USCA11 Case: 22-14098 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 06/01/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-14098
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
SANDRA J. STATEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DR HORTON INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cv-01178-AMM
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14098
Before WILSON, LUCK, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sandra Staten, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district
court’s dismissal of her complaint alleging fraud, bad faith, and un-
just enrichment against D.R. Horton, Inc. In response, D.R. Hor-
ton moved for summary affirmance of the district court’s order,
and Staten responded by moving for summary reversal of the or-
der. After careful review, we grant D.R. Horton’s motion for sum-
mary affirmance and deny Staten’s motion for summary reversal.
Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
the essence, like in “situations where important public policy issues
are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,” or
where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a matter
of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out-
come of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the ap-
peal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,
406 F.2d 1158,
1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 1 A motion for summary affirmance postpones
the due date for the filing of any remaining brief until our Court
rules on the motion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).
We review a district court’s grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and
1In Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions issued before October
1, 1981.
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22-14098 Opinion of the Court 3
construing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, here the plaintiff. Henley v. Payne,
945 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2019). We also review de novo the district court’s determina-
tion of its own subject matter jurisdiction. Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd. v.
APJ Marine, Inc.,
411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2005). We review
for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for a default judg-
ment. Mitchell v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
294 F.3d 1309,
1316 (11th Cir. 2002). And we review the denial of a motion for
reconsideration for abuse of discretion. Corwin v. Walt Disney Co.,
475 F.3d 1239, 1254 (11th Cir. 2007).
Federal courts exercise limited jurisdiction and generally can
only hear actions that involve a federal question or meet the re-
quirements for diversity jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332; Tay-
lor v. Appleton,
30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994). A district court
has jurisdiction over a civil matter where the amount in contro-
versy exceeds $75,000, and is between “citizens of different States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
“[c]itizenship is equivalent to domicile.” McCormick v. Aderholt,
293 F.3d 1254, 1257 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). Corpo-
rations are “citizens” for diversity purposes wherever they are in-
corporated and have their principal place of business.
28 U.S.C. §
1332(c)(1); Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A. v. Lama,
633 F.3d 1330,
1346 (11th Cir. 2011).
Because diversity jurisdiction is measured when an action is
filed, events occurring after the filing of an action cannot create or
destroy diversity jurisdiction. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp.,
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-14098
L.P.,
541 U.S. 567, 575–76 (2004) (holding that, if complete diversity
of citizens did not exist at the time of filing, subsequent events, like
a change in the domicile of a party will not create diversity jurisdic-
tion); PTA-FLA, Inc. v. ZTE USA, Inc.,
844 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir.
2016) (explaining diversity of citizenship, or domicile, must exist at
the time the action is filed in order to be proper); Wright Transpor-
tation, Inc. v. Pilot Corp.,
841 F.3d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting
that diversity jurisdiction “is not destroyed by post-filing changes
to party citizenship”).
A motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. Fortner v.
Thomas,
983 F.2d 1024, 1032 (11th Cir. 1993). Under Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a), a court may enter a default judgment against a party when
the party “has failed to plead or otherwise defend” the claims
against that party. However, the entry of a default judgment “is a
drastic remedy which should be used only in extreme situations.”
Wahl v. McIver,
773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985). We’ve held
that a district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied a
motion for a default judgment when the defendant filed a motion
to dismiss “a short time after the deadline for responsive plead-
ings.” Mitchell,
294 F.3d at 1317.
“We hold the allegations of a pro se complaint to less strin-
gent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Campbell
v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,
760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). “[I]ssues
not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned,”
and “we do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro
se litigant’s reply brief.” Timson v. Sampson,
518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th
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22-14098 Opinion of the Court 5
Cir. 2008). An appellant forfeits a claim when she either makes
only passing references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner
without supporting arguments and authority. Sapuppo v. Allstate
Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United
States v. Campbell,
26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (hold-
ing that issues not properly presented on appeal are deemed for-
feited and will not be addressed absent extraordinary circum-
stances), cert. denied,
143 S. Ct. 95 (2022). Further, “[t]o obtain re-
versal of a district court judgment that is based on multiple, inde-
pendent grounds, an appellant must convince us that every stated
ground for the judgment against [her] is incorrect.” Sapuppo,
739
F.3d at 680. “When an appellant fails to challenge properly on ap-
peal one of the grounds on which the district court based its judg-
ment, [s]he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that
ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.”
Id.
Here, D.R. Horton is entitled to summary affirmance of the
district court’s dismissal of Staten’s amended complaint because
she has not challenged on appeal each of the district court’s inde-
pendent, alternative grounds for dismissal on that basis. Groendyke
Transp.,
406 F.2d at 1162; Sapuppo,
739 F.3d at 680. Even liberally
construed, Staten fails to challenge the district court’s determina-
tion that she did not adequately plead her claim in Count One for
fraud in conformity with Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), so she has abandoned
the issue. See Timson,
518 F.3d at 874. Similarly, Staten fails to ar-
gue on appeal that the district court erred by dismissing her
amended complaint for failure to state a claim for bad faith in
Count Two and unjust enrichment in Count Three.
Id. Because
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-14098
she has abandoned these issues, the district court order dismissing
her claims is due to be affirmed. Sapuppo,
739 F.3d at 680.
Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Staten’s motions for entry of default judgment
against D.R. Horton. Mitchell,
294 F.3d at 1316. The district court
properly denied Staten’s motions because, at the time that she filed
them, D.R. Horton’s time to file a responsive pleading had not yet
elapsed. Although D.R. Horton subsequently failed to timely an-
swer Staten’s amended complaint, Staten did not file another mo-
tion for an entry for default judgment at that time. In any event,
although Staten is correct that a motion to dismiss is not a respon-
sive pleading, D.R. Horton did not “fail[] to plead or otherwise de-
fend” itself against Staten’s claims because it filed a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a); Fortner,
983 F.2d at 1032. Nor has Staten shown that she was
entitled to the drastic remedy of default judgment. Wahl,
773 F.2d
at 1174. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s order denying her
motions for entry of default judgment against D.R. Horton.
As for Staten’s argument on appeal that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case because she moved
to Alabama after D.R. Horton removed the case from the Alabama
state court to the federal district court, we disagree. When Staten
filed her complaint in the Alabama state court, she noted that she
was domiciled in Detroit, Michigan, and D.R. Horton was domi-
ciled in Arlington, Texas. Whether Staten lived in Michigan or Al-
abama when D.R. Horton removed the case to federal court does
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22-14098 Opinion of the Court 7
not affect the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction over her
case. This is because, at all times, D.R. Horton was incorporated
in Delaware and its principal place of business was Arlington,
Texas, both of which are diverse from Michigan and Alabama.
28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Molinos Valle Del Cibao, C. por A.,
633 F.3d at
1346. Thus, the parties were diverse, and the district court had di-
versity jurisdiction over Staten’s action. McCormick,
293 F.3d at
1257.
Accordingly, we GRANT D.R. Horton’s motion for sum-
mary affirmance of the district court’s dismissal of Staten’s pro se
complaint and DENY Staten’s motion for summary reversal.
AFFIRMED.
