Thomas Dale Ferguson v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections ( 2023 )

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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-12727
____________________
THOMAS DALE FERGUSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 3:09-cv-00138-CLS-JEO
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2 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
____________________
Before WILSON, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
Thomas Dale Ferguson is an Alabama prisoner serving a
death sentence following his jury convictions on four counts of cap-
ital murder. After pursuing a direct appeal and post-conviction re-
lief in the Alabama state courts, Ferguson filed a federal habeas pe-
tition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Ferguson appeals the district court’s
denial of his federal habeas petition, arguing that the district court
did not apply the proper standard for intellectual disability as re-
quired by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), and erred in finding
Ferguson was not intellectually disabled. Ferguson also contends
that the state court’s determination that Ferguson’s counsel was
not ineffective during the pretrial and penalty phases was an unrea-
sonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984).
After careful review and with the benefit of oral argument, we af-
firm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Guilt Phase
In 1997, an Alabama grand jury indicted Ferguson on four
counts of capital murder in connection with the murder of Harold
Pugh and his eleven-year-old son, Joey Pugh. Ferguson v. State, 814
So. 2d 925, 933 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (Ferguson I). The murder of
the Pughs constituted four capital counts because the killings were
committed during a robbery in the first degree (two counts); the
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20-12727 Opinion of the Court 3
killings involved the murder of two or more persons by one
scheme or course of conduct; and Joey was less than fourteen years
old at the time of his death. See Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(2), (10),
(15) (1975).
On July 26, 1997, Ferguson and his four codefendants—Mark
Moore, Michael Craig Maxwell, Donald Risley, and Kino Gra-
ham—robbed a bank in Mississippi. Ferguson I, 814 So. 2d at 934.
Prior to robbing the bank, they went looking for a getaway vehicle
at a local boat landing. Id. at 935. Ultimately, they decided to steal
a truck belonging to Harold Pugh. Id. As Harold and Joey arrived
at the boat landing, Maxwell ordered the Pughs back onto their
boat. Id. After getting on the boat and heading downstream, Fer-
guson shot Harold and Maxwell shot Joey. Id. at 937. The jury
found Ferguson guilty on all four counts of capital murder. Id. at
933.
B. Sentencing
During the sentencing phase, Ferguson called Dr. James
Chudy, a clinical psychologist who had evaluated Ferguson for the
sentencing phase. Dr. Chudy testified that Ferguson was not intel-
lectually disabled but that Ferguson’s IQ was likely in the border-
line range. Id. at 962. Further, Dr. Chudy testified that
this borderline intelligence could possibly impair Fer-
guson’s “reasoning in social situations”; that it could
affect his ability to “reason abstractly”; and that it
could “diminish to a degree” his ability to appreciate
the consequences of his actions. In addition, Dr.
Chudy diagnosed Ferguson as having a “personality
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4 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
disorder” with borderline features. Dr. Chudy stated
that this disorder could result in mood swings that
could affect Ferguson’s relationships. Dr. Chudy also
stated that Ferguson may have some “transient or
brief ” psychotic periods where he is “out of touch
with reality.” However, in his written report, Dr.
Chudy stated that Ferguson’s claims of psychotic epi-
sodes—i.e., hearing voices that told him to do things
to other people and having hallucinations of people
and objects moving—were “difficult to substantiate”
and that the accuracy of those claims “remains in
question.” Dr. Chudy also stated in his report that
there were “no signs of disturbance in [Ferguson’s]
thinking”; that Ferguson was not psychotic; and that
Ferguson’s thinking was merely “illogical.”
Id. at 962–63.
Ferguson also called his wife, Karen Ferguson. She testified
that they were married in November 1992, that Ferguson had a job
most of the time they were married, and that Ferguson was not
violent. Karen also testified that Ferguson was mentally slow, and
that she made all the decisions in their marriage, often telling Fer-
guson what to do.
On rebuttal, Alabama called Dr. Stephen Rosen, a clinical
psychologist, who examined Ferguson before trial pursuant to a
court order. Dr. Rosen testified that Ferguson was not intellectu-
ally disabled despite his IQ score of 69, but Ferguson’s IQ was likely
in the borderline range. Id. at 963. Further, Dr. Rosen testified that
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Ferguson first told him that he did not do it and then
said that he was an unwilling participant; by the end
of the evaluation, however, Ferguson was claiming
that voices had told him to commit the crime. Dr.
Rosen stated that during the evaluation Ferguson at-
tempted to give him “the impression that he was
more disturbed than in fact he was” by exaggerating
and claiming symptoms he believed to be signs of a
mental disorder—specifically, by claiming that he
heard voices and saw “little green men [who] were
laughing and telling him to do things.” Dr. Rosen,
like Dr. Chudy, also diagnosed Ferguson as having a
personality disorder and stated that the disorder could
result in mood swings, antisocial traits, and perhaps
some transient or temporary episodes where Fergu-
son is “out of touch with reality.”
Id.Alabama argued the existence of one aggravating circum-
stance: the capital offense (murders) was committed during a rob-
bery. Ferguson argued the existence of five mitigating circum-
stances, including his character. Ferguson presented evidence of
his character—his school records, his relationship with his father
(who was actually his stepfather), and his low IQ. After hearing all
the testimony and considering the evidence, the jury
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6 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
recommended, 11 to 1, a sentence of life in prison without the pos-
sibility of parole.1
At sentencing, the trial judge found one statutory aggravat-
ing circumstance: the murders were committed while Ferguson
was engaged in a robbery. The trial judge found one statutory mit-
igating circumstance: Ferguson had no significant history of prior
criminal activity. The trial judge did find the following evidence to
be mitigating: (1) Ferguson’s surrender and confession to authori-
ties, and (2) the jury’s recommendation of life imprisonment. Yet
when discussing the jury recommendation, the trial court found
that Ferguson’s age at the time of the crime (24) was not a mitigat-
ing circumstance.
Ultimately, the trial court overruled the jury’s vote and sen-
tenced Ferguson to death. The trial judge explained:
The Court does find that there is a reasonable basis
for enhancing the jury’s recommendation of life im-
prisonment without parole for the reasons stated
herein, and this was a murder of a[n] adult man and
his young son during a robbery, and [Ferguson] had
the opportunity to reflect and withdraw from his ac-
tions and chose not to do so; that [Ferguson’s]
1 In a capital case, Alabama now requires that the jury’s sentencing verdict
binds the trial court and is no longer a recommendation to be overridden by
the judge. Ala. Code § 13A-5-47(a) (“Where the jury has returned a verdict of
death, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. Where a sentence of
death is not returned by the jury, the court shall sentence the defendant to life
imprisonment without parole.”).
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capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law was not substantially impaired.
Ferguson appealed, and relevant to this appeal, he argued
that the trial court erred in not finding as a nonstatutory mitigating
circumstance that he was intellectually disabled. Ferguson I, 814 So.
2d at 965. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA) noted
that “the trial court did refer to the evidence of Ferguson’s low in-
telligence in several parts of its sentencing order.” Id. The ACCA
found that the “trial court did not err in not finding, as a nonstatu-
tory mitigating circumstance, that Ferguson was” intellectually dis-
abled because there was no evidence in the record to support that
finding. Id. Ultimately, the ACCA affirmed Ferguson’s conviction
and death sentence. Ferguson I, 814 So. 2d at 970.
The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed Ferguson’s peti-
tion and found that there was no error in the ACCA’s opinion. Ex
parte Ferguson, 814 So. 2d 970, 975 (Ala. 2001). The United States
Supreme Court denied Ferguson’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
Ferguson v. Alabama, 535 U.S. 907 (2002).
C. State Post-Conviction Proceedings
In March 2003, Ferguson petitioned for a writ of habeas cor-
pus in state trial court, also called a Rule 32 petition in Alabama.
Although Ferguson made several claims in his Rule 32 petition, this
section only discusses the issues involved in this appeal. First, Fer-
guson argued that he is intellectually disabled and thus constitu-
tionally protected from being sentenced to death under Atkins v.
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8 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). To support the first prong of his Atkins
claim, Ferguson pointed to his full-scale IQ score of 71 when he
was in the sixth grade and his full-scale IQ score of 69 when he was
awaiting trial. Ferguson then detailed how he established at trial
that he had severe limitations in adaptive functioning, including be-
ing placed in special educational programs at school.
Then, Ferguson also asserted many ineffective assistance of
counsel claims, both at the pretrial and sentencing phases. For the
pretrial stage, Ferguson argued that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to act in his interest by providing inadequate representation
during his statement to the police. Specifically, Ferguson asserted
that his trial counsel failed to adequately advise him of his rights
and encouraged Ferguson to talk to the police even without a plea
deal. Ferguson also argued that his trial counsel failed to conduct
an adequate independent investigation. To support his argument,
Ferguson stated that his trial counsel had minimal contact with his
family, failed to investigate the other suspects, and did not gather
evidence to support his mental health defense.
For the sentencing phase, Ferguson argued that trial counsel
was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present mit-
igation evidence. Relevant to this appeal, Ferguson argued that his
trial counsel failed to contact and interview people who had
knowledge about the abuse Ferguson suffered at the hands of his
stepfather. Ferguson detailed his family history and explained how
his stepfather routinely abused Ferguson’s mother, Betty, and his
half-brothers. Ferguson explained that witnesses would have
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testified about how his stepfather beat Betty to the point that she
attempted suicide, which led to her institutionalization. Ferguson
argued that if his trial counsel had interviewed these witnesses,
they would have been able to present a stronger, more sympathetic
argument during the mitigation phase of sentencing.
In October 2006, the state trial court denied Ferguson’s re-
quest for an evidentiary hearing and summarily denied his Rule 32
petition. In addressing Ferguson’s Atkins claim, the trial court dis-
cussed Ferguson’s IQ scores and how he often gave up easily on
those tests, which resulted in lower scores. The trial court also
stated that the expert opinions both concluded that Ferguson was
not intellectually disabled. Ultimately, the trial court concluded
that Ferguson’s IQ was “best classified as borderline to low average
intellectual functioning.”
The trial court then moved on to discuss the evidence about
whether Ferguson exhibited significant or substantial deficits in
adaptive functioning. The trial court reviewed Ferguson’s work
history, including a promotion, and then discussed Ferguson’s abil-
ity to develop relationships, including his marriage and his actions
during and after the crime. After considering all the evidence, the
trial court found that Ferguson “demonstrated a high level of adap-
tive functioning.” Thus, the trial court found that “Ferguson does
not meet either the intelligence or adaptive functioning elements
necessary to establish” intellectual disability, and thus he was not
intellectually disabled.
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10 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
The trial court also found that Ferguson’s ineffective assis-
tance claim that his counsel should have prevented him from mak-
ing inculpatory statements to police lacked merit. Specifically, the
trial court found that, based on the transcript of Ferguson’s confes-
sion, Ferguson initially contacted the police to give his statement,
and his lawyer advised Ferguson of his right to remain silent and of
the possible consequences of speaking. Next, the trial court found
Ferguson’s arguments that his counsel failed to conduct an ade-
quate independent investigation to be insufficiently pleaded under
Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(b).
Turning to Ferguson’s penalty phase arguments, the trial
court found that Ferguson could not demonstrate deficient perfor-
mance or prejudice as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). Specifically, the trial court explained that “[t]rial coun-
sel’s investigation of Ferguson’s case and presentation of mitigating
evidence was more than reasonable in light of the circumstances of
the case. The reasonableness of trial counsel’s mitigation strategy
is supported by the jury’s 11 to 1 recommendation of life without
parole.” The trial court went through Ferguson’s allegations about
his childhood abuse and how that information was already in the
record through Dr. Chudy’s notes and Karen’s testimony. The trial
court also explained that “[e]ven if the Court assumed that the al-
legations in the petition are true and that counsel could have pre-
sented additional witnesses to testify regarding Ferguson’s abuse as
a child, . . . the evidence would be nothing more than cumulative
to that already presented.” The trial court also agreed with the
sentencing judge who determined that Ferguson’s “difficult
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childhood” was not a mitigating factor. Specifically, the trial court
noted that
Ferguson was 24 years old at the time of the crime.
He had been married for five years and was able to
support himself and his wife while she attended nurs-
ing school. Under the circumstances of this case, the
petitioner’s allegations of child abuse and borderline
intellect, even if true, would not mitigate his actions
as an adult.
In April 2008, the ACCA affirmed the state trial court’s deci-
sion. Ferguson v. State, 13 So. 3d 418, 445 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008)
(Ferguson II). In regard to Ferguson’s Atkins claim, the ACCA re-
viewed the record of both Ferguson’s direct criminal appeal and
post-conviction proceedings and then re-stated verbatim the trial
court’s findings from Ferguson’s post-conviction proceedings. Id.at 433–36. Ultimately, the ACCA concluded that “the circuit court’s
findings are more than supported by the record.” Id. at 435–36.
The ACCA found that Ferguson was not intellectually disabled. Id.
at 436.
Next, the ACCA reviewed Ferguson’s ineffective assistance
claims. First, as to Ferguson’s claim that his counsel was ineffective
during Ferguson’s statements to the police, the ACCA found the
trial court’s dismissal of that claim proper. The ACCA noted that
the day after Ferguson’s arrest, he spoke with the police alongside
his counsel, Tony Glenn. Id. at 437–38. The ACCA reprinted the
following exchange between Glenn and Ferguson:
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Mr. Glenn: Dale, you called me earlier today and you
told me that you wanted to try and help yourself with
the Colbert County Sheriff’s Department and the FBI
on these charges that are here pending today. You had
information you thought would help them. You real-
ize that I have gone over with you your rights and told
you that you don’t have to talk, but it is your—but you
have informed me that you choose to help at this
point to try to help yourself; is that correct?
Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.
Mr. Glenn: Do you realize that there are no deals at
this point?
Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.
Mr. Glenn: That what you are doing is voluntary and
you are doing it to try to help yourself in further-
ance—
Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.
Mr. Glenn: —of this; is that correct?
Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.
Mr. Glenn: And this is what you want to do?
Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.
Mr. Glenn: And do you realize that this is on the rec-
ord, this tape that we are making here today can and
will more than likely be used in court?
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Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.
Mr. Glenn: Okay. With that, do you want to go for-
ward?
Mr. Ferguson: Yes, sir.
Id. at 438. Following this exchange, Ferguson ultimately confessed.
See id.In reviewing the above exchange, the ACCA noted that Fer-
guson himself suggested that he make the inculpatory statement
to the police, not Ferguson’s counsel. Id. The ACCA adopted the
trial court’s finding that Ferguson’s statements were voluntarily
made and concluded that his attorney, Glenn, could not “be held
ineffective for the informed and voluntary choices of [his] client.”
Id. at 438–39.
When pursuing his clam that his trial counsel failed to con-
duct an adequate independent investigation, Ferguson argued that
“[t]rial counsel’s performance was also objectively deficient, for
many reasons and including the unavailability of sufficient funds
for a thorough defense.” Id. at 439. Then, the ACCA addressed:
In a footnote, he then purports not to waive any claim
presented in his petition or apparent from the record.
However, he does not set forth any facts or argument
in support of his bare contention. Rather, he simply
moves to his next ineffective-assistance allegation.
Therefore, he has not complied with the require-
ments set forth in Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P., as to
this allegation.
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Id.Last, as to Ferguson’s ineffective assistance claim, the ACCA
again repeated the findings from the trial court and adopted them
as part of the ACCA’s opinion finding that summary dismissal was
proper. Id. at 439–43.
In January 2009, the Supreme Court of Alabama denied Fer-
guson’s petition for certiorari.
D. Federal § 2254 Proceedings
In 2009, Ferguson filed a federal habeas petition in the
Northern District of Alabama. Relevant to this appeal, Ferguson
challenged the state court’s failure to give him an Atkins hearing on
his intellectual disability claim and the state court’s determination
on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The district court
denied Ferguson’s petition on all grounds.
Ferguson then moved to amend the judgment because,
among other reasons, courts cannot rely on “pre-Atkins evidence to
determine if a petitioner qualifies for relief under Atkins.” The dis-
trict court granted Ferguson’s request and vacated the portion of
its prior order regarding Ferguson’s Atkins claim.
On August 27, 2019, the district court held an evidentiary
hearing on Ferguson’s Atkins claim and heard from two experts.
Ferguson retained Dr. Robert Shaffer to evaluate his “cognitive and
intellectual functions, and his adaptive behavior” to determine
whether Ferguson was intellectually disabled and thus ineligible for
the death penalty. Alabama retained Dr. Glen King “to primarily
determine the intellectual ability of ” Ferguson.
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To prevail on his Atkins claim, Ferguson had to prove that he
had significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (IQ of 70 or
below), substantial deficits in adaptive behavior, and the manifesta-
tion of those problems before Ferguson reached the age of 18. See
Smith v. State, 213 So. 3d 239, 248 (Ala. 2007). At the hearing, the
district court also heard about Ferguson’s prior IQ scores, received
prior expert reports about Ferguson’s intellectual disability, and re-
viewed Ferguson’s school reports, which included prior IQ testing.
The next paragraphs lay out in chronological order the evidence
Ferguson presented to the district court to support his Atkins claim.
In November 1979, Ferguson obtained a full-scale IQ score
of 77 on the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale (Binet). Before the
1985–1986 school year, Ferguson was evaluated for special educa-
tion services because of a “lack of academic progress, suspected
learning disability, deficient reading skills, and deficient handwrit-
ing skills.” Using the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Re-
vised (WISC-R), Ferguson achieved a verbal IQ score of 74, a per-
formance IQ score of 71, and a full-scale IQ score of 71. The eval-
uator noted that Ferguson “gave up easily on both verbal and non-
verbal items,” and he “did not appear to be challenged by the more
difficult items on the test.” Using the results, the school found Fer-
guson was eligible for special services as “educationally mentally
handicapped.” Within the report, the evaluator explained that Fer-
guson’s prior IQ score of 77 on the Binet was consistent with his
current WISC-R score.
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In 1988, pursuant to school policy, the school re-evaluated
Ferguson, and he achieved a verbal IQ score of 87, performance IQ
score of 88, and a full-scale IQ score of 87. As a result, the school
moved Ferguson to normal classes, but he received special assis-
tance such as receiving help with certain subjects, having more
time to take a test, or having someone read the test to him.
In December 1997, Dr. Rosen administered the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R), and Ferguson achieved
a verbal IQ score of 76, a performance IQ score of 66, and a full-
scale IQ score of 69. But Dr. Rosen noted that it was “quite appar-
ent that [Ferguson] did not make a good effort in this test, giving
up readily on many items and seemingly not trying as hard as pos-
sible.” At Ferguson’s criminal trial, Dr. Rosen expounded on Fer-
guson’s lack of effort by noting that Ferguson’s assessment revealed
a “somewhat inconsistent pattern” where he would get the earlier,
simpler questions wrong but would then get later, harder questions
right. Dr. Rosen testified that he did not see any signs of intellec-
tual disability, but that Ferguson’s intellectual abilities were below
average—in the borderline intellectual functioning range with an
IQ between 70 and 84. Dr. Rosen testified that if Ferguson had “re-
ally tried [then] he would have scored probably in the middle 70’s
for most of them, perhaps higher.”
In June 1998, after conducting a psychological evaluation,
Dr. Chudy did not provide a specific IQ score but noted that the
Shipley Institute of Living Scale placed Ferguson in the borderline
intellectual range at about the fifth percentile. Dr. Chudy also
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testified that borderline intellectual functioning covers “the area be-
tween low average intelligence and” intellectual disability.
In preparation for the evidentiary hearing, between Septem-
ber 2017 and March 2018, Dr. Shaffer met with Ferguson and inter-
viewed Ferguson’s mother, Betty. Dr. Shaffer administered the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV), and
Ferguson received a full-scale IQ score of 77. But after applying the
Flynn Effect2 and the standard error of measurement (SEM), 3 Dr.
Shaffer explained that Ferguson’s IQ fell between 69.4 and 78.4 with
95% probability, or between 67.9 and 78.9 with a confidence level
of 99%. Dr. Shaffer determined that the totality of the test scores
aligned with his opinion that Ferguson has significant limitations in
his ability to function intellectually, despite some tests not showing
substantial impairments. As for adaptive functioning, Dr. Shaffer
administered the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales Test
2 The Flynn Effect refers to findings by Dr. James Flynn that average IQ scores
have increased steadily by roughly .3 points every year since the IQ test was
normed. Thus, when applying the Flynn Effect, the evaluator looks at when
the test was normed (approximately mid-2007 for the Wechsler Fourth Edi-
tion) and when the test was administered (September 2017), then determines
the difference (here 10.2 years), and subsequently multiplies it by .3 (the an-
nual increase) to get a set number (3.06), which is subtracted from the full-
scale IQ score (77). So Ferguson’s September 2017 full-scale score of 77 would
be reduced by 3.06 points to 73.94 if adjusted for the Flynn Effect.
3 The SEM typically involves a range from five below to five above the set IQ.
This provides a range for the IQ score, which likely gives a better estimate
than a fixed number for the person’s IQ.
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18 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
(Vineland) 4 to Betty Ferguson because she could provide observa-
tions of Ferguson at the age of 18. Considering Betty’s responses
about Ferguson at the age of 18, Ferguson’s Vineland scores
showed 67 in communication, 67 in daily living skills, and 68 in so-
cialization, giving him a composite score of 63. This placed him in
the first percentile, meaning that 99 percent of comparable eight-
een-year-olds had greater skills and abilities to perform daily rou-
tines than Ferguson did at the age of 18. Dr. Shaffer concluded that
those findings justified an intellectual disability diagnosis.
In February 2018, Dr. King evaluated Ferguson and adminis-
tered the WAIS-IV and the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Test, Fifth
Edition (SB-5). Ferguson received a score of 85 on the WAIS-IV and
a score of 84 on the SB-5. Dr. King adjusted Ferguson’s score on
the WAIS-IV using the SEM, providing a range of 81 to 89. Dr. King
administered the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System where Fer-
guson rated his own abilities on whether he could perform several
tasks. Ferguson highly rated his ability to complete the identified
tasks. Dr. King also administered the Independent Living Scales,
which measures practical abilities of managing money, health and
safety, social adjustment, and problem solving. Dr. King testified
about Ferguson’s performance on the test and noted his belief that
Ferguson did not have subaverage intellectual functioning and that
4 The Vineland looks at three domains of adaptive behavior: communication
skills, daily living skills, and social skills. Typically, the Vineland is adminis-
tered to parents, caregivers, or teachers rather than the person whose IQ is at
issue.
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there was no indication of poor adaptive functioning (only lower
social adjustment which is expected from being on death row).
After the evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Fer-
guson’s request for relief, concluding that Ferguson failed to estab-
lish by a preponderance of the evidence that he has an intellectual
disability. The district court gathered and identified all of Fergu-
son’s IQ scores, as detailed below: 5
Test IQ Test Full Scale Flynn Effect SEM Range
Date Given Score Adjustment
1979 SB-3 77 75.2 70.2–80.2
1985 WISC-R 71 67.7 62.7–72.7
1988 WISC-R 87 82.2 77.2–87.2
1997 WAIS-R 69 64.2 59.2–69.2
2017 WAIS-IV 77 74.3 69.3–79.3
2018 WAIS-IV 78 75.15 70.15–80.15
SB-5 84 79.6 74.6–84.6
5 This chart comes from the district court’s order but does not contain the
column listing when the IQ tests were normed, nor does it contain the corre-
sponding footnotes. We have also adjusted the 2018 SB-5 score to correct an
error recognized by the district court in a subsequent order—the court initially
reduced the SB-5 score for “practice effect,” but later acknowledged that the
practice-effect reduction applied only to the 2018 WAIS-IV score. Of note, the
district court correctly identified the years the tests were normed but still
made mathematical errors when calculating the Flynn Effect. See supra n. 2.
Ferguson does not argue these errors nor do they make a difference in our
ultimate decision. Thus, we use the calculation provided by the district court.
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20 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
The district court reduced the 2018 WAIS-IV IQ score by 7
points for practice effect 6 because Dr. King re-administered the
same test Dr. Shaffer administered five months earlier.
Considering his evaluators also noted that Ferguson did not
try on some of his IQ tests (specifically the ones where he scored
below 70), the district court found that Ferguson did not suffer
from “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning.” As for
adaptive behavior, the district court found that Ferguson failed to
show “substantial present limitations” in adaptive functioning and
that most of the evidence produced focused on the time before and
during Ferguson’s trial. The district court did not address whether
his IQ scores and deficits in adaptive functioning manifested before
Ferguson reached 18-years-old.
Ferguson timely appealed the district court’s denial of ha-
beas relief. First, Ferguson argues that the district court clearly
erred in finding that he was not intellectually disabled. Second, Fer-
guson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective at multiple stages
of his case and thus the ACCA’s decision is an unreasonable appli-
cation of Strickland. We will address each argument in turn.
6 In citing a 2012 study, the district court explained that when “the WAIS-IV
was re-administered at three or six months after the initial, baseline admin-
istration of that test[, the study] found that their Full-Scale IQ score increased
an average of 7 points.”
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20-12727 Opinion of the Court 21
II. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY CLAIM
Ferguson argues that the district court erred in two ways
concerning his Atkins claim.7 First, Ferguson argues that the dis-
trict court erred in requiring him to show that he presently suffered
from substantial deficits in adaptive functioning at the time of his
Atkins hearing, which occurred over twenty years after the crime.
Second, regardless of the standard, Ferguson argues that the district
court clearly erred in finding him not intellectually disabled.
“A determination as to whether a person is [intellectually
disabled] is a finding of fact.” Fults v. GDCP Warden, 764 F.3d 1311,
1319 (11th Cir. 2014). “We review for clear error a district court’s
finding that an individual is not intellectually disabled.” Ledford v.
Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 632
(11th Cir. 2016). “[A] finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
7 In its order granting Ferguson’s motion to alter or amend the judgment as
to his Atkins claim, the district court, citing Burgess v. Commissioner, Alabama
Department of Corrections, 723 F.3d 1308, 1317 (11th Cir. 2013), agreed with Fer-
guson’s argument that it was an unreasonable application of Atkins to consider
potential mitigation information produced before the Atkins decision to deter-
mine whether Ferguson is intellectually disabled. Not until oral argument
when this court asked Alabama whether the district court erred in having an
evidentiary hearing did Alabama contest the district court’s order setting and
conducting an evidentiary hearing. But Alabama’s argument in response was
conclusory at best. Here, we make no determination about whether the dis-
trict court erred in holding an evidentiary hearing and reviewing Ferguson’s
Atkins claim de novo, and we will only review the district court’s finding that
Ferguson is not intellectually disabled.
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22 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573 (1985) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395 (1948)).
In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the execution of in-
tellectually disabled people violates the Eighth Amendment, leav-
ing to the individual states “the task of developing appropriate
ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execu-
tion of sentences.” 536 U.S. at 317. But the Supreme Court noted
that “clinical definitions of [intellectual disability] require not only
subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant limitations
in adaptive skills” that manifested before the age of 18. Id. at 318.
In Ex Parte Perkins, the Supreme Court of Alabama discussed
the Supreme Court’s decision in Atkins and how the broadest defi-
nition of intellectual disability requires the prisoner to prove: (1)
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (IQ below 70), (2)
significant deficits in adaptive functioning, and (3) that both issues
manifested before the age of 18. 851 So. 2d 453, 456 (Ala. 2002).
Later in Smith, Alabama formally adopted the broadest definition
and requires that “in order for an offender to be considered [intel-
lectually disabled] in the Atkins context, the offender must cur-
rently exhibit subaverage intellectual functioning, currently exhibit
deficits in adaptive behavior, and these problems must have mani-
fested themselves before the age of 18.” 213 So. 3d at 248.
Turning to Ferguson’s arguments, he contends that by re-
quiring a showing of present deficits in adaptive functioning,
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20-12727 Opinion of the Court 23
Alabama’s standard for determining intellectual disability conflicts
with Atkins and is thus unconstitutional. Regardless of the validity
of Alabama’s requirement that Ferguson must demonstrate sub-
stantial present limitations in adaptive functioning, under Smith,
Ferguson also has to show he possessed significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning. Because the district court found Ferguson
at no point had subaverage intellectual functioning, and because
Ferguson has not shown the district court clearly erred in making
that finding, we need not address whether requiring present signifi-
cant deficits in adaptive functioning runs afoul of Atkins.
We now turn to Ferguson’s argument about his intellectual
functioning. Specifically, Ferguson argues that when considering
all his IQ scores, including when adjusted for the Flynn Effect and
after the SEM has been applied, he has significantly subaverage in-
tellectual functioning. We disagree.
After reviewing all the evidence, the district court found that
when adjusted for the Flynn Effect, all but two of Ferguson’s IQ
scores were above 70, the rough cutoff for intellectual disability.
The two IQ scores below 70 were the 1985 IQ test (score of 67.7)
and the 1997 IQ test (score of 64.2). The district court discounted
those two scores based on evidence that Ferguson did not put forth
his best effort on those tests. Because we have held that the trier
of fact can discount IQ scores when there is evidence of malinger-
ing, Clemons v. Comm’r, Alabama Department of Corrections, 967 F.3d
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24 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
1231, 1248 (11th Cir. 2020), 8 we cannot say that the district court’s
factual finding about Ferguson’s IQ scores is clearly erroneous.
Ferguson asserts that we should find the district court clearly
erred in discounting the two sub-70 scores because the remaining
tests, including the most recent ones, showed that Ferguson put in
the appropriate effort. Ferguson’s argument misses the mark. Fer-
guson wants us to require the district court to impute his legitimate
effort expended on later tests to all of his tests. This would be an
error—just like it would have been an error had the district court
imputed the malingering accusations onto all of Ferguson’s IQ
scores. Rather, the district court properly reviewed each IQ score
and any notes from the corresponding evaluator to weigh whether
to credit those scores. Both challenged tests included notations
from the evaluators about Ferguson’s lack of effort, and the district
court weighed those records, including Dr. Rosen’s credentials, to
determine whether he could have reasonably arrived at his conclu-
sion. See Clemons, 967 F.3d at 1248. We find that the district court
took the correct approach, and the record supports its finding.
8 Although Clemons involved reviewing the petitioner’s Atkins claim through
the lens of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, we see
no reason why a district court, sitting as the trier of fact, should not be allowed
to discount IQ scores when there is evidence of malingering.
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20-12727 Opinion of the Court 25
After the SEM is applied, only one other test has a range that
falls below 70: the 2017 IQ test. 9 But, importantly, the SEM “is
merely a factor to consider when assessing an individual’s intellec-
tual functioning—one that may benefit or hurt that individual’s At-
kins claim, depending on the content and quality of expert testi-
mony presented.” Ledford, 818 F.3d at 640–41.
We find that the district court committed no clear error in
its consideration of those IQ scores and the SEM range associated
with those scores. Ferguson’s 2017 IQ score of 77 would yield a
SEM IQ range (after being adjusted for the Flynn Effect) of 69.3–
79.3. 10 The other four scores considered by the district court
ranged from just above 70 at the low end of the SEM range to 87.2
at the high end. The experts disagreed as to whether Ferguson’s
intellectual functioning may be higher or lower than his overall IQ
score reflected. For example, the trial experts—one appointed by
the court and one called by Ferguson—testified that Ferguson’s
9 Although the 1985 and 1997 IQ scores would produce a range below 70, we
need not address the SEM range for those tests because we found that the dis-
trict court properly discredited those IQ scores based on malingering.
10 The district court, as we explained earlier, discounted Ferguson’s IQ scores
based on the Flynn Effect and (as to the 2018 WAIS-IV score) the practice ef-
fect. For clarity, we repeat what we’ve said in other cases: while a factfinder
may consider both effects in assessing an offender’s possible intellectual disa-
bility (if there’s evidence to support them), it is not required to consider them.
See Jenkins v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 963 F.3d 1248, 1276 (11th Cir. 2020);
Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987, 1008 (11th Cir. 2019); Ledford, 818 F.3d at
638–39.
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26 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
intellectual functioning was above the disabled range. Twenty
years later, at the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Shaffer explained there
was a 95% probability that Ferguson’s full scale IQ score was be-
tween 69.4–78.4. As a result, Dr. Shaffer found that Ferguson had
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning because his IQ
could be less than 70. But Dr. King testified that, considering Fer-
guson’s IQ scores and the SEM ranges, Ferguson’s IQ placed him
at either the high end of the borderline range (70–84) or at the low
end of the average range (85–115). In ultimately concluding that
Ferguson had not shown significantly subaverage intellectual func-
tioning, the district court credited Dr. King’s testimony over Dr.
Shaffer, which is plausible in light of the record. See Ledford, 818
F.3d at 641 (“So long as the district court’s findings regarding how
the standard error of measurement informs its ultimate intellectual
functioning determination are plausible in light of the record evi-
dence viewed in its entirety, there will be no clear error.”).
* * *
Because the district court’s finding that Ferguson is not in-
tellectually disabled is plausible in light of the entire record, it is not
clearly erroneous. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573–74 (“If the district
court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record
viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even
though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it
would have weighed the evidence differently.”). We therefore af-
firm the district court on this point.
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20-12727 Opinion of the Court 27
III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS
Ferguson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective during
both the pretrial and sentencing stages of his case. The ACCA de-
nied Ferguson’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, so our re-
view is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2554 (AEDPA). See Lynch v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr., 776 F.3d 1209, 1217 (11th Cir. 2015).
Under AEDPA, a federal court can grant relief to a state pris-
oner only if he shows that the state court’s determination of his
claim resulted in a decision that was (1) “contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or (2)
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1)–(2).
Here, Ferguson argues that the ACCA’s decision is an unrea-
sonable application of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668 (1984).
Thus, we will only review whether the ACCA unreasonably ap-
plied Strickland under § 2254(d)(1).
A state habeas court’s decision is an “unreasonable applica-
tion” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies
the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s]
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the
prisoner’s case.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). “To
satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to show that the
state court’s ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was
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28 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
an error well understood and comprehended in existing law be-
yond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Woods v. Don-
ald, 575 U.S. 312, 316 (2015) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
criminal defendant must show: (1) that his lawyer rendered defi-
cient performance, such that he “made errors so serious that coun-
sel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth
Amendment,” and (2) that those errors prejudiced the defense,
such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. As the Supreme
Court described it, a “reasonable probability is a probability suffi-
cient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
As to deficient performance, courts must “indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. “To overcome that
presumption, a defendant must show that counsel failed to act rea-
sonably considering all the circumstances.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563
U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (alteration adopted and internal quotation
marks omitted). “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investi-
gation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable,” but, importantly, “strategic choices made after
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the ex-
tent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations
on investigation.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91. “In other words,
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20-12727 Opinion of the Court 29
counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unneces-
sary.” Id. at 691.
As noted above, to establish prejudice, the defendant “need
not show that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than not al-
tered the outcome in the case”; he need only show a reasonable
probability of a different outcome, which requires a showing “suf-
ficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 693–94. A
court deciding an ineffectiveness claim need not “address both
components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient
showing on one.” Id. at 697.
Ferguson argues that his trial counsel erred at both the pre-
sentencing phase and the penalty phase. We will address each
phase, and Ferguson’s arguments under each, in turn.
A. Pre-Sentencing Phase
Ferguson argues that his trial counsel erred in two ways dur-
ing the pre-sentencing phase. First, Ferguson’s trial counsel was
ineffective for not acting in Ferguson’s best interest during Fergu-
son’s statement to law enforcement. Second, Ferguson’s trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate pretrial
investigation into Ferguson’s mental health evidence and possible
intellectual disabilities for the guilt phase.
i. Confession
Ferguson argues that, for two reasons, his trial counsel was
ineffective at the time he gave his statements to law enforcement,
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30 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
and that, as a result, he was prejudiced to an extent sufficient to
warrant relief under Strickland.
First, Ferguson argues that his trial counsel was deficient for
letting him speak with law enforcement shortly after his arrest. As
discussed above and as the ACCA noted, Ferguson called his coun-
sel, Glenn, to set up a time for Ferguson to give a statement to po-
lice. Then Glenn explained that there was no deal on the table and
that any statements made would be used against Ferguson. As the
ACCA noted, Ferguson conveyed that he understood his rights and
wanted to move forward with the statement.
Ferguson has failed to show how the ACCA unreasonably
applied Strickland. Ferguson attempts to argue that his attorney
should have instructed him to remain silent absent a deal. But as
the ACCA noted, Ferguson requested the meeting where Glenn ap-
peared at the confession with Ferguson and explained Ferguson’s
rights to him. Glenn then explained that there were no deals on
the table and that Ferguson’s statements would likely be used in
court—important information to help Ferguson decide whether to
move forward with speaking to the police. As the ACCA noted,
and confirmed by the transcripts, Ferguson understood those rights
and still made the decision to proceed after speaking with Glenn.
Ferguson II, 13 So. 3d at 438.
Ferguson argues that an attorney renders ineffective assis-
tance when, without doing proper due diligence, counsel fails to
properly advise their client of their right to remain silent or move
to suppress an improper confession. Specifically, Ferguson points
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20-12727 Opinion of the Court 31
to two cases in which this court has found counsel to be ineffective
for failing to suppress a confession. See Smith v. Wainwright, 777
F.2d 609, 616–20 (11th Cir. 1985) (Smith I); Smith v. Duer, 911 F.2d
494, 497–98 (11th Cir. 1990) (Smith II). But Ferguson’s reliance is
misplaced. Both cases involved the same defendant making con-
fessions without counsel present, and counsel subsequently failing
to move to suppress the illegally coerced information. See Smith I,
777 F.2d at 610, 618; Smith II, 911 F.2d at 495–96, 498. Here, Glenn
was present during the confession and properly informed Ferguson
of his rights. In fact, Ferguson contacted Glenn to make the volun-
tary choice to speak with police, which was reaffirmed by Ferguson
after hearing his rights. By informing Ferguson of his rights and
the likelihood that his confession would be used against him, Glenn
was sufficiently “functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed [to Fergu-
son] by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Thus,
the ACCA’s determination that Glenn “cannot be held ineffective
for the informed and voluntary choices” of his client is not an un-
reasonable application of Strickland. Ferguson II, 13 So. 3d at 439.
Second, Ferguson argues that his counsel was deficient for
failing to step in when law enforcement allegedly pressured him to
change his story. But Ferguson did not fairly present this argument
to the district court in his habeas petition.11 See Smith v. Sec’y, Dep’t
of Corr., 572 F.3d 1327, 1352 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting that an
11 We note that Ferguson did raise this issue (although in a conclusory man-
ner) in his state habeas petitions, despite the Commissioner’s arguments to the
contrary.
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32 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
argument that is not fairly presented to the district court will not
be considered on appeal). In his counseled federal habeas petition,
Ferguson never mentions the alleged pressure from law enforce-
ment but mainly argues that Glenn “failed to counsel adequately
and represent vigorously his client’s interest . . . during Mr. Fergu-
son’s alleged ‘confession’ on August 12, 1997.” Ferguson’s attor-
neys did not expressly designate the issue as a distinct claim for re-
lief, nor did they specifically argue that the ACCA unreasonably ap-
plied Strickland. Thus, we will not consider Ferguson’s argument
on whether his counsel was deficient for not intervening during
Ferguson’s confession when police allegedly pressured him to
change his story.
Because Ferguson has failed to show that his counsel was de-
ficient in how he handled Ferguson’s confession, we need not ad-
dress his prejudice argument. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (ex-
plaining that a court considering an ineffectiveness claim need not
“address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes
an insufficient showing on one”); see also Conner v. GDCP Warden,
784 F.3d 752, 766–67 (11th Cir. 2015) (following Strickland and only
addressing one prong because it disposed of the petitioner’s claim).
ii. Adequate Investigation
Ferguson next argues that his counsel was ineffective for fail-
ing to conduct an adequate investigation into his mental health ev-
idence and possible intellectual disabilities before trial. But as the
Commissioner correctly argues, and the district court correctly
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20-12727 Opinion of the Court 33
noted, Ferguson abandoned this claim during his state post-convic-
tion proceedings and thus it is procedurally defaulted.
Ferguson’s inadequate investigation claim was procedurally
defaulted under Alabama’s procedural rules. The ACCA noted that
Ferguson argued that “[t]rial counsel’s performance was also ob-
jectively deficient, for many reasons and including the unavailabil-
ity of sufficient funds for a thorough defense.” See Ferguson II, 13
So. 3d at 439. But the ACCA explained that the conclusory state-
ment without facts or argument did not comply “with the require-
ments set forth in Rule 28(a)(10)” of the Alabama Rules of Appel-
late Procedure. Id.“Claims presented in a Rule 32 petition but not pursued on
appeal are deemed to be abandoned.” Hallford v. Culliver, 459 F.3d
1193, 1199 n.4 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting Boyd v. State,
913 So. 2d 1113, 1145 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003)). “[W]hen a petitioner
has failed to present a claim to the state courts and under state pro-
cedural rules the claim has become procedurally defaulted, the
claim will be considered procedurally defaulted in federal court.”
See Collier v. Jones, 910 F.2d 770, 772 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, Fergu-
son’s claim about an inadequate pretrial investigation is procedur-
ally defaulted. 12
12 Nestled inside the inadequate-pretrial-investigation section of Ferguson’s
brief, he also argues that trial counsel: “failed to present a defense that included
evidence regarding [Ferguson’s] disabilities”; “failed to introduce evidence re-
garding [his] intoxication and drug use”; and “failed to . . . present testimony
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34 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
* * *
Ferguson has not demonstrated, under AEDPA, that the
ACCA’s denial of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim about
his counsel’s actions before his confession was an unreasonable ap-
plication of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Also, Ferguson’s
argument about his counsel’s pretrial investigation for the guilt
phase is procedurally defaulted. Thus, Ferguson has not met his
burden to warrant habeas relief on his pre-sentencing stage claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
B. Penalty Phase
Last, Ferguson argues that his counsel was ineffective by fail-
ing to investigate and present evidence of Ferguson’s stepfather’s
abuse during the penalty phase. Specifically, Ferguson argues that
the ACCA’s determination that Ferguson was not prejudiced be-
cause of that deficient performance was an unreasonable applica-
tion of Strickland. 13 Here, we need not address whether Ferguson’s
about [his] personality and tendencies.” But these are guilt-phase argu-
ments—not pretrial investigation claims—and, thus, they are outside the cer-
tificate of appealability. See McClain v. Hall, 552 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“In an appeal brought by an unsuccessful habeas petitioner, appellate review
is limited to the issues specified in the certificate of appealability.” (alterations
adopted)). Even if they weren’t, as the district court explained, Ferguson’s
guilt-phase arguments were procedurally defaulted because he did not raise
them in the ACCA and he has not given us any reason to excuse the default.
13 Ferguson also maintains that the district court correctly concluded that his
counsel’s performance was deficient and that the ACCA’s determination to
the opposite was an unreasonable application of Strickland.
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20-12727 Opinion of the Court 35
counsel performance was deficient because the ACCA’s determina-
tion that Ferguson failed to establish prejudice was not an unrea-
sonable application of Strickland.
The ACCA adopted the trial court’s finding about prejudice,
specifically noting:
Finally, in light of the nature and circumstances of
this crime—the robbery and murder of a father and
his young son—and the specific findings made by the
sentencing authority, there is no reasonable probabil-
ity that the mitigating circumstances alleged in the pe-
tition, even if true, would have altered the balance of
aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. The
sentencing authority was well aware of the mitigation
evidence presented at trial.
Ferguson II, 13 So. 3d at 442 (internal citation omitted).
Under the prejudice prong, when the defendant challenges
his death sentence, “the question is whether there is a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer—including an ap-
pellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evi-
dence—would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 695. In determining whether there is a reasonable probabil-
ity of a different result, a court must “consider ‘the totality of the
available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the
evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding’—and ‘reweigh it
against the evidence in aggravation.’” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S.
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36 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
30, 41 (2009) (per curiam) (alteration adopted) (quoting Williams,
529 U.S. at 397–98).
The ACCA found that Ferguson’s “trial counsel presented
the vast majority of mitigation evidence that Ferguson alleges
should have been presented.” Ferguson II, 13 So. 3d at 439. We
agree with the ACCA that most of the new mitigation evidence
was cumulative of the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances pre-
sented during sentencing. See Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1298
(11th Cir. 2010) (“[M]uch (although not all) of the ‘new’ testimony
introduced at the post-conviction hearing would simply have am-
plified the themes already raised at trial and incorporated into the
sentencing judge’s decision to override the jury.”); Marquard v.
Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 429 F.3d 1278, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“There is no reason to believe that added details about Marquard’s
troubled childhood and substance abuse—which the sentencing
court clearly recognized in imposing a death sentence—would
have had any effect on the sentence.”).
While more mitigation witnesses could have presented
more details or different examples of these unfortunate aspects of
Ferguson’s life, these aspects were nonetheless known to the sen-
tencing jury and judge. Thus, no significant prejudice can result
from the exclusion of cumulative evidence, meaning Ferguson’s
trial counsel’s failure to present cumulative evidence was not prej-
udicial. See Cullen, 563 U.S. at 200 (“There is no reasonable proba-
bility that the additional evidence Pinholster presented in his state
habeas proceedings would have changed the jury’s verdict. The
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20-12727 Opinion of the Court 37
‘new’ evidence largely duplicated the mitigation evidence at trial.”);
see also Ledford, 818 F.3d at 649–50. Because there is not a “reason-
able probability” that, but for the exclusion of cumulative evidence,
the last remaining juror would have voted for life imprisonment or
the judge would have decided not to override the jury, we cannot
find that the ACCA’s determination that Ferguson failed to show
prejudice was an unreasonable application of Strickland.
Citing Williams v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2008), Fergu-
son argues that prejudice is evident in his case because, like Wil-
liams, the trial judge overrode the jury’s recommendation for life
imprisonment based on one statutory factor. Specifically, as Fergu-
son points out, Williams stated “[t]he fact that the jury decisively
voted against the death penalty, even without the powerful evi-
dence adduced at postconviction, weighs heavily in favor of a find-
ing of prejudice.” 542 F.3d at 1343. The state responds by citing
Lee v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections, where we
said that “the fact that the jury recommended life imprisonment
counsels against a determination that [the petitioner] was preju-
diced under Strickland.” 726 F.3d 1172, 1196 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing
Parker v. Allen, 565 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Whatever tension there may be between Williams and Lee,
we don’t have to resolve it here because, in order to show the ACCA
unreasonably applied Strickland, Ferguson must “show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-
rors,” the trial judge would not have overridden the jury’s recom-
mendation of life imprisonment. See 466 U.S. at 694. Here, the
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38 Opinion of the Court 20-12727
ACCA assumed all of Ferguson’s allegations from his Rule 32 peti-
tion to be true, but even with that assumption, the ACCA found
that there was no reasonable probability that it would have altered
the balance of the aggravating and mitigating evidence. As the
ACCA noted, the trial judge “was well aware of the mitigation ev-
idence presented at trial” yet found that the circumstances of Fer-
guson’s childhood did not amount to a mitigating factor given Fer-
guson’s age, marriage, and employment. Ferguson II, 13 So. 3d at
442. In light of the trial court’s determination, we cannot find the
ACCA unreasonably applied Strickland by concluding that Fergu-
son did not provide enough evidence to undermine the ACCA’s
confidence in the trial judge’s decision to override the jury’s recom-
mendation of life. Ferguson “cannot show that ‘no fairminded ju-
rist’ would have done as the state habeas court did in denying his
claim.” Sealey v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 954 F.3d 1338, 1359
(11th Cir. 2020).
IV. CONCLUSION
After careful review, we find that the district court did not
clearly err in finding that Ferguson was not intellectually disabled.
We also find that the ACCA’s determination that Ferguson’s coun-
sel was not ineffective was not an unreasonable application of
Strickland. Thus, we affirm the district court’s denial of Ferguson’s
habeas petition.
AFFIRMED.