Pleadro J. Scott v. Miami Dade County ( 2023 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-13869
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
PLEADRO J. SCOTT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MIAMI DADE COUNTY,
R. GOMEZ, et al,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-23013-DPG
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-13869
Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Pleadro Scott, proceeding pro se on appeal, appeals a jury
verdict in favor of the appellees in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
action. On appeal, Scott argues that: (1) the district court abused
its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial because the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict; (2) defense
counsel made improper comments during voir dire; (3) the district
court abused its discretion on certain evidentiary rulings; (4) the
jury instructions failed to adequately and fairly present the legal is-
sues to the jury; (5) the district court erred in dismissing Sergeant
Harold Jefferson as a defendant; (6) the district court erred in dis-
missing Officer Jane Doe as a defendant; (7) the district court erred
in dismissing Miami-Dade County as a defendant; and (8) the dis-
trict court erred in granting Lieutenant Constantina Weston’s and
1
Corporal Rolando Gomez’s motion for costs.
We will address each point in turn. We write only for the
parties, so we assume their familiarity with the relevant facts.
I.
1 Scott’s motion to compel the creation of the record on appeal is
DENIED AS MOOT.
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21-13869 Opinion of the Court 3
“We review a ruling on a motion for a new trial for abuse of
discretion.” McGinnis v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc.,
817 F.3d 1241, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). “Deference
to the district court is particularly appropriate where a new trial is
denied and the jury’s verdict is left undisturbed.” Id. (citation and
internal quotations omitted).
A party may move for a new trial under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 59 on the grounds that the verdict was against
the weight of the evidence, the damages were excessive, or the trial
was otherwise unfair. Id. at 1254. The court is then free to weigh
the evidence and may, in its discretion, grant a new trial if it be-
lieves that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence.
Id. However, “[b]ecause it is critical that a judge does not merely
substitute his judgment for that of the jury, new trials should not
be granted on evidentiary grounds unless, at a minimum, the ver-
dict is against the great—not merely the greater—weight of the ev-
idence.” Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc.,
267 F.3d 1183, 1186 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quota-
tions omitted).
Notably, it is the jury’s role to weigh conflicting evidence
and determine the credibility of witnesses. McGinnis, 817 F.3d
at 1254. As such, we afford substantial deference to the fact finder’s
explicit and implicit credibility determinations. See CBS Broad., Inc.
v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 450 F.3d 505, 517 n.23 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“Appellate courts reviewing a cold record give particular defer-
ence to credibility determinations of a fact-finder who had the
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-13869
opportunity to see live testimony.” (citation and alteration omit-
ted)); see also United States v. Lewis, 674 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th Cir.
2012) (“[W]e afford substantial deference to the factfinder’s credi-
bility determinations, both explicit and implicit.” (emphasis
added)).
A plaintiff is entitled to redress under § 1983 if a person act-
ing under color of state law deprived the plaintiff of any right, priv-
ilege, or immunity that the Constitution or laws of the United
States protects. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The Eighth Amendment pro-
hibits the federal government, and state governments through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, from inflicting
cruel and unusual punishments.” Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357
(11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1178 (2022) (citation and in-
ternal quotations omitted). “The prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments requires prison officials to take reasonable measures
to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Id. (citation and internal
quotations omitted). “When a plaintiff invokes this principle in a
lawsuit against prison officials, we often refer to the plaintiff’s
claims as ‘failure-to-protect’ claims.” Id.To succeed on a failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must sat-
isfy the following three elements: (1) he “was incarcerated under
conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm”; (2) “the prison
official had a sufficiently culpable state of mind, amounting to de-
liberate indifference”; and (3) the constitutional violation caused
his injuries. Id. at 1357-58 (brackets and internal quotations omit-
ted). We use an objective standard to examine the first element—
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21-13869 Opinion of the Court 5
a substantial risk of harm—and the plaintiff must “show conditions
that were extreme and posed an unreasonable risk of serious injury
to his future health or safety.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227,
1233 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotations omitted). “The second
element—whether the defendant was deliberately indifferent to
that risk—has both a subjective and an objective component.” Id.Subjectively, the official must both be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm exists, and also draw the
inference. Objectively, the official must have re-
sponded to the known risk in an unreasonable man-
ner, in that he or she knew of ways to reduce the
harm but knowingly or recklessly declined to act.
Id. (internal quotations and ellipsis omitted). “Finally, the plaintiff
must show a ‘necessary causal link’ between the officer’s failure to
act reasonably and the plaintiff’s injury.” Id.We have recognized that an excessive risk of inmate-on-in-
mate violence can constitute a substantial risk of serious harm, but
a plaintiff must show more than an occasional or isolated attack.
Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cty., Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1320
(11th Cir. 2005); accord Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega,
748 F.3d 1090, 1101 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We stress that [a] plain-
tiff . . . must show more than ‘a generalized awareness of risk’”). In
fact, “the plaintiff must show that serious inmate-on-inmate vio-
lence was the norm or something close to it.” Marbury, 936 F.3d
at 1234 (internal quotations omitted). Sworn allegations of a
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-13869
generalized risk, by themselves, do “not support the conclusion
that serious inmate-on-inmate violence was so pervasive that it
constitutes a substantial risk of serious harm to which defendants
were deliberately indifferent.” Id.
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that shields
government officials from civil liability in their individual capacities
when the government official acted within the scope of his discre-
tionary authority and the official’s conduct did not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights. Kesinger v. Herrington,
381 F.3d 1243, 1247-48 (11th. Cir. 2004). Once the government of-
ficial shows that he acted within the scope of his discretionary au-
thority, the plaintiff must attempt to overcome the qualified im-
munity defense by showing that: (1) the defendant violated a con-
stitutional right, and (2) the violation of the right was clearly estab-
lished. Id. at 1248.
Here, the jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of
the evidence. The jury could have credited the Defendants’ testi-
mony that Scott did not communicate a threat that would have put
them on notice of more than a generalized risk of harm, which was
a determination well within the jury’s purview. Even assuming,
arguendo, that the jury believed that Scott had communicated that
he was receiving threats from gangs, the jury could have concluded
that Scott did not communicate more than a generalized risk,
which, contrary to Scott’s argument, is insufficient to show a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm to which the Defendants were
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21-13869 Opinion of the Court 7
deliberately indifferent. Therefore, the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying Scott’s motion for a new trial.
II.
In the criminal context, we review decisions regarding voir
dire for an abuse of discretion and will “reverse only if the question-
ing as a whole did not comply with the essential demands of fair-
ness and did not give reasonable assurance to parties that any prej-
udice of potential jurors would be discovered.” United States v. Dan-
iels, 986 F.2d 451, 454 (11th Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quota-
tions omitted). “When no objections are raised to the allegedly
improper comments, however, we review for plain error, but a
finding of plain error is seldom justified in reviewing argument of
counsel in a civil case.” Ruiz v. Wing, 991 F.3d 1130, 1141 (11th Cir.
2021) (citations and internal quotations omitted). “[P]lain error re-
quires a showing that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain;
(3) it affected substantial rights; and (4) not correcting the error
would seriously affect the fairness of the judicial proceeding.” Id.(internal quotations omitted).
“The purpose of a voir dire is to ascertain whether a poten-
tial juror can render a verdict solely on the basis of the evidence
presented and the charge of the trial court.” Wilcox v. Ford,
813 F.2d 1140, 1150 (11th Cir. 1987). Notably, “a trial judge is ac-
corded wide discretion in ascertaining what questions can and can-
not be asked on voir dire.” Id.USCA11 Case: 21-13869 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 8 of 22
8 Opinion of the Court 21-13869
Here, defense counsel’s comments during voir dire were not
improper because they were to ascertain whether the potential ju-
rors could render a verdict on Scott’s failure-to-protect claim. To
succeed on his failure to protect claim, Scott was required show
that each individual defendant had a sufficiently culpable state of
mind. See Cox, 15 F.4th at 1358. Thus, defense counsel’s question-
ing was to determine whether the potential jurors could render a
verdict on Scott’s failure to protect claim by ensuring that they
would not erroneously find the Defendants liable for another indi-
vidual’s conduct, and the district court had wide discretion to allow
it. See Wilcox, 813 F.2d at 1150. Further, this Court has indicated,
in the habeas context, that eliciting a promise from potential jurors
is not improper. See Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1465 66 (11th
Cir. 1991) (“To the extent that [t]he [petitioner] is alleging that the
jury gave the victim’s occupation undue weight, this problem was
mitigated by an extensive voir dire in which [he] elicited a promise
from each juror not to consider the victim’s occupation and by [his]
closing argument in which he reminded the jurors of their prom-
ises.”). Consequently, the district court was not required to give a
curative instruction.
III.
We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse
of discretion. Proctor v. Fluor Enters., Inc., 494 F.3d 1337, 1349 n.7
(11th Cir. 2007). “To gain a reversal based on a district court’s evi-
dentiary ruling, a party must establish that (1) its claim was ade-
quately preserved; (2) the district court abused its discretion in in-
terpreting or applying an evidentiary rule; and (3) this error
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affected ‘a substantial right.’” Id. at 1349 (internal quotations omit-
ted). “In applying this standard, we will affirm a district court’s ev-
identiary ruling unless the district court has made a clear error of
judgment or has applied an incorrect legal standard” Conroy v.
Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotations omitted).
“A party introducing evidence generally cannot complain on
appeal that the evidence was erroneously admitted.” Ruiz,
991 F.3d at 1140 (citation and internal quotations omitted) (con-
cluding that the plaintiff “waived his objection to the admissibility
of [a] . . . [v]ideo by preemptively agreeing to play the video at the
outset of the trial as a joint exhibit and referring to the video
throughout trial”). Additionally, arguments raised for the first time
on appeal that were not presented in the district court are deemed
waived. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324,
1330-31 (11th Cir. 2004). Similarly, “an appellant[] simply stating
that an issue exists, without further argument or discussion, consti-
tutes abandonment of that issue and precludes our considering the
issue on appeal.” Singh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th
Cir. 2009).
To properly authenticate a piece of evidence, “the propo-
nent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). For
example, testimony from a witness with knowledge that an item is
what it is claimed to be satisfies this requirement.
Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). Further, evidence may be authenticated by
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10 Opinion of the Court 21-13869
its “appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other dis-
tinctive characteristics . . . taken together with all the circum-
stances.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(4).
Under Fed. R. Evid. 1002, “[a]n original writing, recording,
or photograph is required in order to prove its content unless the[]
[Federal] [R]ules [of Evidence] or a federal statute provides other-
wise.” Fed. R. Evid. 1002. We have noted that Rule 1002 essen-
tially restates “the so-called ‘best evidence’ rule.” Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Swann, 27 F.3d 1539, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994). Notably, “Rule 1002
requires production of an original document only when the propo-
nent of the evidence seeks to prove the content of the writing.” Id.“It does not, however, require production of a document simply
because the document contains facts that are also testified to by a
witness.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered into evidence
“to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.”
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Generally, hearsay is not admissible.
Fed. R. Evid. 802. However, the Federal Rules of Evidence also
contain several exceptions to the hearsay rule. See
Fed. R. Evid. 803-804.
As relevant here, public records are not subject to the rule
against hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(8). A document falls under the
“public records” exception to the rule against hearsay if it is “[a]
record or statement of a public office,” which includes records that
set out “the office’s activities” or “a matter observed while under a
legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal case, a matter
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observed by law-enforcement personnel.”
Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(A)(i)-(ii). However, “[h]earsay within hearsay
subject to an exception is not admissible.” United Techs. Corp. v.
Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Thus, “[i]t is well established that entries in a police report which
result from the officer’s own observations and knowledge may be
admitted but that statements made by third persons under no busi-
ness duty to report may not.” Id. (citation omitted). “In other
words, placing otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements by
third-parties into a government report does not make the state-
ments admissible.” Id. (brackets and internal quotations omitted).
Rather, for hearsay within hearsay to be admissible, “each part of
the combined statements [must] conform[] with an exception to
the [hearsay] rule.” Fed. R. Evid. 805.
Additionally, if the declarant is unavailable, the rule against
hearsay does not exclude a statement against interest, which is a
statement, in relevant part, that:
a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would
have made only if the person believed it to be true
because, when made, it was so contrary to the declar-
ant’s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had so great
a tendency to invalidate the declarant’s claim against
someone else or to expose the declarant to civil or
criminal liability[.]
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). Notably, “the statements at issue
must . . . be against the interest of the declarant . . . in order to fall
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12 Opinion of the Court 21-13869
within the exception’s terms.” Goodman v. Kimbrough,
718 F.3d 1325, 1333 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its evi-
dentiary rulings. First, Scott waived his challenges to the admissi-
bility of the safety cell profile sheet by preemptively agreeing to
present it at trial as a joint exhibit. Similarly, he did not raise his
Rule 1002 argument before the district court and, as such, he has
waived that argument. See Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1330 31. Second,
the district court properly excluded Scott’s May 20, 2013, grievance
because it contained double hearsay: Sergeant Johnson’s statement
regarding Scott’s keep separate status, which Lieutenant Gayle in-
cluded in the grievance. Thus, even if the grievance were generally
admissible as a public record, Sergeant Johnson’s statement was in-
admissible unless it also fell under an exception to the hearsay rule.
See United Techs. Corp., 556 F.3d at 1278; Fed. R. Evid. 803(8), 805.
Although Scott argues that the entire grievance was admissible as
a public record, placing Sergeant Johnson’s inadmissible hearsay
statement into the report does not make the statement admissible,
and Scott does not explain how Sergeant Johnson’s statements
were excluded from the rule against hearsay. Id. Third, Scott does
not discuss or identify any of the discovery responses that were al-
legedly erroneously excluded, and, therefore, he has abandoned
the issue. Fourth, the district court properly excluded Officer Jane
Doe’s statements because they were hearsay. Although Scott ar-
gues that Officer Jane Doe’s statements fell under the hearsay ex-
ception for statements against interest, her statements would not
expose her to civil, much less criminal, liability. See Fed. R. Evid.
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804(b)(3). Rather, Officer Jane Doe’s alleged statement—that the
jail card did not contain a keep separate notation—was, at most,
against the Defendants’ interests, not her own. See Goodman, 718
F.3d at 1333 n.2. Specifically, Officer Jane Doe’s statements could
have exposed the Defendants to civil liability by showing that they
failed to act in response to Scott’s fears of being attacked, and,
therefore, they were deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm to
Scott. See Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233. But the statement was not a
statement against interest of Jane Doe, and thus the district court
did not abuse its discretion.
IV.
Generally, we apply “a deferential standard of review to a
trial court’s jury instructions.” Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1356
(11th Cir. 2003). A party may assign as error a failure to give an
instruction if that party properly requested it and also properly ob-
jected. Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(1)(B). However, we “may consider a
plain error in the instructions that has not been preserved . . . if the
error affects substantial rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(d)(2).
We examine “claims pertaining to jury instructions to deter-
mine whether the jury charges, considered as a whole, sufficiently
instructed the jury so that the jurors understood the issues and
were not misled.” Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc.,
437 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted).
Thus, “[t]he district court should not give an instruction which
deals with an issue that is not properly before the jury.” Oxford
Furniture Cos. v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., 984 F.2d 1118, 1127
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14 Opinion of the Court 21-13869
(11th Cir. 1993). “If jury instructions accurately reflect the law, the
trial judge is given wide discretion as to the style and wording em-
ployed in the instruction.” Johnson, 437 F.3d at 1115. We will re-
verse an erroneous instruction only if we are “left with a substantial
and ineradicable doubt as to whether the jury was properly guided
in its deliberations.” Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted).
“It is well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials
are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their sub-
ordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omit-
ted). “Instead, supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs either
when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged uncon-
stitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between
the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional
deprivation.” Id. “The necessary causal connection can be estab-
lished when a history of widespread abuse puts the responsible su-
pervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation,
and he fails to do so.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Alterna-
tively, the causal connection may be established when a supervi-
sor’s custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate indifference to con-
stitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the super-
visor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the
subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from
doing so.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “The standard by
which a supervisor is held liable in his individual capacity for the
actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.” Id. (brackets and
citation omitted).
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Here, the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in
failing to instruct the jury on supervisory liability under § 1983.
Scott did not request a jury instruction on supervisory liability.
Nor did he raise an objection to the instructions below which suf-
ficiently covered Scott’s theory of the case—his failure-to-protect
claim. Moreover, neither Defendant Weston nor Defendant
Gomez supervised Jane Doe, the officer who permitted Scott to be
placed in the holding cell with Dean at the courthouse. Jane Doe
was employed by Court Services Bureau, a completely separate
unit from the detention center that employed Defendants. Addi-
tionally, Scott never raised a separate due process claim regarding
the denial of outdoor recreation, and, therefore, the district court
did not err by not giving the jury an instruction on such denial.
V.
“We review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) for failure
to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true
and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). Further, “[i]n the
case of a pro se action, . . . [we] should construe the complaint more
liberally than it would formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Powell
v. Lennon, 914 F.2d 1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint
must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its
face, which occurs “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
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16 Opinion of the Court 21-13869
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels
and conclusions, and formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007). In other words, a plaintiff must allege facts that sufficiently
connect the defendant with the alleged constitutional violation. See
Douglas v. Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
that dismissal of claims was appropriate where the plaintiff failed
to allege facts associating certain defendants with a particular con-
stitutional violation).
Here, Scott did not allege facts that would connect Sergeant
Jefferson with the alleged constitutional violation or allow the dis-
trict court to draw the inference that he was liable for the alleged
misconduct. Contrary to Scott’s argument—that advanced notice
of the substantial risk of harm was not required—the subjective
component of the deliberate indifference element required that
Sergeant Jefferson “be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists.” See
Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1233. Further, although Scott argues that he
alleged that Sergeant Jefferson failed to take any action in response
to his safety concerns, he specifically alleged that Sergeant Jefferson
told him that he would not encounter other inmates, and, as the
district court noted, he did not make any other factual allegations
that Jefferson knew that Scott was still being placed with other in-
mates and failed to respond. Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing Sergeant Jefferson as a defendant.
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VI.
We review a district court’s dismissal under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) for an abuse of discretion. Rance v. Rocksolid
Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009). Rule 4(m)
provides that, “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the
complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice
to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against
that defendant or order that service be made within a specified
time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). However, “if the plaintiff shows good
cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for
an appropriate period.” Id. “Good cause exists when some outside
factor, such as reliance on faulty advice, rather than inadvertence
or negligence, prevented service.” Rance, 583 F.3d at 1286 (internal
quotations omitted).
Generally, “fictitious-party pleading is not permitted in fed-
eral court.” Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 738 (11th Cir.
2010). However, a distinction exists between claims against ficti-
tious defendants and claims against real defendants sued under fic-
titious names because, “for one reason or another, the plaintiff is
unwilling or unable to use a party’s real name.” Dean v. Barber,
951 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 & n.6 (11th Cir. 1992). We also have sug-
gested that, in the context of prisoner lawsuits, where plaintiffs en-
counter difficulties in identifying the precise defendants, an appro-
priate alternative to dismissal may be for the district court to order
disclosure of the defendants’ identities or to “permit the plaintiff to
obtain their identity through discovery.” See Brown v. Sikes,
212 F.3d 1205, 1209 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
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Accordingly, we have stated that a claim may be maintained
against an unnamed defendant if the defendant is sufficiently iden-
tified, such that the name would “be, at the very worst, surplus-
age.” Dean, 951 F.2d at 1215 n.6. The identification must be more
specific than a person’s title. Richardson, 598 F.3d at 738. The pro-
posed defendant must actually exist, and the complaint must de-
scribe “the person to be sued so that the person could be identified
for service.” Dean, 951 F.2d at 1215 n.6. For example, naming a
defendant with a unique title, such as “Chief Deputy of the Jeffer-
son County Jail John Doe” and “Governor of Alabama,” has been
treated as sufficient. Id. at 1215-16 & n.6. In sum, “as long as the
court-appointed agent can locate the prison-guard defendant with
reasonable effort, prisoner-litigants who provide enough infor-
mation to identify the prison-guard defendant have established
good cause for Rule 4(m) purposes.” Richardson, 598 F.3d at 740.
Here, Scott did not show good cause for his failure to iden-
tify and serve Officer Jane Doe. As an initial matter, Scott only
identified Officer Jane Doe by her title, which was an insufficient
description to allow him to maintain a claim against an unnamed
defendant. See Dean, 951 F.2d at 1215 n.6; Richardson, 598 F.3d at
738. Additionally, before dismissing Officer Jane Doe, the district
court gave Scott multiple opportunities to identify her, and it does
not appear to have abused its discretion in the methods that it took
to assist him. Brown, 212 F.3d at 1209 n.4. Specifically, although
Scott requested to see photographs of every African American fe-
male working in the bridge holding cell on May 15, he provided
specific details describing Officer Jane Doe, including her height
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21-13869 Opinion of the Court 19
and weight, which allowed Commander Prats, Lieutenant Gayle,
and Miami Dade County to narrow it down to two officers that
generally fit Scott’s description. Consequently, showing Scott pho-
tographs of the 54 officers that did not fit the general description
would have been superfluous and, therefore, unnecessary. Thus,
the district court’s three photo arrays, which contained photo-
graphs of the two officers fitting Scott’s description, appear to be
adequate to assist him in identifying Officer Jane Doe, even though
he was ultimately unable to do so. Accordingly, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing her as a defendant.
VII.
Municipalities and other local government entities are “per-
sons” within the scope of § 1983. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, “a municipality cannot be held
liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor . . . or, in other words,
a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory.” Id. at 691. Rather, “to impose § 1983 liability on
a municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional
rights were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or pol-
icy that constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional
right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.”
McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Conse-
quently, “only municipal officers or groups who have final policy-
making authority may subject the municipality to § 1983 liability.”
Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1312 (11th Cir. 2006).
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20 Opinion of the Court 21-13869
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dis-
missing Miami-Dade County as a defendant. In his complaint,
Scott acknowledged that Miami Dade County had protocols in
place to ensure the safety of prisoners, which he alleged that the
Defendants failed to follow, and, therefore, he did not show that
Miami Dade County “had a custom or policy that constituted de-
liberate indifference to” his constitutional rights. Additionally, he
did not allege sufficient facts to show that the Defendants, who
were employed by the MDDOC, had any “final policymaking au-
thority” with respect to Miami Dade County. See Campbell, 434
F.3d at 1312.
VIII.
“[W]e review a district court’s decision about whether to
award costs to the prevailing party for abuse of discretion.”
Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007). “An abuse
of discretion occurs if the trial judge bases an award or denial upon
findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Id.Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) provides that,
“[u]nless a federal statute, the[] [Federal] [R]ules [of Civil Proce-
dure], or a court order provides otherwise, costs—other than attor-
ney’s fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party,” and “[t]he
clerk may tax costs on 14 days’ notice.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1).
Rule 54(d)(1) “establishes a presumption that costs are to be
awarded to a prevailing party, but vests the district court with dis-
cretion to decide otherwise.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012,
1038 (11th Cir. 2000). “To defeat the presumption and deny full
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21-13869 Opinion of the Court 21
costs, a district court must have and state a sound basis for doing
so.” Id. at 1039. “[A] non-prevailing party’s financial status is a fac-
tor that a district court may, but need not, consider in its award of
costs pursuant to Rule 54(d).” Id. “If a district court in determining
the amount of costs to award chooses to consider the non-prevail-
ing party’s financial status, it should require substantial documen-
tation of a true inability to pay.” Id.Additionally, the Southern District of Florida’s Local Rules
provide that a party who seeks taxable costs must file a bill of costs
“within thirty (30) days of entry of final judgment or other appeal-
able order that gives rise to a right to tax costs.”
S.D. Fla. L. R. 7.3(c). Notably, a timely motion for a new trial “sus-
pends the finality of a judgment adverse to the movant for the pur-
pose of an appeal until a ruling is made upon the motion.” Phinney
v. Houston Oil Field Material Co., 252 F.2d 357, 359 (5th Cir. 1958).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in grant-
ing the Defendants’ motion for costs. Scott argues that the Defend-
ants violated Rule 54(d)(2)(B)(i) because they did not file their mo-
tion within 14 days of the jury’s verdict. However, that provision
governs claims for attorney’s fees and related nontaxable expenses,
while the Defendants’ motion sought payment for “all taxable
costs” under Rule 54(d)(1), which does not require a timely motion
by the prevailing party. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) with Fed.
R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2). In other words, Scott’s timing argument is irrel-
evant because Defendants sought only payment of taxable costs.
Moreover, Scott’s timely motion for a new trial suspended the final
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22 Opinion of the Court 21-13869
judgment until the district court ruled on such motion, and the De-
fendants timely filed their motion and bill of costs nine days after
the district court denied Scott’s motion for a new trial. Phinney, 252
F.2d at 359; S.D. Fla. L. R. 7.3(c).
Additionally, the Defendants were the prevailing party, and
there is a presumption that they were entitled to an award of costs.
See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1038. Although Scott argues that the dis-
trict court failed to explain its justification for imposing costs
against him, it was only required to explain its justification if it was
overcoming that presumption and denying the Defendants’ mo-
tion for costs. But the district court did not overcome the presump-
tion; rather, it applied the presumption and granted the Defend-
ants’ motion for costs. See id. at 1039.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is
AFFIRMED.