Gloria Lucia Lotero-Diaz v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2023 )

USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 1 of 14
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10696
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
GLORIA LUCIA LOTERO-DIAZ,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
____________________
Petition for Review of a Decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A079-740-728
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 2 of 14
2 Opinion of the Court 22-10696
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gloria Lucia Lotero-Diaz, a native and citizen of Colombia,
seeks review of an order by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) denying her second motion to reopen her immigration pro-
ceedings. After review, 1 we dismiss the petition in part and deny it
in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Lotero-Diaz entered the United States in 2001. Shortly
thereafter, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is-
sued her a notice to appear (NTA), charging her as removable un-
der 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). Lotero-Diaz conceded removabil-
ity as charged and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) based on her
religion, political opinion, and membership in a social group.
An immigration judge (IJ) first held a merits hearing on
Lotero-Diaz’s application in 2003, and denied her application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. Lotero-Diaz
1 We review de novo our subject matter jurisdiction over a petition for review.
Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015). We also re-
view any constitutional claim or question of law de novo. Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008). We review the BIA’s denial of a
motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion, although we “review any under-
lying legal conclusions de novo.” Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 40
F.4th 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022).
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 3 of 14
22-10696 Opinion of the Court 3
administratively appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA, and the BIA
concluded one of the transcripts of her merits hearing was missing,
and remanded to the IJ for further proceedings, “including a new
hearing, if necessary.”
At a second merits hearing in 2006, the IJ held a new hearing,
but once again denied Lotero-Diaz’s application for asylum, with-
holding of removal, and CAT relief. She administratively appealed
the decision to the BIA, and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s second deci-
sion in February 2008. Lotero-Diaz did not seek review of the BIA’s
decision in this Court.
Instead, Lotero-Diaz later sought to reopen the proceedings,
presenting additional evidence related to her asylum claim. The
BIA denied Lotero-Diaz’s first motion to reopen in September
2008. Lotero-Diaz again did not seek review in this Court.
In July 2020, Lotero-Diaz filed a second motion to reopen—
the present one—to “reopen and remand.” In this second motion
to reopen, she argued the 2001 NTA had been invalid because she
was never an arriving alien, but in fact had been admitted to the
United States. She contended this error had prejudiced her, since
she had applied for adjustment of status based on her marriage to
her lawful permanent resident husband. 2 She contended the De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS) had wrongfully withheld
2 The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services concluded, after an
interview, that Lotero-Diaz had not established her marriage was not entered
into for the primary purpose of circumventing the immigration laws of the
United States.
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 4 of 14
4 Opinion of the Court 22-10696
the relevant necessary evidence showing she had been admitted.
She asserted the evidence was new to her and had “solely been in
[DHS’s] possession since her admission and last entry to the United
States in 2001.” She explained she had sued DHS under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA) in 2020 and had obtained the rele-
vant evidence supporting her motion to reopen.
Lotero-Diaz contended the Government had admitted her
in 2001, but it had then withheld evidence that she had been admit-
ted, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1361. She also asserted that, by charg-
ing her as inadmissible rather than removable, the Government had
lowered its own evidentiary burden. She asserted she was thus eli-
gible for adjustment of status and voluntary departure. She argued
she might ultimately be removable, but not under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7), as was charged. Lotero-Diaz contended the changed
circumstances justified reopening and a “de novo review of her ad-
justment of status application before an [IJ.]” She argued the Gov-
ernment’s “affirmative misconduct” justified tolling the time and
number bars on her motion to reopen.
In support, Lotero-Diaz attached several documents. One
document showed that an official had stamped her passport
“ADMITTED Jun 29 2001.” Other documents, including a “Con-
sular Notification” dated June 29, 2001, explained that Lotero-Diaz
had sought admission as a visitor for pleasure, but she had been
stopped “[a]t secondary inspection” when it was determined that
she had remained over her visa. Another document dated the same
day showed an Immigration officer provided her a “determination
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 5 of 14
22-10696 Opinion of the Court 5
of inadmissibility,” asserting she was “an immigrant not in posses-
sion of a valid unexpired immigrant visa or any other valid entry
document in lieu of an immigrant visa.”
Lotero-Diaz also attached a written statement explaining the
events of June 29, 2001. She recalled being given her stamped pass-
port and walking toward “a large place where people were picking
up luggage.” After she got her luggage, she was stopped by “Cus-
toms Police,” who told her that she had drugs and she should fol-
low him. Although she denied having drugs, she was ultimately
handed over to immigration officials. They detained her for several
hours and forced her to sign various papers she did not understand.
In addition, immigration authorities kept her passport with the ad-
mission stamps after she was released on parole.
A single judge of the BIA denied Lotero-Diaz’s second mo-
tion to reopen in 2022. First, the BIA noted her second motion to
reopen was “both number-barred and untimely.” And, while it
noted she had accused the DHS of fraud, it found no basis “upon
which either bar should be tolled.” The BIA concluded her argu-
ments were “premised on a mistaken view of the legal significance
of a stamp.” It explained an applicant for admission whose passport
is stamped but who is prevented from entering the main terminal
of an airport by an immigration officer does not enter the United
States or become admitted “unless and until the official restraint
ceases and the noncitizen is permitted to physically enter the
United States without official restraint.” And while the BIA agreed
an immigration officer’s admission stamp in a passport “[w]as
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 6 of 14
6 Opinion of the Court 22-10696
generally strong evidence of admission,” it noted that such evi-
dence could be overcome where evidence showed the require-
ments for admission were not met.
The BIA noted Lotero-Diaz’s second motion to reopen in-
cluded evidence showing “she was referred to secondary inspection
at the San Juan airport on June 28, 2001, without her having first
been permitted to enter the United States free of official restraint.”
At a secondary inspection, she was detained and found to be inad-
missible, which led to a “withdrawal of application for admission”
and the cancellation of her visa. Thus, the BIA concluded she was
never admitted to the United States, and she was, thus, properly
charged with inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I).
Accordingly, the BIA denied her second motion to reopen because
it was “both time-and number-barred and the factual basis upon
which [she] s[ought] to avoid these limitations [wa]s not supported
by the record.”
Lotero-Diaz timely filed a petition for review of the order
denying the second motion to reopen.
II. DISCUSSION
Lotero-Diaz asserts several issues in her petition, which we
address in turn. The Government contends we lack jurisdiction
over portions of Lotero-Diaz’s petition, and asserts we should deny
the remainder of her petition.
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 7 of 14
22-10696 Opinion of the Court 7
A. Sua Sponte Reopening
Lotero-Diaz contends the BIA erred in refusing to exercise
its sua sponte authority to reopen. The BIA may reopen a case pur-
suant to its sua sponte authority at any time, though it requires a
showing of exceptional circumstances to do so. Butka v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 827 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(a)); Lenis v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 525 F.3d 1291, 1293-94 (11th Cir.
2008). We lack jurisdiction to review a BIA decision denying a mo-
tion for sua sponte reopening. Butka, 827 F.3d at 1283-84. But we
have left open the question of whether we may exercise jurisdiction
over constitutional claims related to an underlying request for sua
sponte reopening. Id. at 1285 n.6 (citing Lenis, 525 F.3d at 1294 n.7).
To assert a constitutional claim over which we might have jurisdic-
tion, a petitioner must allege at least a colorable constitutional vio-
lation, in other words, the claim must have “some possible validity.”
Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 1281, 1284 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2007).
We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to reo-
pen under its sua sponte authority. Lenis, 525 F.3d at 1293-94; Butka,
827 F.3d at 1283-84. While Lotero-Diaz attempts to raise a consti-
tutional due process claim, Butka, 827 F.3d 1285 n.6, the denial of
purely discretionary sua sponte reopening cannot present a viable
due process claim. See Scheerer v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513 F.3d 1244, 1253
(11th Cir. 2008) (explaining a failure to receive relief that is purely
discretionary does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest
and thus cannot constitute a due process violation). Thus, Lotero-
Diaz has not presented a colorable constitutional claim in this
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 8 of 14
8 Opinion of the Court 22-10696
respect over which this Court might have jurisdiction. Arias, 482
F.2d at 1284 & n.2.
B. 2008 Removal Order
Lotero-Diaz asserts her 2008 removal order was obtained
unlawfully under 8 U.S.C. § 1361. We lack jurisdiction to review
(or estop the government from enforcing) Lotero-Diaz’s 2008 re-
moval order, as she did not timely file a petition for review of that
order. See Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 870 (11th
Cir. 2018) (stating we lack jurisdiction to “review earlier trips
through immigration proceedings”). “[T]o seek judicial review of
[the BIA’s 2008] order, [Lotero-Diaz] must have filed a petition with
[this] Court within 30 days of the issuance of that order,” but she
did not do so. See Gaksakuman v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 1164, 1168
(11th Cir. 2014) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)).
C. Reasoned Consideration
Lotero-Diaz asserts the BIA’s failure to provide her a hearing
violated her Due Process rights and constituted a lack of reasoned
consideration. To enable our review, the BIA must have given “rea-
soned consideration” to a petitioner’s application for relief and
made adequate findings. Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 931 F.3d 1327, 1333
(11th Cir. 2019). The BIA gave reasoned consideration to Lotero-
Diaz’s second motion to reopen. The BIA only needed to draft a
decision that showed it “ha[d] considered the issues” and argu-
ments Lotero-Diaz “raised and announced its decision in terms suf-
ficient to enable [us] to perceive that it has heard and thought and
not merely reacted.” Jeune v. U.S.Att’y Gen., 810 F.3d 792, 803 (11th
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 9 of 14
22-10696 Opinion of the Court 9
Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The BIA’s opin-
ion was detailed, it addressed Lotero-Diaz’s central claims, and it
provided this Court with the basis for reviewing whether reopening
was warranted.
D. Merits of Motion to Reopen
Lotero-Diaz asserts the BIA should have granted her second
motion to reopen the proceedings because her 2008 removal order
was obtained unlawfully under 8 U.S.C. § 1361. She contends reo-
pening was warranted because she presented new evidence, and
that evidence gave the IJ jurisdiction over her pending application
for adjustment of status. She asserts that both the time and num-
ber bars should be equitably tolled because of the nature of the
Government’s 8 U.S.C. § 1361 violation and the fact she could not
have discovered the violation earlier. Alternatively, she argues that,
even if the BIA “has no legal duty to provide [a] remedy for a vio-
lation of 8 U.S.C. § 1361,” this Court should equitably estop the
Government from executing the removal order, because the INS
failed to file all records subject to mandatory disclosure in immi-
gration proceedings. She also contends the BIA impermissibly con-
ducted its own fact-finding on whether she was free of official re-
straint in order to reject her motion to reopen.
The BIA did not err in concluding Lotero-Diaz’s second mo-
tion to reopen was time-and number-barred under the relevant reg-
ulations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i) (providing except for
certain motions by battered spouses, children, and parents, a
noncitizen may file only one motion to reopen her removal
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 10 of 14
10 Opinion of the Court 22-10696
proceedings, and it must be filed within 90 days of the final admin-
istrative removal order). And, assuming without deciding that it
was empowered to toll or estop these bars, the BIA did not abuse
its discretion in finding such an action was not warranted.
1. Equitable Estoppel
We have noted “the Supreme Court has never resolved
whether, and in what manner, the doctrine of equitable estoppel
can be applied against the federal government.” Tefel v. Reno, 180
F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir. 1999). The traditional elements of an
equitable estoppel claim are: “(1) words, acts, conduct or acquies-
cence causing another to believe in the existence of a certain state
of things (2) willfulness or negligence with regard to the acts, con-
duct or acquiescence and (3) detrimental reliance by the other party
upon the state of things so indicated.” Id. (quotations omitted).
But “to establish a claim for equitable estoppel against the govern-
ment,” we have held, “the party seeking to establish estoppel must
prove, in addition to the traditional elements of estoppel, some af-
firmative misconduct by the government.” Id. at 1303. “Affirmative
misconduct requires more than governmental negligence or inac-
tion, because a traditional claim of estoppel already requires at
least negligence by the party being estopped.” Savoury v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 449 F.3d 1307, 1319 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
“Whenever any person makes an application for a
visa . . . the burden of proof shall be on such person to establish
that [the beneficiary] is eligible to receive such visa . . . or is not in-
admissible under any provision of this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 11 of 14
22-10696 Opinion of the Court 11
Additionally, “in any removal proceeding . . . against any person,
the burden of proof shall be upon such person to show the time,
place, and manner of his entry into the United States, but in present-
ing such proof he shall be entitled to the production of his visa or other
entry document, if any, and of any other documents and records . . . per-
taining to such entry in the custody of the Service.” Id. (emphasis
added).
Assuming an equitable estoppel argument were available,
Lotero-Diaz did not show any “affirmative misconduct” by the
Government in failing to turn over the documents that showed her
passport had been stamped “admitted.” Tefel, 180 F.3d at 1303; Sa-
voury, 449 F.3d at 1319. The Government’s failure to disclose the
information, standing alone—while arguably a violation of the text
of 8 U.S.C. § 1361 and potentially negligent—does not constitute
affirmative misconduct. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361, Savoury, 449 F.3d at
1319.
2. Equitable Tolling
The 90-day deadline for a motion to reopen proceedings is
not jurisdictional and is subject to equitable tolling. Avila-Santoyo
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 713 F.3d 1357, 1362–64 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2013) (en
banc). Typically, equitable tolling of a time deadline requires a
showing the litigant (1) has been pursuing his rights diligently and
(2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Bing Quan
Lin, 881 F.3d at 872. We have suggested, without deciding, the nu-
merical limitation on motions to reopen may also be equitably
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 12 of 14
12 Opinion of the Court 22-10696
tolled by an identical showing. Ruiz-Turcios v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 717
F.3d 847, 850–51 (11th Cir. 2013).
“Admission” and “admitted” denote “the lawful entry of [an]
alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by
an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Prior to the Il-
legal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA), “entry” was defined as the “coming of any alien into
the United States, from a foreign port or place or from an outlying
possession, whether voluntary or otherwise.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)
(1995). And, in applying the pre-IIRIRA statute, the BIA deter-
mined an “entry” requires, inter alia, “freedom from official re-
straint.” Farquharson v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 246 F.3d 1317, 1320-21 (11th
Cir. 2001) (applying IIRIRA transitional rules). In Matter of Patel,
the BIA considered whether an applicant had “entered” the United
States “as that term [was] defined for the purposes of the immigra-
tion laws, and should therefore have been placed in deportation
proceedings.” 20 I. & N. Dec. 368, 369-70 (BIA 1991). The BIA,
applying the pre-IIRIRA statute, used the same test as we discussed
in Farquharson requiring, among other things, “freedom from offi-
cial restraint.” Compare id. at 370, with Farquharson, 246 F.3d at
1320-21.
Lotero-Diaz has not shown the BIA abused its discretion in
concluding equitable tolling did not apply to her case. The BIA did
not abuse its discretion in concluding equitable tolling was not war-
ranted on these facts, where, among other things, the Govern-
ment’s failure to disclose the contested documents did not
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 13 of 14
22-10696 Opinion of the Court 13
prejudice Lotero-Diaz. The evidence Lotero-Diaz obtained
through her FOIA suit did not establish she had been “admitted” to
the United States. Specifically, as the BIA noted, “admission” is a
term of art that—like the pre-IIRIRA term “entry”—appears to re-
quire “freedom from official restraint.” See Farquaharson, 246 F.3d
at 1320-21; Matter of Patel, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 369-70. The evidence
in the record shows Lotero-Diaz was never free from official re-
straint on June 29, 2001, in the San Juan airport, such that she was
admitted to the country. Therefore, even if equitable tolling could
be warranted based on a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1361, Lotero-Diaz
did not show the alleged violation prejudiced her nor that the evi-
dence obtained was material. Without showing any prejudice, she
also cannot show a due process violation. See Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 605 F.3d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating to establish a due
process violation, a non-citizen must show she was deprived of lib-
erty without due process and the asserted errors caused her sub-
stantial prejudice).
3. Impermissible Factfinding
The BIA generally cannot engage in de novo factfinding, and
when it does so, it commits legal error. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3); Zhu
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 703 F.3d 1303, 1314 (11th Cir. 2013). Rather, the
BIA reviews the IJ’s findings only for clear error, and it reviews
“questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues” de
novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)-(ii).
Contrary to Lotero-Diaz’s assertions, the BIA did not engage
in impermissible factfinding in ruling on her motion. Evaluation
USCA11 Case: 22-10696 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 05/25/2023 Page: 14 of 14
14 Opinion of the Court 22-10696
of evidence in the first instance is necessary when analyzing a mo-
tion to reopen based on evidence alleged to be new or previously
unavailable. The BIA did not err in reviewing the submitted evi-
dence to determine whether to reopen Lotero-Diaz’s case, as the
regulations require it to do so to determine whether reopening is
warranted. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Lotero-Diaz was never admitted into the
United States and her various arguments based on an “admitted”
status fail. Lotero-Diaz has not shown the BIA acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in denying her motion to reopen. See Ferreira v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 1240, 1243 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating when review-
ing for an abuse of discretion, we will only determine whether the
BIA exercised its discretion arbitrarily or capriciously). Accord-
ingly, we dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.
PETITION DISMISSED IN PART, DENIED IN PART.