USCA11 Case: 22-13150 Document: 30-1 Date Filed: 06/28/2023 Page: 1 of 12
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13150
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MALCOM ANWAR WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60120-KAM-2
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13150
Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Malcolm Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal in part and denial in part of his motion for a
sentence reduction under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He argues that
the district court abused its discretion by (1) construing his
§ 3582(c) motion as a second or successive
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
to vacate sentence; (2) addressing sua sponte whether he had
exhausted his administrative remedies; and (3) failing to consider
his arguments concerning intervening changes in the law and his
rehabilitation as required by Concepcion v. United States,
142 S. Ct.
2389 (2022). After review, we affirm.
I. Background
Williams pleaded guilty in 2015 to Hobbs Act robbery
pursuant to a written plea agreement. At sentencing, Williams was
deemed a career offender under U.S.S.G. 4B1.2(a) on the basis that
the Hobbs Act robbery conviction qualified as a “crime of
violence,” and Williams had two prior state offenses that qualified
as either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 1 The
1 At the time of Williams’s sentencing, the Sentencing Guidelines provided
that a defendant was a career offender if (1) he was at least 18 years’ old when
he committed the instant offense, (2) the instant offense was a felony that was
“either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense,” and (3) the
defendant had two prior felony convictions for “either a crime of violence or
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22-13150 Opinion of the Court 3
district court imposed a sentence of 151 months’ imprisonment.
Williams did not appeal. Two of his codefendants did, however,
and successfully challenged their respective career-offender
enhancements on the basis that Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime
of violence under the Guidelines. See United States v. Eason,
953
F.3d 1184, 1187 (11th Cir. 2020).
In 2020, Williams filed a pro se
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) motion
seeking a sentence reduction based on “extraordinary and
a controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (2014). “Crime of
violence” was defined as:
any offense . . . punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, that—
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
of physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
Id. § 4B1.2(a) (2014). In 2015, the Supreme Court struck down the
“residual clause”—the clause capturing offenses that “otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another”—in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) as
unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States,
576 U.S. 591, 606
(2015). The ACCA’s residual clause was identical to the residual clause
in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Compare
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) with
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). Following Johnson, in 2016, the Sentencing
Commission amended § 4B1.2(a)(2) and removed the residual clause
from the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2016); see also United
States v. Eason,
953 F.3d 1184, 1195 (11th Cir. 2020) (discussing
amendment).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13150
compelling reasons,” namely, that (1) Hobbs Act robbery is no
longer considered a “crime of violence” due to an amendment to
the crime of violence definition in the Guidelines; (2) two of his
codefendants had their career-offender designations based on
Hobbs Act robbery vacated on appeal; and (3) one of his state
convictions should not have counted as a predicate offense for
purposes of the career-offender enhancement. The district court
denied the motion, concluding that it lacked authority to reduce
Williams’s sentence because a change in law did not constitute an
extraordinary and compelling reason under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to
reduce a sentence. Furthermore, it explained that, even if it had
the authority to reduce his sentence, consideration of the
18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors weighed against a reduction. Finally, the district
court noted that releasing him early would be inconsistent with the
policy statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 because Williams presented
a danger to the community.
Williams appealed the denial of his § 3582(c) motion, and we
affirmed. United States v. Williams, No. 20-14360,
2021 WL 6101491
(11th Cir. Dec. 21, 2021).
Thereafter, in August 2022, Williams filed a renewed
motion for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that
the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Concepcion v. United
States, required the district court to consider intervening changes
in the law and changes of fact, such as evidence of rehabilitation,
when deciding § 3582(c) motions for a sentence reduction. Thus,
he argued that, under Concepcion, the district court was bound to
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22-13150 Opinion of the Court 5
consider that Hobbs Act robbery was no longer a crime of violence
under the amended guidelines as evidenced by this Court’s
decision in Eason, as well as his evidence of postconviction
rehabilitation. In terms of evidence of rehabilitation, Williams
noted that he had an “excellent” prison record with no disciplinary
problems, he mentored other inmates, he completed over 500
hours of educational programming, he had no other felony
convictions and was not a danger to society, and he had maintained
positive business and personal relationships in society so that he
would be a productive member upon release. In terms of
compassionate release, Williams alleged that he was “healthy,” but
had been recently diagnosed as “pre-diabetic,” with high A1C levels
and “high sodium.” He maintained that “[a] home diet would
substantially improve these conditions.”
The district court dismissed the motion in part and denied it
in part. First, the district court concluded that, to the extent
Williams sought a sentence reduction based on Concepcion, “the
present motion [was] effectively [an unauthorized] successive
petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2255” over which the court lacked
jurisdiction. Second, as for Williams’s request for a sentence
reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court denied his
motion because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies
and he did not satisfy the definition of “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. This appeal
followed.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13150
II. Discussion
Williams argues that the district court abused its discretion
by (1) construing his § 3582(c) motion as a second or successive
§ 2255 motion to vacate sentence; (2) addressing sua sponte
whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies; and
(3) failing to consider his arguments concerning intervening
changes in the law and his rehabilitation as required by Concepcion.
We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for an
18
U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant,
996
F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
142 S. Ct. 583 (2021). We
review a district court’s denial of a movant’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Harris,
989 F.3d 908, 911
(11th Cir. 2021).
Generally, a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment
once it has been imposed.”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section
3582(c)(1)(A), however, provides the following limited exception:
the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP],
or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant
has fully exhausted all administrative rights . . . may
reduce the term of imprisonment . . ., after
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to
the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . .
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the
Sentencing Commission.
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Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 2 Thus, the district court may reduce a movant’s
imprisonment term if: (1) there are extraordinary and compelling
reasons for doing so, (2) the factors listed in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
favor doing so, and (3) doing so is consistent with the policy
statements in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. United States v. Tinker,
14 F.4th
1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021). If the district court finds against the
movant on any one of these requirements, it cannot grant relief,
and need not analyze the other requirements. United States v. Giron,
15 F.4th 1343, 1347–48 (11th Cir. 2021); Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38
(explaining that “nothing on the face of
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)
requires a court to conduct the compassionate-release analysis in
any particular order”).
The Sentencing Commission defines “extraordinary and
compelling reasons” in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.
Pursuant to this definition, there are four circumstances under
which “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist”: (A) the
defendant suffers from (i) “a terminal illness” or (ii) a permanent
health condition “that substantially diminishes the ability of the
defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a
correctional facility from which he or she is not expected to
recover”; (B) the defendant is “at least 65 years old,” “is
2 “In 2018, Congress passed and the President signed the First Step Act.”
Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248. Section 603(b) of the First Step Act amended § 3582(c)
and “expanded who could file a motion for a sentence reduction” by
permitting prisoners to file their own motions. Id. at 1250; see also The First
Step Act of 2018,
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b),
132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (amending
18 U.S.C. § 3582).
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13150
experiencing a serious [age-related] deterioration in physical or
mental health,” and “has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of
his or her term of imprisonment, whichever is less”; (C) the
defendant’s assistance is needed in caring for the defendant’s minor
child, spouse, or registered partner due to (i) “[t]he death or
incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor child or
minor children” or (ii) “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant’s
spouse or registered partner”; and (D) there exist “other”
extraordinary and compelling reasons “[a]s determined by the
Director of the [BOP].” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1 (A)–(D)).
“[D]istrict courts are bound by the Commission’s definition of
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in [§] 1B1.13.”
Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262; see also Giron, 15 F.4th at 1346 (“[T]he only
circumstances that can rise to the level of extraordinary and
compelling reasons for compassionate release are limited to those
extraordinary and compelling reasons as described by [§] 1B1.13.”).
Under the prior-panel-precedent rule, we are bound by the
holdings of Bryant and Giron unless they have been “overruled or
undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or
by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. Archer,
531 F.3d 1347,
1352 (11th Cir. 2008). “To conclude that we are not bound by a
prior holding in light of a Supreme Court case, we must find that
the case is ‘clearly on point’ and that it ‘actually abrogate[s] or
directly conflict[s] with, as opposed to merely weaken[s], the
holding of the prior panel.’” United States v. Dudley,
5 F.4th 1249,
1265 (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied
142 S. Ct. 1376 (2022), (alterations
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in original) (quoting United States v. Kaley,
579 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th
Cir. 2009)).
Here, the gravamen of Williams’s argument is that
Concepcion changed the framework and analysis that the district
court must conduct when deciding motions for a sentence
reduction under § 3582(c), but his reliance on Concepcion is
misplaced. In Concepcion, the Supreme Court discussed the factors
that a district court must consider when deciding sentence-
reduction motions for crack-cocaine convictions under § 404 of the
First Step Act. 142 S. Ct. at 2401–04. The Court held that when a
district court was deciding whether to exercise its discretion and
award an eligible defendant a sentence reduction, it could
“consider other intervening changes of law . . . or changes of fact,”
reasoning that there were no statutory constraints in place that
prevented district courts from considering such information. Id. at
2396, 2400. But Williams was not convicted of a crack-cocaine
offense and is not an eligible defendant seeking a sentence
reduction under § 404 of the First Step Act. Instead, he is seeking a
sentence reduction under the compassionate release provisions of
§ 603(b) of the First Step Act. Because Concepcion did not address
compassionate release motions, it is not directly on point and does
not directly conflict with or abrogate our precedent in Bryant and
its progeny that, in determining whether a defendant is eligible for
a sentence reduction under the compassionate release provisions,
the district court is limited to “the Commission’s definition of
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-13150
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in [§] 1B1.13.”
Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1262; Dudley, 5 F.4th at 1265. 3
Moreover, in Concepcion, the Supreme Court noted that
Congress may cabin what district courts may consider when
sentencing (or resentencing) a defendant, and it expressly cited the
compassionate release statute as an example: “For [§ 3582(c)]
proceedings, Congress expressly cabined district courts’ discretion
by requiring courts to abide by the Sentencing Commission’s
policy statements.” Concepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2401. This statement
is consistent with our decision in Bryant. 996 F.3d at 1262.
Because Concepcion did not change the analysis for
determining whether a movant is eligible for a § 3582(c) sentence
reduction, it had no application to Williams’s case and the district
3 We note that several of our sister circuits to have considered this issue have
concluded similarly that Concepcion does not bear on the initial question of
whether the movant is eligible for compassionate release—i.e., whether the
movant has establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. See,
e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez,
65 F.4th 1000, 1003–04 (8th Cir. 2023);
United States v. King,
40 F.4th 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2022), cert. denied King v. United
States, No. 22-5878,
2023 WL 3046170 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2023); United States v.
McCall,
56 F.4th 1048, 1061–62 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc), cert. denied McCall v.
United States, No. 22-7210,
2023 WL 3571586 (U.S. May 22, 2023); United States
v. Jenkins,
50 F.4th 1185, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2022); But see United States v. Chen,
48
F.4th 1092, 1099 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that Concepcion supported the Ninth
Circuit’s precedent which permits district courts to consider “an extraordinary
and compelling reason a defendant might raise, including . . . non-retroactive
changes in sentencing law”).
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22-13150 Opinion of the Court 11
court was not required to consider the changes in law or evidence
of rehabilitation proffered by Williams in determining whether
there were extraordinary and compelling reasons for a reduction
under § 1B1.13. Accordingly, to the extent that Williams argued
for a reduction based on Concepcion and other changes in the law,
he was in essence collaterally attacking his conviction and
sentence. A prisoner cannot use § 3582(c)(2) as a vehicle to
collaterally attack their conviction or sentence. Rather, “a § 2255
motion is the exclusive remedy for a federal prisoner to collaterally
attack his conviction and sentence . . . .” Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P.
Atl.,
542 F.3d 1348, 1351 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008). Williams had
previously filed a § 2255 motion and had not sought leave from this
Court to file a second or successive § 2255 motion. See
28 U.S.C.
§§ 2244(b)(3), 2255(h). Consequently, the district court lacked
jurisdiction to consider his collateral challenge to his conviction
and sentence. See Farris v. United States,
333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th
Cir. 2003) (holding that, without the necessary authorization from
the appropriate court of appeals, “the district court lacks
jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition”). Thus, the
district court did not err in dismissing in part the motion as an
unauthorized successive § 2255 motion.
Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying his motion for a sentence reduction under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A). In order to be eligible for such a reduction,
Williams needed to show an extraordinary or compelling reason
under § 1B1.13. He did not. Aside from the changes in law and his
evidence of rehabilitation, which as discussed above are not
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relevant to the threshold eligibility determination, Williams
alleged that he was “healthy,” and that he had been diagnosed as
being pre-diabetic with high A1C and sodium. He did not allege
that those health conditions substantially diminished his ability to
provide self-care in prison or that he was not expected to recover
from those conditions. Thus, he did not satisfy § 1B1.13(A). Nor
did he include any other allegations that would satisfy subsections
(B)–(C) of § 1B1.13. And the BOP did not determine that other
extraordinary and compelling reasons existed in Williams’s case for
purposes of subsection (D). The absence of an extraordinary and
compelling reason as defined in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 foreclosed
Williams’s motion for a sentence reduction. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at
1237–38. Consequently, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying his motion.4
AFFIRMED.
4 Because we conclude that Williams failed to establish the existence of an
extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of compassionate release, it
is unnecessary for us to address his argument concerning the exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
