Carl L. Gregory v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue ( 2023 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 22-10707    Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 05/30/2023   Page: 1 of 23
    [PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 22-10707
    ____________________
    CARL L. GREGORY,
    LEILA GREGORY,
    Petitioners-Appellants,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ____________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    U.S. Tax Court
    Agency No. 10336-18
    ____________________
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    2                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10707
    Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
    BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
    This appeal is a tax dispute over a yacht. It raises an issue of
    first impression about whether hobby losses under Section
    183(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code should be treated as mis-
    cellaneous itemized deductions. This treatment matters for many
    reasons, including because taxpayers (during the relevant time)
    could deduct miscellaneous itemized deductions only for amounts
    that exceeded two percent of their adjusted gross income.
    Carl and Leila Gregory chartered their yacht, Lady Leila, in
    2014 and 2015. They did not conduct the chartering activity for
    profit—it was a hobby. Though the hobby generated income, it
    also incurred sizeable expenses each year. The Gregorys deducted
    some of those expenses under Section 183(b)(2) and placed them
    “above the line” to reduce their gross income. After an audit, the
    Commissioner determined that the Section 183(b)(2) deductions
    were miscellaneous itemized deductions under Section 67, mean-
    ing that they belonged “below the line” and reduced adjusted gross
    income, not gross income. Moreover, because the Gregorys had
    earned tens of millions of dollars in 2014 and 2015 and, at that time,
    the Code allowed miscellaneous itemized deductions only to the
    extent that they exceeded two percent of adjusted gross income,
    the Commissioner disallowed the Section 183(b)(2) deductions al-
    together. Facing deficiencies and penalties, the Gregorys petitioned
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    22-10707              Opinion of the Court                       3
    the Tax Court, which granted summary judgment for the Commis-
    sioner. They now seek appellate review.
    Everyone agrees that Section 183(b)(2) allows a deduction
    for a certain amount of hobby losses, which is capped at the
    hobby’s gross income. But we must decide where those deductions
    belong on a taxpayer’s return: above the line (reducing gross in-
    come) or below the line as miscellaneous itemized deductions (re-
    ducing adjusted gross income). We believe the provisions of the
    Internal Revenue Code, taken together, answer this question and
    hold that Section 183(b)(2) expenses are below-the-line miscellane-
    ous itemized deductions. We agree with the Tax Court and deny
    the petition for review.
    I.
    We begin by reciting the relevant facts, which are not dis-
    puted. In 2011, the Gregorys formed CLC Ventures, Ltd., a Cay-
    man Islands corporation, to own and charter a yacht named Lady
    Leila. Because CLC elected for treatment as a disregarded entity,
    the Gregorys reported CLC’s income and expenses on their per-
    sonal returns. It is undisputed that CLC was not engaged in for
    profit within the meaning of I.R.C. § 183.
    The Gregorys filed joint tax returns for 2014 and 2015, re-
    porting CLC’s income and expenses on their Schedule C (Profit or
    Loss from Business). In March 2018, the Commissioner issued a
    Notice of Deficiency to the Gregorys for tax years 2014 and 2015.
    Because CLC lacked a profit motive, the Commissioner adjusted
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    4                         Opinion of the Court                     22-10707
    the Gregorys’ returns, recharacterizing CLC’s income as “Other In-
    come” and its expenses as “Itemized Deductions” on the Gregorys’
    Schedule A. The Commissioner further classified the itemized de-
    ductions as miscellaneous itemized deductions, meaning they were
    allowable only to the extent that they exceeded two percent of the
    Gregorys’ adjusted gross income under I.R.C. § 67(a).
    The Gregorys reported taxable income1 of $19,666,293 and
    $80,154,735 for 2014 and 2015, respectively, and the Commissioner
    disallowed all deductions attributable to CLC except for several
    hundred dollars of taxes and licensing expenses. The Commis-
    sioner then assessed over three hundred thousand dollars in defi-
    ciencies and penalties.
    The Gregorys petitioned the Tax Court to reconsider the de-
    ficiencies, arguing that hobby expenses under Section 183(b)(2) are
    not miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the two-percent
    floor imposed by Section 67(a). The Tax Court disagreed, deter-
    mining that the Code’s plain language and statutory scheme con-
    firmed that Section 183(b)(2) grants a miscellaneous itemized de-
    duction. The Gregorys filed a motion for reconsideration, which
    the Tax Court denied. The Tax Court issued a final decision up-
    holding the deficiencies—$267,221 in total—but not the penalties.
    1 The Gregorys’ adjusted gross income is not in the record. But all agree that
    it was too high to take a deduction for their hobby losses if those losses are
    treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to Section 67’s two-per-
    cent floor.
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    22-10707               Opinion of the Court                        5
    The Gregorys timely appealed.
    II.
    We review the Tax Court’s ruling on a summary judgment
    motion de novo. Roberts v. Comm’r, 
    329 F.3d 1224
    , 1227 (11th Cir.
    2003). The Tax Court’s application of statutes and conclusions of
    law also receive de novo review. Peterson v. Comm’r, 
    827 F.3d 968
    ,
    986 (11th Cir. 2016).
    III.
    A.
    Before discussing the parties’ arguments, we explain the stat-
    utory scheme for above- and below-the-line income tax deduc-
    tions. To be clear, our background discussion of the relevant statu-
    tory scheme is meant to give context to the parties’ specific argu-
    ments. The Code has a byzantine character, and exceptions to the
    following generalizations may apply in certain circumstances.
    Income tax deductions reduce taxes owed by reducing the
    overall amount of income that is subject to a tax. The Code distin-
    guishes—albeit not explicitly—two principal classes of deductions:
    above-the-line and below-the-line. Above-the-line deductions re-
    duce gross income, that is, “all income from whatever source de-
    rived,” and are enumerated in Section 62(a). I.R.C. §§ 61(a), 62(a).
    Gross income minus above-the-line deductions equals adjusted
    gross income. Id. § 62. After calculating adjusted gross income, tax-
    payers can invoke another round of deductions to lower adjusted
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    6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10707
    gross income. See id. § 63(a). These deductions are commonly de-
    scribed as “below-the-line” because they occur after applying the
    Section 62 deductions to gross income. See Cole v. Comm’r, No.
    14402-11S, 
    2013 WL 1798975
    , at *4 n.4 (T.C. Apr. 29, 2013) (describ-
    ing “below-the-line” deductions as “including itemized deductions
    and” the deductions listed in Section 63(b)). Most below-the-line
    deductions are “itemized” deductions and available only to taxpay-
    ers like the Gregorys who do not take the standard deduction. See
    
    id.
     § 63(b), (d), (e). Subtracting the below-the-line deductions from
    adjusted gross income yields taxable income. Id. § 63.
    The amount and type of deductions available to taxpayers
    “depend[] upon legislative grace.” See New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helver-
    ing, 
    292 U.S. 435
    , 440 (1934). Put differently, there is no general
    right to a deduction. And not all deductions are created equal. For
    instance, taxpayers can usually deduct the full amount of business
    expenses, but other kinds of expenses must rise above a statutory
    floor to trigger a deduction or may not be available to taxpayers
    whose income exceeds a certain threshold. Compare, e.g., I.R.C. §
    162(a) (allowing an uncapped deduction for “all the ordinary and
    necessary expenses paid or incurred . . . in carrying on any trade or
    business”), with, e.g., id. § 213(a) (allowing a deduction for medical
    expenses “to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of
    adjusted gross income”).
    Except for twelve deductions identified in Section 67(b), all
    itemized deductions are “miscellaneous itemized deductions.” Id.
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    22-10707               Opinion of the Court                          7
    § 67(b). During the relevant time period, the law allowed a tax-
    payer to deduct miscellaneous itemized deductions “only to the ex-
    tent that the aggregate of such deductions exceed[ed] 2 percent of
    adjusted gross income.” Id. § 67(a). In other words, a taxpayer
    could deduct only the portion of miscellaneous itemized deduc-
    tions that surpassed two percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross
    income. See Ted D. Englebrecht et al., Trusts Face Limit on Invest-
    ment Advisory Fee Deduction, 77 Prac. Tax Strategies 92, 92 (2006)
    (“Section 67(a) limits an individual’s miscellaneous itemized deduc-
    tions to the amount that exceeds 2% of adjusted gross income.”);
    Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d (Res. Inst. Am.) ¶ A-1311 (Apr. 2023 up-
    date) (describing this principle); Job Search Expenses Can Be Tax De-
    ductible, I.R.S. (Aug. 4, 2012) (“The amount of your miscellaneous
    deduction that exceeds two percent of your adjusted gross income
    is deductible.”).
    This two-percent floor rendered miscellaneous itemized de-
    ductions of little value to most taxpayers. After the relevant time
    period here, Congress amended the Code to disallow all miscella-
    neous itemized deductions of whatever amount, rendering them
    of even less value. But this provision is set to sunset in 2025. I.R.C.
    § 67(g).
    B.
    We now turn to the parties’ arguments. The Tax Court held
    that hobby losses under Section 183(b)(2) are miscellaneous item-
    ized deductions that are applied below the line and subject to the
    two-percent floor imposed by Section 67(a). Because the Gregorys’
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    8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10707
    miscellaneous itemized deductions did not exceed two percent of
    their adjusted gross income, the Tax Court disallowed almost all
    their deductions attributable to Lady Leila. The Gregorys dispute
    this reasoning. They argue that Section 183(b)(2) creates an above-
    the-line deduction for income-producing hobbies. Accordingly,
    they contend that the Tax Court erred in classifying their hobby
    losses as miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to below-the-
    line treatment and to the two-percent floor under Section 67. We
    are not persuaded.
    The language of the relevant statutory provisions settles this
    question. See Mamani v. Berzain, 
    825 F.3d 1304
    , 1309 (11th Cir.
    2016). We presume that the Internal Revenue Code “says . . . what
    it means and means . . . what it says.” See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Ger-
    main, 
    503 U.S. 249
    , 254 (1992). We therefore begin our statutory
    interpretation with the words of the statutes themselves. Harris v.
    Garner, 
    216 F.3d 970
    , 972 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Still, “[s]tatu-
    tory provisions are not written in isolation.” In re Shek, 
    947 F.3d 770
    , 776 (11th Cir. 2020). A provision’s meaning must consider
    both the “particular statutory language at issue” and “the language
    and design of the statute as a whole.” Id. at 777 (quoting K Mart
    Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 
    486 U.S. 281
    , 291 (1988)).
    Three provisions of Section 183 are relevant. First, Section
    183(a) prohibits all hobby loss deductions except for those allowa-
    ble in Section 183(b). I.R.C. § 183(a) (stating that, if an “activity en-
    gaged in by an individual or an S Corporation” is “not engaged in
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    22-10707                Opinion of the Court                          9
    for profit, no deduction attributable to such activity shall be al-
    lowed under this chapter except as provided in this section”). Sec-
    ond, Section 183(b)(1) grants activities not engaged in for profit
    (e.g., hobbies) the same deductions “allowable under this chap-
    ter . . . without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in
    for profit.” Id. § 183(b)(1). Third, and this is the disputed provision,
    Section 183(b)(2) allows “a deduction equal to the amount of de-
    ductions . . . allowable under this chapter . . . only if such activity
    were engaged in for profit.” Id. § 183(b)(2). But the amount of this
    deduction cannot exceed the difference between the hobby’s gross
    income and the deductions allowed under Section 183(b)(1). See id.
    Thus, the law caps a Section 183(b)(2) deduction at the amount of
    the hobby’s “gross income” minus the deductions claimed under
    Section 183(b)(1).
    Everyone agrees that Section 183(b)(2) allows the Gregorys
    a potential deduction for their hobby losses from chartering Lady
    Leila because they could deduct those losses “if such activity were
    engaged in for profit.” Id. Everyone also agrees that the amount of
    that deduction is capped at the hobby’s gross income less the de-
    ductions taken under Section 183(b)(1). Id. § 183(b)(1)–(2). But how
    should Section 183(b)(2)’s deduction be treated? Is it an above- or
    below-the line deduction? If the latter, is it a miscellaneous item-
    ized deduction subject to the two-percent floor?
    Section 183 does not expressly answer these questions. In
    this respect, Section 183(b)(2) resembles many other Code provi-
    sions that identify an allowable deduction but do not account for
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    10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10707
    that deduction’s placement above or below the line. For example,
    Section 162(a) allows a deduction for trade and business expenses.
    But, to find out how to treat that deduction, we must look at Sec-
    tion 62, which provides that deductions for trade and business ex-
    penses reduce the taxpayer’s gross income and therefore belong
    above the line. See id. § 62(a)(1). Likewise, many other deductions
    are granted in one Code section, but limited, capped, or circum-
    scribed in other sections. See, e.g., id. § 161 (allowing itemized de-
    ductions for individuals and corporations); id. § 262(a) (disallowing
    itemized deductions for “personal, living, or family expenses”); id.
    § 68 (phasing out itemized deductions when the taxpayer’s “ad-
    justed gross income exceeds” a certain amount). Section 183 fits
    this pattern; it provides a deduction, but other sections tell taxpay-
    ers whether and how they may benefit from it.
    For their part, the Gregorys resist this reasoning and argue
    that, unlike other Code provisions, Section 183(b)(2) does say how
    the deduction should be treated. Specifically, they assert Section
    183(b)(2) creates an above-the-line deduction that is not subject to
    the two-percent floor. The Gregorys make two text-based argu-
    ments in support of this reading, but neither is persuasive.
    First, the Gregorys argue that Section 183(b)(2) does not
    confer a specific deduction but a deduction framework. That frame-
    work, as the argument goes, requires us to treat Section 183(b)(2)
    expenses the same as business expenses in all respects. The Grego-
    rys contend that, because Section 183(b)(2) waives the for-profit re-
    quirement for other deductions in Chapter 1 of the Code, Section
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    22-10707               Opinion of the Court                         11
    183(b)(2) deductions receive the same placement as trade and busi-
    ness deductions on a taxpayer’s return. If the Gregorys had con-
    ducted their chartering activities for profit, they could have de-
    ducted trade and business expenses from Lady Leila under Section
    162 and placed that deduction above the line under Section 62(a).
    See Est. of Sherrod v. Comm’r, 
    774 F.2d 1057
    , 1064 (11th Cir. 1985)
    (“Section 162 permits the deduction of business expenses in arriv-
    ing at adjusted gross income . . . .”) (emphasis added). They therefore
    conclude that their Section 183(b)(2) expenses attributable to Lady
    Leila are deductible above the line just as if they were trade or busi-
    ness expenses.
    The text does not support the Gregorys’ argument that Sec-
    tion 183(b)(2)’s deduction must be given the same priority and
    placement as a trade or business expense. Section 183(b)(2) grants
    “a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions” allowable for
    activities engaged in for profit. I.R.C. § 183(b)(2). Despite referring
    to business activities to set the deduction “amount,” in no other
    respect does Section 183(b)(2) instruct us to treat that deduction
    the same as a business expense. Amount is not kind. Compare
    Amount, Oxford English Dictionary (online ed. Dec. 2022) (defining
    “amount” as “[a] quantity of something; a portion or measure) (em-
    phasis added) with Kind, id. (defining “kind” as “[a] class or category
    of things distinguished by common characteristics” or “a particular
    variety or type”) (emphasis added). And, of course, even the
    “amount” of the hobby loss deduction under Section 183 is differ-
    ent from the amount of a comparable deduction available to a for-
    profit business because the Section 183 deduction is capped at the
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    12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10707
    hobby’s income. See I.R.C. § 183(b)(2). In short, Section 183(b)(2)
    permits a deduction otherwise disallowed by Section 183(a) and
    identifies its amount. But the deduction allowed by Section
    183(b)(2) is its own thing, not a trade or business expense.
    Second, the Gregorys argue that, because Section 183(b)(2)
    caps the deduction amount at the hobby’s gross income minus the
    Section 183(b)(1) deductions, we can surmise that Section 183(b)(2)
    expenses are supposed to reduce a taxpayer’s gross income—not the
    taxpayer’s adjusted gross income—and therefore belong above the
    line. That argument also misses the mark. The Section 183(b)(2)
    cap is based on the hobby’s gross income; above-the-line deductions
    reduce an individual’s overall gross income from whatever source.
    These are two very different things. Section 183(b)(2) limits deduct-
    ible hobby losses “to the extent that the gross income derived from
    such activity [i.e., the hobby] . . . exceeds the deductions allowable
    by [Section 183(b)(1)].” Id. § 183(b)(2) (emphasis added). The Code
    defines “gross income” as “all income from whatever source de-
    rived.” Id. § 61(a). The “gross income derived from [the hobby],”
    id. § 183(b)(2), therefore means all income from the hobby, not the
    taxpayer’s total gross income. The Tax Court correctly concluded
    that Section 183(b)(2)’s reference to “gross income” merely con-
    cerns the maximum allowable deduction amount under Section
    183(b)(2). It is a benchmark for capping the deduction—it is not a
    command to apply hobby loss deductions against a taxpayer’s total
    gross income.
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    22-10707               Opinion of the Court                         13
    Because the text of Section 183 does not tell us how to treat
    the hobby loss deduction it provides, we must turn to other provi-
    sions of the Code to answer that question. See Hagans v. Comm’r of
    Soc. Sec., 
    694 F.3d 287
    , 296 (3d Cir. 2012) (“When a statute is ‘com-
    plex and contains many interrelated provisions,’ it may be ‘impos-
    sible to attach a plain meaning to provisions in isolation.’” (quoting
    Cleary ex rel. Cleary v. Waldman, 
    167 F.3d 801
    , 807 (3d Cir. 1999))).
    Those provisions are Section 62, Section 63, and Section 67. As ex-
    plained below, those provisions establish that Section 183(b)(2) de-
    ductions are below-the-line and must exceed two percent of a tax-
    payer’s adjusted gross income before they become deductible. We
    will walk through each provision in turn.
    We start with Section 62, which lists all above-the-line de-
    ductions that reduce gross income. See I.R.C. § 62(a) (describing
    over a dozen above-the-line deductions). These deductions include
    trade and business expenses, id. § 62(a)(1), “losses from the sale or
    exchange of property,” id. § 62(a)(3), and certain attorney’s fees, id.
    § 62(a)(21). The list of above-the-line deductions in Section 62(a) is
    exhaustive. Nothing in Section 62’s text suggests that Congress hid
    other above-the-line deductions elsewhere in the Code. See id. § 62.
    And Section 62 nowhere mentions Section 183 or hobby expenses
    within its comprehensive list of above-the-line deductions. See id. §
    62(a)(1)–(21); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
    Interpretation of Legal Texts 93 (2012) (observing that courts should
    not “elaborate unprovided-for exceptions to a text”); EEOC v. Aber-
    crombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 
    575 U.S. 768
    , 774 (2015) (“We construe
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    14                      Opinion of the Court                    22-10707
    . . . [a statute’s] silence as exactly that: silence.”). Accordingly, Sec-
    tion 183 deductions are not above-the-line.
    Next, we move to Section 63. Section 63(d) defines “item-
    ized deductions” as all deductions except (1) the above-the-line de-
    ductions listed in Section 62 and (2) “any deduction referred to in
    any paragraph of subsection (b) [of Section 63].” 
    Id.
     § 63(d). For its
    part, Section 63(b) lists four deductions: the standard deduction,
    the personal exemption deduction under Section 151, the qualified
    business income deduction under Section 199A, and the charitable
    contribution deduction under Section 170(p). Id. § 63(b). Again,
    Section 183 is nowhere to be found. The Section 183 deduction
    must therefore be an “itemized deduction.”
    Lastly, we come to Section 67. Section 67(a) imposes the
    two-percent floor on “miscellaneous itemized deductions.” Id. §
    67(a). In Section 67(b), the statute defines “miscellaneous itemized
    deductions” as all “itemized deductions” other than twelve specific
    listed deductions, none of which mentions hobby expenses or Sec-
    tion 183. See id. § 67(a)–(b). Thus, Section 183(b)(2) expenses are
    miscellaneous itemized deductions and deductible “only to the ex-
    tent that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of ad-
    justed gross income.” Id. § 67(a).
    We note that our reading of these statutes is consistent with
    other courts and IRS regulations. Although none of our sister cir-
    cuits has addressed the Gregorys’ arguments, several lower courts
    have reached the same conclusion we do here. See, e.g., Purdey v.
    United States, 
    39 Fed. Cl. 413
    , 417 (1997) (concluding that Section
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    22-10707               Opinion of the Court                         15
    183(b)(2) deductions are miscellaneous itemized deductions be-
    cause Section 67(b) does not exclude them); Strode v. Comm’r, 
    109 T.C.M. (CCH) 1599
    , 
    2015 WL 3897787
    , at *11 n.12 (2015) (same).
    Likewise, the IRS provides by regulation that “expenses that . . . are
    subject to the 2-percent floor include . . . [e]xpenses for an activity
    for which a deduction is otherwise allowable under section 183.”
    
    26 C.F.R. § 1.67
    -1T(a)(1).
    Tax analysts and commentators also agree that “expenses of
    an activity not carried on for profit are” one of “the principal cate-
    gories of miscellaneous itemized deductions.” B. Bittker & L.
    Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts ¶ 30.4.2 (July
    2022). Leading tax treatises inform tax practitioners that “[d]educ-
    tions for hobby activities are claimed as itemized deductions on
    Schedule A” and “[e]xpenses . . . allowed under the hobby loss rules
    are ‘miscellaneous itemized deductions.’” Fed. Tax Coordinator 2d
    (Res. Inst. Am.) ¶ M-5804 (Apr. 2023 update); see also 1 Richard D.
    Blau et al., S Corporations Federal Taxation § 7:29 (Nov. 2022 update)
    (same); 33 Am. Jur. 2d Federal Taxation ¶ 1153 (May 2023 update)
    (same); 1 Edward F. Koren, Estate, Tax and Personal Financial Plan-
    ning § 4:10 n.15 (Mar. 2023 update) (same). Put another way, Sec-
    tion 183(b)(2) deductions “must be taken as miscellaneous itemized
    deductions subject to the 2%-of-AGI (adjusted gross income) re-
    duction (Section 67).” Donald Samelson, The Income Tax Aspects of
    Artistic Activities, 93 Prac. Tax Strategies 244, 244 (2014).
    In summary, the Tax Court correctly calculated the Grego-
    rys’ tax liability. Section 183(b)(2) allows a deduction for hobby
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    16                     Opinion of the Court                 22-10707
    losses but does not say whether it belongs above or below the line.
    Section 62, however, places that deduction below the line. Because
    Sections 63 and 67 also omit Section 183, hobby expenses deducted
    under Section 183(b)(2) are miscellaneous itemized deductions.
    During the relevant time period, these deductions were subject to
    a two-percent floor on adjusted gross income. The result is that
    Section 183(b)(2) gave the Gregorys a deduction for their expenses
    from operating Lady Leila, but Section 67 did not allow them to
    take that deduction because they could not meet the two-percent
    threshold for miscellaneous itemized deductions.
    C.
    In response to this plain-text analysis, the Gregorys make
    five additional arguments. None is persuasive.
    First, the Gregorys argue that we “recognized the connec-
    tion between Section 183 deductions and the analogous adjust-
    ments under Section 162” in Brannen v. Commissioner, 
    722 F.2d 695
    (11th Cir. 1984). In Brannen, taxpayer-Brannen invested in a limited
    partnership to purchase a “spaghetti western” film to distribute in
    the United States. Brannen, 
    722 F.2d at
    697–700. The film flopped,
    and the Commissioner disallowed certain losses claimed by Bran-
    nen “because the purchase and subsequent distribution of the
    movie [by the limited partnership] was an activity ‘not engaged in
    for profit.’” 
    Id. at 701
    . In affirming the Tax Court, we stated that
    “Section 183 takes effect only when the taxpayer is engaged in an
    activity . . . not otherwise entitled to claimed deductions under Sec-
    tions 162 or 212.” 
    Id. at 704
    . Thus, in assessing profit motive, “we
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    22-10707               Opinion of the Court                       17
    must first determine whether the taxpayer was entitled to deduc-
    tions under Section 162.” 
    Id.
     After deciding that the partnership
    was not “entered into with the dominant hope and intent of realiz-
    ing a profit” and therefore not eligible for Section 162 deductions,
    we held that the partnership could take deductions for “cash paid
    for the movie, to the extent of the gross income derived from the
    activity” under Section 183(b)(2). 
    Id. at 704, 706
    .
    Brannen correctly describes the relationship between Section
    162 and Section 183(b)(2) in determining profit motive. Though we
    held that Brannen could deduct certain expenses to the extent of
    gross income derived from the partnership under Section 183(b)(2),
    we did not opine on the placement of those deductions or whether
    hobby losses belong above or below the line. Moreover, Congress
    did not enact Section 67, which imposed the two-percent floor on
    miscellaneous itemized deductions, until 1986, a couple of years af-
    ter this Court decided Brannen. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
    Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100
     Stat. 2085, 2113–14. Accordingly, Brannen does
    not stand for the proposition that Section 183(b)(2) confers an
    above-the-line deduction, and the Gregorys’ reliance on it is mis-
    placed.
    Second, the Gregorys contend that our interpretation of Sec-
    tion 183(b)(2) contravenes congressional intent. They point to leg-
    islative history, arguing that Congress enacted Section 183 to pre-
    vent wealthy taxpayers from generating artificial losses, not to pre-
    USCA11 Case: 22-10707      Document: 37-1       Date Filed: 05/30/2023      Page: 18 of 23
    18                      Opinion of the Court                   22-10707
    vent taxpayers from deducting legitimate hobby expenses. This in-
    tent explains, for example, why Congress capped the Section
    183(b)(2) deduction.
    This argument misses the point. The Gregorys have a de-
    duction for their hobby losses under Section 183—just as Congress
    intended. But they cannot benefit from that deduction because an-
    other Code provision, Section 67, requires that—to actually take a
    deduction for a miscellaneous itemized deduction such as the one
    for hobby losses—“the aggregate of such deductions [must] ex-
    ceed[] 2 percent of adjusted gross income.” I.R.C. § 67(a). When
    Congress enacted Section 67, it affected taxpayers’ ability to benefit
    from the already-existing deductions that the Code provided. Con-
    gress has revealed its intent, and “we must give effect to” it. Miller
    v. French, 
    530 U.S. 327
    , 336 (2000) (quoting Sinclair Refin. Co. v. At-
    kinson, 
    370 U.S. 195
    , 215 (1962)); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
    Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
    467 U.S. 837
    , 842–43 (1984) (holding that
    courts “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
    Congress”).
    Third, the Gregorys urge us to resolve any statutory ambi-
    guity in their favor because “ambiguous tax statutes are to be con-
    strued against the government and in favor of the taxpayer.” Royal
    Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. v. United States, 
    108 F.3d 290
    , 294 (11th Cir.
    1997). But there is no ambiguity in the tax statutes at issue here. See
    generally Kisor v. Wilkie, 
    139 S. Ct. 2400
    , 2415 (2019) (explaining that
    a provision is “genuinely ambiguous” only when, after a court has
    USCA11 Case: 22-10707     Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 05/30/2023     Page: 19 of 23
    22-10707               Opinion of the Court                        19
    exhausted “all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction,” an “interpre-
    tive question still has no single right answer” (quoting Chevron, 
    467 U.S. at
    843 n.9)). As explained above, a straightforward reading of
    Section 62, Section 63, and Section 67 establishes that the deduction
    provided in Section 183(b)(2) is a below-the-line miscellaneous
    itemized deduction.
    Fourth, citing the canon against implied repeals, the Grego-
    rys posit that our reading of Section 62, Section 63, and Section 67
    implicitly repeals Section 183(b)(2). See, e.g., Posadas v. Nat’l City
    Bank of N.Y., 
    296 U.S. 497
    , 503 (1936) (describing repeal by implica-
    tion). Not so. This case does not implicate the presumption against
    implied repeal because we can read the relevant Code sections har-
    moniously. Section 183(b)(2) grants a deduction for certain hobby
    expenses; Sections 62 and 63 place that deduction below the line as
    an itemized deduction; Section 67 renders it a miscellaneous item-
    ized deduction subject to the two-percent floor. Because our read-
    ing of Sections 62, 63, and 67 does not contravene or undermine
    Section 183(b)(2), the presumption against implied repeal—and im-
    plied amendment—are inapposite.
    Fifth, the Gregorys argue that our reading would lead to an
    odd or absurd result. A court may “disregard[] or judicially cor-
    rect[]” a statutory provision “if failing to do so would result in a
    disposition that no reasonable person could approve.” Scalia &
    Garner, supra, at 234 (alteration omitted). When “the literal reading
    of a statutory” provision compels an odd or absurd result, “we
    must search for other evidence” to avoid that result. Pine v. City of
    USCA11 Case: 22-10707      Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 05/30/2023      Page: 20 of 23
    20                      Opinion of the Court                  22-10707
    West Palm Beach, 
    762 F.3d 1262
    , 1272 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pub.
    Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 
    491 U.S. 440
    , 454 (1989)). But courts
    should invoke the absurdity doctrine only when “the absurdity is
    ‘so gross as to shock the general moral or common sense.’” Packard
    v. Comm’r, 
    746 F.3d 1219
    , 1222 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Crooks v.
    Harrelson, 
    282 U.S. 55
    , 60 (1930)).
    The Gregorys contend that applying Section 67’s two-per-
    cent floor to deductions under Section 183(b)(2) creates an absurd
    result because a taxpayer will need either a very low income or
    very large hobby losses (and hobby income) to benefit from the
    deduction. We disagree. This consequence may be unfavorable for
    the Gregorys, but it is not absurd. The absurdity doctrine should
    “correct obviously unintended dispositions, not . . . revise purpose-
    ful dispositions.” Scalia & Garner, 
    supra, at 239
    . Here, Congress de-
    liberately devised the complained-of result by imposing the two-
    percent floor on miscellaneous itemized deductions. Congress can
    cap or reduce taxpayer eligibility for a tax deduction if it wants, and,
    here, it elected to do so.
    IV.
    The petition is DENIED.
    USCA11 Case: 22-10707     Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 05/30/2023    Page: 21 of 23
    1                     WILSON, J., Concurring               22-10707
    WILSON, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I agree with the majority’s holding that hobby expenses un-
    der Section 183(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code are below-the-
    line miscellaneous itemized deductions, but I would reach this con-
    clusion differently. In my view, the plain language of Section
    183(b)(2) is ambiguous. Thus, I would look to Congress’ intent to
    determine whether Section 183(b)(2) expenses are to be deducted
    above the line (reducing gross income) or below the line as miscel-
    laneous itemized deductions (reducing adjusted gross income
    (AGI)).
    The majority concludes that the plain language of the rele-
    vant statutory provisions—namely, Sections 183, 62, 63, and 67—
    settles the question of whether Section 183(b)(2) creates an above-
    the-line deduction for income-producing hobbies. Maj. Op. at 8,
    13–16. As the majority correctly notes “the text of Section 183 does
    not tell us how to treat the hobby loss deduction it provides.” Maj.
    Op. at 13. But rather than turn to other Code provisions to deduce
    the meaning of Section 183, I would look to congressional intent
    for guidance. We look beyond a statute’s plain language to extrin-
    sic materials to determine congressional intent if the statute’s lan-
    guage is ambiguous. United States v. DBB, Inc., 
    180 F.3d 1277
    , 1281
    (11th Cir. 1999). “A word or phrase is ambiguous when the ques-
    tion is which of two or more meanings applies.” Antonin Scalia &
    Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 32
    USCA11 Case: 22-10707     Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 05/30/2023     Page: 22 of 23
    2                     WILSON, J., Concurring                22-10707
    (2012). Our function as the judiciary “in construing a statute is lim-
    ited to ascertaining the intention of the Legislature therein ex-
    pressed.” Ebert v. Poston, 
    266 U.S. 548
    , 554 (1925).
    Here, the language of Section 183(b)(2) is ambiguous be-
    cause it creates a question of “which of two or more meanings ap-
    plies.” Scalia & Garner, 
    supra.
     For hobbies not engaged in for
    profit, Section 183(b)(2) permits
    a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions
    which would be allowable . . . only if such activity
    were engaged in for profit, but only to the extent that
    the gross income derived from such activity . . . ex-
    ceeds the deductions allowable by reason of [Section
    183(b)(1)].
    Under the Commissioner’s interpretation of this provision, hobby
    expenses are miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to Section
    67’s two-percent floor and are deductible below the line against
    AGI. Under the Gregorys’ interpretation, hobby expenses are akin
    to business expenses and thus can be deducted above the line
    against gross income. Yet, on its face, Section 183(b)(2) simply does
    not tell us whether hobby expenses are miscellaneous itemized de-
    ductions or if they may be treated as business expenses. Indeed,
    based on a facial reading of the plain text, either interpretation
    seems plausible. Given the ambiguity in the statutory language,
    we can—and should—look to extrinsic materials to ascertain how
    Congress intended hobby expenses to be treated under the tax
    code. See DBB, Inc., 
    180 F.3d at 1281
    .
    USCA11 Case: 22-10707        Document: 37-1         Date Filed: 05/30/2023   Page: 23 of 23
    22-10707                 WILSON, J., Concurring                        3
    Fortunately, the legislative history quickly clears up any am-
    biguity. Specifically, the December 2017 conference report for the
    Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 1 confirms that hobby expenses are below-
    the-line miscellaneous itemized deductions that are deductible
    against AGI and subject to Section 67’s two-percent floor. The con-
    ference report repealed certain miscellaneous itemized deductions
    subject to Section 67’s two-percent floor for taxable years begin-
    ning after December 31, 2017. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 273,
    276 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). The report provides a non-exhaustive list
    of items that, under then-present law, were deductible under Sec-
    tion 67 provided they exceeded two percent of the taxpayer’s AGI.
    
    Id.
     at 273–74. Among the list of examples were “[h]obby expenses,
    but generally not more than hobby income.” Id. at 274. Thus, the
    conference report confirms that during the relevant time in this
    case—tax years 2014 and 2015—Congress indeed intended hobby
    expenses to be treated as miscellaneous itemized deductions sub-
    ject to Section 67’s two-percent floor.
    Like the majority, I would deny the petition.
    1 
    Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11045
    , 
    131 Stat. 2054
     (2017).