018, an unknown “white or His-
panic male,” approximately five feet, nine inches, to six feet in
height and wearing “all black”—including a “ski mask” and a dark
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hat with a white emblem in the front—entered a Citgo gas station
brandishing a “black semi auto with a stainless upper slide hand-
gun.” The suspect pointed the firearm at a store employee, cham-
bered a round, and demanded money from the register. The em-
ployee complied, and the suspect fled on foot with $800.
Approximately 90 minutes later that same day, a suspect
matching the description of the Citgo gas station assailant robbed
a Best Western hotel. The suspect, armed with a black frame sem-
iautomatic handgun with a silver upper slide, demanded that the
clerk “open the safe.” As the clerk attempted to open the lock to
the safe, “the suspect fired one shot into the wall above the clerk.”
The suspect told the employee, “the next one goes in your head!”
The suspect took approximately $500 from the register and the safe
and fled. A witness reported a “dark color[ed] sedan leaving the
hotel entrance.”
Two days later, a suspect described as a “white male” and
“wearing all black,” including a “ski mask,” robbed a Metro PCS
store. The suspect wore black Nike sneakers with white soles. The
suspect had a “black semi auto handgun,” demanded money from
the register, and “fired one shot into the wall.” The suspect took
approximately $820 from the register and fled.” The police sus-
pected that a “light colored 2015-2017 Nissan Altima” was involved
based on surveillance from a neighboring business.
Three days after the Metro PCS robbery, a suspect described
as a “white male” in his “late 20’s to early 30’s” and wearing “black
clothing,” a “ski mask,” and “wire rim glasses,” robbed a B Creative
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11341
painting studio. Once again, the suspect demanded money and ob-
tained approximately $60. When the employee told the suspect
that there was no more money, the suspect “cocked” the firearm,
which was believed to be a “9mm.”
About 30 minutes after that robbery, a similar suspect wear-
ing all black clothing, including a black ski mask and gloves, robbed
a Subway restaurant. The suspect demanded money from the cash
register and the safe. The suspect fled the location in a vehicle after
he received money in a “grey bank bag.”
This armed-robbery spree was investigated by the Pasco
County Sheriff’s Office Strategic Target Area Response (“STAR”)
team, which conducts “investigations related to property crime,
burglaries, robberies, and grand theft autos.” Corporal Andrew
Denbo, a seven-year veteran of the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office,
was a member of the STAR team involved in investigating this
string of robberies in the “new and upcoming” Wesley Chapel area.
Corporal Denbo was one of the first officers at the scene of the
Metro PCS store robbery. Given that there was not a lot of crime
in the Wesley Chapel area, the investigation into these robberies
was the highest priority.
B
On March 11, 2018, Corporal Denbo conducted a traffic stop
after he observed, and confirmed on the radar of his patrol car, a
“black Audi sedan” traveling at 75 miles per hour in a 55-miles-per-
hour zone. Mr. Dumas was the driver and sole occupant of the car.
Corporal Denbo approached the vehicle, and asked Mr. Dumas for
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his license and registration. Corporal Denbo also asked Mr. Dumas
where he was headed and if he had received any citations before.
Mr. Dumas provided his license and registration and responded
that he had previously received one citation.
After Corporal Denbo returned to his patrol car, he ran the
driver license and registration to check the status of the vehicle and
Mr. Dumas’ driving history. Corporal Denbo learned that, alt-
hough the car registration was valid, Mr. Dumas had received a
couple of warnings from the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office as well
as several citations in other jurisdictions. Corporal Denbo returned
to Mr. Dumas’ vehicle to speak with him.
When Corporal Denbo approached the vehicle the second
time, Mr. Dumas appeared “nervous,” seemed “uncomfortable,”
“kept looking around the car,” and was “slow” to respond to Cor-
poral Denbo’s questions. According to Corporal Denbo, Mr. Du-
mas was looking at the “front passenger seat of the vehicle,” but
Corporal Denbo could not see what he was looking at. Corporal
Denbo then repositioned himself and leaned forward and down, so
that he could look around Mr. Dumas’ body and into the passenger
seat. At that point, Corporal Denbo was “[l]ess than a foot” away
from the rolled-down window of Mr. Dumas’ car. Corporal Denbo
then observed a partially unzipped bag in the passenger seat, de-
tected the odor of marijuana coming from within the vehicle, and
noticed “shake,” or small pieces of green leafy substances, all
throughout the vehicle’s passenger seat.
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After making these observations, Corporal Denbo asked Mr.
Dumas to step out of the vehicle. Corporal Denbo also asked Mr.
Dumas if he had any weapons, and he responded that he had a gun,
a Glock 17, that was in the bag on the passenger seat. Corporal
Denbo handcuffed Mr. Dumas, placed him on the curb, removed
the bag from the vehicle, and took the gun out of the bag and se-
cured it. Corporal Denbo then called and waited for backup to ar-
rive before searching the vehicle.
When Corporal Denbo searched Mr. Dumas’ vehicle he
found a “piece of marijuana,” “smaller pieces throughout,” and “a
green leafy substance” on the floorboard that he believed to be
“marijuana.” According to Corporal Denbo, there was also a “ma-
rijuana cigarette in the center console ashtray of the vehicle.” Cor-
poral Denbo further found a “scale” that was “seated next to the
driver in the center console, which had small flakes of marijuana
on it and smelled of marijuana.” Corporal Denbo field-tested the
substance he found, and the result was positive for marijuana.
In the backseat of the vehicle, Corporal Denbo found a
“mask” that was “shoved” into the bottom of the pocket directly
behind the passenger seat. The backseat of the vehicle contained
several items of clothing, shoes, and personal effects, including a
“pair of black Nike shoes with a white bottom” and a “New York
Yankees [baseball] hat.” Corporal Denbo also found “black base-
ball gloves in the backseat,” along with a “black t-shirt,” and a “dark
grey bank bag.” He also found suitcases in the trunk which con-
tained black clothing.
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C
Following the search, Corporal Denbo placed Mr. Dumas in
the back of a patrol car and read him his Miranda rights from an
agency-issued card. After reading the Miranda rights to Mr. Du-
mas, Corporal Denbo asked him about the marijuana and the mask
in his car. Mr. Dumas responded that “he just used marijuana, and
when he played baseball [ ] they didn’t drug test him so it wasn’t a
problem.” Mr. Dumas claimed he did not know anything about
the mask. Corporal Denbo arrested Dumas for possession of ma-
rijuana and transported him to the Sheriff’s district office.
While Corporal Denbo was waiting for detectives to arrive
at the district office, he gave Mr. Dumas a copy of a multipurpose
release/waiver form, which Mr. Dumas signed in his presence.
Specifically, Mr. Dumas signed the section titled “Statement of Mi-
randa Rights,” which explained the Miranda rights, but he did not
sign any of the remaining sections, including the section titled
“Waiver of Rights.”
Mr. Dumas was then interviewed by Detective Toner and
Agent Lanier at the Sheriff’s district office. When Mr. Dumas was
first questioned about his involvement in the armed robberies, he
denied any participation. But, when Corporal Denbo was later
transporting Mr. Dumas to the Pasco County jail, Mr. Dumas be-
gan to admit his involvement in the robberies. Corporal Denbo
then returned Mr. Dumas to the Sheriff’s district office, where he
provided a full video-taped confession. Nearly eight hours had
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elapsed from the time Corporal Denbo searched Mr. Dumas’ car
to the time he confessed.
D
A grand jury indicted Mr. Dumas on five counts of Hobbs
Act robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and two counts of
discharging a firearm during two of the robberies, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). After his indictment, Mr. Dumas filed
a motion to suppress all evidence derived from the warrantless
search of his vehicle because, in his view, there was no probable
cause. Mr. Dumas also moved to suppress his incriminating state-
ments because he asserted that he was not properly advised of his
Miranda rights. Mr. Dumas, however, did not challenge the valid-
ity of the traffic stop in his motion to suppress.
At the suppression hearing, Corporal Denbo was the only
witness. Corporal Denbo testified in part that when he searched
Mr. Dumas’ vehicle and saw the mask, the black gloves, the Yan-
kees hat, the Nike shoes, the black clothing, and the bag, he “be-
lieved [Mr. Dumas] was a suspect of [the] robberies at that time.”
D.E. 72 at 53. During both direct and cross-examination, Corporal
Denbo admitted that under the rules and policies of the Pasco
County Sheriff’s Office, his camera should have been turned on
sooner than it had been.
Following the hearing, the district court entered an order
denying Mr. Dumas’ motion to suppress. The district court found
Corporal Denbo credible and ruled that he had probable cause to
search Mr. Dumas’ vehicle based on the odor of marijuana
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emanating from the vehicle. The district court also ruled that Cor-
poral Denbo’s detection of the odor of marijuana, his observation
of marijuana in the vehicle, and Mr. Dumas’ admission of using
marijuana established sufficient probable cause to support Mr. Du-
mas’ arrest for possession of marijuana. Additionally, the district
court concluded that there was no basis to suppress the items re-
lated to the robberies because they were found in plain view during
a lawful search of the vehicle. Finally, the district court ruled that
incriminating statements made by Mr. Dumas were admissible be-
cause he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
In light of the district court’s ruling and Mr. Dumas’ desire
to expedite the appeal of the district court’s order, the parties
agreed to a streamlined bench trial. After a short trial, the district
court found Mr. Dumas guilty of all charges and sentenced him to
25 years in prison.
This appeal followed.
II
On appeal, Mr. Dumas argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress for three reasons. First, the district
court erred in finding that Corporal Denbo had probable cause to
search and arrest him for possession of marijuana because Corporal
Denbo was “anything but a credible witness[.]” Appellant’s Br. at
22. Second, the district court erred in finding that Corporal Denbo
properly seized numerous items unrelated to marijuana possession
because there was no probable cause to seize those items. See id.
at 23. Finally, the district court erred in finding that he waived his
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Miranda rights because Corporal Denbo failed to “secure a valid
waiver.” Id. at 39.
We are unpersuaded by Mr. Dumas’ arguments that the dis-
trict court committed any error. We therefore affirm the district
court’s denial of Mr. Dumas’ motion to suppress.
A
We begin by addressing Mr. Dumas’ challenges to the dis-
trict court’s probable cause rulings.
Probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact subject to
plenary review. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696–97
(1996). We review factual findings for clear error and the applica-
tion of the law to those facts de novo in an appeal from the denial of
a motion to suppress. See United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214,
1222 (11th Cir. 2010). We construe all facts in the light most favor-
able to the party prevailing below—the government in this in-
stance. See United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir.
2000).
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. In most circumstances, unless there is con-
sent, police officers must obtain a warrant supported by probable
cause to justify a search under the Fourth Amendment. See United
States v. Magluta, 418 F.3d 1166, 1182 (11th Cir. 2005). One excep-
tion to the warrant requirement is the so-called automobile excep-
tion, which allows police to conduct a search of a vehicle if (1) the
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vehicle is readily mobile, and (2) the police have probable cause for
the search. See United States v. Lindsey, 482 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir.
2007). No separate exigent circumstances need to be shown. See
Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466 (1999). The validity of the
search turns on whether there was probable cause to believe the
vehicle contained contraband or evidence of a crime. See id.1
Probable cause exists when, “under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in the vehicle.” Lindsey, 482 F.3d at 1293(quotation marks omitted). Specifically, when an officer detects
the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle, there is probable
cause to support a warrantless search of the vehicle. See United
States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 482 (1985) (“After the officers came
closer and detected the distinct odor of marihuana [sic], they had
probable cause to believe that the vehicles contained contra-
band.”); Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553, 560 n.3 (11th Cir. 2015)
(noting that “the smell of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehi-
cle is sufficient probable cause to search a vehicle”). See also United
States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(“There is no doubt that the agent’s suspicions rose to the level of
probable cause when, as the door stood open, he detected what he
knew from his law enforcement experience to be the odor of mari-
juana.”); United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 903 (11th Cir. 1982)
(“[T]he recognizable smell of marijuana gives rise to probable
cause supporting a . . . search.”).
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Here, Corporal Denbo—whose testimony the district court
credited—smelled marijuana when he returned to speak to Mr.
Dumas while conducting a valid traffic stop. After Corporal Denbo
witnessed Mr. Dumas nervously looking at the bag in the passen-
ger seat, he shifted his position to lean forward and down to have
a better view of the passenger seat. At that point, Corporal
Denbo—who was standing “[l]ess than a foot” away from the
rolled down window of Mr. Dumas’ car—detected the odor of ma-
rijuana coming from within the vehicle, and noticed “shake” (or
small pieces of green leafy substances) all throughout the vehicle’s
passenger seat. Corporal Denbo, who had extensive training and
experience with marijuana in his law enforcement career, thus had
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of Mr. Dumas’ car
for evidence of marijuana. See Johns, 469 U.S. at 482; Tobin, 923
F.2d at 1512.
Mr. Dumas challenges the district court’s conclusion that
there was probable cause to search the vehicle based on the odor
of marijuana emanating from the vehicle because Corporal Denbo
was not “a credible witness.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. According to
Mr. Dumas, Corporal Denbo “inexplicably” failed to record all of
the “most crucial moments” that allegedly gave him probable
cause to search the vehicle, which included the interactions with
Mr. Dumas at the driver-side window. Id. at 26.
Mr. Dumas’ argument fails because even if Corporal
Denbo’s camera had been turned on, it could not have captured
the smell of marijuana. At the suppression hearing Mr. Dumas “did
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not present any testimony or evidence to contradict Corporal
Denbo’s testimony” as to the smell of marijuana, see D.E. 80 at 4,
and he does not do so on appeal. As the district court observed,
moreover, Corporal Denbo’s testimony was “consistent with what
was eventually found in the vehicle.” Id. at 3–4. There was also
the near contemporaneous video of Corporal Denbo searching Mr.
Dumas’ vehicle, which revealed evidence of a leafy substance and
marijuana paraphernalia, as well the questioning of Mr. Dumas in
the back of the patrol car. This corroborated Corporal Denbo’s
testimony that he smelled and observed marijuana in Mr. Dumas’
vehicle.
In sum, we cannot say that the district court, which had the
benefit of observing Corporal Denbo, erred in crediting his testi-
mony. See United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 1255–56 (11th Cir.
2015) (“We accept the factfinder’s choice of whom to believe unless
it is contrary to the laws of nature, or is so inconsistent or improb-
able on its face that no reasonable factfinder could accept it . . .
Thus, we defer to the district court’s factual determinations unless
the district court’s understanding of the facts is unbelievable.”) (in-
ternal quotation marks and citation omitted). Corporal Denbo had
probable cause to search Mr. Dumas’ vehicle.
2
Additionally, the district court did not err in ruling that Cor-
poral Denbo had probable cause to arrest Mr. Dumas for misde-
meanor possession of marijuana. As the district court noted, Mr.
Dumas’ arrest for possession of marijuana was based on “Corporal
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Denbo’s detection of the odor of marijuana, observation of mariju-
ana in the vehicle, and [Mr. Dumas’] statement admitting that he
had used marijuana.” D.E. 80 at 5–6. Given these facts, Corporal
Denbo had probable cause to arrest Mr. Dumas for possession of
marijuana. See United States v. Tate, 855 F. App’x 509, 512 (11th Cir.
2021) (holding that there was probable cause to arrest defendant
for possession of marijuana because the police officers found him
passed out in the driver’s seat of his vehicle at an intersection, he
was described as drowsy and loopy, and the police officers claimed
to see an item that looked like a blunt in the center console).
Mr. Dumas’ challenge to the probable cause determination
of his arrest for possession of marijuana focuses, once again, on at-
tacking the credibility of Corporal Denbo due to his failure to rec-
ord the entirety of the encounter. See Appellant’s Br. at 26–31. Mr.
Dumas’ arguments as to the constant deactivation of the camera,
which Corporal Denbo admitted was in violation of the rules and
policies of the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office, and the fact that the
marijuana cigarette was not among the items inventoried from the
car, are well taken but they do not alter our conclusion.
First, Corporal Denbo recorded key critical moments of his
encounter with Mr. Dumas that support the conclusion that he had
probable cause to arrest him for possession of marijuana. Corporal
Denbo, for example, recorded the search of Mr. Dumas’ car, which
showed evidence of marijuana particles as well as drug parapher-
nalia (i.e., the scale) in the car. Corporal Denbo also recorded the
field test that he conducted of a clump of marijuana found in the
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vehicle, which yielded a positive result. And Corporal Denbo rec-
orded his interview of Mr. Dumas in the back of his patrol vehicle,
in which he admitted that he used marijuana. Thus, Mr. Dumas’
argument that there was no evidence to support the district court’s
probable cause determination is incorrect. Probable cause “does
not require convincing proof.” Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 878
(11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Second, the district court explicitly acknowledged the credi-
bility concerns that Mr. Dumas now raises. Indeed, the district
court went out of its way to explain that “[w]ith the advent of mod-
ern technology . . . it is increasingly difficult to understand why law
enforcement officers are either unwilling or unable to consistently
record encounters with the public.” D.E. 80 at 7. According to the
district court, “had Corporal Denbo recorded his entire encounter
with [Mr. Dumas] on his body camera in this instance, it is highly
unlikely the instant motion would have been filed in the first
place.” Id. at 8. Nevertheless, the district court found Corporal
Denbo’s testimony to be credible because “[a]lthough it is certainly
the better practice for law enforcement officers to record encoun-
ters with the public, there is no legal requirement that they do so.”
Id. Given the consideration the district court gave to the issue of
Corporal Denbo’s body camera after listening to the testimony and
reviewing the evidence, which included more than three hours of
cross-examination by Mr. Dumas’ counsel, this is not one of those
rare instances where the credibility determination and finding of
probable cause cannot stand.
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3
We next address the district court’s ruling that the items un-
related to the possession of marijuana did not have to be sup-
pressed. The district court explained that Corporal Denbo’s belief
that the items were linked to the recent armed robberies that he
had “personally investigated” was not “mere speculation,” and that
the items were found in “plain view” during a lawful search of Mr.
Dumas’ vehicle. See D.E. 80 at 5. We agree.
The plain-view doctrine permits the warrantless seizure of
an object where an officer is lawfully located in a place from which
the object can be plainly viewed, the officer has a lawful right to
access the object, and the incriminating character of the object is
“immediately apparent.” United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1290
(11th Cir. 2006) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37
(1990)). The plain-view doctrine applies, for example, when, dur-
ing the course of a lawful search for certain objects, the police come
across other items of incriminating character. See Smith, 459 F.3d
at 1290. For an item’s incriminating character to be “immediately
apparent,” the police must have probable cause to believe the ob-
ject in plain view is contraband or evidence of a crime. See Minne-
sota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993).
Corporal Denbo was lawfully located and had a lawful right
to access Mr. Dumas’ vehicle when he was searching for marijuana.
Indeed, as previously discussed, Corporal Denbo had probable
cause to search the car for evidence of marijuana. Therefore, the
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first two elements of the plain view inquiry are satisfied. See United
States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 720 (11th Cir. 2014) (“Once probable
cause exists to search the vehicle, the police may search all parts of
the vehicle, and any containers therein, where the object of the
search might be found.”) (citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295,
301 (1999)).
As to the third element—whether the incriminating charac-
ter of the object is immediately apparent—it is satisfied as well. At
the suppression hearing, Corporal Denbo testified that “[he] per-
sonally believed [Mr. Dumas] was responsible” for the robbery
spree in the Wesley Chapel area. See D.E. 72 at 55–56. Corporal
Denbo’s belief is not, of course, dispositive because “probable
cause is an objective standard[.]” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138
S. Ct. 577, 584 n.2 (2018). But that belief was based on his discovery
of items that resembled items from the recent armed robberies, in-
cluding (1) a dark grey bank bag, (2) black Nike shoes with white
soles, (3) a black mask, (4) black gloves, and (5) black clothing. See
D.E. 72 at 22, 44, 48–49. Corporal Denbo also testified that Mr.
Dumas resembled the robbery suspect because he was of the same
“race” as the suspect, and had a similar “height” and “body type.”
See id. at 46. In particular, Corporal Denbo noticed that Mr. Dumas
had “thicker eyebrows” and “blue eyes,” which matched the de-
scription of the robbery suspect. See id. at 47. Corporal Denbo tes-
tified that Mr. Dumas’ vehicle, a black Audi sedan, and the vehicle
that Mr. Dumas’ mother drove to the scene of his arrest, a white
sedan, matched the description of the cars in the “be on the look-
out” (BOLO) notices. See id. Finally, Corporal Denbo testified that
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18 Opinion of the Court 21-11341
the black handgun Mr. Dumas had in his car, including its Luger
ammunition, resembled the black handgun the robber had bran-
dished in two of the robberies and the Luger shell casings that were
recovered at one of the robbery scenes. See id. at 48.
In light of this testimony, a reasonable officer with Corporal
Denbo’s prior knowledge about the recent armed-robbery spree
could conclude that the items in the vehicle were evidence of the
recent armed robberies. The district court, therefore, did not err
in denying Mr. Dumas’ motion to suppress on this ground. See
United States v. Reeves, 604 F. App’x 823, 828–829 (11th Cir. 2015)
(holding that the district court did not err in denying a motion to
suppress evidence that a police officer found in plain view during a
lawful search of the defendant’s backpack that was located in his
vehicle and contained items—a laptop computer, approximately
thirty credit cards, and a notebook with names, dates of birth, and
social security numbers—whose incriminating character was im-
mediately apparent to the police officer as evidence of fraud). Cf.
Baldwin, 774 F.3d at 720 (holding that the district court did not err
in denying a motion to suppress because “mail from the IRS not
addressed to [the defendant] or the other passenger in the vehicle,
debit cards not in their names, and currency within plain view”
were sufficient to establish probable cause to search the vehicle for
evidence of identity theft and tax fraud).
Mr. Dumas challenges the district court’s ruling because
“none of the seized items unrelated to the marijuana possession
were incriminatory on their face.” Appellant’s Br. at 36–37.
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According to Mr. Dumas, “[t]here is nothing immediately criminal
about clothing, shoes, baseball equipment, or even a securely en-
cased firearm.” Id. at 37. Mr. Dumas’ argument, however, fails.
As the district court observed, “Corporal Denbo had personally in-
vestigated some of those robberies so he had particularized famili-
arity with the circumstances of those crimes.” D.E. 80 at 5.
We find instructive and persuasive our decision in United
States v. Rivera, 824 F. App’x 930, 934 (11th Cir. 2020). In Rivera,
five convenience stores in the Tampa area were robbed in a ten-
day period by an unknown Hispanic male brandishing a short-bar-
reled shotgun. See id. at 932. In four of the robberies, the suspect
appeared to be wearing “the same white athletic shoes with black
edging.” Id. During the course of the police investigation, the po-
lice witnessed a domestic violence incident at a motel involving
one of the robbery suspects. See id. After the police entered a motel
room to check on the safety of the victim, and in the process of
conducting a protective sweep of the motel room, the police offic-
ers “saw a white athletic sneaker with a black trim on the floor of
the motel room.” Id. In affirming the district court’s denial of a
motion to suppress, the panel held that “the plain-view doctrine
applie[d] to the discovery of the sneaker because it was in plain
view and its incriminating character would have been immediately
apparent to the officers” because “[t]he masked robber was wear-
ing sneakers with the same distinctive pattern, [the suspect]
matched the description of a man wearing similar sneakers just be-
fore the robbery, and [a car] linked to at least one of the robberies
was parked at the motel.” Id. at 934. The panel explained that
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20 Opinion of the Court 21-11341
although “mere possession of a similar sneaker alone might not be
enough . . . the combined circumstances made the incriminating
character of the sneaker in the motel room where [the suspect] was
present immediately apparent.” Id.As in Rivera, the record here reveals that the incriminating
character of the Nike sneakers and other items that were found in
Mr. Dumas’ vehicle was immediately apparent to Corporal Denbo,
who was intimately involved in the investigation of the recent
armed-robbery spree in the Wesley Chapel area. Corporal Denbo
testified that he was among the first officers on the scene at the
Metro PCS robbery, so he remembered that Mr. Dumas’ descrip-
tion matched the “description that the victim had provided in that
particular case.” D.E. 72 at 47. Furthermore, according to Cor-
poral Denbo, who had personally reviewed the security footage
many times, the suspect of the Metro PCS robbery wore black
“Nike shoes with [ ] white sole[s],” a black ski “mask,” “black
gloves,” and was armed with a “9 millimeter handgun.” Id. at 48–
50. Although we recognize, as did the panel did in Rivera, that mere
possession of a common pair of black Nike shoes alone might not
be enough, we conclude that under the totality of the circum-
stances, the incriminating character of the items in Mr. Dumas’ ve-
hicle was immediately apparent to Corporal Denbo. See Rivera, 824
F. App’x at 934.
Contrary to Mr. Dumas’ contention, Corporal Denbo’s be-
lief was not “mere speculation.” Appellant’s Br. at 33. Although
Mr. Dumas highlights some factual differences from the BOLOs,
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21-11341 Opinion of the Court 21
such as the gun with a silver or stainless-steel upper slide and the
height differences of the suspect, those discrepancies ignore the re-
maining similarities previously discussed that led Corporal Denbo
to believe that Mr. Dumas was involved in the armed robberies.
Probable cause turns on the “assessment of probability in particular
factual contexts[.]” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175 (1949) (“In dealing with probable cause, however, as the
very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not tech-
nical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday
life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians,
act.”).
Finally, Mr. Dumas claims that Corporal Denbo “twice ad-
mitted, on video, that there was not probable cause to charge Mr.
Dumas with the robberies.” Appellant’s Br. at 35. Mr. Dumas rea-
sons that because an assistant state attorney purportedly deter-
mined that there was no probable cause to arrest Mr. Dumas for
the robberies, then “there was no probable cause to seize items
speculated to be involved in the robbery.” Id. Mr. Dumas’ argu-
ment, however, does not carry the day because the subjective be-
liefs of Corporal Denbo or the assistant state attorney are irrelevant
to probable cause’s objective analysis. See Craig v. Singletary, 127
F.3d 1030, 1042 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[T]the subjective beliefs of De-
tective Singer are irrelevant to our probable cause analysis. Proba-
ble cause issues are to be decided on an objective basis by courts
without regard to the subjective beliefs of law enforcement offic-
ers, whatever those beliefs may have been.”). See also Whren v.
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22 Opinion of the Court 21-11341
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
III
We conclude by addressing the argument that the district
court erred in finding that Mr. Dumas waived his Miranda rights.
See Appellant’s Br. at 38–41.
A
Miranda effectuates the Fifth Amendment’s protection
against self-incrimination and requires that defendants be informed
of their rights. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420 (1986). A
valid waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent. See United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir.
2010). Finding a valid waiver requires a two-step inquiry. We ask
whether the waiver was (1) a “free and deliberate” choice (2) made
with a “full awareness” of the Fifth Amendment’s protections and
the consequences of abandoning them. See id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). We find voluntary waiver only “if the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an un-
coerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension.” United
States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that Mr. Dumas freely and deliberately waived
his Miranda rights when he spoke to law enforcement. When ana-
lyzing if waiver was “free and deliberate,” we consider “the defend-
ant’s intelligence, the length of his detention, the nature of the in-
terrogation, the use of any physical force against him, or the use of
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21-11341 Opinion of the Court 23
any promises or inducements by police.” Hubbard v. Haley, 317 F.3d
1245, 1253 (11th Cir. 2003). As the district court observed, when
Mr. Dumas was detained he was “23 years old and had a high
school education.” D.E. 80 at 5. And there is no argument, evi-
dence, or allegation that Mr. Dumas was coerced when he spoke
to Corporal Denbo in his patrol car or after he was taken to the
Sheriff’s district office.
We also conclude that Mr. Dumas had full awareness of the
Fifth Amendment’s protections and the consequences of abandon-
ing them. When analyzing these issues, we pay special attention
to the defendant’s intelligence and mental capacity. See Coleman v.
Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1426 (11th Cir. 1994). Nothing in the rec-
ord shows that Mr. Dumas’ intelligence prevented him from appre-
ciating the importance of his rights or the choice to waive them.
After Corporal Denbo read Mr. Dumas his Miranda rights in the
back of the patrol car aloud, Mr. Dumas affirmed that he under-
stood his rights, as evidenced by the video. Likewise, Mr. Dumas
was informed again of his Fifth Amendment rights at the Sheriff’s
district office, where he signed the multi-purpose form. Because
Mr. Dumas was an adult of at least average intelligence, who spoke
English fluently, he had full awareness of his rights.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court
did not err when it found that Mr. Dumas knowingly and volun-
tarily waived his Miranda rights. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S.
370, 388–89 (2010) (“In sum, a suspect who has received and under-
stood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda
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24 Opinion of the Court 21-11341
rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced
statement to the police.”).
B
Finally, Mr. Dumas contends that Corporal Denbo’s reading
of his Miranda rights was too quick to secure a valid waiver. Cor-
poral Denbo, he points out, read 100 words in 13 seconds. See Ap-
pellant’s Br. at 39. Though a police officer should not speed-read
Miranda rights, here the video depicting the moment Corporal
Denbo read Mr. Dumas his Miranda rights in the back of the patrol
car demonstrates that Corporal Denbo read the Miranda rights at a
speed that adequately enabled Mr. Dumas to understand his rights.
Although Corporal Denbo read the Miranda rights swiftly, it was
not so fast that they were incomprehensible, particularly given that
Corporal Denbo paused after reading each right, that he explicitly
asked Mr. Dumas whether he understood the rights that he read to
him, and that Mr. Dumas said he did. In sum, Mr. Dumas has failed
to convince us that the manner in which Corporal Denbo read him
his Miranda rights was not understandable or unclear as a matter
of law.
Mr. Dumas also contends that law enforcement’s failure to
obtain his written waiver of Miranda rights at the Sheriff’s district
office means he did not waive his rights there. See Appellant’s Br.
at 41. We find this argument unconvincing as well. “A signed Mi-
randa waiver is usually strong evidence that the defendant waived
his rights, but it is not necessary.” Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d at 1319(emphasis added). See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373
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21-11341 Opinion of the Court 25
(1979) (“An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right
to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong proof
of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary
or sufficient to establish waiver.”). The fact that Mr. Dumas did not
sign the “Waiver of Rights” portion of the Miranda form he signed
at the Sheriff’s district office does not mean he did not waive his
Miranda rights. See Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d at 1319 (rejecting de-
fendant’s argument that he did not freely and knowingly waive his
Miranda rights because he did not sign the Miranda waiver form
presented to him).
IV
We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Dumas’ motion
to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his vehicle
and the incriminating statements he made following his arrest.
AFFIRMED.