Ricky Giddens v. Thomas Frye ( 2023 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 22-12959   Document: 7-1     Date Filed: 06/23/2023   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 22-12959
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    RICKY GIDDENS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    BROOKS COUNTY GEORGIA, et al.,
    Defendants,
    THOMAS FRYE,
    in his offical capacity as Deputy
    at the Brooks County Sheriff's Office,
    USCA11 Case: 22-12959        Document: 7-1        Date Filed: 06/23/2023         Page: 2 of 7
    2                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12959
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    D.C. Docket No. 7:19-cv-00140-LAG
    ____________________
    Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Ricky Giddens, proceeding pro se,1 appeals the district
    court’s 4 August 2022 order dismissing Giddens’s pro se civil action
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . In that order, the district court determined
    that no permissive extension was warranted to allow Giddens ad-
    ditional time to complete service of process. No reversible error
    has been shown; we affirm.
    1 We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 
    518 F.3d 870
    , 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
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    22-12959                  Opinion of the Court                               3
    This appeal is the second time this case has come before us;
    we summarize only those facts pertinent to this appeal.2 Briefly
    stated, Giddens filed this civil action asserting claims for violations
    of the Fourth Amendment and Georgia law arising from an 18
    March 2019 traffic stop. On 20 April 2021, the district court dis-
    missed without prejudice -- for failure to effect timely service of
    process -- Giddens’s claims against Officer Frye.
    Giddens appealed that decision. In that earlier appeal, we
    determined that the district court acted within its discretion in find-
    ing that Giddens had demonstrated no “good cause” under Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 4(m) for failing to serve Officer Frye. See Giddens v. Brooks
    Cty., No. 21-11755, 
    2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 7299
    , at *16-17 (11th Cir.
    March 21, 2022) (unpublished). We concluded, however, that the
    district court erred in failing to show that it considered whether
    other circumstances existed -- including the running of the applica-
    ble statutes of limitation -- that might warrant a permissive exten-
    sion of time to complete service of process. Accordingly, we
    2 The underlying facts are set out more fully in our earlier opinion in Giddens
    v. Brooks Cty., No. 21-11755, 
    2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 7299
     (11th Cir. March 21,
    2022) (unpublished).
    USCA11 Case: 22-12959      Document: 7-1        Date Filed: 06/23/2023   Page: 4 of 7
    4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-12959
    vacated the district court’s 20 April 2021 order of dismissal and re-
    manded to the district court to consider expressly whether a per-
    missive extension would be warranted under the circumstances in-
    volved in this case. See 
    id. at *17-18
    .
    On remand, the district court issued the 4 August 2022 order
    of dismissal that is now before us in this appeal. In the 4 August
    order, the district court acknowledged that the applicable statute of
    limitations expired in March 2021 and that -- absent a permissive
    extension -- Giddens would be barred from refiling his claims. The
    district court concluded, however, that no permissive extension
    was warranted under the circumstances.
    The district court explained that its 29 October 2020 order
    (issued five months before the statute of limitations expired) ad-
    vised Giddens that the United States Marshals Service was unable
    to serve Officer Frye at the address provided by Giddens. The dis-
    trict court gave Giddens a 45-day extension of time to provide a
    valid address where Officer Frye could be served and warned ex-
    pressly that failure to provide a valid address could result in dismis-
    sal of the case. Nineteen days later, Giddens returned the USM 285
    form listing the same address for Officer Frye that Giddens had
    USCA11 Case: 22-12959         Document: 7-1          Date Filed: 06/23/2023          Page: 5 of 7
    22-12959                    Opinion of the Court                                  5
    been told was no longer current. The district court observed that
    Giddens’s response indicated that he had made no “discernable ef-
    fort to discover a proper address.” Because Gidden had failed to
    provide a valid address for Officer Frye despite the district court’s
    clear instructions and extension of time to do so, the district court
    determined that no permissive extension was warranted.
    We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s sua sponte
    dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) for failure to effect service. See
    Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll Cty. Comm’rs, 
    476 F.3d 1277
    , 1280 (11th Cir.
    2007). We also review under an abuse-of-discretion standard the
    district court’s decision about whether to grant an extension of
    time under Rule 4(m). See 
    id.
     Although we construe liberally pro
    se pleadings, pro se litigants must still conform to procedural rules.
    See Albra v. Advan, Inc., 
    490 F.3d 826
    , 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
    When -- as in this case 3 -- “a plaintiff fails to show good cause
    for failing to effect timely service pursuant to Rule 4(m), the district
    3 In an earlier appeal, we affirmed the district court’s determination that no
    good cause existed under Rule 4(m) to excuse Giddens’s failure to effect ser-
    vice of process. We are bound by our earlier ruling on that issue; we will not
    consider the arguments Giddens now seeks to raise about good cause. See
    Lebron v. Sec’y of Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 
    772 F.3d 1352
    , 1360 (11th Cir.
    2014) (“Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine, the ‘findings of fact and
    USCA11 Case: 22-12959        Document: 7-1        Date Filed: 06/23/2023         Page: 6 of 7
    6                         Opinion of the Court                       22-12959
    court must still consider whether any other circumstances warrant
    an extension of time based on the facts of the case.” See Lepone-
    Dempsey, 
    476 F.3d at 1282
    . A district court must consider, for exam-
    ple, whether the running of the statute of limitations would bar
    the plaintiff from refiling his claims. See 
    id.
     As long as the district
    court takes into consideration the applicable statute of limitations,
    that the statute of limitations has expired “does not require that the
    district court extend time for service of process under Rule 4(m).”
    
    Id.
    Given the circumstances in this case, the district court acted
    within its discretion in finding that a permissive extension of time
    was not warranted. The district court considered the pertinent fac-
    tors -- including that the statute of limitations would now bar Gid-
    dens from refiling his claims -- in deciding whether a permissive
    extension of time was warranted. The record shows that Giddens
    failed to comply with the district court’s clear instructions that, to
    avoid dismissal, Giddens needed to supply a valid address for Of-
    ficer Frye. Instead, Giddens completed a second USM 285 form
    conclusions of law by an appellate court are generally binding in all subsequent
    proceedings in the same case in the trial court or on a later appeal.’”).
    USCA11 Case: 22-12959     Document: 7-1     Date Filed: 06/23/2023    Page: 7 of 7
    22-12959              Opinion of the Court                        7
    using an address he knew was invalid. Nor did Giddens demon-
    strate that he exercised diligence in searching for a valid address.
    Giddens did not make use of the full 45-day extension of time
    granted by the district court or otherwise explain the steps he took
    to locate a proper address. On this record, we see no abuse of dis-
    cretion.
    AFFIRMED.