USCA11 Case: 22-13865 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 05/11/2023 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13865
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
RACHELLE GENDRON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GWEN CONNELLY,
in her official capacity as District Attorney of St. Clair County,
LAMAR WILLIAMSON,
in his official capacity as District Attorney of St. Clair County,
SHERIFF, ST. CLAIR COUNTY
PENNEE BARRON,
THIRTIETH JUDICIAL COURT OF ALABAMA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13865
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-01205-ACA
____________________
Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Rachelle Gendron, proceeding pro se, appeals from the dis-
trict court’s final order dismissing with prejudice her amended
42
U.S.C. § 1983 civil complaint. After Gendron filed her original
complaint, the district court struck it as a shotgun pleading and di-
rected Gendron to replead. In the order directing her to replead,
the court explained how Gendron had violated the shotgun plead-
ing rule and provided detailed instructions on how Gendron could
correct the issues in her complaint. Thereafter, Gendron filed an
amended complaint, but the district court found that the amended
complaint “ha[d] continued to fail to follow the procedural require-
ments under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b),”
and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. On appeal, Gendron
argues that the district court’s with-prejudice dismissal was unwar-
ranted because her failure to comply with the court’s repleading
order was merely a result of her inexperience in pleading as a pro se
litigant, not willful and deliberate misconduct. After careful re-
view, we affirm.
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22-13865 Opinion of the Court 3
We review a district court’s dismissal of a shotgun pleading
on Rule 8 or 10 grounds for abuse of discretion. Vibe Micro, Inc. v.
Shabanets,
878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018); Weiland v. Palm
Beach Cnty. Sherriff’s Office,
792 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015). Un-
der the abuse-of-discretion standard, we must affirm unless we find
that the district court made a clear error of judgment or applied the
wrong legal standard. Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc.,
583 F.3d
1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009). While we construe pleadings filed by
pro se parties liberally, pro se litigants still must conform to proce-
dural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc.,
490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Further, claims should be stated “in numbered para-
graphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circum-
stances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
Shotgun pleadings generally fall into four categories,
namely, complaints that: (1) contain multiple counts where each
count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (2) are “replete
with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously con-
nected to any particular cause of action”; (3) do not separate each
cause of action or claim for relief into separate counts; or (4) assert
multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying
which of the defendants are responsible for which acts or omis-
sions. Weiland,
792 F.3d at 1321–23. The unifying characteristic of
all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree or
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13865
another “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims
against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”
Id. at
1323.
We’ve repeatedly condemned shotgun pleadings. See Davis
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol.,
516 F.3d 955, 979 n.54 (11th Cir.
2008) (collecting cases in which we have rejected shotgun plead-
ings), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S.
544 (2007), as recognized in Estate of Bass v. Regions Bank, Inc.,
947
F.3d 1352, 1356 n.3 (11th Cir. 2020). In so doing, we’ve held that a
district court can dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading grounds
under its “inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the
prompt resolution of lawsuits.” Vibe Micro,
878 F.3d at 1295 (quo-
tation omitted). And, if the court permits the plaintiff to amend
and explains in its repleading order how the offending complaint
violates the shotgun pleading rule, but the plaintiff still fails to rem-
edy the shotgun pleading issues, the court does not abuse its dis-
cretion in dismissing the case with prejudice.
Id. at 1295–96.
In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
dismissing Gendron’s complaint with prejudice for being a shotgun
pleading. See
id. The dismissal order explained that Gendron
“ha[d] continued to fail to follow the procedural requirements of
pleadings under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 10(b),”
and concluded that the amended complaint “still fail[ed] at its job
of notifying the defendants ‘of the claims against them and the
grounds upon which each claim rest[ed].’” It added that our Court
repeatedly has condemned shotgun pleadings and that the district
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22-13865 Opinion of the Court 5
court had the authority to dismiss a complaint solely on the basis
of being a shotgun pleading. Thus, to the extent Gendron suggests
that the district court dismissed her complaint for any reason other
than being a shotgun pleading, the record belies this claim.
Further, although Gendron was proceeding pro se, it was
well within the district court’s discretion to dismiss the amended
complaint as a shotgun pleading. See Albra,
490 F.3d at 829. As the
record reflects, Gendron was given an opportunity to amend her
complaint according to the court’s specific instructions and with a
warning that a failure to do so could result in dismissal. In its order
directing her to replead, the district court explained to Gendron
that her amended complaint should: (1) contain a separate count
for each claim with a factual basis for that claim only; (2) include
headings for each count identifying the specific defendant(s) against
whom the claim was asserted and the statute or law under which
the claim was brought; and (3) avoid conclusory statements,
providing a specific example from Gendron’s complaint about the
district attorneys she sued, with instructions on how to correct it.
But despite the court’s warning, Gendron cured only one of
the three deficiencies identified by the court -- that is, she provided
a basis for each constitutional violation she alleged. However, the
amended complaint still did not articulate any specific claims
against the defendants nor did it include headings for each count.
Further, it continued to raise conclusory assertions of her inno-
cence and entitlement to relief and largely reasserted her prior al-
legations against the originally named parties. Notably, the
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13865
amended complaint retained the conclusory statement about the
district attorneys that the court had identified as problematic in its
repleading order.
On this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in dismissing Gendron’s complaint with prejudice. Moreover, the
district court was not required to grant Gendron yet another
chance to amend the complaint since she does not argue, and the
record does not show, that she ever sought leave to amend from
the district court. See Bank v. Pitt,
928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir.
1991) (holding that a pro se plaintiff must generally be given “one
chance to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses
the action with prejudice”) (emphasis added), overruled in part by
Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp.,
314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1
(11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that the rule in Bank does not
apply to counseled plaintiffs).
AFFIRMED.
