USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 1 of 12
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10665
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LEONEL GARCIA CABEZA,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20383-KMM-3
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 2 of 12
2 Opinion of the Court 22-10665
____________________
No. 22-10691
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ENER CORTES RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20383-KMM-2
____________________
____________________
No. 22-10703
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 3 of 12
22-10665 Opinion of the Court 3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PABLO GUERRERO MARQUEZ,
Defendant- Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20383-KMM-1
____________________
Before LAGOA, BRASHER and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this consolidated appeal, codefendants Leonel Garcia
Cabeza, Ener Cortes Rodriguez, and Pablo Guerrero Marquez
each appeal their convictions after pleading guilty to conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine on board a vessel subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States. They also appeal their re-
spective 135-month imprisonment sentences, arguing they are sub-
stantively unreasonable. On appeal, the codefendants argue that
the government failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement un-
der the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”) of
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 4 of 12
4 Opinion of the Court 22-10665
establishing that their vessel was without nationality because the
facts proffered in support of their guilty pleas did not establish that
the Coast Guard asked for the master or person in charge to make
a claim of nationality or that they were silent in response to such a
request. Further, they each argue that their sentences were sub-
stantively unreasonable because they did not account for their re-
spective history and characteristics, their role in the offense, or the
need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. After reviewing
the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we affirm the defendants’
convictions and sentences.
I.
We review whether the district court had jurisdiction de
novo, even when a party raises the jurisdictional question for the
first time on appeal, and review factual findings related to jurisdic-
tion for clear error. United States v. Iguaran,
821 F.3d 1335, 1336
(11th Cir. 2016).
Under the MDLEA, the question of whether a vessel is sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the United States is a jurisdictional ques-
tion, and not an element of the offense.
Id. Jurisdictional issues
under the MDLEA “are preliminary questions of law to be deter-
mined solely by the trial judge.”
46 U.S.C. § 70504(a). “Further-
more, for a district court to have adjudicatory authority over a
charge that a defendant conspired to violate the substantive crime
defined in subsection (a), the Government must preliminarily show
that the conspiracy’s vessel was, when apprehended, subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States.” United States v. De La Garza, 516
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 5 of 12
22-10665 Opinion of the Court
5
F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). We
have treated the jurisdictional requirement under the MDLEA as
“akin to the amount-in-controversy requirement contained in
28
U.S.C. § 1332.”
Id. at 1271. Parties may stipulate to facts that sup-
port a jurisdictional finding but may not stipulate to jurisdiction.
Iguaran,
821 F.3d at 1337. “[F]ailure to object to allegations of fact
in a [presentence investigation report (“PSI”)] admits those facts for
sentencing purposes.” United States v. Wade,
458 F.3d 1273, 1277
(11th Cir. 2006).
The MDLEA makes it a crime to conspire to distribute a con-
trolled substance while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.
46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(b). The
MDLEA’s definition of a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States” includes a “vessel without nationality.”
Id.
§ 70502(c)(1)(A). Under the MDLEA,
the term “vessel without nationality” includes—
(A) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in
charge makes a claim of registry that is denied by the
nation whose registry is claimed;
(B) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in
charge fails, on request of an officer of the United
States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of
United States law, to make a claim of nationality or
registry for that vessel;
(C) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in
charge makes a claim of registry and for which the
claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 6 of 12
6 Opinion of the Court 22-10665
unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its national-
ity; and
(D) a vessel aboard which no individual, on request of
an officer of the United States authorized to enforce
applicable provisions of United States law, claims to
be the master or is identified as the individual in
charge, and that has no other claim of nationality or
registry under paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (e).
Id. § 70502(d)(1). With regard to a claim of nationality or registry,
the MDLEA further provides that:
A claim of nationality or registry under this section
includes only—
(1) possession on board the vessel and production of
documents evidencing the vessel’s nationality as pro-
vided in article 5 of the 1958 Convention on the High
Seas;
(2) flying its nation’s ensign or flag; or
(3) a verbal claim of nationality or registry by the
master or individual in charge of the vessel.
Id. § 70502(e).
We have held that § 70502(d)(1) is not an exhaustive list of
every circumstance in which a vessel lacks nationality. United States
v. Nunez,
1 F.4th 976, 984 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
142 S. Ct. 2675 (2022). To determine whether a vessel is without
nationality, we look to customary international law.
Id. In Nunez,
we noted that a vessel usually makes its nationality known by flying
a nation’s flag or carrying registration papers.
Id. at 985. When a
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 7 of 12
22-10665 Opinion of the Court 7
vessel does not have those common signs of nationality, we look to
§ 70502(e) and international law. Id.
In determining whether a vessel is stateless, we have held
that a vessel was subject to the United States’s jurisdiction under
§ 70502(d)(1)(B) where it “flew no flag, carried no registration pa-
perwork, and bore no markings indicating its nationality”; despite
repeated questioning, the captain concealed himself among the
crew and failed to identify himself or the vessel’s nationality; and
the crew, when questioned, “made no claims about the boat’s na-
tionality or registry.” United States v. De La Cruz,
443 F.3d 830, 832
(11th Cir. 2006). Similarly, in De La Garza, we held that the vessel
was stateless because the defendant stipulated that the vessel was
not flying any flag and had no indicia of nationality and indicated
at his plea hearing that he understood that the United States
claimed jurisdiction over the vessel and wished to plead guilty. 516
F.3d at 1272.
Likewise, in United States v. Cabezas-Montano, we held that a
vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States where the
Coast Guard members testified that they asked the crew to identify
the master of the vessel and no one identified himself as the master
and when asked individually if anyone wished to make a claim of
nationality for the vessel, no one responded.
949 F.3d 567, 589-90
(11th Cir. 2020). We noted that the questions were sufficient, even
though the Coast Guard failed to ask for the “individual in charge,”
because that individual still had an opportunity to make a claim of
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 8 of 12
8 Opinion of the Court 22-10665
nationality for the vessel when the Coast Guard asked if anyone
wished to do so.
Id. at 589 n.14.
In Iguaran, the plea agreement, factual proffer, and PSI all
contained the same stipulation that Iguaran was “on board a vessel
that was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
821 F.3d
at 1337 (quotation marks omitted). We stated that the stipulation
was not sufficient to establish jurisdiction because parties may not
stipulate to jurisdiction, which is a question of law.
Id. We stated
that Iguaran’s plea agreement did not otherwise contain facts that
would support a finding that the vessel was stateless.
Id. We deter-
mined that “Iguaran’s factual proffer, his presentence investigation
report, and the transcript from his change of plea hearing also
failed to supply facts which established that Iguaran’s vessel was
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.”
Id. Even though
Iguaran’s co-conspirator admitted to facts that would support a
finding that the vessel was stateless, we held that the record in the
co-conspirator’s case was irrelevant to whether Iguaran’s record
sufficiently established the United States’ jurisdiction over the ves-
sel.
Id. at 1337-38. When the record is not fully developed, at least
in part because of the defendant’s failure to raise the issue below,
we will remand the case to the district court for further factual find-
ings.
Id. at 1338. Accordingly, we remanded the case to allow the
government to provide evidence that Iguaran’s vessel was subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
In Nunez, the Coast Guard approached a vessel with four
men on board and asked who was the pilot or master of the vessel.
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 9 of 12
22-10665 Opinion of the Court 9
1 F.4th at 981. One crew member responded that they all took
turns performing the duties of the pilot or master. Id. We noted
that because no one claimed to be the master of the vessel, the
Coast Guard was not required to inquire as to the nationality of the
vessel. Id. at 986. We held that the vessel was stateless because
there were no registry papers on board, there were no markings to
indicate the nationality of the vessel, and no one, master or crew-
member, made a verbal claim of the vessel’s nationality. Id. We
noted that under international law, there are no set standards for
what questions authorities must ask to determine whether a vessel
is stateless. Id. at 987. We also noted that typically there is some
form of examination by authorities to determine a vessel’s nation-
ality, but that international treatises do not address how to treat a
vessel without a master and no nationality markings. Id.
The record in the present case demonstrates that Garcia
Cabeza, Cortes Rodriguez, and Guerrero Marquez admitted in
their respective factual proffers and PSIs that the vessel had no in-
dicia of nationality and none of the men on board claimed to be
the master or captain of the vessel, which relieved the Coast Guard
of having to confirm the nationality of the vessel. See Nunez, 1 F.4th
at 986. Under our precedent, those facts were sufficient to establish
that the vessel was stateless for purposes of subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Accordingly, because we conclude that the district court had
jurisdiction over the defendants, we affirm their convictions.
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 10 of 12
10 Opinion of the Court 22-10665
II.
When reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness,
we consider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). A district court abuses its discretion
when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due signifi-
cant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrele-
vant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing
the proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160,
1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We will vacate a sentence “if, but
only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey,
612
F.3d at 1190 (quotation marks omitted). The district court commits
a clear error of judgment when it considers the proper factors but
weighs them unreasonably.
Id. at 1189.
We have emphasized that we must give due deference to the
weight the district court assigns to the sentencing factors. United
States v. Shabazz,
887 F.3d 1204, 1224 (11th Cir. 2018). The district
court need not account for every § 3553(a) factor, nor must it dis-
cuss each factor and the role that that factor played in sentencing.
United States v. McBride,
511 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 2007). The
district court also does not have to give all the factors equal weight,
and we give discretion to the district court’s attachment of great
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 11 of 12
22-10665 Opinion of the Court 11
weight to one factor over another. United States v. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015).
Along with the § 3553(a) factors, the district court should
also consider the particularized facts of the case and the guideline
range. Id. at 1259-60. However, it maintains discretion to give
heavier weight to any of the § 3553(a) factors or combination of
factors than to the guideline range. Id. at 1259. The “district court
may determine, on a case-by-case basis, the weight to give the
Guidelines, so long as that determination is made with reference to
the remaining § 3553(a) factors that the court must also consider.”
United States v. Hunt,
459 F.3d 1180, 1185 (11th Cir. 2006). Indicators
of a reasonable sentence are the district court’s imposition of a sen-
tence within the guideline range, and its imposition of a sentence
well below the statutory maximum penalty. United States v. Croteau,
819 F.3d 1293, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2016).
One of the purposes of the Guidelines is providing certainty
and fairness in sentencing, and “avoiding unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct.” United States v. Docampo,
573 F.3d 1091, 1102 (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). Alt-
hough we have never stated what the defendant’s burden is in these
contexts, we have noted that the district court is required to avoid
the unwarranted disparities between similarly situated defendants,
indicating that the court should be aware of any potential for this
issue at sentencing. See
id. at 1101-02. As the Sentencing Commis-
sion considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
USCA11 Case: 22-10665 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 06/27/2023 Page: 12 of 12
12 Opinion of the Court 22-10665
disparities when crafting the Guidelines, the district court neces-
sarily gives significant weight and consideration to this factor by
correctly calculating and considering the guideline range. United
States v. Hill,
643 F.3d 807, 884-85 (11th Cir. 2011).
The record here demonstrates that the district court did not
err in its imposition of the defendants’ sentences. Garcia Cabeza’s
sentence is reasonable because the district court did not commit a
clear error in judgment in determining that a sentence at the low-
end of the guideline range was warranted after weighing the large
quantity of cocaine possessed, Garcia Cabeza’s poor upbringing,
his position in the drug enterprise, and the need to avoid unwar-
ranted sentencing disparities. Cortes Rodriguez’s sentence is also
reasonable because the district court was within its discretion in
determining that his poor upbringing did not justify a variance, that
the guideline range adequately accounted for the quantity of co-
caine on the vessel, and that a guideline sentence would avoid un-
warranted sentencing disparities. Finally, Guerrero Marquez’s sen-
tence is reasonable because the district court properly exercised its
discretion in determining that the amount of cocaine on the vessel
outweighed his personal history and that the guideline range ade-
quately reflected the seriousness of the offense. Accordingly, based
on the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the defendants’ convic-
tions and sentences.
AFFIRMED.
