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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-14396
____________________
ROLAND EDGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
KRISTA MCCABE,
THE CITY OF HUNTSVILLE, ALABAMA,
CAMERON PERILLAT,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-01977-LCB
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14396
____________________
Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and COVINGTON,* Dis-
trict Judge.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
Roland Edger brought both a § 1983 false arrest claim and a
state law false arrest claim against two Huntsville, Alabama police
officers and the City itself. After the district court concluded that
the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because they had
arguable probable cause to arrest Mr. Edger, he appealed. After
careful review of the record and with the benefit of oral argument,
we REVERSE the district court’s grant of qualified immunity.
I.
A.
The facts of this case are not in dispute, as the entirety of the
encounter between Mr. Edger and the police was captured on the
police officers’ body-worn and dash cameras. Both Mr. Edger and
the defendants agree that the video and audio evidence from these
cameras is authentic. Before turning to that evidence, we must first
detail the events leading up to the start of the recordings.
Mr. Edger is a mechanic in Huntsville, Alabama, where he
manages the Auto Collision Doc store. One of Mr. Edger’s
* Honorable Virginia M. Hernandez Covington, United States District Judge
for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.
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21-14396 Opinion of the Court 3
longtime clients is Kajal Ghosh, who owns a red Toyota Camry.1
The Camry is primarily driven by Mr. Ghosh’s wife, who works as
a teacher at Progressive Union Missionary Baptist Church. One or
two days before June 10, 2019, Mr. Ghosh called Mr. Edger and
reported that the Camry had broken down while his wife was
working at the Church. He asked Mr. Edger to fix the car and told
him the keys would be waiting for him at the Church’s front office.
On June 10, around 2 p.m., Mr. Edger went to the Church
to pick up the keys and to inspect the Camry. He determined
something was wrong with either the car’s steering or its tires, and
he concluded he would need to come back later with tools to fix
the car. That evening, he returned to the Church with his stepson,
Justin Nuby, in tow, intending to either fix the Camry on-site or to
take it back to the shop for further repairs. Mr. Edger and Mr.
Nuby drove a black hatchback to the Church.
After Mr. Edger and his stepson entered the Church’s lot,
the Church’s security guard observed them and grew concerned.
From here on, the facts of this case were captured by audio and
visual recording devices. At about 8:05 p.m., the security guard
called 911 and told dispatch: “I have two Hispanic males, messing
with an employee’s car that was left on the lot.” He also noted that
1 In the record, the owner of the car on which Mr. Edger was working is re-
ferred to by various combinations of the names “Ghosh,” “Kajal,” “Ghosh Pa-
tel,” and “Mr. Patel.” For consistency, we will refer to this individual as Kajal
Ghosh, or Mr. Ghosh, as that is the name by which he identified himself in his
deposition.
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-14396
he observed them remove a tire from the car. During the 911 call,
the guard identified himself as a security guard for the Church,
gave his phone number, noted his employer, and gave a description
of Mr. Edger and Mr. Nuby. About 30 minutes later, at 8:36 p.m.,
Officer Krista McCabe arrived at the Church in her patrol car.
As Officer McCabe’s body camera shows, she pulled into the
Church parking lot and parked in front of where Mr. Edger and Mr.
Nuby were working. McCabe Body Camera at 0:00:30. 2 As she
stepped out of the squad car, Mr. Edger was laying on the ground
next to the car, with the Camry’s tire removed. Id. at 0:00:36. Mr.
Nuby greeted Officer McCabe as she exited her vehicle and ap-
proached the Camry. Id. at 0:00:36–0:00:46. Mr. Edger continued
to work, and the following conversation began:
Officer McCabe: What are y’all doing?
Mr. Edger: Getting the car fixed.
Officer McCabe: Is this your car?
Mr. Edger: Yeah, well, it is one of my customer’s.
Officer McCabe: One of your customer’s?
Mr. Edger: Ghosh Patel, yep. I was over here earlier.
2 Officer McCabe’s body camera footage is available online. See Video – In-
vestigating Officer Body Camera, Doc. 28-9
(https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/media-sources).
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21-14396 Opinion of the Court 5
Id. at 0:00:47. At this point Officer McCabe gestured towards the
black hatchback.
Officer McCabe: Whose car is that?
Mr. Edger: That’s mine.
Officer McCabe: The black one?
Mr. Edger: Yeah.
Id. at 0:01:03. Officer McCabe then watched in silence as Mr. Edger
attempted to jack the Camry up. Eventually the car slipped from
the jack and slammed into the ground. Id. at 0:01:08–0:01:48. Im-
mediately after the Camry slipped, Officer Perillat arrived at the
scene in a squad car. He exited his car and approached on foot,
positioning himself behind Mr. Edger, out of Mr. Edger’s line of
vision. From here, the interaction rapidly escalated:
Officer McCabe: Alright. Take a break for me real
fast and do y’all have driver’s license or IDs on you?
Mr. Edger: I ain’t going to submit to no ID. Listen,
you call the lady right now. Listen I don’t have time
for this. I don’t mean to be rude, or ugly, but . . .
Officer McCabe: Okay. No, you need to—
Mr. Edger: I don’t mean to be—
Officer McCabe: —give me your ID or driver’s li-
cense.
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-14396
Mr. Edger: No. I don’t. Listen, I don’t want you to
run me in for nothing.
Officer McCabe: Are you refusing me—are you re-
fusing to give me your ID or driver’s license?
Mr. Edger: I’m telling you that if you will call this
lady that owns this car—
In the middle of Mr. Edger’s sentence, as he was attempting
to explain the situation to Officer McCabe, Officer Perillat seized
Mr. Edger from behind. He led Mr. Edger to the side of the Camry
and started handcuffing him. As Mr. Edger protested, Officer Peril-
lat told Mr. Edger: “We don’t have time for this,” and, “You don’t
understand the law.” During this time, the video shows that Mr.
Edger offered his driver’s license at least three times before the of-
ficers could finish handcuffing him. Eventually, the officers man-
aged to handcuff and search Mr. Edger, and then detain him in a
squad car. Throughout this process, the officers never asked Mr.
Edger or his stepson for their names or addresses. Id. at 0:00:44–
0:02:16.
B.
Mr. Edger was charged with obstructing governmental op-
erations in violation of Alabama Code § 13A-10-2(a)(1). The City
of Huntsville dropped all charges relating to this incident.
After the dismissal of the charges, Mr. Edger filed a § 1983
civil rights lawsuit, alleging a false arrest in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights against unlawful searches and seizures, as well
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21-14396 Opinion of the Court 7
as a state law false arrest claim. On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the district court found that the defendants were enti-
tled to federal and state law immunities. It reasoned that even
though Mr. Edger committed no acts giving rise to actual probable
cause, a reasonable but mistaken officer could nonetheless have be-
lieved his refusal to produce physical identification was a crime,
and the officers thus had arguable probable cause to make the arrest.
This appeal followed.
II.
We review summary judgment rulings de novo, applying
the same legal tests as the district court. Smith v. Owens,
848 F.3d
975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017).
III.
We focus on the federal claims first. In general, when gov-
ernment officials are performing discretionary duties, as all parties
concede they were in this case, they are entitled to qualified im-
munity. Lee v. Ferraro,
284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). A plain-
tiff may rebut this entitlement by showing that the government of-
ficials (1) committed a constitutional violation; and (2) that this vi-
olation was “clearly established” in law at the time of the alleged
misconduct. See Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). In
theory, this judge-made doctrine is designed to protect govern-
ment officials from the consequences of their reasonable mistakes
made in the exercise of their official duties. See
id. at 231. The test
is conjunctive, and if a plaintiff fails either prong of the qualified
immunity analysis, his claim is barred.
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8 Opinion of the Court 21-14396
There are three recognized ways to show that a law is
“clearly established.” First, a plaintiff may show that a “materially
similar case has already been decided,” whose facts are similar
enough to give the police notice. See Keating v. City of Miami,
598
F.3d 753, 766 (11th Cir. 2010). Second, he may show that a
“broader, clearly established principle should control the novel
facts” of his case.
Id. This “broader” principle may be derived from
“general statements of the law contained within the Constitution,
statute, or caselaw.” Mercado v. City of Orlando,
407 F.3d 1152, 1159
(11th Cir. 2005) (alteration adopted) (emphasis added) (quoting
Willingham v. Loughnan,
321 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2003)). Fi-
nally, a plaintiff may show that the officer’s conduct “so obviously
violates [the] constitution that prior case law is unnecessary.” Keat-
ing,
598 F.3d at 766 (quoting Mercado,
407 F.3d at 1159). While we
must be mindful of the “specific context of the case,” we “do[] not
require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established.”
Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna,
142 S. Ct. 4, 7–8 (2021) (per curiam).
Mr. Edger alleges that he was falsely arrested in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. For Fourth Amendment purposes, arrests are seizures
and are unreasonable unless supported by probable cause. See Da-
vis v. Williams,
451 F.3d 759, 764 n.8 (11th Cir. 2006); Morris v. Town
of Lexington,
748 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2014). Probable cause
exists where “facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge . . . would cause a prudent person to believe” that a
crime was being committed. Morris,
748 F.3d at 1324.
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21-14396 Opinion of the Court 9
In the false arrest context, we have often said that an officer
is entitled to qualified immunity if he had even “arguable probable
cause,” meaning that “reasonable officers in the same circum-
stances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants
could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff.”
See, e.g., Brown v. City of Huntsville,
608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010)
(discussing the qualified immunity standard). We have recently
clarified, that having “arguable probable cause” is just another way
of saying that the law is not “clearly established.” See Garcia v. Ca-
sey,
75 F.4th 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he arguable probable
cause inquiry in a false arrest case is no different from the clearly
established law inquiry in any other qualified immunity case.”).
Thus, if we conclude that the officers had arguable probable cause
then we conclude that their violation of the law was not clearly
established and vice-versa.
Applying these principles to this case, Mr. Edger was
charged with obstructing governmental operations in violation of
Alabama Code § 13A-10-2(a)(1). A person violates this section if,
“by means of intimidation, physical force or interference or by any
other independently unlawful act, he” obstructs a governmental func-
tion. Id. (emphasis added). Our inquiry therefore asks whether the
officers had probable cause to believe Mr. Edger obstructed gov-
ernmental operations in violation of this statute. If not, our inquiry
is whether no reasonable officer would believe that Mr. Edger ob-
structed governmental operations—or in other words, whether it
was clearly established that there was no probable cause to arrest
Mr. Edger for this crime.
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The defendants argue that they had probable cause to arrest
Mr. Edger for violating § 13A-10-2(a)(1) on two theories. First, they
argue that Mr. Edger used “physical force or interference” to ob-
struct the officer’s investigation. Second, in the alternative, they
argue that Mr. Edger committed an “independently unlawful act”
by refusing to identify himself as Officer McCabe ordered. They
propose two different statutes, the Alabama Stop-and-Identify stat-
ute § 15-5-30, and the Alabama driver’s license statute § 32-6-9, for
why Mr. Edger was required to produce his identification. The of-
ficers are entitled to qualified immunity if they had arguable prob-
able cause to arrest Mr. Edger based on any of these theories. We
address whether the officers had arguable probable cause for each
of these theories in turn.
A.
Turning first to the theory that Mr. Edger obstructed the of-
ficers by using “intimidation” of “physical force.” First, the defend-
ants argue that Mr. Edger’s noncompliance and “aggressive de-
meanor” obstructed Officer McCabe’s investigation and provided
her probable cause to arrest Mr. Edger. But “words alone fail to
provide culpability under” Alabama’s obstruction statute.
D.A.D.O. v. State,
57 So. 3d 798, 806 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009). So, Mr.
Edger’s statements and noncompliance without more do not begin
to provide “facts or circumstances” to support probable cause.
Second, the defendants suggest that Mr. Edger physically
threatened Officer McCabe in the moments following the Camry
slipping off the jack and hitting the ground because he “jumped up”
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21-14396 Opinion of the Court 11
and “waved his hands,” among other things. But the video evi-
dence in this case speaks for itself. See Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach,
561 F.3d 1288, 1290 n.3 (11th Cir. 2009) (noting we review video
evidence de novo); Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380–81 (2007) (ex-
plaining that where one party’s account is contradicted by the
video evidence “[t]he Court of Appeals should not have relied on
such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light de-
picted by the videotape”). The final interaction between Mr. Edger
and Officers McCabe and Perillat is depicted from four separate an-
gles on four separate cameras—two body-worn police cameras and
two dash cameras. In each video, the Camry slips off the jack, slam-
ming into the ground in front of Mr. Edger. In each, he stands up,
slapping his leg, and turns to answer Officer McCabe’s questions.
Though he is clearly frustrated and gesturing as he speaks, his
hands are empty. He stands in one spot without walking towards
Officer McCabe. Looking to all the facts within the officer’s
knowledge at the time of the incident, no reasonable officer could
have observed Mr. Edger and believed he was using “intimidation”
or “physical force” to “intentionally obstruct[]” Officer McCabe’s
investigation. Accordingly, no reasonable police officer could be-
lieve that Mr. Edger violated this portion of the obstruction statute,
and therefore there was not even arguable probable cause—much
less actual probable cause—to support Mr. Edger’s arrest. This the-
ory does not support the grant of qualified immunity to the offic-
ers.
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B.
Turning now to the defendant’s theory that probable cause
existed to support Mr. Edger’s arrest because he violated Alabama’s
Stop-and-Identify statute, Alabama Code § 15-5-30. The Stop-and-
Identify statute allows an Alabama police officer who “reasonably
suspects” a crime is being, has been, or is about to be committed to
stop a person in public and “demand of him his name, address and
an explanation of his actions.” Id.
Mr. Edger argues that he cannot possibly have violated § 15-
5-30, because it clearly delineates three things the police may ask
him for: his name, his address, and an explanation of his actions.
He argues nothing in the statute requires him to produce physical
identification, and that Officer McCabe’s question, “Do y’all have
driver’s license or IDs on you?” and repeated references to “IDs”
were clearly demands for him to produce physical identification of
some kind. He notes that physical identification is not one of the
three enumerated things that the police may ask for under Ala-
bama law, and that he was never asked for his name or address.
We agree with the district court’s assessment that Mr. Edger
did not actually violate § 15-5-30 and thus did not actually commit
an “independently unlawful act” justifying arrest under § 13A-10-
2(a)(1). Section 15-5-30 does not require anyone to produce an
“ID” or “driver’s license” as Officer McCabe demanded. Indeed, it
does not require anyone to produce anything. Instead, it grants
Alabama police the authority to request three specific pieces of in-
formation. Here, the video evidence is clear that neither Officer
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McCabe nor Officer Perillat asked for Mr. Edger’s name or address.
Additionally, Mr. Edger’s objection was clearly related to the un-
lawful demand that he produce physical identification. When
asked, “What are y’all doing?” he responded to Officer McCabe and
explained they were fixing the car and that it belonged to a cus-
tomer. When he stood up to answer more of her questions, the
video shows he continued explaining who the owner of the car was
and began explaining how they could verify the information before
he was abruptly arrested by Officer Perillat. Because the Alabama
statute, by its plain text, does not permit the police to demand phys-
ical identification, the officers lacked probable cause and thus vio-
lated Mr. Edger’s Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him. The
first prong of the qualified immunity analysis is therefore satisfied.
Where we part ways with the district court is on the issue of
arguable probable cause or the “clearly established law” prong of
the qualified immunity analysis. We hold that the plain text of the
Alabama statute is so clear that no reasonable officer could have
believed they could arrest Mr. Edger for failing to produce his “ID”
or “driver’s license” under § 15-5-30.
Three related premises lead us to this conclusion. First, the
broad background rule is that the police may ask members of the
public questions and make consensual requests of them, Florida v.
Bostick,
501 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1991) (collecting cases and examples),
“as long as the police do not convey a message that compliance . . .
is required.”
Id. at 435. But the person “need not answer any ques-
tion put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to questions at all
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and may go on his way.” Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 497–98
(1983).
Second, while the Fourth Amendment permits the police to
briefly detain a person to investigate criminal activity, any obliga-
tion to answer police questions arises from state—not federal Con-
stitutional—law. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev.,
542 U.S.
177, 187 (2004) (analyzing Nevada’s Stop-and-Identify statute and
noting “the source of the legal obligation [to answer] arises from
Nevada state law, not the Fourth Amendment”).
Finally, as noted, the Alabama statute is clear. It lists only
three things that the police may ask about. This is not an issue of
“magic words” that must be uttered. There is a difference between
asking for specific information: “What is your name? Where do
you live?” and demanding a physical license or
ID. The infor-
mation contained in a driver’s license goes beyond the information
required to be revealed under § 15-5-30. Compare
Ala. Code § 32-6-
6 (“Each driver license . . . shall contain a distinguishing number
assigned to the licensee and a color photograph of the licensee, the
name, birthdate, address, and a description of the licensee . . . .”),
and
Ala. Code § 22-19-72 (requiring that there be “a space on each
driver’s license . . . to indicate in appropriate language that the [li-
censee] desires to be an organ donor”), with
Ala. Code § 15-5-30 (“A
[police officer] may stop any person abroad in a public place whom
he reasonably suspects is committing . . . a [crime] and may de-
mand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.”).
Further, neither the parties nor our own research can identify any
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21-14396 Opinion of the Court 15
Alabama law that generally requires the public to carry physical
identification—much less an Alabama law requiring them to pro-
duce it upon demand of a police officer. There simply is no state
law foundation for Officer McCabe’s demand that Mr. Edger pro-
duce physical identification.
So to summarize, it has been clearly established for decades
prior to Mr. Edger’s arrest that the police are free to ask questions,
and the public is free to ignore them. It has been clearly established
prior to Mr. Edger’s arrest that any legal obligation to speak to the
police and answer their questions arises as a matter of state law.
And the state statute itself in this case is clear and requires no addi-
tional construction: police are empowered to demand from an in-
dividual three things: “name, address and an explanation of his ac-
tions.”
Ala. Code § 15-5-30. It was thus clearly established at the
time of Mr. Edger’s arrest that she could not demand he produce
physical identification. And because Officer McCabe’s demands for
an “ID” or a “driver’s license” went beyond what the statute and
state law required of Mr. Edger, she violated clearly established
law. Under this set of facts and these precedents, no reasonable
officer could have believed there was probable cause to arrest Mr.
Edger for obstructing governmental operations by violating § 15-5-
30. And this theory cannot support the grant of qualified immunity
to the officers.
C.
Finally, the defendants also argue that Mr. Edger violated
the Alabama driver’s license statute,
Ala. Code § 32-6-9(a), which
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requires those “driving” to “display the [license], upon demand of
a . . . peace officer.”
Id. The defendants argue that because Mr.
Edger admitted that the black hatchback was his, that he must have
driven it there and he was therefore “driving” and subject to the
requirement to display his license. They argue this constitutes an
“independently unlawful act” under § 13A-10-2(a)(1) and a crime in
and of itself justifying the arrest.
The defendants argue that “driving” is a broad term also en-
compassing those with “actual physical control” of the vehicle. Ap-
pellee Br. at 33 (citing
Ala. Code § 32-1-1.1(14) (defining “driver”)).
The test for “actual physical control” means the “exclusive physical
power, and present ability, to operate, move, park, or direct” the
vehicle under the totality of the circumstances. Davis v. State,
505
So. 2d 1303, 1305 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). Assuming without decid-
ing that this is the appropriate test for determining if someone is
“driving” under § 32-6-9, 3 under the totality of the circumstances,
Mr. Edger was not driving. When Officer McCabe arrived on
scene, she found Mr. Edger partially under the Camry attempting
to jack it up. The Camry itself had a wheel removed and was thus
disabled and incapable of being driven. The black hatchback was
approximately two parking spaces away from where Mr. Edger
was, and he was engaged in working on the Camry. No reasonable
person could believe that Mr. Edger had the “present ability . . . to
3 We note that the defined term “driver” does not appear in § 32-6-9, and the
term “driving” is undefined in § 32-1-1.1. Compare
Ala. Code § 32-6-9, with
id.
§ 32-1-1.1(14).
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21-14396 Opinion of the Court 17
operate, move, park, or direct” the black hatchback from two park-
ing spaces away and underneath another car. See Davis,
505 So. 2d
at 1305. The only case analyzing § 32-6-9 cited by the defendants is
from this court, Cantu v. City of Dothan,
974 F.3d 1217, 1230 (11th
Cir. 2020), where we concluded the police may have had probable
cause to arrest someone for failure to display their license. But that
case’s facts are materially different because, there, the arrest at-
tempt occurred after the individual walked towards their vehicle
and attempted to get in before being stopped by the officer. Id. at
1223.
In sum, there was not actual probable cause to believe that
Mr. Edger was driving a car without displaying his license at the
time Officer McCabe arrived. Nor could any reasonable officer be-
lieve so based on the facts in this case, and therefore there was no
arguable probable cause either. Thus, this final theory cannot sup-
port the grant of qualified immunity to the officers.
* * *
In summary, Officers McCabe and Perillat violated Mr.
Edger’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights when they
arrested him with neither actual, nor arguable, probable cause. Ac-
cordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of qualified im-
munity to the officers and remand for further proceedings.
IV.
The district court dismissed Mr. Edger’s state law claims
against Officer McCabe, Officer Perillat, and the City because it de-
termined that arguable probable cause was a defense to those
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18 Opinion of the Court 21-14396
claims as well. It did not conduct any independent analysis on
these claims and instead linked its decision directly to the finding
of arguable probable cause on the federal claims. Accordingly, be-
cause we hold that there was no arguable probable cause—i.e., the
lack of probable cause was clearly established—we VACATE the
district court’s dismissal of the state law claims and remand for fur-
ther proceedings.
REVERSED and VACATED.
