USCA11 Case: 22-10385 Document: 40-1 Date Filed: 08/18/2023 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10385
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
CHRISTINA NECOLE VAZQUEZ-KLECHA,
as adult child of GEORGE HALE BICKERSTAFF, III, deceased,
Plaintiff-Counter
Defendant-Appellant,
versus
ELIZABETH ANN BICKERSTAFF,
Citizen of Georgia,
MICHAEL NEELY,
Citizen of Georgia,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10385
Defendants-Counter
Claimants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:20-cv-00227-CDL
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This is a negligence case arising out of the death of George
Hale “Bick” Bickerstaff, III, in July 2019. On July 12, Bick had a
heated argument by phone with his sister, Elizabeth Bickerstaff
(“Beth”), about how her cows had damaged a fence on property
they jointly owned and on which Bick resided. Soon after, Beth
and her long-term boyfriend, Michael Neely, who lived together
on adjacent property, drove to Bick’s residence, where Bick was
waiting outside with a rifle nearby. Upon their arrival, in circum-
stances vigorously disputed by the parties, Bick shot at Beth’s truck
with the rifle, and Neely shot Bick at close range with a 9mm hand-
gun, ultimately killing him.
The district court granted summary judgment to Beth on
claims that she negligently caused Bick’s death or acted in concert
with Neely to do so. But it denied summary judgment to Neely
with respect to his individual negligence. That negligence claim
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22-10385 Opinion of the Court 3
remains pending for trial and stayed until this appeal is resolved.
The court then certified its decision as a partial final judgment un-
der Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After careful
review, though, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction
because the district court abused its discretion by certifying the par-
tial judgment under Rule 54(b).
I.
In September 2020, Christina Necole Vazquez-Klecha
(“Klecha”), as Bick’s surviving child, filed an action for wrongful
death against Beth and Neely. One year later, after discovery
closed, Beth and Neely each filed motions for summary judgment
on all claims against them. Klecha moved for partial summary
judgment.
The district court entered an order granting Beth’s motion
for summary judgment and denying the other motions. In the
court’s view, no reasonable jury could “conclude that Elizabeth’s
individual conduct amounted to negligence and that her alleged
negligence was a proximate cause of Bick’s death,” or that she en-
gaged in “concerted” conduct with Neely to negligently bring
about his death. But the court denied summary judgment on the
claim against Neely for his individual negligence.
Klecha then requested entry of partial final judgment under
Rule 54(b). She contended that the order was final in that it re-
solved the claims against Beth and that there was no just reason for
delay. In her view, permitting immediate review would prevent a
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10385
“duplicative retrial of the same matter” if we reversed the grant of
summary judgment as to Beth, thus conserving judicial resources.
Without any clear opposition from the defendants, the dis-
trict court granted Klecha’s motion to certify the partial judgment
as final under Rule 54(b). Citing reasons of judicial economy, the
district court found “no just reason for delay” of any appeal. The
court stated that pretrial review of the summary-judgment order
would “avoid the possibility of two trials” if we concluded on ap-
peal that the court erred in granting summary judgment. And
avoiding unnecessary trials was “particularly important in the on-
going covid era,” in the court’s view. Plus, the court found that it
was “unlikely that the Court of Appeals would have to decide the
same issues again even if one or both Defendants appealed after a
future trial.” The court stayed the action—that is, the remaining
negligence claim against Neely—pending any appeal of its ruling.
Klecha now appeals.
II.
Before reaching the merits, “[w]e must first satisfy ourselves
that we have jurisdiction over this appeal.” Doe #1 v. Red Roof Inns,
Inc.,
21 F.4th 714, 722 (11th Cir. 2021). Although no party on appeal
questions the propriety of the district court’s entry of final judg-
ment under Rule 54(b), “we do so sua sponte because such certifica-
tions implicate the scope of our appellate jurisdiction.” Lloyd No-
land Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp.,
483 F.3d 773, 777 (11th
Cir. 2007). We have asked for and received responses from the par-
ties on this issue, which has been carried with the case.
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22-10385 Opinion of the Court 5
Ordinarily, we lack jurisdiction over a judgment that does
not resolve all claims against all parties in a lawsuit unless the dis-
trict court has certified its partial judgment as “final” under Rule
54(b). Id.; see
28 U.S.C. § 1291; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Because the
judgment here did not resolve the claim against Neely, Klecha
could not have appealed without Rule 54(b) certification. See Lloyd
Noland,
483 F.3d at 777. So “we must consider whether the district
court’s determinations under Rule 54(b) fit within the scope of the
rule.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
A district court must follow a two-step analysis in certifying
a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b).
Id. First, the court must
enter a “final” judgment that “disposes entirely of a separable claim
or dismisses a party entirely.”
Id. at 777, 779. And second, the court
must determine that there is “no just reason for delay.”
Id. at 777.
Only the second requirement is at issue here. We review the dis-
trict court’s determination that no just reason for delay existed for
an abuse of discretion. Red Roof, 21 F.4th at 722.
“Not all final judgments on individual claims should be im-
mediately appealable, even if they are in some sense separable from
the remaining unresolved claims.” Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
446 U.S. 1,
8 (1980). “When determining whether there is no just reason for
delay, the district court should consider judicial administrative in-
terests—including the historic federal policy against piecemeal ap-
peals—and the equities involved.” Red Roof, 21 F.4th at 722.
Because Rule 54 (b) certifications depart from the “historic
federal policy against piecemeal appeals,” “we have explained that
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10385
certifications must be reserved for the unusual case in which the
costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of
overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing
needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some
claims or parties.” Peden v. Stephens,
50 F.4th 972, 978 (11th Cir.
2022) (quotation marks omitted). “These unusual circumstances
will be encountered only rarely.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the district court certified the partial judgment
under Rule 54(b) to promote judicial economy—that is, to “avoid
the possibility of two trials” if we concluded on appeal that the
court erred in granting summary judgment. While the court’s con-
cerns are understandable, we rejected nearly identical reasoning in
Ebrahimi as a basis for granting Rule 54(b) certification. See
Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd. of Educ.,
114 F.3d 162, 168 (11th Cir.
1997). We explained that, in certifying its judgment under Rule
54(b), the court in that case “may have reasoned that early review
by the appellate court would eliminate the necessity for a second
trial in the event we reversed its rulings on the dismissed claims.”
Id. But “[a]bsent special circumstances,” we stated, “the district
court’s preference for pretrial appellate review of its dismissal deci-
sions constitutes an improper basis for issuance of a partial final
judgment.”
Id.
Accordingly, the parties’ and the district court’s “preference
for pretrial appellate review” of the summary judgment order,
standing alone, is not enough to justify granting Rule 54(b) certifi-
cation. The critical question is whether there is anything special or
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22-10385 Opinion of the Court 7
unique about this case that would warrant immediate review.
Klecha maintains that this case is similar to Red Roof, where we
found such special circumstances, but we disagree.
In Red Roof, four plaintiffs, alleging that they were the vic-
tims of sex trafficking, filed nearly identical complaints against nu-
merous individual and businesses involved in the hotel industry.
21 F.4th at 719–20. The district court granted three hotel franchi-
sors’ motions to dismiss “in nearly identical orders” in each of the
four cases, fully resolving all claims against the three defendants.
Id. at 720. The court then certified its order under Rule 54(b) for
reasons of judicial economy, including streamlining the litigation
and avoiding duplicative discovery and trials. Id. at 721.
On appeal, we concluded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding no just reason for delay, citing the
“unique circumstances of these cases.” Id. at 722. We found that
“[a]ddressing this consolidated appeal now significantly enhances
the efficiency of the litigation,” explaining that “[t]he relatedness of
these four cases, their early stage in litigation, the number of de-
fendants involved, and the substantial discovery to be had are the
kind of ‘special circumstances’ that warrant appellate review.” Id.
at 723; see also Peden, 50 F.4th at 978 (stating that Red Roof “illus-
trates the proper use of a Rule 54(b) certification”).
None of the special circumstances identified in Red Roof are
present here. This is a single case with two defendants based on a
short series of events, not multiple related cases against numerous
individuals and corporate defendants arising out of a large-scale
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10385
venture. And this appeal does not come “early in litigation” with
“substantial discovery [still] to be had.” Red Roof, 21 F.4th at 723.
Rather, discovery is closed, the court has ruled on summary judg-
ment, and the remaining claims are ready for trial. Accordingly,
Red Roof does not support Klecha’s claim that an immediate appeal
would “significantly enhance[] the efficiency of the litigation.” Id.
Klecha also cites the district court’s finding that we likely
would not have to “decide the same issues again” in the event of a
future appeal. Even so, “we undoubtedly would be required to re-
learn the same set of facts if and when the case returned to us on
appeal.” Ebrahimi,
114 F.3d at 167. The claims against Beth are
based on the same set of facts as the pending claims against Neely.
And “[i]n instances such as this, when the factual underpinnings of
the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims are intertwined, courts
should be hesitant to employ Rule 54(b).”
Id. As we observed in
Ebrahimi, “judicial administration and efficiency will not normally
be furthered by having piecemeal appeals that require two (or
more) three-judge panels to familiarize themselves with a given
case.
Id. (cleaned up).
Finally, “we consider whether equitable considerations jus-
tify the district court’s decision to grant Rule 54(b) certification.”
Id. at 168. In certifying its decision, the court did not suggest that
this case “was an exceptional one or that there would be any unu-
sual hardship in requiring either [Klecha] or any of the parties she
sued to await the disposition of the entire case before obtaining ap-
pellate review.”
Id. (emphasis added); see id.at 166 (stating that
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22-10385 Opinion of the Court 9
Rule 54(b) certification is limited to instances where “immediate
appeal would alleviate some danger of hardship or in-justice asso-
ciated with delay”).
Nor does our review of the record disclose any equitable
considerations that might support “depart[ing] from the federally
preferred practice of postponing appeal until after a final judgment
has been entered.”
Id. at 168. Beth contends that a pretrial appeal
could avoid a duplicative and expensive jury trial that would force
the parties to “relive this tragic event twice.” Yet it is not unusual
for some claims to be resolved at summary judgment, while other
claims, arising from the same facts, proceed to trial. Inherent in
that scenario is the possibility of two trials if the district court erred
in its pretrial ruling. Or if the court did not err, there could be one
trial and one appeal, thereby conserving judicial resources. Re-
gardless, the “federally preferred practice” is to “postpon[e] appeal
until after a final judgment has been entered,”
id., notwithstanding
that the court or the parties may wish to avoid the possibility of a
“second trial in the event we reverse[],”
id. at 167.
In short, to the extent equitable considerations support the
propriety of Rule 54(b) certification to some degree, they are not
“sufficient to overcome the associated injury to the interest of judi-
cial administration.”
Id. at 168. Based on our review of the record,
“there is no reason to suppose that an immediate appeal will suffi-
ciently increase efficiency . . . that the Court should tolerate the
costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of
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overcrowding the appellate docket.” Peden, 50 F.4th at 979 (quota-
tion marks omitted).
For these reasons, the record lacks sufficient support for the
district court’s determination of “no just reason for delay” to appeal
the partial judgment in favor of Beth. Because granting Rule 54(b)
certification was improper, we lack jurisdiction over the otherwise
non-final summary-judgment order. See Lloyd Noland,
483 F.3d at
777. Accordingly, we must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdic-
tion without reaching the merits.
DISMISSED.
