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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13015
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
TYE HILMO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ERICA JACKSON,
COURTNEY VINSON,
in their individual capacities,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13015
D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-00292-RWS
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Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The terms of Tye Hilmo’s probation required him to
comply with the law. After he was caught driving under the
influence, his probation officer, Erica Jackson, obtained a warrant
for his arrest to revoke his probation. But Jackson missed one key
detail: Hilmo’s probation had already expired. Rather than
reviewing the underlying sentencing documents and confirming
that Hilmo was still on probation, she instead relied on a
(miscalculated) end date in the Department of Community
Supervision’s computer system. So Hilmo spent over a month in
jail for a probation violation even though he was no longer on
probation.
Hilmo now sues Jackson for violating
42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
depriving him of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
malicious prosecution. Jackson, in turn, asserts qualified
immunity. The district court granted summary judgment for
Jackson.
An officer violates the Fourth Amendment when she
intentionally or recklessly misrepresents a fact necessary to support
an arrest warrant. Negligent misrepresentation is not enough—
even if it leads to unlawful detention like it did here. Jackson’s
claim for qualified immunity turns on whether the line between
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22-13015 Opinion of the Court 3
recklessness and negligence is clearly established. We conclude
that it is not. All parties—and this Court—agree that Jackson
violated the Department’s policies and acted carelessly in obtaining
the warrant for Hilmo’s arrest. But despite this inexcusable
mistake, Jackson did not violate a clearly established constitutional
right, so we affirm the grant of summary judgment.
I.
In 2015, Hilmo pleaded guilty to several misdemeanors—
including driving under the influence—and received a sentence of
eight months of incarceration followed by about four years of
probation. With credit for time served between his arrest and
sentencing, his probation expired on December 20, 2018. Over six
months later, Hilmo was arrested again for driving under the
influence. He quickly posted a bond and was released.
The day after his second arrest, the Department of
Community Supervision—which managed Hilmo’s probation—
received the county jail logs reflecting that Hilmo was arrested.
Had Hilmo still been on probation, his second arrest would have
violated the condition that he comply with all criminal laws. The
community supervision officer assigned to his case was Erica
Jackson. She had only been assigned to Hilmo’s case for about a
week at that point and had never met or spoken with him. When
she saw that Hilmo had been arrested, she checked the
Department’s electronic “portal” listing each probationer’s
probation end date, which incorrectly reflected that Hilmo was still
on probation. So she prepared and signed a probation violation
arrest warrant application. The Department’s assistant chief
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13015
reviewed and approved the application—without independent
investigation—and a judge issued the warrant.
A week later, Hilmo was arrested on the warrant. He sat in
jail for over a month until his hearing. When his hearing finally
came, the Department realized its mistake and released Hilmo.
How did this happen? When Jackson prepared the warrant
application, she says she relied only on the probation expiration
date listed in the Department’s computer system. When Hilmo’s
probation began, an unknown officer incorrectly calculated his end
date by not including the required credit for time served. So when
Jackson attempted to verify that Hilmo was still on probation, she
saw that his probation expired in January 2020, which would have
meant that he was still subject to his probation conditions.
The Department’s policies mandated that Jackson verify
that the date was correct by reviewing the underlying sentencing
documents. Despite this, she says that no one informed her she
needed to independently verify the date. Jackson gives three
reasons for not checking the sentencing documents. First, she
believed that the dates were accurate because the state had just
completed a statewide verification process. Second, she trusted
that this specific date was accurate because she received the case
from an officer that had just been promoted. And third, the case
notes showed that Hilmo’s previous officer had been trying to
change his status to “unsupervised,” which she understood to
require a verification of his end date.
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22-13015 Opinion of the Court 5
The Department’s computer system prompted Jackson to
confirm that she had verified the computation before she sought
the warrant. And after submitting the application she wrote in the
case notes: “Warrant submitted for approval. End date verified.
Defendant had no credit for time to be put in.” Jackson testified
that in that statement she was referring to her review of the
“portal” and prior case notes, not communicating that she
reviewed the underlying sentencing documents.
Hilmo sued Jackson for violating
42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
depriving him of his Fourth Amendment rights. 1 At the close of
discovery, the district court granted Jackson’s motion for summary
judgment. Hilmo now appeals, and we affirm.
II.
We review the district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. Hardigree v. Lofton,
992 F.3d 1216, 1223 (11th
Cir. 2021). “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Hilmo, the
nonmoving party.
Id.
1 Hilmo also brought an illegal seizure claim against Community Supervision
Officer Courtney Vinson and claims for unlawful extension of probation
against Jackson and Vinson. Hilmo’s appeal is limited to the district court’s
order granting summary judgment for Jackson on the illegal seizure claim.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13015
III.
Qualified immunity “protects government officials who are
sued under § 1983 for money damages in their individual
capacities.” Id. Jackson is entitled to qualified immunity in the
exercise of her discretionary authority “unless (1) she violated one
or more constitutional rights and (2) it was clearly established at
the time that her specific actions did so.” Harris-Billups ex rel. Harris
v. Anderson,
61 F.4th 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2023) (quotations
omitted and alteration adopted). Hilmo does not dispute that
Jackson acted within her discretionary authority, so the burden
shifts to Hilmo to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate.
Powell v. Snook,
25 F.4th 912, 920 (11th Cir. 2022).
Jackson can show that a constitutional right was clearly
established by showing that it is “sufficiently clear that a reasonable
official would understand that what [she] is doing violates that
right.” Washington v. Rivera,
939 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2019)
(quotation omitted). It is not enough to show that an abstract right
is clearly established—the inquiry focuses on whether the
defendant’s particular conduct infringes that right.
Id. “If case law,
in factual terms, has not staked out a bright line, qualified
immunity almost always protects the defendant.” Powell, 25 F.4th
at 921. (quotation omitted). The “salient question is whether the
state of the law at the time of the incident gave the officer fair
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warning that [her] conduct was unlawful.” Id. (quotations omitted
and alteration adopted). 2
Hilmo’s § 1983 claim is based on malicious prosecution,
which is “shorthand for a claim of deprivation of liberty pursuant
to legal process.” Luke v. Gulley,
975 F.3d 1140, 1143 (11th Cir. 2020)
(quotation omitted). Under this Circuit’s simplified malicious
prosecution standard, Hilmo “must prove (1) that the defendant
violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from seizures
pursuant to legal process and (2) that the criminal proceedings
against him terminated in his favor.”
Id. at 1144. The first element
requires Hilmo to establish “that the legal process justifying his
seizure was constitutionally infirm and that his seizure would not
otherwise be justified without legal process.”
Id. (quotations
omitted).
Hilmo can prove that the arrest warrant was constitutionally
infirm if he establishes either that Jackson “should have known that
[the] application failed to establish probable cause” or that she
“intentionally or recklessly made misstatements or omissions
2 Generally, there are three methods to establish that the law was clearly
established: “(1) by pointing to a materially similar decision of the Supreme
Court, of this Court, or of the supreme court of the state in which the case
arose; (2) by establishing that a broader, clearly established principle should
control the novel facts of the case; or (3) by convincing us that the case is one
of those rare ones that fits within the exception of conduct which so obviously
violates the constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Powell, 25 F.4th
at 920 (quotations omitted and alteration adopted). Hilmo’s brief does not
explain under which method the law is clearly established.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13015
necessary to support the warrant.” Williams v. Aguirre,
965 F.3d
1147, 1165 (11th Cir. 2020). Because the warrant application on its
face establishes probable cause—even if falsely—Hilmo’s claim
falls into the latter category, which are known as Franks violations.
See Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 171 (1978). Franks violations
are “explicitly limited” to “cases of perjurious or recklessly false
statements” and “does not apply to negligent misrepresentations.”
Kelly v. Curtis,
21 F.3d 1544, 1554 (11th Cir. 1994).
Hilmo has not presented evidence that Jackson intentionally
misrepresented his probation status. Jackson had only been
assigned to Hilmo’s case for a week and had never met or spoken
with him. She has consistently testified that she did not review the
underlying sentencing documents and opted instead to rely only
on the date listed in the Department’s computer system, which she
claims she had reason to trust. To the extent that she
contemporaneously implied that she did verify the probation end
date, she has testified that she was referring to her review of the
date listed in the computer system and the case notes, not the
underlying sentencing documents. Hilmo has not presented
evidence contradicting this testimony sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact. Moreover, Jackson testified that this was her
consistent practice.
With no intentional misrepresentation, Hilmo needs to
show that Jackson acted recklessly rather than negligently to
succeed. But on that front, Jackson is entitled to qualified
immunity. Almost three decades ago, we noted that “the
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difference between ‘reckless’ and merely ‘negligent’ disregard for
the truth is not crystal clear” because “we have not staked out a
bright line” rule.
Id. That remains true today. Hilmo does not
point to a subsequent decision of this Court or the Supreme Court
that clearly establishes that the sort of conduct involved here is
recklessness rather than negligence. Nor is this a case of obvious
clarity. If anything, our subsequent case law cuts against a finding
of recklessness here. See Washington, 939 F.3d at 1246–1249.
Therefore, a reasonable probation officer might not have known
that she was acting recklessly, rather than negligently, by not
verifying Hilmo’s probation end date under these circumstances.
See Kelly,
21 F.3d at 1554. Jackson is thus entitled to qualified
immunity. 3
* * *
The district court’s order granting summary judgment for
Jackson is AFFIRMED.
3 We do not address the district court’s alternative holding that a probation
revocation proceeding is not a criminal proceeding for the purposes of a
malicious prosecution claim.
