USCA11 Case: 22-12611 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 10/31/2023 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12611
____________________
TAMARA BAINES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA,
ROBIN SHAHAR,
in her Individual Capacity,
Defendants-Appellees,
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cv-00279-TWT
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12611
____________________
Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Tamara Baines appeals the summary judgment
order rejecting her claims against the City of Atlanta and Robin
Shahar. Although the district court granted the city and Shahar
summary judgment on most of Baines’s claims, it left one claim
pending against the city. Because the proceedings in the district
court are not final, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction and dis-
miss the appeal.
I.
In this action, Baines, a former city employee, raised several
employment-related claims. She brought a claim for sexual harass-
ment and gender discrimination under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
both the city and Shahar. She also brought other claims against the
city under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans
with Disabilities Act, and the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”). The district court granted summary judgment to the
city and Shahar on all of Baines’s claims except for an FMLA inter-
ference claim in which she alleged that the city required her to
work while on FMLA leave.
After the district court entered the summary judgment or-
der, Baines filed a motion seeking the entry of a partial final judg-
ment on the claims dismissed on summary judgment so that she
could immediately appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) (permitting a
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22-12611 Opinion of the Court 3
district court to “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more,
but fewer than all, claims . . . if the court expressly determines that
there is no just reason for delay”). Baines also requested that the
district court stay any further litigation of the FMLA interference
claim until her appeal of the summary judgment order was com-
pleted. The district court denied Baines’s request for a partial final
judgment and a stay, noting that the case had “already been pend-
ing for more than three years” and “[a]llowing a piece-meal appeal
could delay final resolution of the case in [the district court] by
years.” Doc. 326 at 1. 1
Baines and the city then prepared to try the FMLA interfer-
ence claim. The district court set a trial date and held a pretrial con-
ference. Less than a week before trial, Baines and the city filed a
notice informing the court that “the FMLA interference claim . . .
was resolved . . . subject to Atlanta City Council and Mayor ap-
proval.” Doc. 344 at 1. The city agreed to pay an undisclosed sum
of money to resolve the FMLA interference claim.
A few days later, the district court entered a short order stat-
ing that “[a]ll of [Baines’s] claims have been resolved.” Doc. 345 at
1. The court also directed the clerk to “enter a final judgment in
favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff as to all claims ex-
cept the FMLA interference claim that was settled.”
Id. The clerk
then entered a judgment. A few days later Baines filed a notice of
1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12611
appeal. It was not until a few weeks later that the city council re-
viewed and approved the settlement agreement.
While the appeal was pending, we issued jurisdictional ques-
tions asking the parties to address whether the proceedings in the
district court were final. Baines and the City then filed in the district
court a “Joint Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice” that pur-
ported to be made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
41(a)(1)(A)(ii). Doc. 353-1 at 1. In the filing, Baines and the city
“stipulate[d] that [Baines’s] FMLA interference claim arising out of
her allegation that she was required to perform work while on ap-
proved FMLA leave . . . is dismissed[] with prejudice.” Doc. 353-1
at 1. Baines and the city signed the stipulation; Shahar did not.
II.
We have a threshold obligation to ensure that we have ju-
risdiction to hear this appeal because “without jurisdiction we can-
not proceed at all in any cause.” Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc.,
965 F.3d
1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020) (alterations adopted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Because we are a court of limited jurisdiction, ad-
judicating an appeal without jurisdiction would offend fundamen-
tal principles of separation of powers.”
Id. (alteration adopted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
We have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts.”
28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A final decision is one by
which a district court disassociates itself from a case.” Gelboim v.
Bank of Am. Corp.,
574 U.S. 405, 408 (2015) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “A final decision is typically one that ends the
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22-12611 Opinion of the Court 5
litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but
execute its judgment.” Mayer v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc.,
672 F.3d
1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). An
order that disposes of fewer than all claims against all parties to an
action generally is not appealable unless the district court enters a
partial final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).
Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant,
689 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir.
2012).
To begin, the district court’s summary judgment order was
plainly not a final order. It did not dispose of all the claims because
Baines’s FMLA interference claim remained pending. And alt-
hough Baines sought entry of a partial final judgment under Rule
54(b) so that she could appeal the summary judgment order, the
district court denied her request.
Even though the district court’s summary judgment order
was not a final order, we still may have jurisdiction if the district
court issued “a series of court orders, considered together” that “ef-
fectively terminate[d] the litigation.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Gar-
den City,
235 F.3d 1325, 1327 (11th Cir. 2000). For this standard to
be satisfied, the district court had to have disposed of Baines’s
FMLA interference claim. We thus consider whether the district
court disposed of this claim when (1) it entered an order stating that
all claims had been resolved and directing the clerk to enter a judg-
ment or (2) Baines and the city filed the joint stipulation purporting
to dismiss the claim.
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12611
Our analysis of these issues turns on two provisions of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). Rule 41(a)(2) authorizes a district
court to enter a court order “dismiss[ing] an action . . . at the plain-
tiff’s request.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). And Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) per-
mits a plaintiff to “dismiss an action” by filing “a stipulation of dis-
missal signed by all parties who have appeared.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(a)(1)(A)(ii). After considering these provisions, we conclude that
neither the district court’s order nor the stipulation disposed of the
FMLA interference claim.
The district court’s order, which stated that all claims had
been resolved and directed the clerk to the enter a judgment in fa-
vor of the city and Shahar on the claims covered by the summary
judgment order, did not dispose of the FMLA interference claim.
Even if the district court implicitly intended for this order to dismiss
the FMLA interference claim, the district court lacked authority un-
der Rule 41(a)(2) to dismiss the claim.2 As we recently explained,
2 Although the district court’s order did not expressly mention Rule 41, we
construe its order as purporting to dismiss the claim under Rule 41(a)(2). See
Rosell v. VMSB, LLC,
67 F.4th 1141, 1143 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2023).
We briefly explain why we do not treat the district court’s order as dismissing
the FMLA interference claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It is true
that a settlement between the parties may render a claim moot. See Yunker v.
Allianceone Receivables Mgmt., Inc.,
701 F.3d 369, 372 (11th Cir. 2012). But when
the district court entered this order, Baines and the city had reached only a
tentative settlement agreement; it was not final because it still had to be re-
viewed and approved by the city council and the mayor. Because it remained
possible that the city might reject the settlement offer, the FMLA interference
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22-12611 Opinion of the Court 7
“Rule 41(a)(2) specifies when an ‘action’ can be dismissed at plain-
tiff’s request by court order.” Rosell v. VMSB, LLC,
67 F.4th 1141,
1143 (11th Cir. 2023) (emphasis added). When a plaintiff brings
multiple claims against a party, Rule 41(a)(2) does not authorize the
district court to dismiss just “one count rather than the entire ac-
tion.”
Id. at 1144. Because Baines brought multiple claims against
the city, the district court lacked authority under Rule 41(a)(2) to
dismiss only a single claim. We thus conclude that the district
court’s order did not dismiss the FMLA interference claim. See
id.
We now consider whether the joint stipulation of dismissal
filed by Baines and the city disposed of the FMLA interference
claim. On its face, the stipulation purported to dismiss this claim.
But our precedent compels us to conclude that the stipulation was
invalid and did not dispose of the claim. As we have explained, “a
voluntary dismissal purporting to dismiss a single claim” under
Rule 41(a)(1)(A) “is invalid, even if all other claims in the action
have already been resolved.” In re Esteva,
60 F.4th 664, 677–78 (11th
Cir. 2023).
The stipulation was invalid under Rule 41(a)(1)(A) for an-
other reason, too: it was not signed by all the parties. To be effec-
tive under Rule 41(a)(1)(A), a stipulation must be signed by all
claim was not moot when the district court’s order was entered. See Smith v.
Owens,
848 F.3d 975, 978 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that rejected settle-
ment offer did not moot claim); see also 13B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.2 (4th ed. April 2023 update) (rec-
ognizing that a “tentative settlement” does not moot a claim). We thus do not
construe the district court’s order as a dismissal based on mootness.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12611
parties that appeared at any point in the action. See City of Jackson-
ville v. Jacksonville Hosp. Holdings, L.P., No. 22-12419, F. 4th ,
2023 WL 5944193, at *3–4 (11th Cir. Sept. 13, 2023). 3 Because the
stipulation was not signed by Shahar, a party who had appeared in
the action, it was ineffective. Thus, the parties’ joint stipulation did
not dispose of the FMLA interference claim.
After careful consideration, we conclude that the FMLA in-
terference claim “remain[s] pending before the district court.”
Id.
at *1. As a result, “there has not been a final judgment below, and
we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal.”
Id. Ac-
cordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
We note that nothing in our decision forecloses Baines, on
remand, from seeking leave under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
15 to amend her complaint to drop the FMLA interference claim in
light of the parties’ settlement or the district court from dismissing
the FMLA interference claim under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 12 if appropriate. See Rosell, 67 F.4th at 1144.
DISMISSED.
3 Baines suggests that we construe the joint stipulation as a motion to amend
the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Because nothing in
the stipulation suggested that Baines was seeking leave to amend the com-
plaint, we decline to construe the joint stipulation as a motion to amend.
