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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-13954
____________________
AM GRAND COURT LAKES LLC,
AM 280 SIERRA DRIVE LLC,
Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants-Appellees,
versus
ROCKHILL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cv-23576-KMW
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
AM Grand Court Lakes LLC and AM 280 Sierra Drive LLC
(collectively “AM Grand”) owned a group of buildings that were
operated as an assisted living facility. AM Grand submitted a claim
to its insurer, Rockhill Insurance Company, for damage caused by
Hurricane Irma. Rockhill denied the claim because it determined
that the hurricane caused only minor damage to the property and
the cost of any repairs was less than the insurance policy’s deducti-
ble.
AM Grand sued Rockhill for breach of the policy. The case
went to trial, where a jury found that Rockhill had breached the
terms of the insurance policy and that AM Grand’s covered losses
amounted to $9,280,000. Based on the jury’s findings, the district
court entered judgment in AM Grand’s favor. After the district
court entered judgment, Rockhill filed a motion for a new trial ar-
guing that the jury’s damages award was excessive. The district
court denied the motion.
Rockhill argues on appeal that the district court erred in
denying its motion for a new trial because there was no evidence
in the record to support the jury’s finding that AM Grand sustained
a loss of $9,280,000. After careful consideration, and with the ben-
efit of oral argument, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient
to sustain the verdict. Thus, we affirm.
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 3
I.
A.
AM Grand owned property in Miami Gardens, Florida,
which it operated as an assisted living facility. The facility com-
prised five buildings, each of which was five stories tall. The build-
ings were connected by a series of catwalks. There were about 200
residential units at the facility. The facility also included a dining
room, an activity center, and nursing stations. All together, the fa-
cility totaled approximately 165,000 square feet.
AM Grand insured the property against certain losses, in-
cluding losses due to hurricanes. Under the insurance policy’s
terms, Rockhill was required to “pay for direct physical loss of or
damage to” the property. Doc. 203-2 at 30. 1 The maximum cover-
age under the policy was $15,112,500. For claims arising out of
damage caused by a hurricane, the policy had a deductible of
$330,250, which represented two percent of the total insured value.
On September 10, 2017, Hurricane Irma made landfall. In
the area near the facility, the storm produced heavy rain and wind
gusts of over 100 miles per hour. According to Jonathan Kirschner,
who was responsible for overseeing the property for AM Grand,
the five buildings were in good condition before the hurricane. Alt-
hough parts of some of the buildings previously had sustained
1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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4 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
water damage, Kirschner reported that AM Grand had repaired this
damage before the hurricane.
After the storm, Kirschner visited the property and saw that
it had suffered substantial damage. He observed that portions of
the roofs on two of the buildings (Buildings B and D) “had been
pulled up” in the storm and were missing. Doc. 270-3 at 25–26. To
keep additional water from permeating these buildings due to the
roof damage, AM Grand hired a contractor who performed tem-
porary repairs to the roof of Building D and potentially also Build-
ing B.2
AM Grand notified Rockhill that the property had sustained
damage in Hurricane Irma and submitted a claim for the damage.
AM Grand hired a public insurance adjuster, Five Star Claims Ad-
justing, to assist with its claim. After inspecting the property, Five
Star concluded that the roofs of all five buildings had been damaged
in the hurricane and needed to be replaced. It estimated a cost of
approximately $1,200,000 to replace all the roofs. Because AM
Grand could not afford to replace the roofs, it waited for Rockhill
to approve its claim.
Rockhill hired an independent adjusting firm, Engle Martin,
to review AM Grand’s claim. Colby Chavers, an Engle Martin
2 There is conflicting evidence in the record about whether temporary repairs
were made to the roof of Building B. Several witnesses testified at trial that
temporary repairs were made to the roof of Building D only. But at least one
witness reported that temporary repairs were made to the roof of Building B
as well.
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 5
employee, was assigned the claim. Chavers’s role was to determine
the extent of the damage caused by the hurricane and estimate how
much it would cost to repair the damage. Shortly after the storm,
he visited the property and conducted a physical inspection. From
his inspection, Chavers determined that the only damage from the
storm was to a portion of the roof of Building D. When he in-
spected the buildings, Chavers saw some evidence of water dam-
age inside the buildings. But he concluded that this water damage
had occurred over time before Hurricane Irma.
In addition, Rockhill hired third-party experts to evaluate
the scope of the damage caused by the hurricane.3 Engle Martin
engaged Timothy Philmon from Donan Engineering and Mason
Mitchell from the Tines Group. About three months after the hur-
ricane, Philmon and Mitchell inspected the property, including the
roofs and some interior areas of the buildings.
After this physical inspection, Philmon determined that the
damage from Hurricane Irma was confined to Building D and that
only a portion of Building D’s roof needed to be repaired. Philmon
found “no interior or structural damage” to Building D from the
hurricane. Doc. 270-3 at 162. Philmon admitted that he saw “severe
deterioration” of parts of Building B’s roof, id. at 180, but he con-
cluded that this deterioration was the result of regular “wear and
tear” that occurred before Hurricane Irma. Doc. 270-4 at 34–35.
3 AM Grand does not dispute that the policy permitted Rockhill to retain these
additional experts.
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6 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
Mitchell prepared an estimate of the cost of these repairs. He
estimated that it would cost approximately $149,000 to repair the
portions of Building D’s roof that Philmon determined had been
damaged in the hurricane. 4
Based on this estimate and the cost of the temporary repairs
that AM Grand had already completed for Building D, Rockhill de-
termined that AM Grand sustained a loss of $235,556.80 due to the
hurricane. Because this amount was less than the policy’s hurricane
deductible, Rockhill concluded that it owed nothing under the pol-
icy. In May 2018, approximately eight months after the hurricane,
Rockhill notified AM Grand of its decision.
AM Grand maintains that while it was awaiting Rockhill’s
decision, the condition of the buildings deteriorated. According to
Kirschner, moisture damage began to appear inside the buildings.
AM Grand’s maintenance department tried to make repairs. But
the moisture damage kept recurring, requiring additional repairs.
As a result, the maintenance department had to repair some of the
buildings’ interior walls multiple times.
After Rockhill denied the claim, with the buildings’ condi-
tions worsening, AM Grand hired Sergio Arce, an independent in-
surance adjuster, to assess the scope of damage the property
4 Because AM Grand’s public adjuster had determined that all the roofs
needed to be replaced, Engle Martin prepared its own estimate about the cost
to replace all the roofs. It estimated that replacing all the roofs would cost
$1,110,714.
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 7
sustained from the hurricane. In July 2018, approximately 10
months after the hurricane, Arce inspected the property and per-
formed diagnostic testing on the roofs and interior walls of each
building. Based on his inspection, Arce determined that the roofs
of all five buildings suffered “catastrophic failure due to Hurricane
Irma” and needed to be replaced. Doc. 203-59 at 5.
Arce also determined that water had permeated the walls of
the buildings due to the roof damage. He took readings of the mois-
ture levels on the floors, ceilings, and walls and found high mois-
ture levels throughout the buildings. He saw “a lot of water stain-
ing, spalling, [and] blistering of walls particularly around the col-
umns in the hallways of all the buildings.” Doc. 270-2 at 30.
Al Brizuela, a structural engineer and building contractor,
worked alongside Arce. Brizuela agreed with Arce’s opinions that
the roofs of all the buildings were damaged and that the moisture
permeated the interior walls of the buildings. Brizuela concluded
that this damage resulted from Hurricane Irma.
Brizuela explained how the damage to the buildings’ roofs
caused the moisture problems in the walls. He said that the roof of
each building was saturated with water. The water then migrated
down the walls of each building. He explained that the concrete
walls were constructed with hollow core planks. Water was
trapped and accumulated in these hollow areas. The water then
corroded the rebar in the walls, which led to expansion and crack-
ing of the concrete walls in every building.
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8 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
Brizuela assessed what was needed to repair this damage to
the buildings’ interiors. To repair the damage to the concrete walls,
he opined, contractors would have to open up the damaged areas
and remove the water from the hollow areas. They would then
have to chip away the damaged concrete, brush the rebar to re-
move the rust, and cover the rebar with rust inhibitor. Lastly, they
would need to apply concrete patches. According to Brizuela, it
would be less expensive to knock down and rebuild the buildings
than to try to repair the concrete because the labor costs associated
with the repairs would be “astronomical.” Id. at 99.
AM Grand relied on Alain Gonzalez, a construction man-
ager with experience constructing assisted living facilities, to esti-
mate the cost of rebuilding. According to Gonzalez, it would gen-
erally cost between $315 and $400 per square foot to build an as-
sisted living facility. But Gonzalez had never seen a successful bid
of less than $200 per square foot. Given Gonzalez’s estimates of the
cost per square foot to rebuild and that the existing buildings cov-
ered approximately 165,000 square feet, it would cost AM Grand
between $33,000,000 and $66,000,000 to rebuild all the buildings.
B.
After Rockhill failed to pay the claim, AM Grand sued the
insurer in Florida state court for breach of contract. Rockhill re-
moved the action to federal district court and filed a counterclaim
seeking a declaratory judgment that it owed AM Grand nothing
under the policy.
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 9
The district court held a jury trial, which lasted five days. At
trial, the jury heard testimony from witnesses including Kirschner,
Chavers, Philmon, Mitchell, Arce, Brizuela, and Gonzalez.
The primary dispute at trial was the extent to which the
property sustained damage from Hurricane Irma. AM Grand con-
tended that the storm damaged the roofs and interiors of each of
the five buildings. Based on Brizuela’s opinion that it would be less
expensive to rebuild rather than repair the buildings and Gonza-
lez’s opinion about the cost of rebuilding, AM Grand asked the jury
to award $15,112,500, an amount equal to the policy limits. If the
jury concluded that only the roofs were damaged by the storm,
however, AM Grand asked alternatively for the jury to find that it
sustained a loss of approximately $1,200,000, representing the cost
to replace all the roofs based on the estimate from Five Star, its
public adjuster. 5
In contrast, Rockhill took the position that the property sus-
tained minimal damage from Hurricane Irma. It maintained that
only a portion of the roof of one building, Building D, was damaged
by the hurricane. It presented evidence showing that the loss AM
Grand sustained for this damage was $235,556.80, which was less
than the policy’s deductible. Rockhill offered no evidence about the
cost to repair or rebuild if the hurricane damaged the interior of
any of the buildings.
5 Although the public adjuster from Five Star did not testify at trial, Five Star’s
estimate was admitted into evidence.
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10 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
The jury found that Rockhill breached the insurance policy.
It determined that AM Grand’s “covered damages resulting from
Hurricane Irma” were $9,280,000. Doc. 202 at 1–2. After subtract-
ing for the policy’s deductible and making other adjustments, the
district court entered a judgment in AM Grand’s favor in the
amount of $8,753,594.61 plus pre-judgment and post-judgment in-
terest. 6
Rockhill filed a motion for a new trial. 7 It argued that the
jury’s finding that AM Grand sustained damages in the amount of
$9,280,000 was “excessive.” Doc. 252 at 18. Because there was “no
reasonable relation” between the “amount of damages sought” and
the amount of the jury’s award, Rockhill argued, the jury’s award
must have been based on “speculation and conjecture.” Id. at 20.
6 AM Grand also has sought to recover its attorney’s fees and costs. After the
disposition of this appeal, the district court will rule on AM Grand’s request.
7 Rockhill also filed a motion for judgment as matter of law, arguing, con-
sistent with its strategy at trial, that there was no evidence that AM Grand
sustained a loss “in excess of the [p]olicy’s deductible,” and therefore the rec-
ord did not support any amount of damages. Doc. 186 at 4. The district court
denied the motion.
On appeal, Rockhill argues that the district court erred in denying its motion
for judgment as a matter of law. But Rockhill conceded in its reply brief that
based on the estimated $1,200,000 to replace all the roofs, the evidence sup-
ported a jury finding that AM Grand sustained a loss up to that amount. We
agree with Rockhill’s concession that this evidence was sufficient to allow the
jury to award AM Grand some damages. The district court thus did not err in
denying Rockhill’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 11
The district court denied the motion. Addressing Rockhill’s
argument that the damages award was excessive, the court ex-
plained that the relevant question was whether the jury’s award
was “so inordinately large” that it “obviously . . . exceed[ed] the
maximum limit of a reasonable range.” Doc. 279 at 19 (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that Rockhill failed
to show the verdict was excessive. The court observed that at trial
each party made a strategic decision to take an all-or-nothing ap-
proach to the case. First “all”: AM Grand sought the policy limits
of $15,112,500, maintaining that Hurricane Irma had damaged the
roofs and interior of all five buildings and the buildings needed to
be rebuilt rather than repaired. Then “nothing”: Rockhill urged
that AM Grand could recover nothing because the hurricane had
damaged only a portion of one building’s roof, and it would cost
less than the policy’s deductible to repair this damage. The court
concluded that the jury “rejected both sides’ ultimate positions”
when it found that AM Grand suffered damage from the hurricane
in an amount above the deductible but below the policy limits. Id.
at 21. Because the jury’s verdict was “within the range shown by
the evidence at trial,” the court ruled that the verdict was not ex-
cessive. Id. at 21 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8
8 Rockhill also filed a motion for relief from the judgment under Rule 60. In
the Rule 60 motion, it argued, in relevant part, that the verdict should be set
aside because the jury’s award was excessive. The court denied the Rule 60
motion explaining that it had “already determined,” in denying the motion for
a new trial, “that there [was] evidence on the record sufficient” to support the
award. Doc. 279 at 24.
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12 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
This is Rockhill’s appeal.
II.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of
a motion for a new trial. See Kerrivan v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
953 F.3d 1196, 1204 (11th Cir. 2020). In reviewing a compensatory
damages award on a state-law claim, we evaluate the propriety of
the award under state law. See Myers v. Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc.,
592 F.3d
1201, 1211 (11th Cir. 2010); see Kerrivan, 953 F.3d at 1204 n.6 (look-
ing to state law to determine whether a compensatory damages
award was excessive).
III.
The issue before us on appeal is whether the district court
abused its discretion when it denied Rockhill’s motion for a new
trial. Rockhill argues that the district court should have ordered a
new trial because the damages the jury awarded were excessive.
Under Florida law, 9 it is the responsibility of “the court,
upon proper motion, to review the amount of” a damages award
to determine whether the amount is “excessive . . . in light of the
facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact.”
9 Here, there is no dispute that Florida supplies the relevant state law.
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 13
Fla. Stat. § 768.74(1). 10 To determine whether an award is exces-
sive, the court must consider the following criteria:
(a) Whether the amount awarded is indicative of prej-
udice, passion, or corruption on the part of the trier
of fact;
(b) Whether it appears that the trier of fact ignored
the evidence in reaching a verdict or misconceived the
merits of the case relating to the amounts of damages
recoverable;
(c) Whether the trier of fact took improper elements
of damages into account or arrived at the amount of
damages by speculation and conjecture;
(d) Whether the amount awarded bears a reasonable
relation to the amount of damages proved and the in-
jury suffered; and
(e) Whether the amount awarded is supported by the
evidence and is such that it could be adduced in a log-
ical manner by reasonable persons.
Id. § 768.74(5).
When reviewing a jury’s damages award under § 786.74, we
must bear in mind that “assessing the amount of damages is within
10 Florida law requires a court to review whether a damages award is exces-
sive in “any action for damages, whether in tort or in contract.”
Fla. Stat.
§ 768.71(1).
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14 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
the province of the jury.” Odom v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
254 So.
3d 268, 277 (Fla. 2018). “[A] court should never declare a verdict
excessive merely because it is above the amount which the court
itself considers the jury should have allowed.”
Id. (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
In addition, when a trial court refuses to grant a new trial or
reduce a damages award, “the correctness of a jury’s verdict is
strengthened.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent un-
usual circumstances, the trial court judge who denied the motion
for a new trial had “the opportunity to observe the witnesses and
to consider the evidence in the context of a living trial rather than
upon a cold record.”
Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Given the deference afforded a trial court’s deci-
sion, an appellate court generally “should not disturb” a verdict as
excessive “unless the verdict is inordinately large as obviously to
exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the
jury may properly operate.”
Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Int’l Union of Op-
erating Eng’rs,
349 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976)). Under this standard,
our review of the district court’s order denying Rockhill’s motion
for new trial is “very restricted.” Lassiter, 349 So. 2d at 627.
Rockhill argues that the jury’s damages award was excessive
because it “bore no relationship to the evidence of damages ad-
duced at trial.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. According to Rockhill, the ev-
idence allowed the jury only three options with respect to the
amount of AM Grand’s damages:
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 15
(1) to find that all the buildings were damaged in the
hurricane, on the interior and the exterior, and
needed to be rebuilt, at a cost between $51,000,000
and $66,000,000, and thus AM Grand could recover
the policy limits of $15,112,500;
(2) to find that all the buildings’ roofs were damaged
in the hurricane and needed to be replaced at a cost
of approximately $1,200,000, and thus AM Grand
could recover $869,750 after subtracting the policy’s
deductible; or
(3) to find that only a portion of Building D’s roof was
damaged in the hurricane and needed to be repaired,
leaving AM Grand with a loss of $235,556, which was
below the policy’s deductible, and thus AM Grand
could recover nothing.
Because the jury’s verdict fell outside these three options, Rockhill
says, the verdict was excessive.
Rockhill is correct that the amount of damages depended on
the extent to which AM Grand’s buildings were damaged in Hurri-
cane Irma. But we disagree that the jury’s options were as limited
as Rockhill describes. Instead, we conclude—based on the evidence
presented at trial—that the verdict was within the range of dam-
ages that a jury reasonably could have awarded.
At trial, the parties presented conflicting evidence on the ex-
tent of the damage AM Grand sustained due to Hurricane Irma.
The jury could have found that the damage fell somewhere be-
tween damage to a part of the roof of Building D (as Rockhill
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16 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
claimed) and damage to the roofs and interiors of every building
(as AM Grand claimed). For example, the jury could have found
that the hurricane damaged both the roof and interior of Building
B, damaged part of the roof of Building D, and caused no damage
to the other three buildings. If the jury so found, then based on AM
Grand’s damages model presented at trial, the jury could have con-
cluded that AM Grand’s total loss from the hurricane was
$9,200,000. Let us explain how the jury could have gotten there.
For Building B, the jury could have found, based largely on
the testimony from AM Grand’s witnesses, that the hurricane
caused substantial damage to both the roof and interior of the
building. The jury heard from Kirschner that he saw damage to the
roof of Building B after the hurricane. He observed, among other
things, that Styrofoam was missing from portions of Building B’s
roof. Indeed, witnesses from both sides, Philmon and Arce, con-
firmed that there was damage to Building B’s roof. Philmon testi-
fied that he saw “severe deterioration” of Building B’s roof, Doc.
270-3 at 180, and Arce testified that the integrity of Building B’s roof
was “gone.” Doc. 270-2 at 26.
It is true that the jury heard conflicting evidence about the
cause of the damage to Building B’s roof. Philmon opined that the
roof’s severe deterioration occurred before the storm. But the jury
could have disbelieved his testimony and instead credited Bri-
zuela’s testimony that Hurricane Irma damaged the roof of Build-
ing B.
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 17
The jury also heard evidence that the hurricane damaged
not only Building B’s roof, but also its interior walls. Arce described
to the jury how his inspection and testing showed high moisture
levels in Building B’s walls. And Brizuela opined that this water
damage was a result of the storm and the roof’s failure, rather than
any other cause.
After finding that Hurricane Irma damaged Building B’s roof
and its interior walls, the jury also could have found based on Bri-
zuela’s testimony that it would be more cost effective to tear down
and rebuild Building B than to engage in the more labor-intensive
and expensive process of trying to repair the water damage inside
the walls. 11 It then could have used Gonzalez’s damages model in-
dicating that it would cost between $200 and $400 per square foot
to rebuild the building. Because the evidence at trial showed that
Building B was approximately 39,000 square feet, the jury could
11 Rockhill argues that the jury could not find that any of the buildings needed
to be demolished and rebuilt because under Florida law AM Grand could re-
cover the costs of rebuilding only if a “governmental authority issue[d] an or-
der requiring the demolition of the structure or prohibiting repair of the struc-
ture.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. Because there was no evidence of a government
order requiring demolition or prohibiting repair of the buildings, Rockhill
says, AM Grand could not recover damages for the cost of rebuilding. But
Rockhill never took this position in the district court and instead raises it for
the first time on appeal. Therefore, we will not consider it. See Access Now, Inc.
v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[A]n issue not raised
in the district court and raised for the first time on appeal will not be consid-
ered by this [C]ourt.”).
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18 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
have found that it would cost between $7,800,000 and $15,600,000
to rebuild Building B.12
For Building D, the jury could have found that the building
sustained limited damage to its roof from Hurricane Irma and
awarded AM Grand the cost to repair the roof only. There was am-
ple evidence before the jury that Building D’s roof sustained dam-
age in the hurricane. Kirschner testified to seeing damage to the
roof after the hurricane. Rockhill’s witnesses admitted that Build-
ing D’s roof sustained some damage from the hurricane and
needed at least some repairs: Chavers testified that he saw “physical
damage” to the roof of Building D and Philmon agreed that he saw
that “the roof over Building D was damaged by wind.” Doc. 270-3
at 129, 162.
The evidence also supported a finding that the limited dam-
age to Building D’s roof could be repaired without replacing the
entire roof. The jury could have reached this conclusion based on
Philmon’s testimony that the damage to Building D was limited “to
the roof covering, downspouts[,] and gutters” and there was “no
12 Rockhill has not challenged on appeal the admission of Brizuela’s expert
testimony that rebuilding would be less expensive than repairing or Gonza-
lez’s expert testimony about the cost per square foot to rebuild.
We note, too, that at trial Rockhill made a strategic decision to focus on chal-
lenging AM Grand’s evidence about the extent of the damage caused by the
hurricane. It could have, but did not, introduce its own evidence about what
it would cost to repair water damage in the interior of any of the buildings,
the cost per square foot to rebuild buildings in an assisted living facility, or
whether rebuilding would be less expensive than making repairs.
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 19
interior or structural damage” to the building. Id. at 162, 170. And
based on Rockhill’s estimate, the jury could have found that it
would cost $235,556 to repair this damage.
Finally, as to the three remaining buildings, the jury could
have found that AM Grand failed to prove that they sustained any
damage from Hurricane Irma. Although Arce and Brizuela opined
that these buildings’ roofs and interiors were damaged in the
storm, there was evidence going the other way. The jury heard
Chavers’s and Philmon’s opinions that these buildings sustained no
damage from Hurricane Irma and that the water damage inside
them occurred before the storm. Even Kirschner, AM Grand’s cor-
porate representative, did not report seeing any damage to the
roofs of these buildings after the storm. As a result, the jury reason-
ably could have awarded AM Grand no damages for the three re-
maining buildings.
If the jury made the findings described above about the ex-
tent of the damage to each building, then based on the evidence
about the cost of rebuilding Building B and repairing Building D’s
roof, the jury could have calculated AM Grand’s loss from the hur-
ricane to be between $8,035,556 and $15,835,556. The jury’s finding
that AM Grand’s loss was $9,280,000 was well within this range. See
United States v. Sullivan,
1 F.3d 1191, 1196 (11th Cir. 1993) (explain-
ing that a “jury enjoys substantial discretion in awarding damages
within the range shown by the evidence” and is entitled to “reject
the figures offered by the parties”).
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20 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
In arguing that the jury’s verdict was excessive, Rockhill says
that because AM Grand tried the case as a total-loss case, maintain-
ing that all the buildings sustained both roof and interior damage
from the hurricane, the jury had no basis for finding that some, but
not all, of the buildings needed to be rebuilt. 13 Not so. Given the
conflicting evidence at trial about the extent of the damage to each
building individually and whether Hurricane Irma was the cause of
the damage, the jury, as factfinder, was free to find that some, but
not all, of the buildings sustained damage from the hurricane and
to determine the extent of the damage to each building.
We acknowledge that in arriving at a loss amount of
$9,280,000, the jury likely had to have credited some parts of a wit-
ness’s testimony while rejecting other parts of that same witness’s
testimony. For example, the jury may have credited Brizuela’s
opinion that it would be more cost effective to rebuild than replace
buildings with interior water damage but not credited his opinion
that all the buildings sustained damage in the hurricane. But it was
well within the jury’s role of fact finder to make such credibility
13 Rockhill raised for the first time at oral argument another reason why the
jury could not find that some, but not all, the buildings needed to be rebuilt.
It argued that because of the way the buildings were connected, if any building
needed to be demolished, all would need to be demolished. Rockhill thus con-
tended that it was impossible for the jury to conclude that only some of the
buildings needed to be rebuilt. Assuming it is not too late for Rockhill to raise
this argument, it has identified no evidence in the record to support its asser-
tion that it would be impossible to demolish and rebuild some, but not all, of
the buildings. And after carefully reviewing the record, we have found no such
evidence.
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 21
determinations. See Moore v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co.,
340 U.S. 573,
576 (1951) (recognizing that a jury may “credit or discredit all or
part of” a witness’s testimony); Seymour v. Oceanic Navigating Co.,
453 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir. 1972) (recognizing that a factfinder
“may, of course, choose to reject certain portions of a witness’s tes-
timony while accepting other portions”).14
What is more, there are other ways that the jury reasonably
could have arrived at its $9,280,000 damages verdict. As AM
Grand’s counsel explained at oral argument, the jury could have
found that Building A1, which covered approximately 27,000
square feet, suffered both roof and interior damage from the hurri-
cane and that AM Grand would need to rebuild this building. Using
Gonzalez’s damages model, the jury could have found that it
would cost between $5,400,000 and $10,800,000 to rebuild. Or the
jury could have found that Buildings A1 and A2, which together
totaled approximately 44,000 square feet, both needed to be rebuilt
due to roof and interior damage from the storm. Applying Gonza-
lez’s damages model to this scenario, the jury could have found
that it would cost between $8,800,000 and $17,600,000 to rebuild
Buildings A1 and A2. Under either of these additional scenarios, the
14 In Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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22 Opinion of the Court 20-13954
trial evidence would have supported the jury’s $9,280,000 ver-
dict. 15
The jury’s damages award in this case was not “so inordi-
nately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reason-
able range within which the jury may properly operate.” Odom,
254
So. 3d at 277 (internal quotation marks omitted). We reach this
conclusion after considering the evidence in the record as well as
the “deference properly given to the jury’s determination of such
matters of fact as the weight of the evidence and the quantum of
damages” and the deference due the district court, which denied
Rockhill’s motion for a new trial after “observ[ing] the witnesses”
and “consider[ing] the evidence in the context of a living trial rather
than upon a cold record.”
Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 16
15 Rockhill speculates that the jury reached its $9,280,000 verdict based on
evidence showing that AM Grand’s parent company lost approximately
$9,000,000 in its investment when it sold the property. Rockhill argues that it
would have been improper for the jury to consider the ultimate value of AM
Grand’s investment to calculate its loss from the hurricane under the insur-
ance policy. Because, as we explain above, the jury’s award was reasonable
and supported by evidence about the loss that AM Grand sustained in the hur-
ricane, we need not address Rockhill’s argument.
16 Rockhill also argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for
relief from judgment under Federal of Civil Procedure 60. It says that because
the jury’s “verdict was excessive,” the district court erred in denying its Rule
60 motion and refusing to set aside or reduce the verdict. Appellant’s Br. at 35.
We affirm the district court’s denial of the Rule 60 motion for the same reasons
that we affirm the denial of the Rule 59 motion for a new trial.
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20-13954 Opinion of the Court 23
AFFIRMED.
