USCA11 Case: 23-10554 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 07/25/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-10554
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
RICHARD R. FINCH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
EMI CONSORTIUM SONGS, INC.,
a New York corporation,
d.b.a. EMI Longitude Music,
Defendant,
HARRY WAYNE CASEY,
an individual,
HARRICK MUSIC, INC.,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10554
a Florida corporation,
Defendants-Appellees,
MATTHEW NELLES, et al.,
Respondents.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cv-20144-DPG
____________________
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
There’s a lot of history in this case, but only a small part of
it matters. In 1983, Richard Finch transferred his copyright and
royalty rights to bandmate Harry Casey. Some legal back-and-
forth occurred in the interim, but we’ll jump ahead. In 2015, Casey
sent Finch a letter asserting that Finch was never an “author” under
the terms of the Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. § 203, and thus didn’t
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23-10554 Opinion of the Court 3
retain any termination rights. 1 Four years later, in 2019, Finch sent
Casey a notice of termination under § 203.
This litigation began in 2022, when Finch filed suit against
Casey and others requesting declaratory judgment that his § 203
termination rights were valid. Casey asserted multiple defenses in
response, including that Finch’s claim was barred by the copyright
law’s three-year statute of limitations. See id. § 507(b) (copyright
claims must be “commenced within three years after the claim ac-
crued.”).
The district court granted summary judgment for Casey on
the ground that Finch’s claims were time-barred. 2 Copyright-
based claims that turn on ownership or authorship accrue on the
date that the “plaintiff learns, or should as a reasonable person have
learned, that the defendant was violating his ownership rights.”
See, e.g., Webster v. Dean Guitars,
955 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir.
2020). An express assertion of sole authorship or ownership—like
Casey’s letter—triggers the accrual of an ownership claim.
Id. at
1276–77. Accordingly, the district court held, the clock began to
1 Finch allegedly also sent a termination letter to Casey in 2012.The parties
dispute whether Casey ever received the letter, but that doesn’t matter for
purposes of this appeal. The relevant events begin with the 2015 letter.
2 “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.” Salinero v. Johnson & Johnson,
995 F.3d 959, 964 (11th
Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10554
run on Finch’s § 203 claim when Casey expressly repudiated
Finch’s authorship in May 2015.
Notwithstanding the district court’s straightforward ruling,
Finch raises one narrow issue on appeal: whether Casey could raise
the statute of limitations as a defense at all. To be clear, Finch
doesn’t challenge the statute of limitations’ application; rather, he
challenges the availability of the defense. Finch attempts to paint
Casey’s statute-of-limitations defense as a time-barred authorship
counterclaim—limited by the same three-year statute of limita-
tions that hinders Finch here.
Despite his efforts, the two defenses are distinct. Statutes of
limitations are affirmative defenses. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); see also Day
v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,
122 F.3d 1012, 1015 (11th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam) (“A statute of limitations defense is an affirmative defense.”
(citation omitted)). The Sixth Circuit case on which Finch so heav-
ily relies to argue otherwise, Garza v. Everly, concerned “a defend-
ant . . . seeking affirmative relief packaged within a defense and . . .
attempting to dodge a statute of limitations.”
59 F.4th 876, 884 (6th
Cir. 2023). The Sixth Circuit concluded that such a defendant
couldn’t leverage an affirmative defense into affirmative relief.
Id.
This case is different. Casey does not seek any affirmative
relief, nor does he attempt to dodge a statute of limitations. If an-
ything—ironically—Finch is the one “packag[ing]” claims and de-
fenses to get around a statute of limitations. Casey raised an affirm-
ative defense distinct from any authorship claim. Because the stat-
ute of limitations argument is dispositive, we need not consider the
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23-10554 Opinion of the Court 5
sole-authorship debate. The district court was correct to grant
summary judgment.
As a final bit of housekeeping, we address Casey’s “Motion
for Damages and Costs Pursuant to Rule 38.” Rule 38 sanctions are
appropriately imposed against appellants who raise “clearly frivo-
lous claims in the face of established law and clear facts.” Farese v.
Scherer,
342 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For purposes of Rule 38, a claim is
clearly frivolous if it is “utterly devoid of merit.” Bonfiglio v. Nugent,
986 F.2d 1391, 1393 (11th Cir. 1993). Although Finch’s appeal
pushes the boundary, we will exercise our discretion to DENY Ca-
sey’s motion here.
AFFIRMED.
