USCA11 Case: 21-14176 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2023 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-14176
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
NNAMDI MARCELLUS MGBODILE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00439-MLB-JKL-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14176
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nnamdi Mgbodile appeals his convictions and total sentence
of 156 months’ imprisonment for bank fraud, money laundering,
and conspiracy to commit bank fraud. First, he argues that the dis-
trict court erred by not providing an entrapment instruction to the
jury as he raised more than a scintilla of evidence indicating that a
government agent induced him to commit an offense. Next, he
argues that the district court erred in holding him accountable for
a total loss of over $6 million when the district court’s loss calcula-
tion included intended losses and funds that were returned to vic-
tims. Next, he argues that the district court erred in imposing an
enhancement for his role as an organizer or leader of the offense
because he did not organize underlying fraudulent conduct. Fi-
nally, Mgbodile argues that his within-the-Guidelines sentence is
procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the district
court clearly erred in assessing his role in the offense, violated his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and abused its
discretion in considering his personal history and characteristics.
For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the district court.
I.
We review de novo the district court’s refusal to provide a
defendant’s requested entrapment jury instruction. United States v.
Dixon,
901 F.3d 1322, 1346-47 (11th Cir. 2018). Whether an entrap-
ment instruction is proper depends on whether “there is sufficient
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21-14176 Opinion of the Court 3
evidence from which a jury could find entrapment.”
Id. at 1347
(citation omitted). Failure to provide an instruction where the de-
fendant has properly shown sufficient evidence of entrapment is
reversible error. United States v. Mayweather,
991 F.3d 1163, 1176
(11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
An entrapment defense “consists of two related elements:
government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition
on the part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct.”
Id.
at 1176 (quotation marks omitted). The defendant has the “initial
burden of producing sufficient evidence of government induce-
ment.”
Id. “[T]o determine whether a defendant has produced
enough evidence to merit an entrapment defense and a jury in-
struction, we look only at whether there was sufficient evidence
produced to raise the issue of government inducement.”
Id.
To meet his initial burden of production, “the defendant
must merely come forward with some evidence, more than a scin-
tilla, that government agents induced him to commit the offense.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). We accept the testimony most fa-
vorable to the defendant.
Id. However, the defendant must show
more than the government’s presentation of an “attractive” oppor-
tunity to commit an offense.
Id. at 1177. Rather, inducement “re-
quires an element of persuasion or mild coercion,” such as a show-
ing “that the defendant had not favorably received the government
plan, and the government had to push it on him, or that several
attempts at setting up an illicit deal had failed and on at least one
occasion he had directly refused to participate.”
Id. (quotation
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-14176
marks omitted). This test is considered “an opportunity plus some
added government behavior that aims to pressure, manipulate, or
coerce the defendant into criminal activity.”
Id. (emphasis in orig-
inal).
Once the defendant meets his initial burden, the entrapment
question becomes a factual issue for the jury to decide, and an in-
struction should be proffered.
Id. at 1176. At that point, the gov-
ernment must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was predisposed to commit the crime.
Id.
Here, there was no indication that Mgbodile felt coerced to
participate in the scheme. After the cooperating witness proposed
the scheme, Mgbodile initiated contact with and instructed the co-
operating witness in how to conduct the scheme. Given the lack
of evidence that the cooperating witness made Mgbodile feel like
he needed to be involved in the scheme, the district court did not
err in determining that Mgbodile failed to show government in-
ducement to engage in the scheme. Therefore, we affirm as to this
issue.
II.
We generally review a district court’s application of the
Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United
States v. Grant,
397 F.3d 1330, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005). We “may af-
firm on any ground supported by the record.” United States v. Dud-
ley,
5 F.4th 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted).
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21-14176 Opinion of the Court 5
For purposes of Guidelines enhancements, within a criminal
conspiracy, the acts of one co-conspirator may be imputed to other
co-conspirators if the acts were reasonably foreseeable and fur-
thered the joint criminal activity even if the defendant did not per-
sonally take the action asserted in a certain Guidelines enhance-
ment. United States v. Singh,
291 F.3d 756, 761–62 (11th Cir. 2002).
“To determine whether a defendant is liable for the acts of co-con-
spirators, the district court must first make individualized findings
concerning the scope of criminal activity undertaken by the defend-
ant,” after which the district court may determine whether the
co-conspirators’ acts were reasonably foreseeable. United States v.
Moran,
778 F.3d 942, 974 (11th Cir. 2015). The Guidelines provide
that a defendant is responsible for relevant conduct in “jointly un-
dertaken criminal activity,” regardless of whether the defendant
was charged as a co-conspirator, if others’ actions (1) occurred
“within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity”;
(2) occurred “in furtherance of that criminal activity”; and (3) were
“reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
The 2018 Guidelines provide an 18-level offense level in-
crease if the losses of an offense were more than $3,500,000 but less
than $9,500,000. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J). The Guidelines’ commentary
specifies that, subject to some exclusions, “loss is the greater of ac-
tual loss or intended loss.” Id. § 2B1.1, comment. (n.3(A)). The
Guidelines define an “actual loss” as a “reasonably foreseeable pe-
cuniary harm that resulted from the offense.” Id. § 2B1.1, com-
ment. (n.3(A)(i)). Intended losses, however, include “the pecuniary
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-14176
harm that the defendant purposely sought to inflict,” including “in-
tended pecuniary harm that would have been impossible or un-
likely to occur (e.g., as in a government sting operation.” Id.
§ 2B1.1, comment. (n.3(A)(ii)). The government must prove the
loss amount by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.
Foley,
508 F.3d 627, 633 (11th Cir. 2007).
Here, because Mgbodile knowingly laundered hundreds of
thousands of dollars through a variety of frauds, the district court
did not err in finding that he knew of the general extent of the
frauds being committed and holding him accountable as a co-con-
spirator for more than $3.5 million in actual losses. The timing of
the victim’s payments in relation to payments made to interna-
tional accounts and accounts under Mgbodile’s control, and the di-
vision of payments to numerous different accounts, indicated that
Mgbodile knew that he was involved in at least one extensive fraud-
ulent scheme. Mgbodile does not deny that the victim’s actual
losses exceed the $3.5 million necessary to trigger the Guidelines’
18-level enhancement, so we need not address whether the district
court erred in considering intended losses or returned funds.
Therefore, we affirm as to this issue.
III.
We review for clear error the imposition of an aggravat-
ing-role enhancement. United States v. Martinez,
584 F.3d 1022,
1025 (11th Cir. 2009). Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, a defendant receives
a four-level increase if he “was an organizer or leader of a criminal
activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise
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21-14176 Opinion of the Court 7
extensive.” The defendant must have been the organizer or leader
of one or more participants in the offense. Id. comment. (n.2). In
determining whether a defendant was a leader or organizer, as op-
posed to a less culpable manager or supervisor, courts should con-
sider the defendant’s (1) exercise of decision making authority;
(2) nature of participation in the offense; (3) recruitment of co-con-
spirators; (4) claimed right to a larger share of the proceeds of the
offense; (5) the degree of participation in planning or organizing
the offense; (6) the nature and scope of the activity; and (7) the de-
gree of control exercised over others. Id. comment. (n.4). The
Guidelines provide that there may be more than one person who
qualifies as a leader or organizer of a conspiracy. Id.
Here, the district court did not clearly err in increasing
Mgbodile’s offense level due to his role as an organizer or leader in
extensive criminal activity. Mgbodile directed and paid others to
open bank accounts, some of which were used to receive fraudu-
lent funds; paid bank employees to facilitate fraud; orchestrated the
operation of an account designed to receive fraudulent funds; and
passed only a small percentage of his takings to the participants
whom he recruited. Considering this evidence, the district court
did not clearly err and it is immaterial that Mgbodile may not have
personally conducted every part of the offense. We affirm as to
this issue.
IV.
An appellate court normally reviews the reasonableness of a
sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38,
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-14176
41 (2007). However, we review for plain error procedural sentenc-
ing issues raised for the first time on appeal. United States v. Van-
dergrift,
754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). To show plain error,
the defendant must show “(1) that the district court erred; (2) that
the error was ‘plain’; and (3) that the error affected his substantial
rights.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted; alterations adopted).
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first con-
sider whether the district court committed a procedural error, such
as failing to calculate or improperly calculating the Guidelines
range. Gall,
552 U.S. 51. We ensure that the district court treated
the Guidelines as advisory, considered the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fac-
tors, did not select a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, and
adequately explained the sentence.
Id. The district court may base
its factual findings on, among other things, evidence presented at
trial, undisputed statements in the presentence investigation report
(“PSI”), and evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. United
States v. Martinez,
584 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2009). Under plain
error review, a district court’s consideration of an improper
§ 3553(a) factor does not affect a defendant’s substantial rights if he
fails to show that his sentence would have been different but for
that improper consideration. Vandergrift,
754 F.3d at 1312 (deter-
mining that the district court’s improper consideration of the de-
fendant’s rehabilitative needs did not affect his substantial rights
because it was only a minor part of the court’s reasoning).
Although the Fifth Amendment prevents a district court
from making a negative inference based on a defendant’s silence at
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21-14176 Opinion of the Court 9
sentencing, Mitchell v. United States,
526 U.S. 314, 328 (1999),
526 U.S. at 328, a sentencing court “may take into account a de-
fendant’s freely offered statements indicating a lack of remorse,”
United States v. Stanley,
739 F.3d 633, 652 (11th Cir. 2014).
The district court’s “unjustified reliance on a single factor
may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence.” United States v.
Kuhlman,
711 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks
omitted). However, a sentence is substantively unreasonable only
when the district court “(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant
factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight
to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v.
Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation
marks omitted). We “commit[] to the sound discretion of the dis-
trict court the weight to be accorded to each § 3553(a) factor,”
United States v. Perkins,
787 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2015), and the
district court may “attach great weight to one factor over others,”
United States v. Riley,
995 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021) (quotation
marks omitted).
“The party challenging a sentence has the burden of show-
ing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record,
the § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded sen-
tencing courts.” Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d at 1256. We will vacate a
district court’s sentence “only if we are left with the definite and
firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-14176
that is outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.” United States v. Goldman,
953 F.3d 1213, 1222
(11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omitted). A sentence within the
Guidelines range “is a strong indication of reasonableness.” United
States v. Oudomsine,
57 F.4th 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2023).
Here, the district court did not impose a procedurally or sub-
stantively unreasonable sentence. Despite Mgbodile’s contentions,
the district court did not base his sentence on clearly erroneous
facts. As discussed above, the district court did not err in finding
that he was a leader in the offense, so it did not err in weighing that
against him in the § 3553(a) factors. The district court also did not
impede Mgbodile’s right to allocute because it allowed him to
speak freely, and the district court was not required to interpret his
allocution in the way most favorable to him. See Mitchell,
526 U.S.
at 328. Additionally, the district court’s consideration of
Mgbodile’s lack of remorse reflected a proper application the
§ 3553(a) deterrence factor. Finally, the district court was entitled
to weigh Mgbodile’s personal experiences against him, even if he
wanted the district court to weigh those experiences in his favor.
See Perkins,
787 F.3d at 1342. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
