USCA11 Case: 22-13140 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13140
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOAQUIN ELIAS PALMA-PADILLA,
a.k.a. Palma
a.k.a. Palmera
a.k.a. El de los Cocos
a.k.a. Jacob
a.k.a. Israel 26
a.k.a. lmdio,
Defendant-Appellant.
USCA11 Case: 22-13140 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 2 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 22-13140
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20657-DPG-5
____________________
Before WILSON, LUCK, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Joaquin Elias Palma-Padilla appeals his 120-month sentence,
a downward variance from the guideline range of 135-168 months,
for conspiracy to import more than 5 kilograms of cocaine into the
United States. He argues that his sentence is substantively unrea-
sonable and that favorable mitigating factors warranted a further
downward variance than that granted by the district court.
When reviewing for substantive reasonableness, we con-
sider the totality of the circumstances under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but
not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes” of
§ 3553(a), including the need to reflect the seriousness of the of-
fense, promote respect for the law, provide punishment for the of-
fense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the de-
fendant’s future criminal conduct. See
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In
imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the
nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and character-
istics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the
USCA11 Case: 22-13140 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 3 of 5
22-13140 Opinion of the Court 3
applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy statements of the
Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentenc-
ing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims.
Id.
§ 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7). “The district court is not required to explicitly
address each of the § 3553(a) factors or all of the mitigating evi-
dence. Rather, [a]n acknowledgment [that] the district court has
considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors will
suffice.” United States v. Taylor,
997 F.3d 1348, 1354-55 (11th Cir.
2021) (quotation marks and citation omitted, alterations in origi-
nal).
The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of es-
tablishing that it is unreasonable based on the facts of the case and
the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1378
(11th Cir. 2010). We will not substitute our own judgment for that
of the sentencing court and will sometimes affirm the district court
even if we would have done something differently because the
question is whether the district court’s decision was “in the ballpark
of permissible outcomes.” United States v. Rosales-Bruno,
789 F.3d
1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted). We will va-
cate a defendant’s sentence only if we are “left with the definite and
firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence
that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.” United States v. Trailer,
827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th
Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted).
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13140
The district court abuses its discretion when it “(1) fails to
afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant
weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac-
tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the
proper factors.” United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir.
2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).
The weight given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is commit-
ted to the district court’s sound discretion. United States v. Ramirez-
Gonzalez,
755 F.3d 1267, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2014). In considering
the § 3553(a) factors, the district court need not explicitly address
each factor or all the mitigating evidence. United States v. Taylor,
997 F.3d 1348, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 2021). Instead, an acknowledg-
ment that the district court has considered the defendant’s argu-
ments and the § 3553(a) factors will suffice. Id.
As we have previously recognized, a district court’s careful
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is not unreasonable simply
because the defendant disagrees with the court’s assessment of
those factors. United States v. Valnor,
451 F.3d 744, 752 (11th Cir.
2006). Moreover, while we do not apply a presumption of reason-
ableness to sentences within the guideline range, we ordinarily ex-
pect such a sentence to be reasonable. United States v. Stanley,
739
F.3d 633, 656 (11th Cir. 2014). Indeed, a district court’s imposition
of a sentence within the guideline range and well below the statu-
tory maximum penalty indicates reasonableness. United States v.
Croteau,
819 F.3d 1293, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 2016).
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22-13140 Opinion of the Court 5
Palma-Padilla’s sentence is substantively reasonable. The
district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the nature and
circumstances of the offense and his history and characteristics.
The court conducted an individualized assessment, reviewed the
presentence investigation report, considered the arguments raised
at sentencing, and reasonably applied the sentencing factors under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It was within the district court’s discretion as
to how much weight to assign a particular sentencing factor in view
of Palma-Padilla’s mitigation arguments. The court had discretion
in weighing the sentencing factors and did not abuse its discretion
by not varying its sentence further downward based on Palma-Pa-
dilla’s personal circumstances. See Ramirez-Gonzalez,
755 F.3d at
1272-73. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the 120-month sentence
here was a downward variance from the guideline range of 135-168
months and well below the statutory maximum of life, both of
which are indicators that the sentence is substantively reasonable.
See Croteau,
819 F.3d at 1310. Although the district court did not
adopt Palma-Padilla’s requested sentence, that does not compel the
conclusion that it abused its discretion, nor does it suggest that the
court imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence.
AFFIRMED.
