Jeffery Wooden v. The Town of Eatonville ( 2023 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10649
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JEFFERY WOODEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
THE TOWN OF EATONVILLE,
ROY SMITH,
Individually,
ROBERT L. JONES,
Individually,
ANTHONY GRANT,
in his official capacity as mayor of Eatonville, Florida,
JOSEPH JENKINS,
individually and in his official capacity as deputy chief
of the Eatonville police department,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10649
TOWN OF EATONVILLE,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:19-cv-02382-CEM-EJK
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jeffery Wooden, proceeding pro se, filed an action for false
arrest and false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort
claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution under
Florida law against the town of Eatonville, Roy Smith, Robert
Jones, Anthony Grant, and Joseph Jenkins (collectively, “Defend-
ants”). Wooden now appeals the district court’s order granting in
part the Defendants’ partial motions to dismiss several of his claims
and its order granting summary judgment to the Defendants on the
remaining claims in his complaint.
On appeal, Wooden first argues that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants because
there was no probable cause for any of his arrests. Second, he ar-
gues that the district court erred in granting the Defendants’
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motion to dismiss his state law false imprisonment claims against
Officers Roy Smith and Jones on the ground that they were entitled
to immunity under state law. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2021, Wooden filed the operative complaint
against Defendants and asserted eleven claims. In Counts I to III,
he alleged that Jenkins, Jones, and Roy Smith falsely arrested and
imprisoned him without probable cause and in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. In Counts IV and V, he brought claims under
Monell1 against Jenkins and Grant in their official capacities, con-
tending that they participated in a longstanding practice causing
the deprivation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment for his
false imprisonment and arrest. In Counts VI to VII, Wooden al-
leged state tort claims for false imprisonment against Jones, Roy
Smith, and the Town of Eatonville. In Counts IX and X, he alleged
malicious prosecution claims against Jones and Jenkins. And, in
Count XI, he alleged a defamation claim against Jenkins.
A. Allegations in the Complaint
1 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978) (holding
that, although a § 1983 plaintiff cannot rely on the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior to hold a municipality liable for its employees’ actions, a municipality can
be liable for such actions under § 1983 if its “policy or custom” caused the
deprivation of the plaintiff’s federal right).
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In the operative complaint, Wooden alleged the following.
Wooden’s mother, Debbie Smith, 2 owned a hotel in Eatonville
known as the Eatonville Home Town Suites. In 2002, Wooden’s
mother sold a partial ownership interest in the hotel to the
Eatonville mayor, Anthony Grant. Wooden’s mother later passed
away, and Wooden was named the personal representative of his
mother’s estate, in which his mother’s ownership interest was an
estate asset. After being appointed personal representative,
Wooden and Grant had a business relationship, which deteriorated
after Wooden noticed that Grant was mismanaging the hotel. Af-
ter the relationship deteriorated, Grant misused his power as
mayor to have Wooden arrested for trespassing on the property to
prevent the latter from entering the hotel to inspect the books and
records. Wooden later obtained an order from the Orange County
Probate Court granting him access to the hotel property to moni-
tor or review, in an orderly fashion, the hotel records on weekdays
from 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
Wooden further alleged that, on December 17, 2015, he
went to the hotel and found it locked, so he hired a locksmith so
that he could access the property. Shortly after, Grant arrived and
demanded that Wooden leave the premises. Soon after, two offic-
ers from the Eatonville Police Department arrived at the hotel to
respond to Grant’s call about a “burglary in process.” Wooden ex-
plained that he was the partial owner of the hotel and showed the
2 Because one of the defendants also has the last name of Smith, for the rest of
the opinion, we refer to each Smith by their full names.
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officers a copy of the order allowing him access to the property.
The officers told Grant that the dispute was a civil matter that
should be resolved through the courts. While the officers were
leaving, Jenkins arrived and was hostile to Wooden, stating that he
needed to leave the hotel because “the mayor said so.” Wooden
informed Jenkins that he was partial owner of the hotel and had
legal authority to be there, and he refused to leave the property.
Jenkins stated that he would talk to the state attorney’s office to
determine if Wooden was illegally on the property because Grant
did not want him on the property and stated that he was the mayor.
Wooden further stated that on December 18, 2015, he re-
turned to the hotel, and, shortly after, Grant arrived with Jenkins
and Officer Jones. Jones then arrested Wooden for trespassing, and
Wooden was transported to jail. However, the case was dismissed
because it was deemed “unsuitable for prosecution.” On January
16, 2016, Wooden was standing on the hotel property to watch a
Martin Luther King, Jr., Day parade, and Jones approached him.
Grant had called Jenkins, who ordered Jones to go to the hotel to
“handle the situation.” Jones told Wooden that he knew he should
not be there, and Wooden told Jones that he had legal authority to
be on the premises and showed him the notice showing that the
charges against him arising out of the December 18 arrest had been
dismissed because the case was deemed unsuitable for prosecution.
Jones arrested Wooden and took him to jail. However, there were
no court records that showed that Wooden ever had an open case
for that arrest.
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Wooden further alleged that from February 2016 to about
October 2016, the probate court banned both Grant and Wooden
from the property and established a curatorship, which was later
dissolved. Wooden was reappointed as personal representative of
his mother’s estate and co-owner of the hotel property. On No-
vember 16, 2016, Wooden went to the property and was ap-
proached by Grant and Gary Lowry, a hotel employee, who called
Officer Roy Smith to come to the hotel. Roy Smith began to ver-
bally abuse and curse Wooden, slamming handcuffs tightly on his
wrists and telling him not to resist, although he was not resisting.
Roy Smith put Wooden in the police car before turning around and
releasing Wooden, telling him that “he’d better not return” to the
property. On November 15, 2016, Wooden again entered the hotel
to “trespass a vagrant” on the property after noticing a high level
of crime on the property. Due to this high level of crime, he set up
a make-shift security office in room number 127. On November
18, 2016, Jenkins obtained an arrest warrant to arrest Wooden for
attempted burglary of room 127. After finding out about the arrest
warrant on January 17, 2017, Wooden turned himself in to the po-
lice and was placed in jail. However, the case was dismissed and
deemed unsuitable for prosecution.
B. The Motions for Partial Dismissal
Jenkins, Jones, and Roy Smith answered, denied liability,
and asserted certain defenses. Jenkins then filed a partial motion to
dismiss claims brought against him in his official capacity, arguing
that either he or the municipality should be sued, but not both.
Roy Smith, Jenkins, and Jones also filed a partial motion to dismiss
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Counts VI and VII, arguing that the complaint failed to state a claim
for relief against them in their individual capacities because
Wooden did not allege that they acted in bad faith or with a mali-
cious purpose. They also argued that Count XII should be dis-
missed because Jenkins had an absolute privilege regarding any
statement he made incidental to his official duties, shielding him
from a defamation claim arising from actions taken within the
scope of his employment.
C. The Motions for Summary Judgment
Following discovery, Jenkins, Jones, and Roy Smith, in their
individual capacities, filed motions for summary judgment on
Wooden’s claims. In support of their motions, they filed certain
evidentiary materials, including a transcript of Wooden’s deposi-
tion, the shareholder’s agreement between Grant and Wooden’s
mother, documents showing that Wooden was the personal repre-
sentative of his mother’s estate, information regarding the guardi-
anship of Wooden’s mother, judges’ access orders allowing
Wooden to inspect the hotel, a judge’s order revoking two orders,
and affidavits from Jones and Roy Smith. Further, in support of his
motion for summary judgment in his official capacity, Jenkins filed
additional documents, including various arrest warrants, trespass
warnings, and offense reports for Wooden.
Wooden stated the following in his deposition. On Decem-
ber 17, 2015, he was present at the hotel exercising his rights as per-
sonal representative of his mother’s estate to see how business was
going. He became personal representative of his mother’s estate
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in 2010 based on a decision of his siblings. His sister, Monique
Washington, had a guardianship over his mother and was origi-
nally the personal representative after her mother died without a
will. Later, the siblings agreed to make Wooden the personal rep-
resentative. His family built the hotel in 1960 and owned it for
forty years. Wooden’s mother needed help maintaining the hotel,
so she partnered with Grant and created a corporation, Eatonville
Holdings, Inc., where Wooden’s mother owned forty percent eq-
uity of the company and Grant owned sixty percent. Wooden’s
mother and Grant participated in a lawsuit over mismanagement
of funds. According to Wooden, this lawsuit was resolved on the
basis that “everything just went back to the shareholders agree-
ment,” and neither party was required to pay the other a monetary
payment. As to the hotel, Wooden’s responsibilities included
maintaining the books and records. He also helped maintain the
hotel. He had a court order from 2012 that said that he was not
trespassing when he was present at the hotel and had a right to in-
spect documents. However, from December 2015 through No-
vember 2016, he did not have access to the financial information of
the hotel.
Wooden further stated that on December 17, 2015, he went
to the property to review records. Debbie Jefferson or Garry
Lowry, who both worked at the hotel, contacted Grant, who came
to the hotel with Jenkins. Grant said that Wooden was trespassing
and that he wanted him off the property, but Jenkins said that he
did not know if he could do that and would check with a local state
attorney. The next day, Jenkins said he spoke to the attorney who
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told him that this was a civil matter. Jenkins said he was shown
documentation regarding Wooden’s rights to the property and
asked him to file a complaint with the police department, which
Wooden did, and then he returned to the hotel office. However,
Grant again returned with Jenkins and Jones, and Jenkins said that
Wooden needed to leave because he was trespassing. Wooden re-
sisted and said he would not leave, and Jones arrested him and took
him to jail for trespassing. Jenkins never personally arrested
Wooden, but he was close by during the arrest on December 18,
2015, when Jenkins ordered Jones to arrest him. Wooden claimed
that the Eatonville Police violated his civil and constitutional rights,
but there were no specific policies or procedures he could name.
Wooden talked to the state attorney, who said she could not be-
lieve he went to jail and said that this charge was unsuitable for
prosecution. The charges were eventually dropped, and he was
never adjudicated guilty of any offense for the events of that day.
Wooden further stated that on January 16, 2016, he returned
to the property because he believed the trespassing order was not
in effect, as he was not prosecuted for the previous alleged trespass.
He was present on the property to watch the Martin Luther King,
Jr., parade with his family. He entered the hotel office as he was
waiting for the parade to pass, and Jones approached him and asked
what he was doing there. Wooden stated that he was waiting for
the parade, and Jones told him he was not supposed to be there.
Wooden showed him the paperwork that his previous trespass was
deemed unsuitable for prosecution, and Jones said that he did not
care and was taking Wooden to jail, which he did. Jenkins was not
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present the day of the arrest. Wooden was later released and not
criminally charged.
Wooden also stated that a curator took over the property
from around February or March to October 2016, and he was not
allowed on the property until the curatorship ended. After that,
the ownership went back to the shareholder agreement, where
Wooden was again personal representative of his mother’s estate.
There were no arrests between January 16, 2016, to November
2016. However, on November 13, 2016, Wooden went to room
127 of the hotel for security purposes because of a high rate of
crime and drug use on the property. In the meantime, Grant, Jen-
kins, and Roy Smith persuaded a judge to issue a warrant for
Wooden’s arrest, saying that he burglarized the room, which was
occupied. This was false information, Wooden asserted, because
he did not burglarize the occupant’s room. According to Wooden,
the room was vacant and destroyed and not occupied. He had to
have the occupant removed from the apartment for using drugs on
the property. Later, in December 2016, Wooden discovered the
warrant for his arrest and turned himself in in January 2017.
Wooden further stated that as to the November 16, 2016,
incident, the police report from that day said that he threatened to
kill or injure Grant. As the officer was taking Wooden to jail, the
officer turned around, told him not to go back to the hotel, and
released him. Jenkins was not present at this arrest. The reason he
was released was because Jenkins said that a witness’s statement
that the police used in support of the arrest was not true. He again
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was not prosecuted for the offense. As to his malicious prosecution
claim, Wooden conceded that he was not prosecuted as a result of
any of the arrests.
A police report for the November 13, 2016, arrest stated that
an officer obtained a copy of a judge’s order, which stated that
“[t]he curator shall immediately give all the assets of the corpora-
tion Eatonville Holdings, Inc., back to the majority shareholder,
Anthony Grant.” The order also stated that “assets of a corporation
cannot be taken into an estate as assets of the estate.” The report
stated that Wooden disputed the information.
The attached shareholder agreement stated that Debbie
Smith and Anthony Grant entered into a business agreement form-
ing Eatonville Holdings, Inc., where Debbie Smith had a forty per-
cent stock ownership in the motel and Grant had a sixty percent
stock ownership. The first access order from the Orange County,
Florida, state court said that the personal representative of Debbie
Smith’s property had the right to access the hotel on July 9, 2010,
to inspect the property’s financial records. On August 6, 2012, a
third access order granted Wooden authority to go to the hotel “in
an orderly fashion” to “monitor or review any records or receipts
of revenue for the said property from Monday through Friday from
9 a.m. to 1 p.m. without pay.” An order on May 28, 2014, revoked
the first access order and a second access order not in the record.
The order stated that Wooden was directed to “file the necessary
forms and documents to close th[e] Estate within 90 days from the
date of th[e] Order.”
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Jones stated the following in an affidavit. Jones arrived at
the hotel on December 18, 2015, where he saw Wooden, Grant,
and Jenkins, and Wooden was causing a disturbance. He knew
from personal knowledge that Grant was the owner and operator
of the hotel, and Grant signed a trespass warning directed at
Wooden, which had an expiration date of December 18, 2016.
Jones personally served Wooden with the trespass warning in front
of Grant and Jenkins and repeatedly ordered Wooden to leave the
premises, but he refused. Jones thus arrested Wooden for trespass-
ing under Florida Statute § 810.08. On January 16, 2016, Jones
again arrested Wooden for trespassing at the hotel pursuant to the
trespass warning issued on December 18, 2015. The affidavit in-
cluded a copy of the arrest affidavit from January 16, 2016, from
Jones, which stated that Wooden falsely gained entry to the office
with a locksmith after showing the locksmith some papers and ask-
ing him to open the front door. Jones further stated that the person
who called the police felt that Wooden was disrupting the business
with his presence.
Roy Smith also stated the following in an affidavit. On No-
vember 16, 2016, he responded to a call at the hotel relating to a
disturbance, where he met with Grant, who he knew as the owner
and operator of the hotel. Roy Smith was aware of the previous
trespass warning that had an expiration date of December 18, 2016.
Grant told Roy Smith that Wooden had approached him and the
hotel manager, Gary Lowry, at the back of the hotel, where
Wooden stated three times, “I’m gonna kill you and lay your bitch
ass down.” Lowry confirmed these statements. Based on these
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sworn statements from Grant and Lowry, Roy Smith took
Wooden into custody on charges of intimidation—threat to kill or
injure, in violation of Florida Statute § 836.10. On November 13,
2016, he also approached the hotel and was advised that Wooden
gained access to room 127, occupied by a tenant named Timothy
Davis, by using a crowbar, and that Wooden removed Davis’s pos-
sessions and placed them on the sidewalk. Davis provided a sworn
statement, stating he wished to prosecute Wooden for burglarizing
his hotel room. Roy Smith also obtained a sworn statement from
the front desk clerk, Jefferson, who confirmed the incident. Fol-
lowing the incident, Roy Smith completed an affidavit for arrest,
and a state court judge signed an arrest warrant.
Jenkins also stated the following in an affidavit. He was the
Chief of Police for the Eatonville Police Department during all in-
cidents in Wooden’s complaint. He was present on December 18,
2015, when Wooden was causing a disturbance at the hotel and
Grant signed a trespass warning directed at Wooden. Despite the
fact that Jones served him with the warrant and directed him to
leave, Wooden refused and was arrested in Jenkins’s presence. Jen-
kins was not present for any of the other arrests, but in Jenkins’s
view, there was probable cause for the arrests based on the trespass
warning or sworn witness statements.
Wooden filed responses opposing all of the motions for
summary judgment.
D. The District Court’s Rulings
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A magistrate judge prepared a report and recommendation
(“R&R”), first recommending denying Jenkins’s motion to dismiss
and construing Counts Four and Five against Jenkins as claims
against Eatonville. Second, as to Wooden’s state law false impris-
onment claims against Jones and Roy Smith, the magistrate judge
stated that Wooden had failed to allege facts showing that Jones
and Roy Smith acted maliciously or in bad faith and thus recom-
mended dismissal of those claims based on sovereign immunity.
Third, the magistrate judge recommended dismissing Wooden’s
defamation claim because Jenkins was covered by absolute privi-
lege for statements made related to his official duties and Wooden
had failed to allege that Jenkins acted outside these duties by pre-
paring a warrant. The magistrate judge also provided a notice to
the parties that they had fourteen days after service of the R&R to
object and that a “party’s failure to file written objections waive[d]
that party’s right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual
findings or legal conclusion the district court adopt[ed] from the
[R&R].”
Then, the district court issued an order addressing the pend-
ing motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. First,
noting that no objections had been filed to the R&R, the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation with the ex-
ception that it disagreed with the magistrate judge that Wooden
had dropped Eatonville from the suit because Wooden clearly
listed the town in the “Parties” section of his amended complaint.
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The district court then addressed the Defendants’ motions
for summary judgment and analyzed whether there was probable
cause for Wooden’s four arrests, which would bar all his remaining
claims under § 1983 and for state law false imprisonment and mali-
cious prosecution. The court first noted that it was undisputed that
Grant was an owner of the property and that the only evidence
provided by Wooden as the basis for his right to legally be on the
property was his authority as personal representative of his
mother’s estate pursuant to the Letters of Administration, the
Shareholder agreement, and the access orders in the probate case.
As for the December 17, 2015, incident, the district court
noted that Wooden was not arrested or prosecuted as a result, and
therefore there was no basis for claims of false imprisonment or
malicious prosecution based on this incident. Even if there were,
the district court explained, the claims would fail because there was
probable cause to arrest him. It determined that Wooden only had
authorization from the letters of administration, shareholder agree-
ment, and access orders to go on the property “in an orderly fash-
ion,” which Wooden did not do when he hired a locksmith to break
into the property and disrupt the business’s operation. The court
thus determined that there was probable cause to believe that
Wooden had exceeded his authority to be on the property, which,
together with the property owner’s request that Wooden leave,
was sufficient probable cause to arrest Wooden for trespass.
As to Wooden’s December 18 arrest for again using a lock-
smith to gain access to the office on the property, the district court
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determined there was information sufficient to find probable cause.
The district court reached this conclusion because Wooden’s ac-
cess to the property exceeded his authority, and Jones and Jenkins
had reason to believe the access order was no longer valid given
that the incident occurred well beyond the ninety-day deadline that
had been set to close the probate case. Further, the district court
rejected Wooden’s argument that probable cause did not exist be-
cause this was a civil matter. As the district court explained, even
if that were true, the officer’s decision to arrest someone was dif-
ferent from the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute or not, and it did
not affect whether probable cause existed for the arrest in the first
place.
For the January 16, 2016, arrest, the district court deter-
mined that Jones knew that Wooden had been issued a trespass
warning that was still in effect and that the probate court had en-
tered an order reasonably read to have revoked Wooden’s access
to the property, which was enough to create probable cause to ar-
rest Wooden for trespass. Further, the district court determined
that even if Jones believed the third access order was still in effect,
Wooden’s presence on the property was beyond what was allowed
in that order, as he only had authority to review any records or
receipts of revenue, which did not give him authority to enjoy the
Marin Luther King, Jr., Day parade with his family like he admitted
to doing. Lastly, the district court said that the state attorney’s de-
cision not to prosecute Wooden for the December 2015 incident
did not render the trespass warning ineffectual or impact whether
there was probable cause for his arrest.
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As for the November 13, 2016, arrest, the district court held
that breaking into a room in the hotel and installing a security office
was clearly beyond the authority Wooden had based on the pro-
bate order and gave grounds for probable cause for trespass and
burglary. While the court noted that Wooden maintained that the
room was vacant, it stated that two witnesses had provided Roy
Smith with statements establishing that the room had been rented
to Davis and Davis’s property had been removed from the room.
As for the November 16, 2016, arrest, the district court held
that there was probable cause that Wooden threatened to injure
Grant based on the sworn statements of two witnesses and the his-
tory between the parties, which Roy Smith was aware of. The dis-
trict court held that even if there were not probable cause to arrest
Wooden for threatening to kill Grant, there was probable cause to
arrest him for trespass based on the previous trespass notice that
was still in effect and a probate order that plainly stated that all as-
sets and management of the property belonged to Grant.
Thus, the district court held that, because there was proba-
ble cause to arrest Wooden in each instance, the Defendants were
entitled to summary judgment on all remaining claims. This ap-
peal ensued.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment, “viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable factual
inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party.” Amy v. Carnival Corp.,
961 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Guevara v. NCL
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(Bahamas) Ltd., 920 F.3d 710, 720 (11th Cir. 2019)). Summary judg-
ment is appropriate when the record evidence shows that “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “But it
is improper if a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving
party.” Amy, 961 F.3d at 1308. In addition, documents filed by pro
se litigants are to be liberally construed and must be held to less
stringent standards than documents drafted by attorneys. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
“A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place for a
felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the officer’s presence, is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is supported
by probable cause.” Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003). A
warrantless arrest lacking probable cause violates the Constitution
and can underpin a § 1983 claim, “but the existence of probable
cause at the time of arrest is an absolute bar to a subsequent con-
stitutional challenge to the arrest.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608
F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010). “Probable cause exists where the
facts within the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials,
derived from reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to
cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that a criminal of-
fense has been or is being committed.” Id. In deciding whether
probable cause exists, police officers need not resolve every incon-
sistency found in the evidence, as long as it is reasonable to con-
clude from the totality of the circumstances that a crime was com-
mitted. Paez v. Mulvey, 915 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2019). Some
conflicting evidence or a possible affirmative defense does not
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“necessarily vitiate probable cause.” Id. “That a defendant is sub-
sequently acquitted or charges are dropped against the defendant
is of no consequence in determining the validity of the arrest it-
self.” Marx v. Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1990). The
standard for determining probable cause is the same under Florida
and federal law. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1433 (11th Cir.
1998).
Probable cause is an absolute bar to state law and § 1983
claims alleging false arrest. Id. at 1435. “The existence of probable
cause constitutes an affirmative defense to the claims of false arrest
and imprisonment under Florida law.” Id. at 1436. The existence
of probable cause will also defeat a claim for malicious prosecution
under Florida law. DeMartini v. Town of Gulf Stream, 942 F.3d 1277,
1309 (11th Cir. 2019).
Florida law defines “trespass” as
Whoever, without being authorized, licensed, or in-
vited, willfully enters or remains in any structure or
conveyance, or, having been authorized, licensed, or
invited, is warned by the owner or lessee of the prem-
ises, or by a person authorized by the owner or lessee,
to depart and refuses to do so, commits the offense of
trespass in a structure or conveyance.
Fla. Stat. § 810.08(1). Florida law defines “burglary" as “[e]ntering
a dwelling, a structure, or a conveyance with the intent to commit
an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the
public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter.” Id.§ 810.02(1)(b). As relevant here, Florida law defines the crime of
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threats, in relevant part, as “[w]hoever, either verbally or by a writ-
ten or printed communication, maliciously threatens to accuse an-
other of any crime or offense, or by such communication mali-
ciously threatens an injury to the person, property or reputation of
another.” Id. § 836.05.
Here, the district court did not err in granting the Defend-
ants’ motions for summary judgment because there was probable
cause for each of Wooden’s arrests, which was fatal to each of his
claims. First, the fact that criminal charges were dropped or not
brought against Wooden for the arrests has no bearing on the prob-
able cause analysis. Marx, 905 F.3d at 1507. Next, although the ad-
ministration of Wooden’s mother’s estate was a civil matter gener-
ally, Wooden could not engage in alleged criminal activity of tres-
passing, burglary, and threats related to his mother’s estate.
Further, the district court also properly rejected Wooden’s
argument that there was not probable cause to arrest him because
he was authorized by the probate court to enter the property as the
personal representative of his mother’s estate. Even assuming the
access order was still valid at the relevant times that Wooden was
arrested, Wooden could only enter the property “in an orderly fash-
ion” to review the books and records. But, reviewing each of the
four incidents, there was probable cause for each arrest.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting sum-
mary judgment as to all claims of false imprisonment, false arrest,
and malicious prosecution, and we affirm as to this issue.
II.
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22-10649 Opinion of the Court 21
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss. Chua v. Ekonomou, 1 F.4th 948, 952 (11th Cir. 2021). We
will accept the allegations in the complaint as true and construe
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.Florida’s sovereign immunity statute grants immunity to
police officers unless they “acted in bad faith or with malicious
purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful disregard
of human rights, safety, or property.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a).
“An officer acts maliciously when he acts with ‘the subjective in-
tent to do wrong.’” Baxter v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1271 (11th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Peterson v. Pollack, 290 So. 3d 102, 109 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2020)). Additionally, we have held that a plaintiff’s
intentional infliction of emotional distress and malicious prose-
cution claims were barred by Florida’s sovereign immunity stat-
ute. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1330
(11th Cir. 2015).
Under 11th Circuit Rule 3-1, “a party who fails to object to
a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation ‘waives the
right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on
unobjected-to-factual and legal conclusions’” so long as “the
party who failed to object ‘was informed of the time period for
objecting and the consequences for failing to do so.’” Harrigan v.
Metro Dade Police Dep’t Station #4, 977 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (11th
Cir. 2020) (quoting 11th Cir. R. 3-1). “[H]owever, the court may
review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of
justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. We will find plain error only when (1)
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22 Opinion of the Court 22-10649
an error has occurred, (2) the error was plain, (3) the error af-
fected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) the error seri-
ously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. Dupree v.
Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2013). An error is plain if
the explicit language of a statute or rule or precedent from the
Supreme Court or us directly resolves the issue. United States v.
Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 2020).
Finally, we have “long held that an appellant abandons a
claim when he either makes only passing references to it or raises
it in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments
and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,
681 (11th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860,
873 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (holding in the criminal context that is-
sues not raised in an initial brief are deemed forfeited and will not
be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances), cert. denied,
143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).
Here, as an initial matter, Wooden did not argue on appeal
that the district court erred in dismissing his defamation claim
against Jenkins. As a result, he forfeited any challenge to the dismis-
sal of this claim. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 681. Further, Wooden did
not file any objections to the R&R recommending partial dismissal,
so he is, at most, entitled only to plain error review. And Wooden
has not shown that the district court plainly erred in granting the
partial motions to dismiss because the officers were shielded by
sovereign immunity. Accordingly, we also affirm as to this issue.
****
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22-10649 Opinion of the Court 23
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s or-
ders.
AFFIRMED.