Health Freedom Defense Fund v. President of the United States ( 2023 )

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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11287
____________________
HEALTH FREEDOM DEFENSE FUND,
a Wyoming Not-for-Profit Corporation,
ANA CAROLINA DAZA,
an individual,
SARAH POPE,
an individual,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL
AND PREVENTION, et al.,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11287
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-01693-KKM-AEP
____________________
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
In the winter of 2020, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services (HHS) determined that the threat posed by the novel
SARS-CoV-2 virus constituted a public health emergency. Determi-
nation of Public Health Emergency, 85 Fed. Reg. 7316-01 (Feb. 7, 2020).
Not long after, then-President Trump declared that the global out-
break constituted a national emergency. Declaring a National Emer-
gency Concerning the Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak,
85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 13, 2020). Over the course of the next
three years, spanning two presidential administrations, public serv-
ants scrambled to take actions they believed would combat the
spread of the disease and safeguard the well-being of Americans.
With mixed results, many of those actions were challenged in our
nation’s courts.
The particular action before us today is a mandate promul-
gated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
In January of 2021, President Biden issued Executive Order 13998,
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22-11287 Opinion of the Court 3
which directed the secretaries of multiple agencies to “immediately
take action, to the extent appropriate and consistent with applica-
ble law, to require masks to be worn in compliance with CDC
guidelines in or on” airports, commercial aircraft, trains, public
maritime vessels, intercity bus services, and other forms of public
transportation. Promoting COVID-19 Safety in Domestic and Interna-
tional Travel, 86 Fed. Reg. 7205, 7205 (Jan. 21, 2021). Pursuant to
that order, the CDC published the rule at issue—the Requirement
for Persons to Wear Masks While on Conveyances and at Transportation
Hubs, 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-01 (Feb. 3, 2021) (“Mandate”).
Among other things, the Mandate required individuals to
“wear a mask while boarding, disembarking, and traveling on any
conveyance into or within the United States” and while “at any
transportation hub that provides transportation within the United
States.” Id. at 8029. The Mandate’s duration was tied to that of the
COVID-19 pandemic, remaining “in effect unless modified or re-
scinded based on specific public health or other considerations, or
until the Secretary of Health and Human Services rescinds the de-
termination under section 319 of the Public Health Service Act (42
U.S.C. [§] 247d) that a public health emergency exists.” Id. at 8030.
A few months after the Mandate’s promulgation, Plaintiffs-
Appellees initiated this litigation, arguing that the Mandate was un-
lawful under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(APA), and unconstitutional under non-delegation and separation-
of-powers tenets. Not reaching the constitutional questions, the
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11287
district court agreed with Appellees’ APA arguments on a number
of grounds and vacated the Mandate nationwide.
This appeal followed. For its part, the government sought
to defend the legality of the Mandate and the sufficiency of the pro-
cedures by which it was promulgated. Appellees, on the other
hand, sought to defend the relief they had obtained from the dis-
trict court and ensure their lives were no longer impacted by the
Mandate.
A Mandate that, as we write, no longer exists. On April 10,
2023, President Biden signed a joint resolution of Congress that ter-
minated the national emergency. Act of Apr. 10, 2023, Pub. L. No.
118-3, 137 Stat. 6 (2023). More relevant to this case, on May 11,
2023, the HHS Secretary’s declaration of a public health emergency
expired. See End of the Federal COVID-19 Public Health Emergency
(PHE) Declaration, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(May 5, 2023), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/your-health/end-of-phe.html. Therefore, even had the dis-
trict court sided with the government, the Mandate would have
expired by its own terms on May 11, 2023. See 86 Fed. Reg. 8025-
01 at 8030 (“This Order will remain in effect . . . until the Secretary
of Health and Human Services rescinds the determination . . . that
a public health emergency exists.”).
This development raises the jurisdictional question of moot-
ness—that is, whether “the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or
the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Al-
ready, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quoting Murphy v.
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22-11287 Opinion of the Court 5
Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam)). In making this deter-
mination, “we look at the events at the present time, not at the
time the complaint was filed or when the federal order on review
was issued.” Djadju v. Vega, 32 F.4th 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 2022).
So, here, we “analyze this case as if [Appellees] had originally
sought to litigate the validity of a [regulation] which by its terms
had already expired.” See Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987).
Rarely will challenges to a law’s validity survive a mootness analy-
sis when that law is no longer effective. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 377 (2017) (mem.) (holding that an appeal no longer pre-
sented a “live case or controversy” because the provisions of the
challenged order “expired by [their] own terms”); see also Aaron Pri-
vate Clinic Mgmt. LLC v. Berry, 912 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 2019).
Probabilities aside, the basic question is whether events have oc-
curred that deprive this court of the ability to provide meaningful
relief. See Djadju, 32 F.4th at 1107; Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d
1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
The answer to that question is, quite clearly, yes. Appellees
initiated this litigation in order to have the Mandate 1) declared un-
lawful and 2) set aside. Regarding Appellees’ second objective,
coming on the heels of a joint resolution from Congress and fol-
lowing the HHS Secretary’s conclusion that the public health emer-
gency has ended, the Mandate has expired on its own terms. As a
consequence, there is no longer any Mandate for us to set aside or
uphold. Indeed, even if we were to decide against Appellees and
reverse the district court—as the government desires—there would
be no Mandate to reinstate. Regarding Appellees’ first objective,
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11287
we do not think asking for a declaratory judgment that the Man-
date is unlawful saves this case from mootness. If it did, our case
law would be turned on its head. That is, “[a]bsent exceptional cir-
cumstances, a challenge to the enforcement of a statute [would not
become] moot when that law is no longer effective.” Aaron Private
Clinic Mgmt., 912 F.3d at 1335.
Appellees thoughtfully argue that this case is preserved by
two notable exceptions to mootness: the doctrines of “voluntary
cessation” and “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” How-
ever, we disagree with the applicability of both.
Starting with the doctrine of “voluntary cessation,” courts
have long recognized that defendants cannot moot a case and avoid
litigation simply by ceasing its conduct once a complaint is filed.
Already, 568 U.S. at 91. “Otherwise, a defendant could engage in
unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared moot,
then pick up where he left off, repeating this cycle until he achieves
all his unlawful ends.” Id. Given this possibility, the party asserting
mootness carries the “heavy burden” of demonstrating to the court
“that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to
start up again.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting United States v. Concentrated
Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). When dealing
with government defendants, we have held that challenges to laws
that have been “unambiguously” terminated are moot unless there
is a “reasonable basis to believe that the policy will be reinstated if
the suit is terminated.” Keister v. Bell, 29 F.4th 1239, 1250 (11th Cir.
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22-11287 Opinion of the Court 7
2022) (quoting Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections in Palm Beach Cnty.,
382 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2004)); see also Atheists of Fla., Inc. v.
City of Lakeland, 713 F.3d 577, 594 (11th Cir. 2013). Absent any ev-
idence of reinstatement, “there is simply no point in allowing the
suit to continue and we lack [the] power to allow it to do so.”
Troiano, 383 F.3d at 1285.
Here, the government has carried its burden: there is no rea-
sonable basis to expect the Mandate will be reinstated if this case is
rendered moot. By its own terms, the Mandate expired after the
HHS Secretary declared that the public health emergency has
ended, and there is no hint that this decision was an effort to avoid
further litigation. Further, nothing in the text of the Mandate sug-
gests it can be revived after its expiration, and there is not a grain
of evidence that the CDC has any plans to promulgate an identical
mandate. And while we recognize that the government continues
to defend the legality of the Mandate, that fact “has little, if any-
thing to do . . . with the voluntary-cessation analysis.” Keohane v.
Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1269 (11th Cir. 2020). The
question is simply whether there is a reasonable basis to expect the
challenged conduct to “start up again” if this case is declared moot.
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189. We conclude there is not.
Turning to the doctrine of “capable of repetition, yet evad-
ing review,” this narrow exception applies only where “(1) the chal-
lenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior
to cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation
that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11287
again.” Arcia v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 772 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.
2014) (citing Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 735 (2008)); see also Al Najjar,
273 F.3d at 1336 (noting that the exception is “narrow” and only
applies in “exceptional situations”).
Appellees run into trouble with the second prong. While
the phrase “capable of repetition” is broad and suggests that Appel-
lees could hypothesize scenarios in which the government might
reengage in the challenged conduct, precedent reins in the phrase’s
meaning. To start, as noted above, we have held that there must
be some reasonable, non-speculative expectation that the allegedly
unlawful action will happen again. Arcia, 772 F.3d at 1343; see also
Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2004). Similarly,
the Supreme Court has clarified that this “exception requires a ‘rea-
sonable expectation’ or a ‘demonstrated probability’ that ‘the same
controversy will recur.’” Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisc. Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 463 (2007) (cleaned up) (quoting Murphy, 455 U.S.
at 482). In addition, for this doctrine to apply, “future recurrences
must involve substantially the same parties.” Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at
1309; Fed. Election Comm’n, 551 U.S. at 463.
We find Appellees’ contention that there is a reasonable ex-
pectation that the CDC will issue another nationwide mask man-
date for all conveyances and transportation hubs to be speculative
at best. Appellees point to the CDC’s broad interpretation of the
Public Health Services Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 703, § 361(a), as
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22-11287 Opinion of the Court 9
amended, 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) 1 and suggest that the CDC could use
this interpretation to promulgate a similar mask mandate to fight
against more ubiquitous diseases like the common cold and influ-
enza. 2 Yet, conjectures of future harms like these do not establish
a reasonable expectation that a mask mandate from the CDC will
reissue. Indeed, since the Public Health Services Act’s enactment
in 1944, no government authority has ever invoked the law to re-
quire masking for common respiratory diseases. We have no basis
to expect that 79-year trend to change. Moreover, while we think
a legal degree confers many advantages, we do not believe it equips
us to accurately predict if or when another global respiratory pan-
demic will infect our shared world.
And that brings us to this final point regarding this doctrine.
Recall that “[f]or this ‘reasonable expectation’ standard to be met,
future recurrences must involve substantially the same parties.”
1 The CDC claims that this statute provides it with the requisite authority to
pass the Mandate.
2 Appellees cite to a CDC webpage to make this point. See Travelers’ Health,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (last visited May 30, 2023),
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/page/masks. That webpage advises that
“Common respiratory infections include COVID-19, influenza, and the com-
mon cold. Masking is a critical public health tool for preventing the spread of
respiratory diseases. When people properly wear a high-quality mask or res-
pirator, they protect themselves and those around them, and help keep travel
safer for everyone.” We do not read this excerpt as an indication that the CDC
is likely to impose additional mask mandates, but rather as guidance on best
practices that individuals may utilize to prevent the spread of disease while
traveling.
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11287
Bourgeois, 387 F.3d at 1309. We note that the COVID-19 pandemic
of 2020 is often compared to the influenza pandemic of 1918.
Given the primary comparator occurred over a century earlier, we
simply have no reasonable basis to conclude the same parties will
be involved in a future controversy if a similar situation ever does
arise again. Indeed, putting aside the unanswerable question of
where Appellees might be in this hypothetical situation, there is no
guarantee that the president at that time would order agencies to
issue a similar mask mandate or that such a mandate would come
from the CDC as opposed to another agency. Even in this case,
President Biden’s executive order tasked numerous agencies in ad-
dition to the CDC to pass masking requirements. 86 Fed. Reg. at
7205. Point being, there is not a “reasonable expectation or a
demonstrated probability that the same controversy will recur in-
volving the same complaining party.” Fed. Election Comm’n, 551
U.S. at 463 (internal quotation marks omitted).
And lastly, as in all cases, we look to the Supreme Court for
guidance. Recently, the Court dismissed as moot a motion by a
collection of States to intervene in a case involving “Title 42 or-
ders”—emergency immigration decrees designed to prevent the
spread of COVID-19. Arizona v. Mayorkas, 143 S. Ct. 1312 (2023)(mem). While the Court’s brief Order was devoid of analysis, a
separate Statement from Justice Gorsuch revealed that the Court’s
decision was based on the end of the public health emergency un-
derlying the Title 42 orders. See id. at 1313–14 (Gorsuch, J., state-
ment). The same reasoning applies here.
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Having determined this case to be moot, we turn to the final
question of this saga: What next? The parties argue over this point,
but fortunately, our longstanding case law provides a clear answer.
“The ‘ordinary practice in disposing of a case that has become moot
on appeal is to vacate the judgment with directions to dismiss.’”
League of Women Voters of Fla. Inc. v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 66 F.4th 905,
949 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S.
472, 482 (1990)); see also United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S.
36, 39 (1950); Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood Cty., 299 U.S. 259, 267
(1936); Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d
1248, 1271 & n.24 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc); Al Najjar, 273 F.3d at
1340; In re Ghandtchi, 705 F.2d 1315, 1316 (11th Cir. 1983) (per cu-
riam). So, in a case born of extraordinary circumstances, we con-
clude with a familiar routine.
Accordingly, the order and judgment of the district court are
VACATED, and the district court is instructed to DISMISS the
case as MOOT.