USCA11 Case: 22-13441 Document: 32-1 Date Filed: 08/11/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13441
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
BLUE MOUNTAIN HOLDINGS LTD.,
a British Columbia, Canada corporation,
LIGHTHOUSE ENTERPRISES, INC.,
a Barbados Company,
Plaintiffs-Counter Defendants-Appellants,
versus
BLISS NUTRACETICALS, LLC,
a Georgia Limited Liability Company,
DOES 1 THROUGH 10,
SHABANA PATEL,
a Georgia Citizen,
FARUQ PATEL,
a Georgia Citizen,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13441
PHILLIP JONES,
a Georgia Citizen ,
Defendants-Appellees,
VITAZEN BOTANICALS, LLC,
a Florida Limited Liability Company, et al.,
Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs-Counter Claimants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-01837-TWT
____________________
Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
We agree with the district court that Lighthouse abandoned
its trademark. That conclusion rested on two sub-conclusions:
first, that Lighthouse’s transfer of its trademark to Blue Mountain
was a license; but second, that this license became a “naked license”
when Lighthouse failed to police Blue Mountain’s use of the trade-
mark. Because we find no error in either, we affirm.
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22-13441 Opinion of the Court 3
First, the transfer was a license—not an outright sale or an
assignment. That it was labeled a sale is not dispositive. “Whether
a transfer of a particular right or interest under a patent is an assign-
ment or a license does not depend upon the name by which it calls
itself, but upon the legal effect of its provisions.” Waterman v. Mac-
kenzie,
138 U.S. 252, 256 (1891). What distinguishes a license from
an assignment is the control retained by the licensor: While “[a]n
assignment is the transfer of the entire interest in a mark” and ren-
ders the assignee “the new owner,” “a license involves the transfer
of something less than the entire interest, and does not affect the
licensor’s title.” 4 Callmann on Unfair Comp., Tr. & Mono. § 20:53
(4th ed.). Here, Lighthouse did not transfer its “entire interest” to
Blue Mountain. As the district court explained:
Blue Mountain could not receive legal title to the
mark with the USPTO or any other government reg-
istry; Blue Mountain could not register the mark in
new jurisdictions in its own name—only Light-
house’s; Blue Mountain could not license or assign
the mark except as specified in the Agreement or with
Lighthouse’s prior written consent; Blue Mountain
could manufacture, distribute, and sell its products
only through approved entities; Lighthouse contin-
ued to have a sufficient “ownership interest” to pro-
tect the mark; and Lighthouse could order Blue
Mountain to modify or cease its use of the mark if
Lighthouse suspected harm to the mark’s goodwill or
noncompliance with the Agreement.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13441
Doc. 359 at 5–6. This transfer didn’t make Blue Mountain the
“new owner” of Lighthouse’s trademark. Blue Mountain had only
a license.
Second, this license became a “naked” license, and thereby
worked an abandonment. “The abandonment of a mark by ‘naked
licensing’ occurs when the owner of a mark fails to supervise its
licensee and allows the licensee to depart from the licensor’s qual-
ity standards.” Groucho’s Franchise Sys., LLC v. Grouchy’s Deli, Inc.,
683 F. App’x 826, 830 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citing Kentucky
Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp.,
549 F.2d 368, 387
(5th Cir. 1977)). We don’t judge the “nakedness” of a license by
looking at whether the licensor allows product quality to suffer.
See Kentucky Fried Chicken,
549 F.2d at 387. Rather, we look merely
at whether the licensor is keeping an eye on product quality—
whether, in other words, it “has abandoned quality control” or not.
Id. (“We must determine whether Kentucky Fried has abandoned
quality control; the consuming public must be the judge of
whether the quality control efforts have been ineffectual.”). If it
has, the license is “naked” and the trademark is abandoned.
The district court didn’t err by finding that Lighthouse aban-
doned quality control here—and that there’s no genuine dispute as
to that fact. Quite the opposite, “the record in this case shows that
Lighthouse . . . engaged in no meaningful supervision or inspection
of products bearing the VIVAZEN mark.” Doc. 345 at 16. Indeed,
the record is replete with “sworn deposition testimonies and ad-
missions of material facts” from top Lighthouse and Blue Mountain
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22-13441 Opinion of the Court 5
officials “asserting unequivocally that Lighthouse has never super-
vised Blue Mountain’s production, marketing, or sale of VIVAZEN
products.” Doc. 359 at 7 (emphasis added); see Doc 345 at 16 (“Dur-
ing their depositions, Blue Mountain’s and Lighthouse’s corporate
representatives revealed that Lighthouse does not exercise any
quality control over Blue Mountain’s operations and does not in-
spect any of Blue Mountain’s products.”).1 That is more than
enough to find that Lighthouse abandoned quality control, and
thus abandoned its trademark altogether.
The district court’s orders are AFFIRMED.
1 While Lighthouse tried to “backtrack on their numerous admissions” and
“drum up a fact issue by citing new deposition excerpts” on the motion for
reconsideration, that effort came too late. Doc. 359 at 8. “[P]arties are not
permitted to introduce new evidence on a motion for reconsideration, unless
the evidence was previously unavailable (which is not the case here).”
Id. And
“[n]either the district court nor this court has an obligation to parse a summary
judgment record to search out facts or evidence not brought to the court’s
attention.” Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc.,
463 F.3d 1201, 1208 n.11
(11th Cir. 2006).
