USCA11 Case: 22-12949 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 06/01/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12949
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JONATHAN DAVIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CLERK OF SUPERIOR COURT FOR EFFINGHAM COUNTY,
SHERIFF OF EFFINGHAM COUNTY, GA,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00244-RSB-CLR
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12949
____________________
Before WILSON, LUCK and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Jonathan Davis, proceeding pro se, appeals the dis-
trict court’s order dismissing his pro se civil complaint under
42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Jason Bragg, in his official capacity as clerk of
the Superior Court for Effingham County. The district court found
that Davis’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations because
the claim began to accrue when he was arrested, which was more
than two years before he filed his complaint. Davis’s complaint
also asserted claims against Jimmy McDuffie, in his official capacity
as Sheriff of Effingham County, and a state law claim against Bragg.
Davis argues that the district court erred in finding that the statute
of limitations began to run on the date of his arrest rather than the
date of his release because the warrant had no legal effect, as it was
void ab initio, and as a matter of Georgia law, the claim began to
accrue at the time of his release. After reading the parties’ briefs
and reviewing the record, we affirm the district court’s order dis-
missing Davis’s complaint.
I.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss, accepting the allegations as true and construing
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Chaparro v. Carni-
val Corp.,
693 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2012). “A Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate if it is
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22-12949 Opinion of the Court 3
apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-
barred.” Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc.,
750 F.3d 1195, 1197 (11th
Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).
We liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Erickson v.
Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94,
127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). Nonetheless,
“issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed aban-
doned.” Timson v. Sampson,
518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). An
appellant fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not “plainly
and prominently raise it.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739
F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted); United
States v. Campbell,
26 F.4th 860, 872-73 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc)
(holding that issues not raised in an initial brief are deemed for-
feited and will not be addressed absent extraordinary circum-
stances), petition for cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,
143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).
No person acting under color of state law shall intentionally
deprive another of their rights under the Constitution. See
42
U.S.C. § 1983; Holmes v. Crosby,
418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005).
All constitutional claims brought under § 1983, however, are sub-
ject to the statute of limitations governing personal injury actions
in the state where the § 1983 action was brought. McNair v. Allen,
515 F.3d 1168, 1173 (11th Cir. 2008). In Georgia, the applicable stat-
ute of limitations for personal injury actions is two years. O.C.G.A.
§ 9-3-33; see also Lovett v. Ray,
327 F.3d 1181, 1182 (11th Cir. 2003).
“[T]he accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question
of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.”
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12949
Wallace v. Kato,
549 U.S. 384, 388,
127 S. Ct. 1091, 1095 (2007) (em-
phasis omitted). The statute of limitations for a civil rights action
begins to run from the date that the cause of action accrues, which
occurs when “the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of ac-
tion” and “can file suit and obtain relief.”
Id. (quotation marks
omitted). Notably, an action accrues when “the facts which would
support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a
person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Rozar v.
Mullis,
85 F.3d 556, 561-62 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omit-
ted). A § 1983 cause of action will only accrue once the plaintiff
knows or should know (1) that he has suffered an injury that forms
the basis of his action and (2) the identity of the person or entity
that inflicted the injury. Chappell v. Rich,
340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th
Cir. 2003).
As an initial matter, Davis abandoned any challenge to his
claims against Sheriff McDuffie and his state law claim against
Bragg by failing to address the dismissal of those claims on appeal.
In addition, the record demonstrates that the district court did not
err in finding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date
of Davis’s arrest because Davis alleged that he knew that the war-
rant was invalid when he was arrested. While Davis argues that
the accrual date should be decided by Georgia law, the Supreme
Court has held that the accrual date is a question of federal law.
Because Davis filed his complaint outside of the two-year statute of
limitations, his claims are barred. Accordingly, based on the afore-
mentioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing
Davis’s complaint.
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22-12949 Opinion of the Court 5
AFFIRMED.
