Akeem Muhammad v. Julie Jones ( 2023 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12563
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
AKEEM MUHAMMAD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JULIE L. JONES,
individual capacity,
JOHNNY FRAMBO,
in his official and individual capacity Florida Department of Cor-
rections State Chaplain,
SHANE PHILLIPS,
in his individual capacity,
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
CHIEF, BUREAU OF CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AND
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12563
MONITORING, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:18-cv-00212-HLA-JBT
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Akeem Muhammad, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed
a complaint bringing claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-1, against Florida Department of Corrections
(FDOC) and Florida State Prison (FSP) officials, alleging violations
of his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment and the RLUIPA. His claims centered around the timing and
nutritional adequacy of meals and medication provided to inmates
during Ramadan. He appeals the district court’s orders: (1) grant-
ing in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss; (2) entering summary
judgment in favor of the defendants on his First Amendment and
RLUIPA claims; and (3) denying his motion to reimburse service
costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2). Although we partially affirm
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22-12563 Opinion of the Court 3
based on qualified immunity, we reverse and remand in part for
further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Muhammad has been a practicing Muslim since 1996. As
part of his faith, he observes Ramadan, an annual month-long pe-
riod of prayer and fasting. Muhammad believes he must abstain
from consuming food, water, and medication during the day dur-
ing Ramadan. Importantly for this case, Muhammad believes the
fasting period begins at astronomical twilight, which precedes sun-
rise. He must consume a nutritionally adequate, meatless, Kosher
diet during two meals each day—one pre-fast meal before astro-
nomical twilight and one post-fast meal after sunset. Muhammad
also takes medication for several medical conditions, which is typ-
ically provided by prison officials in the morning after astronomical
twilight and in the afternoon. He must take his medication in pres-
ence of medical staff, and his doctor will discontinue treatment if
he refuses his medication for three days.
When Muhammad filed this prisoner civil rights action in
February 2018, he was being detained at FSP. He alleged prison
officials provided his pre-fast meal and medication before sunrise
but not before astronomical twilight, leaving him to choose be-
tween his religious beliefs and receiving adequate nutrition and
medical care. As a result, he stopped fasting 17 days into Ramadan
in 2017 and has allegedly been unable to fast in the years since then.
He alleged that his qualitative religious experience was destroyed,
and he suffered serious physical injuries, including “exacerbated
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12563
hypertension, exacerbated [Irritable Bowel Syndrome (IBS)], se-
vere dehydration, severe physical pain, severe fatigue, and severe
lethargy.”
Muhammad sued four FSP employees in their official capac-
ities: Food Service Director Jeffery Andrews; two vocational in-
structors, R. Davis and H. Sellers; and a correctional officer, A.
McGregor. Muhammad also sued four FDOC employees in their
official and individual capacities: Julie Jones, the FDOC’s Secretary;
Johnny Frambo, Chaplaincy Services Administrator; Shane Phil-
lips, Chief of the Bureau of Contract Management and Monitoring;
and Craig McCormick, Public Health Nutrition Program Manager.
Three of the FDOC defendants were later substituted in their offi-
cial capacities: Mark Inch for Jones; Angela Gaskins for Phillips; and
Brenda Patterson for McCormick.
As for relief, Muhammad sought (1) an injunction against
Jones in her official capacity only; (2) a declaratory judgment that
Frambo, Phillips, McCormick, and the FSP defendants violated the
RLUIPA in their official capacities; and (3) compensatory, nominal,
and punitive damages from the original FDOC defendants in their
individual capacities—Jones, Frambo, Phillips, and McCormick—
for violating his First Amendment rights. Muhammad did not seek
monetary damages under the RLUIPA, nor did he seek monetary
damages against any defendant in an official capacity.
A month after filing the operative complaint, Muhammad
informed the district court that he had been transferred from FSP
to another state facility and conceded the transfer mooted his
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22-12563 Opinion of the Court 5
official capacity RLUIPA claims against the four FSP defendants—
Andrews, Davis, Sellers, and McGregor. In response to that stipu-
lation and the defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court dis-
missed the claims against Andrews, Davis, Sellers, and McGregor
as moot. It also denied qualified immunity on the First Amend-
ment claim, but it dismissed Muhammad’s claim for compensatory
damages based on the physical injury requirement under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(e).
The defendants answered, again asserting qualified immun-
ity as an affirmative defense to all monetary damages, and moved
for summary judgment.
In March 2022, the court granted summary judgment in fa-
vor of the remaining defendants. It found they were entitled to
qualified immunity as to nominal damages and that Muhammad
was not entitled to recover punitive damages because it found the
“Defendants’ statements made under penalty of perjury to be more
credible than Plaintiffs unsubstantiated claims that these Defend-
ants ‘maliciously participated’ in refusing to accommodate his reli-
gious beliefs during Ramadan in 2017.” With respect to the FDOC
defendants on the RLUIPA claim, the district court concluded:
Statements made by the plaintiff are insufficient to es-
tablish that that plaintiff’s religious practice has been
substantially burdened. . . . Because Defendants have
provided support that they made substantial efforts to
accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs and Plaintiff
has not met his burden to support that his religious
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exercise was substantially burdened—that his physi-
cal health was detrimentally affected by not being
able to fast in the periods as required to observe Ram-
adan—and having no material facts at issue, judg-
ment is due to be entered in favor of Defendants.
After the court denied Muhammad’s motion to alter or
amend the judgment, the defendants moved for taxation of costs.
Muhammad then appealed from the final judgment, and the dis-
trict court stayed the costs motion pending the outcome of this ap-
peal. 1
II. DISCUSSION
We take the following issues in turn: (1) whether Muham-
mad’s transfer from FSP to a different Florida prison mooted his
claims and, if not, whether the defendants’ policies substantially
burdened his religious exercise under the RLUIPA; (2) whether
qualified immunity precluded Muhammad’s First Amendment
claim; and (3) whether Muhammad was entitled to reimbursement
for service costs. 2
1 We remand this case to the district court for further proceedings on the mer-
its, so Muhammad’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction for the district court to
rule on the defendants’ motion for costs is DENIED AS MOOT. In any event,
the motion to relinquish jurisdiction was unnecessary because this appeal did
not prevent the district court from ruling on collateral matters. See Weaver v.
Fla. Power & Light Co., 172 F.3d 771, 773 (11th Cir. 1999).
2 Our review of these issues is largely de novo. See CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v.
City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006) (mootness); Baker v. City of
Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2023) (motion to dismiss for failure to
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A. RLUIPA Claim for Prospective Relief
(i) Mootness
First, Muhammad contends his transfer from FSP did not
moot his claims, and we agree to the extent he seeks prospective
relief on the FDOC’s statewide policies. “The general rule is that a
prisoner’s transfer or release from a jail moots his individual claim
for declaratory and injunctive relief,” even when “there is no assur-
ance that he will not be returned to the jail.” McKinnon v. Talladega
Cnty., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an inmate’s
claim was moot where he challenged “unconstitutional conditions
in a single jail where [he] is no longer incarcerated”). But a transfer
between state prisons does not moot a request for injunctive relief
against the head of the state prison system. See Hardwick v. Brinson,
523 F.2d 798, 799-801 (5th Cir. 1975). 3
As Muhammad acknowledged in the district court, the
claims against the FSP defendants were mooted by his transfer
state a claim); Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1297 (11th Cir. 2022) (sum-
mary judgment based on qualified immunity); Knight v. Thompson, 797 F.3d
934, 942 (11th Cir. 2015) (legal conclusion that a prison policy comports with
RLUIPA). We also review the legal interpretation of Civil Rule 4 de novo, see
Prewitt Enters., Inc. v. Org. of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 353 F.3d 916,
920 (11th Cir. 2003), but we review the denial of a motion for costs for abuse
of discretion, see Cochran v. EI duPont de Nemours, 933 F.2d 1533, 1540 (11th Cir.
1991).
3 The decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1,
1981, are binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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from FSP. 4 See McKinnon, 745 F.2d at 1363. But injunctive relief
can still be granted with respect to the FDOC defendants because
an injunction against them would apply to any state prison in Flor-
ida. See Hardwick, 523 F.2d at 800-01. We read the district court’s
order to be consistent with this understanding. Because there is
still a live controversy as to injunctive relief against the FDOC de-
fendants, we turn to whether summary judgment was proper.
(ii) Summary Judgment Order
Muhammad argues that, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to him, the district court erred by finding the
FDOC’s refusal to accommodate his Ramadan beliefs did not place
a substantial burden on his religious exercise. We agree.
The RLUIPA protects inmates “who are unable freely to at-
tend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the
government’s permission and accommodation for exercise of their
religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 710 (2005). “While the
First Amendment requires only that prison restrictions be reasona-
bly related to legitimate penological interests,” Davila v. Gladden,
777 F.3d 1198, 1212 (11th Cir. 2015), “[t]he RLUIPA provides
greater religious protection than the First Amendment,” Dorman v.
Aronofsky, 36 F.4th 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2022).
4 Muhammad sued the FSP defendants only in their official capacities and for
declaratory judgment. His claims for monetary damages, which are addressed
below, were limited to the FDOC defendants.
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To make a claim under the RLUIPA, the plaintiff must first
show that a government rule, regulation, practice, or policy sub-
stantially burdens his exercise of religion. Id. If successful, it be-
comes the defendant’s burden to show that the challenged di-
rective is the “least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
government interest.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc(a). A plaintiff’s religious exercise is substantially
burdened when the prison’s policy makes him choose between vi-
olating that policy—and risk facing disciplinary action—or violat-
ing his religion. See Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015). While
a “substantial burden must place more than an inconvenience on
religious exercise,” “modified behavior, if the result of government
coercion or pressure, can be enough” to show a substantial burden
on religious exercise. Thai Meditation Ass’n of Ala., Inc. v. City of Mo-
bile, 980 F.3d 821, 829-31 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks omit-
ted).
When considering summary judgment motions, “courts
must construe the facts and draw all inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and when conflicts arise be-
tween the facts evidenced by the parties, [they must] credit the
nonmoving party’s version.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707
F.3d 1244, 1252 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). While
an affidavit may not be conclusory, nothing prohibits an affidavit
from being self-serving, and a litigant’s self-serving statements
based on personal knowledge or observation can defeat a summary
judgment motion. United States v. Stein, 881 F.3d 853, 857 (11th Cir.
2018) (en banc). “Even if a district court believes that the evidence
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presented by one side is of doubtful veracity,” “[a] case should be
put to the jury if there is any genuine issue of material fact, includ-
ing one created solely by the testimony of a party.” Feliciano, 707
F.3d at 1247, 1252 (quotation marks omitted).
First, the district court improperly weighed evidence at sum-
mary judgment. See id. at 1247, 1252. When construing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to Muhammad, there is more
than enough for his RLUIPA claim to survive summary judgment.5
No one disputes the sincerity of Muhammad’s religious belief that
he must begin his Ramadan fast at astronomical twilight. Moreo-
ver, Muhammad stated in a sworn affidavit that he was woken up
for his morning meals and medication during Ramadan between
5:00 a.m. and 5:30 a.m., which was after astronomical twilight, and
this forced him to forgo his medication and eat only the dinner
meal. This is also consistent with Jones’s interrogatory response,
which stated the 2017 Ramadan accommodations for Muslim in-
mates included “providing them with prescribed medications (sin-
gle dose) and a pre-fasting meal between astronomical twilight and
civil twilight or at approximately 60-80 minutes before sunrise.”
(emphasis added).
More fundamentally, the district court “misunderstood the
analysis that RLUIPA demands.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 361. For a person
5 Muhammad did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment, so we con-
strue the evidence in the light most favorable to him and express no opinion
about whether Muhammad might have prevailed had he moved for summary
judgment.
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holding the sincere religious belief that he must begin fasting at as-
tronomical twilight, an FDOC policy and practice of providing
pre-fast meals and medication after astronomical twilight pres-
sured Muhammad to choose between adhering to his religious be-
liefs and receiving adequate nutrition and medication. See Thai
Meditation Ass’n of Ala., Inc., 980 F.3d at 829-30; Dorman, 36 F.4th at
1314. That is enough to satisfy his burden under the RLUIPA. The
district court found the defendants provided Muhammad “a rea-
sonable opportunity” to practice his religious beliefs and that the
institutional guides and memoranda “reflects recognition of [Is-
lam]’s requirements . . . during Ramadan.” But this “improperly
imported a strand of reasoning from cases involving prisoners’ First
Amendment rights.” Holt, 574 U.S. at 361. Even if the FDOC’s
policies satisfied the religious needs of some Muslim inmates dur-
ing Ramadan, that does not rebut Muhammad’s showing that his
religious beliefs were substantially burdened by those policies. See
id. at 362.
The FDOC defendants then needed to show that providing
pre-fast meals and morning medication after astronomical twilight
is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling govern-
ment interest. See Dorman, 36 F.4th at 1313; 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a).
The district court concluded that the defendants “have demon-
strated that the policy at issue” met that standard, and it previously
alluded to “the prison officials’ interests in providing safety and or-
der.” But the court did not identify any specific interest raised by
the FDOC defendants, explain why that interest would be compel-
ling, or explain how its policies were the least restrictive means of
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furthering that interest. And, as in the district court, the FDOC
defendants have failed on appeal to identify any such compelling
interest. See Holt, 574 U.S. at 364 (noting our obligation to consider
whether exceptions are required under the RLUIPA without un-
questioning deference to a state’s department of corrections).
Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the FDOC defendants on Muhammad’s RLUIPA claim and
remand for further proceedings. We now turn to Muhammad’s
request for monetary damages.
B. First Amendment Claim for Monetary Damages
Muhammad also sought monetary damages from the
FDOC defendants in their individual capacities on his First Amend-
ment claim. The district court rejected (a) compensatory damages
for failure to satisfy the physical injury requirement under
§ 1997e(e); (b) punitive damages because the defendants’ sworn
statements about a lack of malicious intent were “more credible”
than Muhammad’s “unsubstantiated” claims; and (c) nominal dam-
ages based on qualified immunity.
On appeal, Muhammad contends he suffered more than a de
minimis injury under § 1997e and that the district court erred in
finding then-Secretary Jones and Chaplaincy Services Administra-
tor Frambo 6 were entitled to qualified immunity because it
6 Muhammad has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s qualified im-
munity analysis as to the other defendants. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (explaining that a party on appeal
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22-12563 Opinion of the Court 13
resolved factual disputes against Muhammad at summary judg-
ment. Even if we agree that the district court improperly weighed
evidence at summary judgment, we can affirm on any ground sup-
ported by the law and the record. See Feliciano, 707 F.3d at 1251-54(affirming on other grounds after holding the district court improp-
erly weighed evidence).
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for govern-
ment officials sued in their individual capacities if their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Christmas
v. Harris Cnty., 51 F.4th 1348, 1353 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation
marks omitted). It is undisputed that Jones and Frambo were act-
ing within their discretionary authority, so the burden shifts to Mu-
hammad to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate. Id. at
1354. The Supreme Court has outlined four factors that frame our
First Amendment inquiry, but the fundamental issue is whether
the prison regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests. Rodriguez v. Burnside, 38 F.4th 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2022)
(citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987)). Unlike the
RLUIPA framework, which provides for a “focused inquiry” as-
sessing “whether a prison policy as applied to an individual prisoner is
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmen-
tal interest,” the First Amendment inquiry under Turner “makes no
abandons a claim if he fails to plainly and prominently raise it, such as by de-
voting a discrete section of his argument to that claim).
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comparable, individualized demands.” Id. at 1332-33 (quotation
marks omitted).
“Even if the prison’s policies were improper, the prison offi-
cials would be entitled to qualified immunity” “unless it is shown
that they violated a constitutional right that was clearly established
at the time of the challenged action.” Id. at 1134-35 (quotation
marks omitted). It is clearly established that a prisoner is entitled
to reasonably adequate food, that is “[a] well-balanced meal, con-
taining sufficient nutritional value to preserve health.” Hamm v.
DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985). And a prison
should accommodate an inmate’s religious dietary restrictions,
subject to budgetary and logistical limitations, when a belief is truly
held. See Martinelli v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986), abro-
gation recognized by Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 503 (11th Cir.
1996); see also O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)
(explaining prison regulations should be judged under a reasona-
bleness test, not the more stringent least restrictive means test).
We need not decide whether there was a violation because
Muhammad has not met his burden on appeal of identifying deci-
sions of the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court, or the Florida Su-
preme Court that would “make it obvious to all reasonable gov-
ernment actors, in the defendant’s place,” that establishing FDOC
policies and guidance providing for pre-fast Ramadan meals and
medication before sunrise but after astronomical twilight violated
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federal law. 7 Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 977-78 (11th Cir.
2008) (quotation marks omitted); see Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach,
561 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2009). Turner does not ask “courts
to fine tune a prison’s policy to accommodate a prisoner’s individ-
ual request,” and Muhammad “has not shown that a reasonable of-
ficial would have had fair and clear warning that his particular con-
duct was unlawful and unconstitutional.” Rodriguez, 38 F.4th at
1334 (quotation marks omitted).
In short, “qualified immunity, pled by [Jones and Frambo] as
an affirmative defense, should have been the analysis used to grant
them summary judgment,” and we can affirm as to all monetary
7 Muhammad largely failed to argue that the officers violated any clearly es-
tablished law, and he may have “forfeited any such argument—which is rea-
son enough to affirm the district court’s qualified-immunity finding.” Christ-
mas, 51 F.4th at 1354, n.4. At most, Muhammad included a string citation for
the proposition that “[t]he RLUIPA and First Amendment give Muslim pris-
oners the right to fast daily during Ramadan[] and require prison officials to
accommodate those daily Ramadan fasts.” The only case he cites from this
Court is Saleem v. Evans, 866 F.2d 1313, 1314 (11th Cir. 1989). Saleem is not
relevant, but it attached an unpublished opinion from Diaab v. Green, 794 F.2d
685 (11th Cir.1986) (table). Even if an unpublished opinion attached to a pub-
lished opinion could show a clearly established right, the Diaab panel re-
manded for further proceedings because the district court should not have dis-
missed the case without service on the defendants and a hearing on the sincer-
ity of the plaintiff’s alleged religious beliefs and the state’s justification for reg-
ulating the manner in which those beliefs are practiced. Id. at 1317-18. Nota-
bly, on remand, the district court in Diaab granted the prison officials qualified
immunity from damages, which we affirmed. Id. at 1314 n.2. Neither Saleem
nor Diaab support reversal on qualified immunity in this procedural posture.
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damages on that basis. Wilson v. Blankenship, 163 F.3d 1284, 1288
(11th Cir. 1998).
C. Service Costs
Finally, Muhammad contends the district court erred in
denying his motion for reimbursement of the costs to serve Jones,
Frambo, Andrews, Sellers, and McGregor after they refused to
waive service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
Civil Rule 4 distinguishes between serving individuals, Fed.
R. Civ. P. 4(e), and “[a] state, a municipal corporation, or any other
state-created governmental organization,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(j). The
distinction is relevant in this case because Rule 4(d)(2)’s mandatory
waiver provision8 generally applies to individuals—thereby shifting
service costs to individual defendants—but not state and local gov-
ernments. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d); Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll County
Comm’rs, 476 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007).
In opposing Muhammad’s motion for costs, the defendants
conceded that he “complied substantially” with the procedures to
shift costs of service but argued they had good cause not to coop-
erate because Muhammad failed to state a claim against them.
8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) provides:
If a defendant located within the United States fails, without
good cause, to sign and return a waiver requested by a plaintiff
located within the United States, the court must impose on the
defendant: (A) the expenses later incurred in making service;
and (B) the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, of
any motion required to collect those service expenses.
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Instead of addressing good cause, the district court reasoned that
the defendants were sued in their official and individual capacities,
so Muhammad’s claim was against the state, and the state is not
required to waive service under Rule 4(j). Muhammad disagrees,
contending those defendants needed to be served individually un-
der Rule 4(e) and should be required to reimburse his costs to serve
them pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2).
We have not directly addressed whether, as Muhammad ar-
gues, a state official sued in an official capacity for prospective relief
should be served under Rule 4(e) or (j). 9 But we need not reach
that issue in this appeal because we have held that plaintiffs assert-
ing § 1983 claims against a city and individual officers needed to
properly serve each within the time provided by Rule 4(m).
Lepone-Dempsey, 476 F.3d at 1281. That is, the plaintiffs needed to
serve the city pursuant to Rule 4(j) and serve the individual defend-
ants pursuant to Rule 4(e). Id.9 The First Circuit has held that a state officer, whether sued in an individual
or official capacity, must be served under Rule 4(e) because the officer is bound
by the judgment and can be held in contempt for disobeying a court order.
Caisse v. DuBois, 346 F.3d 213, 216 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Echevarria-Gonzalez v.
Gonzalez-Chapel, 849 F.2d 24, 28-30 (1st Cir. 1988)). The Fifth Circuit “disa-
gree[d] with the First Circuit’s reading of rule 4, at least insofar as the First
Circuit’s reasoning subjects state officers to the mandatory waiver provisions
of the rule.” Moore v. Hosemann, 591 F.3d 741, 747 (5th Cir. 2009). Based on
the 1993 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4(d), the Fifth Circuit held that a
state official sued in his official capacity for injunctive relief “is not subject to
the mandatory waiver-of-service provisions of rule 4(d).” Id.USCA11 Case: 22-12563 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 08/25/2023 Page: 18 of 19
18 Opinion of the Court 22-12563
Although we did not address costs of service in Lepone-Demp-
sey, it follows that individual state defendants served under Rule
4(e) are subject to the failure-to-waive provision of Rule 4(d)(2)
even if they are also sued in an official capacity. This is consistent
with how Rule 4 treats federal employees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(3)
(providing that a United States officer sued in an individual capacity
in connection with their official duties “(whether or not the officer
or employee is also sued in an official capacity)” must be served
under Rule 4(e)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee’s note to
2000 amendment (explaining that it was making explicit the under-
standing that federal employees sued individually must be served
as individuals, invoking subdivision (e) and the waiver-of-service
provisions of subdivision (d)).
Jones, Frambo, Andrews, Sellers, and McGregor were sued
in their individual capacities, so they were subject to service under
Rule 4(e) and the cost-shifting provision of Rule 4(d)(2). Because
they have not shown good cause for the failure to waive service,
the court “must impose” the expenses Muhammad incurred in
making service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(2); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4
advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (explaining that
“sufficient cause should be rare” and a claim being “unjust” does
not qualify as good cause for failure to waive service). Accordingly,
we reverse the denial of Muhammad’s motion for reimbursement
of service costs and remand for the district court to award costs
under Rule 4(d)(2).
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22-12563 Opinion of the Court 19
III. CONCLUSION
Muhammad has alleged Florida prison officials forced him
to choose between observing his religious beliefs during Ramadan
and receiving adequate nutrition and medication. The FDOC de-
fendants sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 for First
Amendment violations are entitled to qualified immunity. On that
basis, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Jones
and Frambo as to monetary damages. But we reverse the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the FDOC defendants on Muham-
mad’s RLUIPA claim for prospective relief and the denial of Mu-
hammad’s motion for costs of service. We remand to the district
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND REMANDED IN
PART.