USCA11 Case: 22-13783 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 06/26/2023 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13783
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
PAUL ANDREW JACKSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATIONS,
as Trustee for the Pooling and Servicing
agreement dated as of November 1, 2005,
Securitized Asset Backed Receivables LLC
2005-HE1,
PHH MORTGAGE SERVICE CORPORATION,
Through Merger Ocwen Loan Servicer,
USCA11 Case: 22-13783 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 06/26/2023 Page: 2 of 4
2 Opinion of the Court 22-13783
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cv-61919-DPG
____________________
Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Paul Jackson, proceeding pro se, appeals the District Court’s
order dismissing his pro se civil complaint against Wells Fargo Bank,
National Association (“Wells Fargo”), Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC
(“Ocwen”), and PHH Mortgage Corporation (“PHH”), alleging vi-
olations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”),
12 U.S.C. § 2605, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(“FDCPA”),
15 U.S.C. § 1692, and
18 U.S.C. § 1011 in connection
with a state foreclosure action. The District Court concluded that
Jackson’s claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, as his
claims sought to undo the state court foreclosure judgment. 1 Jack-
son argues that his claims were separate from the state foreclosure
proceedings because, in the District Court, he alleged claims for
1The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives from Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co.,
263 U.S. 413,
44 S. Ct. 149 (1923), and D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462,
103 S. Ct.
1303 (1983).
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22-13783 Opinion of the Court 3
fraud. He also argues that the foreclosure proceeding was barred
by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Secu-
rity Act (“CARES Act”),
Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 12003(b)(2),
134
Stat. 281, 516 (2020). 2
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Hall v. U.S. Dep’t Vet-
erans’ Affairs,
85 F.3d 532, 533 (11th Cir. 1996). We review de novo
the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Lozman v. City of
Riviera Beach,
713 F.3d 1066, 1069 (11th Cir. 2013).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from
reviewing state-court decisions because lower federal courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction over final state-court judgments. Behr v.
Campbell,
8 F.4th 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2021). The Rooker-Feldman
doctrine applies to “cases brought by state-court losers complain-
ing of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the
district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.” Nicholson v. Shafe,
558
F.3d 1266, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). The
doctrine applies not only to federal claims raised in state court, but
also to those that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
judgment. Casale v. Tillman,
558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009).
2 We need not address this claim because Jackson raises it for the first time on
appeal. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
385 F.3d 1324, 1331–32 (11th
Cir. 2004); see also Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama,
633 F.3d 1330, 1352
(11th Cir. 2011) (refusing to address a theory of liability that was not presented
to the district court).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13783
A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state-court
claim when, in substance, it amounts to a direct appeal of the state-
court judgment, even if the appellant does not refer to the proceed-
ing as a direct appeal. Behr, 8 F.4th at 1211. A “claim that at its
heart challenges the state court decision itself—and not the statute
or law which under-lies that decision—falls within the doctrine.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). Courts must use a claim-by-claim
basis, deciding “whether resolution of each individual claim re-
quires review and rejection of a state court judgment.” Id. at 1213.
Claims that seek “relief from the judgment of the state court” ra-
ther than damages for constitutional violations are barred. Id. at
1214.
Here, the District Court did not err in finding that Jackson’s
claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. While he al-
leged fraud, his claims challenged the state court’s judgment that
authorized the foreclosure sale, as he challenged the validity of the
documents considered by the state court. As to his RESPA and
FDCPA claims, he explicitly noted that the state court rejected
those arguments. His
18 U.S.C. § 1011 claim is also barred because
its resolution would require review and rejection of the state
court’s decision that the documents were valid. Further, his only
requested relief was an injunction against the state court judgment
and notice of foreclosure sale, rather than damages for constitu-
tional violations.
AFFIRMED.
