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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10435 & No. 22-10437
____________________
SABAL TRAIL TRANSMISSION, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
3.921 ACRES OF LAND IN LAKE COUNTY FLORIDA,
UNKNOWN OWNERS,
Defendants,
SUNDERMAN GROVES, INC,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10435
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 5:16-cv-00178-JSM-PRL
____________________
Before BRANCH, GRANT, Circuit Judges, and HINKLE,* District
Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The Natural Gas Act authorizes private entities who have
received a certificate of public convenience and necessity to acquire
property “by the exercise of the right of eminent domain.” 15
U.S.C. § 717f(h). Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC, invoked this
power of eminent domain to acquire easements to build a pipeline
on land owned by Sunderman Groves, Inc. In the condemnation
proceeding, the district court determined that the Act incorporates
state eminent domain law, and it consequently applied Florida law
to grant attorneys’ fees, costs, and prejudgment interest to
Sunderman Groves. Sabal Trail appeals these awards, arguing that
the district court should have applied federal law instead.
After this panel heard oral argument, a different panel of our
Court decided a nearly identical case that arose out of Sabal Trail’s
use of the eminent domain power to build this same pipeline. See
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land,
59 F.4th 1158,
* The Honorable Robert L. Hinkle, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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22-10435 Opinion of the Court 3
1160–62 (11th Cir. 2023). That panel determined that proceedings
under § 717f(h) must look to state law to determine the measure of
compensation. Id. at 1175.
It is “firmly established” that “each succeeding panel is
bound by the holding of the first panel to address an issue of law,
unless and until that holding is overruled en banc, or by the
Supreme Court.” United States v. Hogan,
986 F.2d 1364, 1369 (11th
Cir. 1993). This Court’s prior construction of the Natural Gas Act
is now the law in this Circuit, and it conclusively resolves this
appeal. We therefore AFFIRM the district court.
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22-10435 GRANT, J., Concurring 1
GRANT, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join the Court’s opinion in full. I write separately to
respectfully express my disagreement with two other cases—one
old and one new.
Decades back, our predecessor court held in Georgia Power
Co. v. Sanders that the Federal Power Act incorporates state-law
standards of compensation for eminent domain proceedings.
617
F.2d 1112, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). 1 Section 21 of that Act
delegates “the exercise of the right of eminent domain” to private
licensees building dams.
16 U.S.C. § 814. More recently, this Court
was asked to interpret a different statute with the same language.
The panel in Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land
concluded that Georgia Power requires us to use the same state-law
rules—this time for pipeline construction under the Natural Gas
Act.
59 F.4th 1158, 1175 (11th Cir. 2023) (hereinafter referred to as
Thomas, the name of one of the landowners in that proceeding); 15
U.S.C. § 717f(h).
Like at least one member of that panel, I think Georgia Power
was wrongly decided. See 59 F.4th at 1175 (Jordan, J., concurring).
But unlike the panel, I do not think that our prior-panel precedent
rule required us to extend Georgia Power’s incorrect reasoning
about the Federal Power Act to the Natural Gas Act. See id. at
1 All published cases of the former Fifth Circuit decided before the close of
business on September 30, 1981, are precedent in this Circuit. See Bonner v.
City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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2 GRANT, J., Concurring 22-10435
1168–69. I write to emphasize that, when facing similar
interpretive questions about other statutes, we should not
overread or further extend these two precedents—the
compensation standards of the Fifth Amendment apply to private
delegations of the federal eminent domain power unless Congress
says otherwise. 2
I.
The Federal Power Act authorizes private licensees to
condemn property “by the exercise of the right of eminent
domain.”
16 U.S.C. § 814. At a glance, that phrase might not seem
to specify a standard of compensation. But with a closer look at
eminent domain law, the standard becomes clear: when Congress
delegates “the exercise of the right of eminent domain” without
specifying more, it is granting the original landowners the
compensation that is required by the Fifth Amendment.
The Fifth Amendment requires “just compensation”
whenever the federal government exercises the power of eminent
domain. U.S. Const. amend. V. And a whole body of caselaw has
developed explaining exactly what “just compensation” means.
2 The problem’s importance is underscored by Georgia Power’s influence in
other circuits. Two other circuits have copied its flawed analysis when
interpreting the Natural Gas Act. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC v. Permanent
Easement for 7.053 Acres,
931 F.3d 237, 241, 246–55 (3d Cir. 2019); Columbia Gas
Transmission Corp. v. Exclusive Nat. Gas Storage Easement,
962 F.2d 1192, 1197–
99 (6th Cir. 1992). And the Second Circuit has applied the Georgia Power
framework to the Rail Passenger Service Act. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
Two Parcels of Land,
822 F.2d 1261, 1265–67 (2d Cir. 1987).
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22-10435 GRANT, J., Concurring 3
For example, “indirect costs to the property owner caused by the
taking of his land are generally not part of the just compensation to
which he is constitutionally entitled.” United States v. Bodcaw Co.,
440 U.S. 202, 203 (1979). As a result, “attorneys’ fees and expenses
are not embraced within just compensation.”
Id. (alteration
adopted and quotation omitted).
For better or worse, this Fifth Amendment “just
compensation” standard is less generous than what some States
offer when they exercise their own eminent domain power. To
take the same example, the Florida Constitution—unlike the Fifth
Amendment—provides that the condemner must pay the original
property owner’s attorneys’ fees. Joseph B. Doerr Tr. v. Cent. Fla.
Expressway Auth.,
177 So. 3d 1209, 1215 (Fla. 2015). But state laws
in no way limit the federal eminent domain power; they “do not,
and could not, affect questions of substantive right—such as the
measure of compensation—grounded upon the Constitution of the
United States.” United States v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369, 380 (1943).
Congress, of course, can always choose to provide more
compensation than the Fifth Amendment requires—“just
compensation” is a floor, not a ceiling. 3 Congress can even choose
3 The facts of this case demonstrate why, as a matter of policy, Congress might
want to do just that. Sunderman Groves’s attorneys’ fees and costs were over
$150,000 greater than the jury award for the easements. And the jury award
for the easements was over $250,000 more than Sabal Trail originally offered.
In other words, without attorneys’ fees and costs, Sunderman Groves would
have faced an undesirable choice: (1) entering litigation that ultimately cost
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4 GRANT, J., Concurring 22-10435
to copy state law standards of compensation. See, e.g.,
33 U.S.C.
§ 532 (requiring “just compensation” to be “ascertained and paid
according to the laws of [the] State” when the power of eminent
domain is invoked to build interstate bridges). But any
compensation beyond the Fifth Amendment is “a matter of
legislative grace rather than constitutional command.” Bodcaw,
440 U.S. at 204.
Those same rules apply when a federal statute authorizes
private parties to exercise the right of eminent domain on behalf of
the federal government. “For as long as the eminent domain
power has been exercised by the United States, it has also been
delegated to private parties.” PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey,
141
S. Ct. 2244, 2255 (2021). And whether the federal government itself
or a private licensee is exercising the federal eminent domain
power, the power is the same. See id. at 2257.
Putting all of this together: when a federal statute authorizes
“the exercise of the right of eminent domain,” without saying
more, the statute authorizes only the compensation required by
the Fifth Amendment—regardless of whether the United States or
a private licensee exercises that power. Courts can only require
additional compensation when the text shows that Congress
granted it. See Bodcaw,
440 U.S. at 204.
more money than it was worth or (2) taking a dramatically underpriced offer
for the easements. That might not violate the Fifth Amendment, but it still
raises serious fairness concerns.
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22-10435 GRANT, J., Concurring 5
Georgia Power took a completely different approach when
interpreting the Federal Power Act. It said that the statute’s text
did “not specify” whether state or federal law governed the
question of compensation, which left the Court to “the task of
interstitial federal lawmaking.” Ga. Power, 617 F.2d at 1115. So the
Court made federal common law. There was no question that the
source of the eminent domain power was federal, and that the
statute required a federal rule of decision. See id. But though
Georgia Power stylized its analysis as preferring state substantive law
to federal common law, it actually supplemented a federal statute
with a new common-law rule: it replaced the compensation
standard Congress set for a private delegation of the federal eminent
domain power with standards from state laws that limited the state
governments’ exercise of the state eminent domain power. See id.
at 1115–16, 1124.
By imposing state rules where federal law already provided
a standard, Georgia Power improperly expanded federal common
law. That assertion of judicial authority is justified only when a
federal court is “compelled to consider federal questions which
cannot be answered from federal statutes alone.” City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois,
451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) (quotation omitted). Such
instances are “few and restricted”—essentially limited to cases in
which a statute lacks a necessary rule of decision. Tex. Indus., Inc.
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981) (quotation
omitted); City of Milwaukee,
451 U.S. at 314. Even then, federal
common law is appropriate only where it is “necessary to protect
uniquely federal interests” or where Congress itself has authorized
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6 GRANT, J., Concurring 22-10435
the courts to “formulate substantive rules of decision.” Tex. Indus.,
451 U.S. at 640–41 (quotation omitted).
Here, the Federal Power Act does not lack a rule of
decision—it provides one. Section 21 of the statute authorizes “the
exercise of the right of eminent domain,” a power that is defined
by the Fifth Amendment.
16 U.S.C. § 814; see Miller,
317 U.S. at
380; Bodcaw,
440 U.S. at 203. The Act thus has no “gaps” requiring
interstitial lawmaking, and it offers no indication that Congress
meant for federal courts to build out compensation standards.
Even so, the Georgia Power Court supplemented the Act with
federal common law, and thus granted more compensation than
authorized by Congress or required by the Constitution.
Georgia Power also undermined Congress’s ability to delegate
the eminent domain power. Though it acknowledged other cases
had concluded that federal law determines “just compensation,” it
said those cases were different because they involved the United
States exercising condemnation authority itself rather than
delegating that authority to a private party. Ga. Power, 617 F.2d at
1119–20, 1119 n.9 (citing, e.g., Miller,
317 U.S. at 380). But that
distinction has no basis—the choice of how to exercise the eminent
domain power and what additional compensation to provide
belongs to Congress alone. Accord Thomas, 59 F.4th at 1175 (Jordan,
J., concurring); Ga. Power, 617 F.2d at 1129 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
In short, the Federal Power Act should have been
interpreted to authorize only the compensation required by the
Fifth Amendment—nothing in the Act suggests Congress intended
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22-10435 GRANT, J., Concurring 7
to grant more compensation than that. “[I]t is for Congress, not
federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied
as a matter of federal law.” City of Milwaukee,
451 U.S. at 317.
Georgia Power was wrong to hold otherwise.
II.
Like the Federal Power Act, the Natural Gas Act authorizes
private licensees to acquire property “by the exercise of the right of
eminent domain.” 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). And like the Federal Power
Act, the Natural Gas Act provides no indication that Congress
intended to authorize additional compensation. See id. So—like
the Federal Power Act—the Natural Gas Act should be read as
providing no more compensation than is required by the Fifth
Amendment.
But that was not this Court’s holding in Thomas. There, the
panel held that the Natural Gas Act incorporates state law
standards of compensation. 59 F.4th at 1175. In doing so, it
extended Georgia Power’s error—an error that previously affected
only a single law. In explaining its holding, the panel said that the
prior-panel precedent rule required it to analyze the Natural Gas
Act under the Georgia Power framework. Id. at 1164–65, 1168–69.
I disagree. The prior-panel precedent rule requires this
Court to follow Georgia Power’s construction of Section 21 of the
Federal Power Act—the statute at issue in that case. But it does
not require us to extend that case’s reasoning to a new statute. No
doubt, there are many similarities between the Federal Power Act
and the Natural Gas Act—first among them a delegation to private
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8 GRANT, J., Concurring 22-10435
parties of “the exercise of the right of eminent domain.” Compare
16 U.S.C. § 814, with 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h). But similar (or even
identical) language is not enough. “[S]tare decisis doesn’t apply to
statutory interpretation unless the statute being interpreted is the
same one that was being interpreted in the earlier case.” Bourdon
v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
940 F.3d 537, 548 (11th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial Precedent 343
(2016)). So when an earlier case construes a statute under a
misguided methodology, it does not require future panels to apply
that same incorrect methodology to all similar statutes.
To be sure, the prior-panel precedent rule is a crucial part of
our Circuit’s jurisprudence. “It promotes predictability of
decisions and stability of the law, it helps keep the precedential
peace among the judges of this Court, and it allows us to move on
once an issue has been decided.” Atl. Sounding Co. v. Townsend,
496
F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2007) (E. Carnes, J., concurring). But it
is not unlimited—indeed, our deference to prior panels can only be
absolute because it is narrow. And we “have pointed out many
times that regardless of what a court says in its opinion, the
decision can hold nothing beyond the facts of that case.” Edwards
v. Prime, Inc.,
602 F.3d 1276, 1298 (11th Cir. 2010). A panel has the
authority to bind this Circuit on the legal question before it, but
not to dictate the answer to a different legal question.
There is, moreover, “a difference between following a
precedent and extending a precedent.” Jefferson Cnty. v. Acker,
210
F.3d 1317, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000). We should be especially careful
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22-10435 GRANT, J., Concurring 9
to remain within the limits of the prior-panel precedent rule when
dealing with “moribund” precedents whose “reasoning has been
undermined by later decisions.”
Id. And if a discredited precedent
does not directly control, we need not extend that decision—“by
even a micron.”
Id. That principle should give us further pause
about expanding Georgia Power’s reach. After all, in the years since
Georgia Power, the Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished
against energetic federal common lawmaking. See, e.g., Rodriguez
v. FDIC,
140 S. Ct. 713, 717 (2020); City of Milwaukee,
451 U.S. at
315–17; Tex. Indus.,
451 U.S. at 640–41.
In sum, no matter how similar the Federal Power Act and
the Natural Gas Act may be, they are different statutes. A court’s
construction of one does not bind future courts on the
interpretation of the other. By holding otherwise, Thomas went
beyond the limits of our prior-panel precedent rule and needlessly
extended old reasoning to a new context.
* * *
Thomas requires that we affirm the district court’s reading of
the Natural Gas Act. But its consequences reach no further. Just
as Georgia Power binds future courts’ interpretation of only the
Federal Power Act, Thomas binds future courts’ interpretation of
only the Natural Gas Act. Should this Circuit encounter other
statutes delegating the federal eminent domain power—with
nothing more—we should apply the Fifth Amendment rather than
follow Georgia Power’s methodology.
